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Application No. 74 of 1971, decided on 4th June 1971.

Grievance notice‑Grievance notice by Trade Union‑Cannot be taken to be a notice by individual workman and hence not sufficient compliance of law.

read with Limi tation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 29‑Grievance petition‑Limitation‑Limitation of time prescribed by S. O. 18, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordi nance, 1968‑Mandatory‑Time barred petition, held, cannot be entertained by Labour Court.

It was contended that in view of the provisions of Standing Order No. 18(d) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 the Labour Court is competent to ignore the limitation laid down in Standing Order No. 18(a) and (b) of the Ordinance.

Held: Section 3 of the Limitation Act say, that if an application is made after the period of limitation prescribed therefore then it shall be dismissed. Section 29 of the Limitation Act says that where any special law prescribes for an application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act then the period so prescribed by the special law shall be read as the period of limitation for the purposes of section 3 of the Limitation Act. The combined effect of sections 3 and 29 of the Limitation Act is that a petition under Standing Order No. 18 has got to be dismissed, if it is beyond time.

Sub‑clause (d) of Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordi nance, 1968 means nothing but this that if a petition under Stand ing Order No. 18 has been properly filed then a proper relief or any other just relief may be given to a party by the Court, even though not claimed, acting under the power given in clause (d) of Standing Order No. 18. It does not empower the Labour Court to entertain an application which is time‑barred, because that has to be dismissed in view of the provisions of section 3 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act.

(Members consulted). This order will dispose of Petition No. 74 of 1971, In re: Mansoor Shah v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum Petition No. 75 of 1971, In re: Abdul Majid v. Plywood action, Jhelum Petition No. 76 of 1971, In re: Nadir Khan v Plywood Factory, Jhelum Petition No. 77 of 1971, In re: Abdul Hag v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum Petition No. 79 of 1971, In re: Muhammad Saghir v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum. Petition No. 79 of 1971, In re: Safdar Hussain v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum Petition No. 80 of 1971, In re Muhammad Sharif v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum and Petition No. 81 of 1971, In re: Muhammad Zaman v. Plywood Factory, Jhelum, which have been filed under Standing Order No. 18 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), as common questions of fact and law arise in these petitions.

The short facts for the disposal of these petitions are that the petitioners in all these cases were employees of the respon dent who were suspended from service on 25‑12‑1970 and were dismissed on 28‑12‑1970. All the employees were members of the employees Registered Union. Bearing Manzoor Shah the others are also its office‑bearers. The registered Trade Union gave a grievance notice against the order of suspension under acknowledgment due on 6‑1‑1971 to the respondent, which was returned as refused. A joint application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was filed for re instatement of the petitioners which was disposed of on 18‑3‑1971 by my learned predecessor with the direction that separate petitions should be filed under Standing Order No. 18 of the Ordinance as the relief for re‑instatement could be granted under that Standing Order only. The present petitions were, therefore, filed on 16‑4‑71. The statement of the learned counsel for the petitioners has been recorded today wherein it has been admitted that no grievance notice was given against the order of suspension or dismissal by any of the individual petitioners. The only grievance notice was the one which was given by the employees of the Trade Union on 6‑1‑71. In view of these facts it is to be decided whether any of the petition is within time or not and as such maintainable or not. Since the relief is being claimed by an individual workman under Standing Order No. 18, we have to see whether the provisions of grievance procedure as provided under that Stand ing Orders Ordinance has been complied with or not. Standing Order No. 18 is to the following effect:‑

"18. Grievance procedure.‑Any individual workman who has a grievance in respect of any matter under this Ordinance and intends to seek redress thereof, shall observe the following procedure:‑

(a) the workman concerned shall bring his grievance to the notice of his employer, in writing, within fifteen days of the occurrence of the cause of such grievance, and the employer shall, within thirty days of such grievance being brought to his notice, inquire into the matter, giving the workman con cerned an opportunity of being heard, and communicate ,his decision, in writing, to the said workman;

(b) if the employer fails to give a decision within the period specified in clause (a), or if the workman is dissatisfied with such decision, the workman may make a complaint to the Industrial Court having jurisdiction, within thirty days from the date of the decision, or where the employer fait to give a decision, within sixty days of the workman bringing the grievance to the notice of the employer, unless the grievance has already been raised or has otherwise been taken cognizance of as an industrial dispute under the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968.

Provided that no complaint shall lie against an order of termination of employment of a workman unless the workman concerned is an officer of registered Trade Union and his employment is alleged to have been terminated for his Trade Union activities or unless the workman concerned, whether an officer of a registered Trade Union or not, has been deprived of the benefits in accruing to him under this Ordinance;

(c) On receipt of any complaint under clause (b), the Court, after giving notice to the employer concerned and giving the parties an opportunity of being beard may decide the matter in such summary way as it deems fit ;

(d) in deciding the matter, the Court may pass such orders, including orders regarding costs, as it may deem just and proper and it may in appropriate case, require by such order, the re‑instatement of the complaint, and such order shall be final."

A perusal of the opening words of the above Standing Order shows that it is any individual workman who has a grievance under the Ordinance and intends to seek redress thereof shall observe the procedure laid down in the Standing Order. It is only after the observance of that procedure by the individual workman that he can get relief otherwise or no. Sub‑clause (a) of Standing Order No. 18 shows that an individual workman has to bring his grievance to the notice of his employer in writing within 15 days of the cause of grievance. The employer is required to inquire into the grievance within 15 days of the receipt of the notice giving the workman an opportunity of being heard and then to communicate a decision in writing to the workman. Subsection (b) of Standing Order No. 18 says that if the employer fails to give a decision within the period specified in clause (a) or. if the workman is dissatisfied with his decision the workman may make a complaint to the Court within 30 days from the date of decision or if so decision is given within sixty days of the workman bringing the grievance to the notice of the employer. The above provisions clearly show that a time‑table has been fixed for the workman as to how he has to approach the Court. In this particular case it is admitted that none of the petitioners has observed this procedure or this time table.

We have now to see whether after having failed to observe the procedure laid down in S. O. 18 whether the individual workman can get a relief under the Standing Order on the strength of the grievance notice given by the Trade Union. The notice which has been given by the Trade Union is not provided for in the Ordinance itself, as such the notice given by the Trade A Union cannot be taken to be a notice by the individual workman as provided for in Standing Order 18.

We have to keep in view also the provisions of Limitation Act. Section 3 of the limitation Act says that if an application is made after the period of limitation prescribed therefore then it shall be dismissed. Section 29 of the Limitation Act says that where any special law prescribes for an application a period of limitation different from the one prescribed by the First Schedule of the Limitation Act then the period so prescribed by the special law shall be read as the period of limitation for the purposes of section 3 of the Limitation Act. The combined effect of sections 3 and 29 of the Limitation Act is that the present petition under Standing Order No. 18 has got to be dismissed if it is beyond time. Since in these cases the grievance notice under S. O. 18 has not been given by any of the individual workman within the prescribed period of limitation the petitioners cannot be given any relief by this Court, as their petitions are time‑barred. In this view of the matter all these petitions have got to be dismissed.

The learned counsel for the petitioners argued on the basis of the provisions of sub‑clause (d) of the Standing Order No. 18 that this Court is competent to ignore the period. of limitation as it is given power to pass such orders as it may deem just and proper. Sub‑clause (d) of S. O. 18 means nothing but this that if a petition under Standing Order No. 18 has been properly filed then a proper relief or any other just relief may be given to a party by the Court, even though not claimed, acting under the power given in clause (d) of S. O. 18. It does not empower this Court to entertain an application which is time‑barred because that has to be dismissed in view of the provisions or section 3 read with section 29 of the Limitation Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot, therefore, be accepted. In view of what has been said above we dismiss these petitions as time‑barred.

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