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Application No. 374 of 1970, decided on 25th May 1971.

read with Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 151 & O. XXXIX, r. 2‑Eviction from residential quarter‑Temporary injunction‑Cannot be issued to stay eviction.

A workman filed an application against his dismissal ender Standing Order 18 of West Pakistan Industrial' and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and prayed for In junction against his eviction from residential‑quarter, provided by employer, pending final decision of application.

Held: The provisions of Standing Order No. 16, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordi nance, 1968 exclude the application of any other law to a workman to whom the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 apply. Reading these provisions in the light of section 3 of the Ordinance, no room for doubt is left that the provisions of Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the C. P. C. read with 'section 151, C. P. C. are not applicable and cannot be employed for the benefit of a workman. The reason is very obvious. A workman who is provided residential accommodation by his employer is mere a licensee in the residential accommodation. The moment his employment is terminated he has no right to stay in the residential accommoda tion because his licence is revoked. Under the ordinary law he can be thrown out immediately after the termination of his services by the employer but a protection has been provided to him under Standing Order No. 16 for a period of two months after the order of his dismissal or discharge etc.; as the case may be and thereafter also the employer is not allowed to take the law into his own hands and has to approach the Magistrate who may or may not order his ejectment. It has also beer; provided in the Standing Order No. 16 that if a workman is ultimately re‑instated then the employer shall be bound to provide him With similar accommodation from the date of such re‑instatement or pay him monthly allowance in lieu thereof at the rate tree times the wages of the last working day. This provision itself is a sufficient guarantee ‑against the loss of accommodation by him under the provisions of Standing Order No. 16, if his petition ultimately succeeds under Standing Order No. 18. With all the safeguards provided in the Standing Order No. 16 itself, the petitioner is net entitled to any further protection as prayed for by him. If any further protection was intended for the workman it would have been so provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance of 1968.

A perusal of provisions of Standing Order No. 16 also shows that the Magistrate has 'to act on the complaint of the employer and there is no provision in the Standing Orders Ordinance, which authorises the Labour Court to sit in judgment over the order of the Magistrate or to stop him from doing his duty assigned to him under Standing' Order' No. 16. In these circumstances it is not proper that a stay order is issued to the petitioner to the effect that proceedings are not taken against him under Standing Order No. 16. The questions of irreparable loss and balance of convenience are of no consequence in face of special provisions of Standing Order No. 16 of 1968.

Farooq Ahmad for Petitioner.

Sh. Gulzar Muhammad for Respondent.

(Member consulted). This is an application by Bakhsh Elahi petitioner for the issue of a temporary injunction during the pendency of a complaint filed by him under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 for his re instatement as he has been dismissed by the respondent with effect from 1‑9‑1970 on ground of misconduct. The petitioner is challenging the order of his dismissal by a separate petition.

The application under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, IP68 was filed on 16‑11‑70. The stay applica tion was filed by the, petitioner on the same date, which was fixed for order of the Court on 20‑11‑1970. On that date my learned predecessor issued a notice to the respondent to file a reply against the stay application and then went on to say that respondent is also directed not to eject the petitioner Bakhsh Elahi from the quarter occupied by him until the petitioner's complaint has been decided finally by the Labour Court. When the notice was served on the respondent, he filed objections against the issue of stay order and requested for its vacation on the ground that the main petition under Standing Order No. 18 of 1968 was not maintain able and the provisions of Order XXXIX, rule 2 read with section 151, C. P. C. were not applicable for the temporary in. junction in these proceedings and that the petitioner was governed by, the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 of 1968 which exclude the grant of temporary injunction. Balance of convenience was also pleaded by the respondent in his favour.

At the time of arguments it was contended on behalf of the respondent that in the presence of Standing Order No. 16 of 19.68 the question of stay could not arise. The petitioner counsel argued that as by order dated 20‑11‑1970 this Court directed that the petitioner is no, to, be ejected until the petitioner's complaint has been decided finally by this Court, which order is final and the same cannot be upset.

So far as the question of finality of the order dated 20‑11‑1970 is concerned we have to find out from the order itself whether the same could be said to be final or not. If that order is final then of course this Court has got no power to review that order. But if that order is not final then it has to be decided whether the stay granted in favour of the petitioner should continue or should be vacated. For the facility of reference the order dated 20‑11‑1970 passed on stay application is reproduced below.

"A notice of this application shall be sent to the respon dent for filing a reply in Lahore on 30‑12‑1970 at 10 a.m. he respondent is also directed not to eject the petitioner Bakhsh Elahi from the quarter occupied by him until the petitioner's complaint has been decided finally by this Labour Court."

A reading of the above order will show that the Court actually issued notice to the respondent calling upon him to file a reply against the application for the issue of a temporary injunction and then went on to direct that the petitioner is not to be ejected. If the order is read as a whole it obviously means that the stay was to last till such time as the final decision is given on the stay application after hearing the point of view of the respondent. The order dated 20‑11‑1970 cannot, therefore, be said to be a final order in the sense in which it was contended to be on behalf of the petitioner. It has to be decided after considering the objections raised on behalf of the respondent whether stay should be allowed to be continued or not.

So far as the merits of the case are concerned it was con tended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has a prima facie case in his favour as his application under Standing Order No. 18 of 1968 is likely to succeed in which he will be re‑instated and as such he should not be disturbed from his residential accommodation till the final decision of his main application. It was also argued that if the petitioner is ejected under the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 then he will not be able to pursue his case satisfac torily which would amount to an irreparable loss to him. Finally it was contended that the balance of convenience is in favour of the petitioner as he is living in the quarter to question.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that when a protection has been given to the petitioner under Standing Order No. 16 of 1968 that lie cannot be ejected for complete two months after the order of dismissal then the question of stay does not arise because if it was intended to provide further protection to him, it would have been so provided in the Stinging Order Ordinance of 1968 itself.

So far as the first objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the main petition under Standing Order No. 16 is not main tainable, is concerned it cannot be accepted because it has been held in so many cases that in spite of the provisions of section 4 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 an application under Standing Order No. 18 of 1968 is maintainable. It is entirely different matter whether such an application succeeds or fails on merits.

The main thing to be seen is whether the provisions of Order XXXIX, rule 2 of the C. P. C are available or not for the issue of temporary injunction during the pendency of a complaint filed under Standing Order No. 18 of 1968. The open ing words of the provisions of Standing Order No. 18 of 1968 show that an individual workman who has a grievance in respect of any matter under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, has to observe a particular procedure. The conditions of employment which govern the workman are laid down in the Standing Orders as is apparent from section 3 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, which is to the following effect: ‑

"3. Enforcement of Standing Orders.‑In every industrial or commercial establishment, conditions of the employment of workmen and other incidental matters shall subject to the other provisions of this Ordinance, be regulated in accordance with the Standing Orders."

The above provision clearly shows that the conditions of service of the petitioner are to be governed by the Standing Orders Ordinance itself. Keeping in view the above‑position, we now look at the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 of 1968, which is to the following effect:

"16. Eviction from residential accommodation.‑(1) Notwith standing the provisions of any law for the time being in force, including those of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance No. VI of 1959), a workman occupying residential accommodation provided by his employer who has resigned or retired, or has been, retrenched, discharged or dismissed, or whose services have been terminated shall vacate such accommodation within a period of two months from the date of his retrenchment, discharge, dismissal or termination of services, as the case may be, provided that in case of re‑instatement of the workman, the employer shall be bound to provide him with similar residential accommodation from the date of such re‑instatement or pay him per mensem an allowance in lieu thereof at the rate of three times the wages of the last full working day.

(2) If a workman, who has been retrenched, discharged or dismissed, or whose services have been terminated, fails to vacate any residential premises provided by the employer, within the period specified in clause (1), the employer may lodge a complaint with a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction in the area where such residential accommodation is located.

(3) The Magistrate on hearing the parties, may, notwith standing anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, summarily decide the case and may pass an order of eviction, giving the workman a reasonable time to vacate the premises.

Where a Magistrate passes an order for the eviction of a workman, he may also pass order directing a police officer to evict such workman and any other person occupying through such workman the residential accommodation in respect of which the order of eviction is made, if the workman or such other person fails to vacate the accommodation within the time allowed under clause (3)."

A perusal of the above provisions shows that the opening words of the above Standing Orders are very important; which are "notwithstanding the provisions of any law for the time being in force including those of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, a workman occupying residential accommoda tion ."The above words exclude the application of any other law to a workman to whom the provisions of Standing Order No. 16 apply. Reading the above provisions in the light ox section 3 of the Ordinance, 1968 quoted above, no room for doubt is left that the provisions of Order XXXIX. rule 2 of the C. P. C. read with section 151, C. P. C. are not applicable and cannot be employed for the benefit bf a workman. The reason is very obvious. A workman who is provided residential accommodation by his employer is mere a licensee in the residential accommodation. The moment his employment is terminated he has no right to stay in the residential accommodation because his, licence is 'evoked. Under the ordinary law he can be thrown out immediately after the termination of his services by the employer but a protection has been provided to him under Standing Order No. 16 for a period of two months after the order of his dismissal or discharge etc., as the case may be, and thereafter also the employer is not allowed to take the law. into his own hands and has to .approach the Magistrate who may or may not order his ejectment. It has also been provided in. the Standing Order No. 16‑ that if a workman is ultimately‑re‑instated then the employer shall be bound to provide him with similar accommodation from the date of such re‑instatement or pay, him monthly allowance in lieu thereof at the rate three times, the wages, of, the last working day. This provision itself is a sufficient guarantee against the loss of accommodation by him under the provision or Standing Order No. 16 if hit petition ultimately succeeds under Standing Order No. 18. With all the safeguards provided in the Standing Order No. 16 itself; the petitioner is not entitled to any further protection as prayed for by him. If any further protection was intended for the workman it would have been so provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance of 1968.

A perusal of provisions of Standing Order No. 16 also shows that the Magistrate has to act on the complaint of the employer and there is no provision in the Standing Orders Ordinance, which authorises this Court to sit in Judgment over the order of the Magistrate or .to atop .him from doing his duty assigned to him under Standing Order. No. 16. In these Circumstances it is not proper that a stay order is issued to the petitioner to the effect that proceedings are not taken against him under Standing Order No. 16. The questions of irreparable loss and balance of convenience are of no consequence in face of special provisions of Standing Order No. 16 of 1968.

In view of what has been said above the petitioner is not entitled to the issue of a temporary injunction prayed for and as inch the staff order issued by order dated 20‑11‑1979 is hereby vacated and the petition for stay is dismissed. Major Saleh‑ud‑Din Gauhar, Member; agrees with the above order.

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