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Appellate Side No. 272 of 1958‑59, decided on 30th November 1959, District Lahore.

(a) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 38 (3)‑Fitness certificate‑Motor Vehicles Examiner and Issuing Authority same person‑Competent to cancel certificate.

(b) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 38 (3)‑Cancellation of fitness certificate‑Offence committed in respect of vehicle of Section A of Group B of company‑Cancellation operative only against Section A and not against others.

(c) Motor Vehicles Act (IV of 1939), S. 38 (3)‑Impounding of Registration certificate and fitness certificate‑Amounts to cancellation of latter.

Kh. Abdur Rahim and Muhammad Salim for Section B & C of Company.

Amanullah and Secretary, R. T. A. Lahore.

This appeal has been filed against orders dated 14th of September 1959, passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, whereby the permit of the Appellant Company on the Lyallpur‑Shahkot Route was suspended for a period of three months.

The facts of the case are that Bus No. PBG 830 was being plied on the Lyallpur‑Shahkot Route by Section A of Group B of the New Lyallpur‑Sumandri Transport Company. The Fitness Certificate of this Bus was cancelled on the 6th July 1959, after it had been inspected by the Issuing Authority. On the 25th July 1959, it was found that this very bus was being plied without there being a Fitness Certificate. The matter was reported to the R. T. A. The R. T. A. passed the order mentioned above. Hence this appeal I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for Section B & C of the same Company. Secretary, R. T. A., who is present has also been heard. . The first point urged before me was that the cancellation was wrong in the sense that the Motor Vehicles Examiner alone cancelled the Fitness Certificate. An examination of the record shows that this very Examiner is the Issuing Authority and, under section 38 (3) of the ,q Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, he is the competent authority, to cancel a certificate of fitness. It is thus established that the cancellation of the fitness certificate was perfectly legal.

The next point urged before me was that, at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed, the motor vehicle was not plying. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention for the simple reason that, on the date of the offence, tickets were issued for passengers who were to travel by this very vehicle.

It has also been pointed out before me that, at the time the R. T. A. passed the order, the Company was not heard. The Secretary, R. T. A., has pointed out that Sultan Muhammad, Director In charge of Section A of the Company was present and was heard. There is, therefore, no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.

It has been urged before me that the permit is one entity and, if it is suspended, it should be applicable to all sections of Group B of New Lyallpur‑Samundri Transport Co. and not to Section A alone. This group consists of Sections A, B, C and D. These Sections ply their own buses on specified dates. In the month of July the Section A of this Group was operating their vehicles from the 17th to the 27th July 1959. The offence was detected on the 25th July 1959, and relates to the period for which Section A of the Company alone was plying their buses. It is thus obvious that the offence was committed by Section A and there is no reason why other Sections of this route should suffer. It has also been pointed out by the learned counsel for Sections B and C of this Group that, under the provisions of section 38 (3), the suspension of a permit is to relate to the vehicle in respect of which the certificate of fitness or registration has been' cancelled. Since this suspension was the result of an offence committed in respect of the B Vehicle of Section A of this group, it is only this Section against whom it should be operated and not other.

It was urged by the counsel for the appellant that the pro visions of section 60 were not attractive in this case. I am afraid, I cannot accept this contention. Section 60 (1) (a) of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Act makes a mention of subsection (3) of section 59, subsection 3‑(a) of section 59 makes a mention of Chapter V and section 69 is a part of Chapter V. It, therefore, follows that, if a vehicle is not so maintained as is desirable under section 69, it will attract the provisions of section 59 (3) (a) and that of section 60 (1) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 if without proper maintenance as envisaged by this section, it is being plied.

It was also urged before me that the Motor Vehicles Examiner was not on good terms with the appellant and, therefore, his action cannot be treated as bona fide. On the 6th of July 1959, the Motor Vehicles Examiner inspected the vehicle in question and gave a letter to the employee of the appellant pointing out certain defects. He also impounded the registration certificate. The certificate of fitness was also contained in this very booklet. The e impounding amounted to cancellation specially when the defects had been pointed out in the cancellation of the fitness certificate and the appellant took no action to file appeal against this cancellation.

After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and the examination of the relevant record, in my opinion, it is established that, on the 6th July 1959, the vehicle in question was found to be defective. No attempt was made to get the defects removed and get a certificate of fitness in this condition it was being put on the road on the 25th July 1959. In these circumstances, the R. T. A. was perfectly justified in awarding the punishment which it did. 1, therefore, see no justification for any interference. The appeal fails and is rejected hereby.

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