Lawyers Directory Listing
Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.
Appeal No. MN‑87 of 1984, decided on 21st May, 1984.
‑‑Ss Os. 15 (4) & 1 (b) ‑ Termination ‑ Blacksmith appointed on ad hoc basis against a permanent work continuing for more than three years--Satisfactorily completed probationary period ‑ Services extended from time to time--Terminated on allegations amounting to misconduct‑Held : Such device amounts to abuse of process of law‑Ad hoc appointment can be made where actual job is not permanent and services are required for a short period‑Since worker had become permanent, he could be removed from service after following procedure given in S.O. 15 (4) for misconduct‑Order of termination set aside and worker reinstat ed with back benefits.
Muhammad Bilal for Appellant.
Date of hearing : 9th May 1984.
The decision dated 29th January, 1984 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan has been challenged in this appeal, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. According to the appellant, the respondent was only an ad hoc appointee and thus was legally removed by not extending the period of his service. No doubt vide order dated 21st March, 1979 Exh. R. 12 the respondent was appointed on ad hoc basis for two months and the period of his service was extended vide Exhs. R. 13 to R. 20 from time to time but it appears that it was a device to be saved from the applicability of Standing Order 1 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Such a device cannot be recognised and approved. This amounts to abuse of the process of law. Ad hoc appointments can be made where actually the job is not permanent and services are required for a short period. If the work for the completion of which appointment is made is in reality temporary, and has not been completed for some reason, the period may be extended but the work that has continued up to 2 years and still exists cannot be said to be temporary. R. W. 1 said that another person has been appointed in place of the respondent. This fact is admitted in the written statement also. It is thus clear that the services of a blacksmith were still requi red when the respondent was terminated. A work that has continued for three years and is still continuing cannot be said to be of temporary nature. No ground has been given in any document or oral statement to show that the work for which the respondent was employed is of temporary nature. According to Standing Order I, a work that has subsisted beyond nine months is permanent and an employee who has satisfactorily completed nine months service on such a job becomes per manent. The respondent completed nine months service in November, 1979. The first allegation of slackness in duty was leveled against him vide Exh. R. 1 on 24th March, 1980 after he had satisfactorily completed the probationary period. Before 24th March, 1980 he had become per manent. All other allegations were made and charge‑sheets given after wards. Since he had become permanent, he could be removed from service after following the procedure given in Standing Order 15 (4) for misconduct, if any committed by him. The allegations for which his services were terminated amount to misconduct.
3. The learned lower Court has rightly held that the respondent is not a civil servant and that he is a workman as the term has been defined in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and section 2 (i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The persons who are covered by ,the definition of workman as defined in the Factories Act are not civil servants as defined in the Civil Servants Act. The res pondent comes within the definition of workman as defined in section 2(9) of the Factories Act. He is a blacksmith and thus works in the manufa cturing process as defined in the said Act. This is not the case of the appellant that the respondent has any supervisory power. His pay too less than Rs. 800, so he does not come within the exception (b) of section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Needless to says that a blacksmith has to do manual skilled work and thus the respondent is covered by the definition of workman as defined in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
4. As a result, the appeal being without any force is dismissed in limine.
M. I.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer