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Appellate Side No. 75 of 1958‑59, decided on 14th December 1959, District Quetta‑Kalat.

(a) Route permit‑Additional service‑Existing operator has only preferential claim subject to past performance and future promise, and not an overriding claim.

(b) Route permit‑R. T. A's resolution declaring that addi tional service would be given to existing operators‑R. T. A. within its rights to change mind subsequently‑No question of Review‑Policy, or general resolutions Change able.

(c) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 47 (1) (a)‑Route permit‑Grant‑" Interest of public generally "‑Tribal representa tions‑Valid consideration for grant.

Clause (a) of section 47 (1), Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), permits R. T. A. to take into account " the interest of the public generally ", and tribal representation can be a valid consideration under this clause.

These are two connected appeals against R. T. A. Quetta's order dated 29‑1‑1959 refusing the grant of stage carriage permits to the appellants for an additional service on Quetta‑Chamman route. By the same order R. T. A. granted these permits to Shah Muhammad Transport Co., which is respondent No. 2.

2. The appellants claimed this additional service as existing operators on the route. Appellant No. (1) represented to R. T. A. that there was no need for an additional service but if .it were to be permitted it should be allotted to them. Actually there have been plied, with some interruptions, three services on this route; and the fact that appellant No. 1 has more than once been hauled up for over‑loading (once to the extent of carrying 15 persons on the roof of the vehicle) and tire report that the respondent Company has been successfully operating on this route since the grant of these permits for additional service for nearly eleven months are sufficient proof of the public need and demand for an additional service. But the Secretary to R. T. A. was also deputed to make a survey of the volume of traffic and it was on his report, presented to R. T. A. on the 29th January 1959, that a decision to allot the additional service to respondent No. 2 was taken.

3. The first, contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that there was no need for an additional service and provision of additional service and the grant of permits for the same to the third company impinged on the rights of the existing opera tors. I have examined the first part of the issue above and find that the need for an additional service on this route is established. As regards the second part, I cannot accept the view that an existing operator has an overriding claim in all circumstances to any new service opened on his route. All I can accept on his A behalf is that his claim should receive preferential consideration subject to his past performance and future promise. In this case the Bogra Company, according to R. T. A.'s report enclosed with its letter dated the 7th April 1959, has had five warnings and one punishment of suspension of permit during the year, January 1958‑February 1959. As regards the bona fides of the Bogra Company it has to be mentioned that when this additional service was first notified they did not apply for it. When it was advertised a second time they applied but emphatically stated that their interest in the new service was only to keep out other competitors.' It was on this blunt statement made by Taj Mir of the Bogra Transport Company that R. T. A. became doubtful of his bona fides, and I am not surprised that R. T. A. felt that the Bogra Transport Company could not, with this approach, be entrusted with the efficient operation of the additional service. As regards the second appellant, viz. Mujahid Transport Company, R. T. A.'s order shows that the Managing Director of the Company has left Pakistan and is now in Afghanistan; the Company has two vehicles already plying on the Quetta‑Chaman route, and it will not be able to ply a third service efficiently. I agree with this finding.

4. Another plea advanced on behalf of the appellants is in the form of an objection to the grant of these permits to respondent No. 2. When this additional service was first advertised, there was no applicant except respondent No. 2; and. R. T. A. felt that Shah Muhammad had only recently left school, was inexperienced in the business and had no vehicles; and, therefore, his application should be rejected. At a previous meeting R. T. A. had expressed the view that the third service should be " offered " to the existing transport companies, vide its resolution dated the 27th February 1958. At the last meeting however the permits were refused to the existing transport companies. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that this amounted to a review of its previous order, which was illegal because there is no provision for review in the Motor Vehicles Act. I am afraid I cannot accept this interpre tation of the action taken by R. T. A. The resolution of the 27th February 1958 was only a general or policy direction and not a final order granting permits to the existing operators and creating civil rights in their favour. It was, therefore, quite open to R. r. A. to change its mind and withdraw its offer '. Like wise it was within its discretion to revise its opinion about respondent No. 2. After all the respondent had not been condemned) for any fault or declared ineligible; and when he satisfied R. T. A. that the possessed both he resources and the capacity to manage the additional service, R. T. A. was justified in granting him the permits.

5. Finally it has been urged on behalf of the appellants that R. T. A. was wrongly influenced in taking the decision in favour of respondent No. (2) on the basis of tribal considerations. The vicinity of this route is populated by two main tribes, ASHEZAI AND KAKOZAI. The Bogra Transport Company represents the first and respondent No. (2) the second. It has been suggested that 50 per cent. shares of appellant No. 2 belong to Kakozai tribe, but this is not established ; R. T. A.'s papers do not record the alleged acquisition by Abdullah Jan of 50 per cent shares of this company. It is true that R. T. A. was influenced by the need for tribal representation but it is also true that it was also directly or indirectly, influenced by the behavior of appellant No. (1). It has been argued that selection based on tribal basis is ipso facto vitiated. Clause (a) of section 47 (1) permits R. T. A. to take into account " the interest of the public generally ", and tribal representation can be a valid consideration under this clause.

In effect, I dismiss the appeal.

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