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Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑5 of 1969, decided on 21st May 1969.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan, Karachi Bench, dated the 8th November 1968, in Civil Petition No, 567 of 1968).

S. 97 (1) (a) read with Municipal Administration Ordinance (X oh 1960), S. 4 (2)‑‑General tax and fire‑brigade tax leviable under S. 97 (1) (a) of City of Karachi Municipal .yet. 1933 imposed or assessed before repeal of Act by Ordinance X of 1960‑Recoverablt after repeal of Act.

A number of persons received bills in 1966 in respect of their properties for payment of general tax and fire‑brigade tax, under S. 97 (1) (a) of the City of Karachi Municipal Act, 1933, for period 1951‑52 to 1965‑66. They objected that as the Karachi Municipal Act, 1933, had been repealed by the Municipal Admi nistration Ordinance, 1960 the Municipality was not competent to recover taxes for period when the Municipality was governed by the Municipal Act of 1933. The Supreme Court held that "Subsection (2) of section 4 of the Ordinance clearly saves tax imposed or assessed under the Act of 1933 after the repeal of the Act. The scheme of the 1933 Act clearly showed that after tile annual value of any property was determined the taxes which could be imposed on property would stand levied automatically at the rates determined by the Municipality from time to time. We have already seen that the annual value of the properties in question was determined at the relevant time, the general tax and the fire‑brigade tax, therefore, stood imposed or assessed before the Act was repealed by the Ordinance. The imposition was saved by section 4 (2) of the Ordinance and therefore there was no bar for the Municipal Committee to present the bill in question. Mr. Ramchandani could not point out that there was any time limit for presentation of the bill. In that view of the matter the High Court rightly held that the bill was properly presented".

P. D. Ramachandani, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Abdul Hafeez Memon, Attorney for Petitioners.

Nemo for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 21st May 1969.

This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi, dismissing in limine a writ petition in which the petitioners called in question the right of the respondents to levy general and fire‑brigade tax in respondent of some properties owned by the petitioners.

In December 191,,0, the petitioners received a bill for Rs. 3,676.32 in respect of the properties in question and this .amount included not only water and conservancy taxes but also general tax and fire‑brigade tax. On the reverse, of the bill it was shown that a sum of Rs. 30,625 was due as arrears of general tax and fire‑brigade tax for 1951‑52 to 1965‑66. The petitioners protested against the demand for payment of general tax and fire‑brigade tax but with no effect.

Being unable to get any relief from the Municipality and thereafter from the Commissioner of Karachi, the Controlling authority of the Municipality, the petitioners tiled the writ petition in question. En the writ petition it was asserted, inter cilia, that is the Karachi Municipal Act of 1933 had been repealed by the Municipal Ordinance, 1960. the saving clause contained, section 4 of the Ordinance did not enable the Municipality to recover taxes for the period when the Municipality was governed by the Municipal Act of 1933.

The learned Judges of the High Court took the view that in ‑the present case the assessment of the annual letting value was admittedly made before 1951 or 1952. They also found that a ;general tax and a fire‑brigade tax was leviable under section 97 (I) (a) of the Act of 1933, therefore the levy of general tax and fire‑brigade tax was before the Act of 1933 was repealed and there was no bar on the part of the Municipality to present the bill for the dues under those heads after the repeal of the Act in view of subsection (2) of section 4 of the Ordinance.

Subsection (2) of section 4 of the Ordinance clearly saves tax imposed or assessed under the Act of 1933 after the repeal of the, Act. The scheme of the 1933 Act clearly showed that after the annual value of any property was determined the taxes which could be imposed on property would stand levied automatically at the rates determined by the Municipality from time to time. We have already seen that the annual value of the properties in question was determined at the relevant time, the general lax and the fire‑brigade tax, therefore stood imposed car assessed before' the Act was repealed by the Ordinance, This imposition was saved by section 4 (2) of the Ordinance and therefore there was no bar for the Municipal Committee to present the bill in question. Mr. Ramachandani could not point out that there was any time limit for presentation of the bill. In that view of the matter the High Court rightly held that the bill was properly presented.

The learned counsel has contended that had the bill been presented at ‑the time of the levy of the taxes then the petitioners would have availed of the right of appeal given by section 1‑11 (1) (c) of the Act of 1933. We do not see how the .right was not available to the petitioners even though the bill was presented after the repeal of the 1933 Act. This right of appeal was not taken away expressly by the Ordinance and therefore the petitioners were entitled to prefer an appeal within the time limit prescribed by the Act if they so wanted after the bill had been presented. We, therefore, feel that there is no ground for interference with the order of the High Court.

The petition is dismissed.

Leave refused.

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