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Appeals Nos. LHR‑431.and 432 of 1983, decided on 25th March, 1.984.
‑‑S. 2 (i)‑"Workman"‑Whether or not a person a workman‑Determining factor‑Nature of duties Mere name and designation of post not relevant‑Security‑Guard‑Responsible. to extinguish fire if broke up, to keep‑fire fighting instruments ready for use and to open and close factory gates and search those leaving factory premises‑Doing manual work and not merely watch and ward at night‑Held: Workman.
1983 P L C 342 and 1981 P L C 818 distinguished. .
--‑S. 25‑A‑Grievance petition ‑Impleading employer‑Employer who passed impugned order to be sued and not the factory or establishment.
Mian Khurshid Ahmad for Appellant.
Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing : 18th March, 1984.
The two appeals captioned above arise from the decision, dated 24th July, 1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore, whereby the respondents were directed to be reinstated in service with 50 per cent back benefits. Since the facts and legal points involved in the two appeals are the same, both the appeals are being disposed of together through this single judgment.
2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents, being security guards, are not workmen. Name and designation of the post are not the deciding factors but duties are relevant. The respondents stated that their primary duty was to extinguish fire if and when it broke up, to clean and keep the fire‑extinguisher and material. ready for use, to check the chaff with a wooden fork to see that nothing was hidden in it and check the cars of the officers when they go out of the factory. R.Wr‑2 said that it was not the duty of the Chowkidars to, extinguish fire. But he has also stated that except the fire‑engine driver there is no other special staff to extinguish the fire. Now, our man is not sufficient to extinguish the fire. Since there is no other staff' to extinguish the fire, the statements of the respondents are believable that it is their duty to extinguish the fire and to keep the fire‑fighting instru ments ready. Obviously such a work can be done by hands. This part I of the statement of R.W.‑2 also appears to be wrong that gate clerks search the persons leaving the factory. The security guards are responsible it something is removed from the factory through the gate. If gate clerks effect the searches of the persons leaving the factory, then there is no justification to keep security guards. The gate clerks may check the vehicles bringing in and taking out goods and make entries according in the relevant register, but not to search the persons going out of the factory. However, the Chowkidars who do the duty of watch and ward at night are not workmen and their duty is only to remain present and guard the premises but gatemen of the factories have to open and close the gates' and search the employees and other persons when they leave the factory Since they do manual work, they are covered by the definition of workman as defined in section 2 (i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. 1983 P L C 342 and 1981 P L C 818 cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are distinguishable as the employees in those cases were not, doing any manual work.
3. The next point argued is that not the Personnel Manager but Packages Limited should have been sued. In labour cases the employers who passed the impugned order is to be sued and not the factory or the establishment.
4. It has also been argued that the learned lower Court has directed the reinstatement of the respondents solely on the ground that quantity of the milk recovered from was very small. This is not so. The learned lower court has on the basis of evidence held that the milk had been purchased against tokens. Since milk was purchased, it was not the stolen property. If it was not used within the premises and was being removed, it was not in violation of any rule. The learned lower Court has thus rightly held that no misconduct was committed.
5. The respondents stated on oath that since their dismissal from service, they remained un‑employed. Their statements were not rebutted. So the respondents are entitled to full back benefits.
6. As a result, both the appeals are dismissed.
A.E.
Appeal dismissed.
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