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Criminal Review Petition No. 8‑R of 1974, decided on 12th February 1975.

(On Review of the judgment and order of this Court made on the 29th of April, 1974 in Cr. Appeals Nos. 42 and ‑41 of 1971).

‑‑ S. 302‑[Murder‑case]‑Commutation of death sentence‑General amnesty declared by President on 23‑12‑1971 applying only to convicts standing sentenced to death on such date‑Death sentence of petitioner having already been set aside by High Court, petitioner's case, held, not covered by terms of amnesty.‑[Amnesty‑Sentence].

----S. 302‑[Murder‑case]‑Expectancy of life‑Petition for leave to appeal filed in Supreme Court soon after setting aside of petitioner's death sentence by High Court and restoration of death sentence prayed for 'by complainant in such petition‑Petitioner having full notice of his death sentence being likely to be restored at any moment and death sentence actually restored‑Order of Supreme Court restoring, death sentence though made six years after imposition of death sentence by trial Court and four years after its being set aside by High Court, yet petitioner all along having notice of such contingency likely to arise‑Ground of acquisition of expectancy of life, in circumstances, held, not tenable in circumstances and interference with previous order not justified in exercise of review jurisdiction‑‑Supreme Court Rules, 1956, O. XXVl, r. 1.

Sh. Abdul Karim, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner.

Maqbool Ahmad Qadri, Advocate‑on‑Record for Respondent No. 1.

Nema for the State. .

Date of hearing : 12tb February, 1975.

This petition seeks review of as order made by this‑Court on the 29th of April, 1974, whereby accepting Cr. Appeal No. 41 of 1971, we had restored the death sentence passed against the petitioner Siraj Din by the trial Court or. 24‑2‑1968. The High Court had, while maintaining the petitioner's conviction under section 302/34 P. P. C. for the murder of one Haji Arif reduced his sentence to that of transportation for life. While restoring the death sentence we 'had taken note of the fact that the petitioner had acted in a brutal manner, and there was no extenuating circumstance in his favour, as the abducted woman Mst. Kaniz Fatima was not related to him.

It is submitted by the learned counsel for the‑petitioner that the death sentence awarded‑ by ‑this Court be commuted to imprisonment for life for the following reasons :‑

(a) That the President of Pakistan had declared on the 23rd of December 1971, a general amnesty for all those who stood condemned to death on that date, and their sentence were commuted to transportation for life, but the benefit of this amnesty could not be availed of by the petitioner as his death sentence had been set aside in appeal by the Lahore High Court on the 24th of March 1970; and

(a) That the death sentence was originally awarded by the trial Court on 24‑2‑68, and its restoration by this Court after lapse of six years was not justified, as in the meantime, the petitioner had acquired an expectancy of life under the appellate order of the High Court dated the 24th of March, 1970.

We find that the grounds urged by the learned counsel are not tenable in law. The general amnesty declared by the President of Pakistan on 23‑12‑71 applied only to those convicts who stood sentenced to death on that date, but A the petitioner was not one of them, as his sentence of death had already been set aside by the High Court on 24‑3‑70. He was, therefore, not covered by the terms of the amnesty.

As regards the expectancy of life, we notice that soon after the death sentence was set aside by the High Court on 24‑3‑70, a petition for leave to appeal was filed in the Court by the complainant in May, 1970, praying that the sentence of death be restored. Leave to appeal was granted in this petition in October 1970, and since then the 'petitioner had full notice that his death sentence might be restored any moment. It was in fact restored on 29‑4‑74. It is true that this order has been made by this Court more than six years after the sentence of death was imposed by the trial Court, and fours years after it was set aside by the High Court, yet all along the petitioner had notice that such a contingency might arise.

‑. For the foregoing reasons we consider that the grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner do not justify interference by us, in the exercise of our review jurisdiction, with a legal sentence passed by this Court, but the petitioner may, if so advised, approach the executive Government in this behalf.

The review petition is accordingly dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

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