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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑16 of 1969, decided on 5th May 1969.
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, Karachi, dated the 31st January 1969, in IInd Appeal No. 139 of 1968).
Ss. 13 & IS‑Appellate authority ordering eviction of tenant in terms of compromise arrived at by party and directing tenant to hand over possession on 30‑9‑66‑Execution of order, held, could rightly be sued out on or after that date‑Plea that fresh tenancy created‑Repelled.
S. A. Nusrat, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by IC. A. Ghani, Attorney for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondent.
Date of hearing : 5th May 1969.
The Courts below have in terms of the consent order passed by the Additional District Judge, Karachi, as an appellate authority under the Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 on the 28th August 1965, directed the eviction of the petitioner from house No. 51‑P. I. B. Colony, Karachi. Mr. S. A. Nusrat appearing for the petitioner concedes that the grounds raised in opposition to the order for eviction have been rightly ruled out by the High Court, but maintains that the order dated the 28th August 1965, could not be enforced in execution proceedings as it had resulted in creating a fresh tenancy in favour of the petitioner.
The plea was not raised in the Courts below and on merit too has little substance. The compromise incorporated in the order of the appellate authority dated the 28th August 1965, stipulated that the petitioner will hand over possession of the house in his occupation to the respondent on the 30th September 1966. By virtue of section 17 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance the order had the force of a decree passed by a Civil Court. Execution of the order could, therefore, be sued out on and after the aforesaid date. The contention that as certain extraneous matters were also incorporated in the consent order it had the effect of afresh agreement of tenancy is, therefore, devoid of force. At best the argument will apply to matters not arising for decision of the appellate authority in the application under section 13 but as to the stipulation for delivery of possession the matter precisely arose for determination and the agreement on this point resulted in a consent order for ejectment of the petitioner after the 30th of September 1966.
The petition is dismissed.
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