Find a Lawyer

Appeals Nos. QSA‑210 to 212 and 221 to 223 of 1984, decided on 1st December, 1984.

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑

‑‑S. 2 (i)‑Workman‑Watchman‑Responsible to protect property of Mills, stop entry of undesirable persons‑Protector, held, essen tially to use bands if criminal force is used by any intruder and weapons are also used by hands‑Such workman, held, covered by definition of "workman".

(b) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑

‑‑S. O. 12 (3) ‑Termination of service‑Reasons and grounds‑Ser vices "No longer required"‑No ground when posts not abolished.

‑‑Ss. 25‑A & 38 (3)‑Reinstatement‑Back benefits ‑ Impugned termination order held by Labour Court as unjustified‑Petitioner filing affidavit before Labour Court before decision of case that be remained unemployed during intervening period‑Such affidavits not controverted by employer‑Petitioner in circumstances, held, entitled to back benefits on reinstatement ‑ Order of Labour Court refusing back benefits upset by Appellate Tribunal.

Hamid Mahmood for Management.

Ch. Ghulam Qadir Cheema for Respondents.

Date of hearing : 16 October, 1984.

The six appeals captioned above arise from the decision, dated 26th March, 1984 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lahore at Ferozewala, whereby Gul Zaman, Sultan Khan and Aman Ullah Khan, who in this judgment will be described as the respondents, were directed to be reinstated in service without back benefits. The Pioneer Steel Mills (hereinafter to be called as the appellants) have in their appeals challenged the direction of reinstatement of the respondents in service, whereas the respondents have in their appeals claimed back benefits. As all the six appeals arise from the same decision, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment.

2. The respondents are Chowkidars. Their services were terminated as no longer required vide orders dated Exhs. P. 4, P. 5 and P. 6, respectively. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondents are not covered by the definition of workman. Reliance has been placed upon duty roster Exh. R‑1, which, according to the respondents and the learned lower Court is a fabricated document. The res pondents relied upon the oral evidence of P. W. 1 and Gul Zaman P. W. 2 one of the respondents and overtime slips Exhs. P. I and P. 2. The oral evidence on the point of workman is that the respondents used to close and open the door, search the persons and vehicles entering and leaving the Mills, take files from one place to another, serving water on demand and clean ing the chairs and tables. So far as the definition of workman given in section 2 (i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is concerned, a person doing manual, skilled or unskilled work is covered by the definition. R. Ws. 1 and 2 have tried to belie the respondents about the closing and opening the doors and taking files from one place to the other but have not suggested who else performs these duties. The officials who actually may be performing these duties, too have not been put in the witness box. Mere denial is not sufficient. R. W. 2 has denied that the respondents used to inspect the persons and vehicles but said that they used to simply watch them. This watching is not understandable. The persons going out are searched to see if they are removing any property of the Mills. In the same manner vehicles are checked to see if goods are being removed according to record. But mere watching the persons and vehicles is mean ingless. Since it has not been shown who else performed these duties, the learned lower Court was justified in believing the evidence of the respon dents in this respect. Even duty roster Exh. R. I is not helpful to the appellant and rather helps the respondents. Hands are used for protecting the property of the Mills. Hands are used to stop the entry of undesire able persons. If criminal force is used by any intruder, naturally the protector has to use his hands. Weapons are used by hands. Since manual duty is given in Exh. R. I, it supports the case of the respon dents. However, Exhs. P. 1 and P. 2 are not relevant. Firstly, they have not been proved to have been signed by any officer of the appellant and secondly they show that Gul Zaman worked temporarily as Naib‑Qasid for four days in place of one Rafique. Substantive post was not Naib -Qasid of Gul Zaman, so document is not helpful. The respondents, therefore, have been rightly adjudged by learned lower Court as work men.

3. So far as order of termination is concerned, the same is hit by Standing Order 12 (3) as no cogent ground of termination is given. "No longer required" is no ground. This is not the case of the appellants that the posts of the respondents were abolished. Their case is that the respondents were guilty of dereliction of duty as they did not help and protect Murid Hussain from the clutches of the assailants. There is no evidence that the respondents had come to know that Murid Hussain was being injured or murdered, This is not known how he was murdered. If firing had been done by the assailants, of course the respondents could have been attracted to the place of occurrence. If the deceased was strangulated or throttled, he would have been able to raise alarm. In the absence of evidence how he was murdered, it cannot be said that the respondents bad come to know about the incident and intentionally did not intervene. The other thing is that even if it be said that the respondents knew at the time of the incident that Murid Hussain was being given injuries, charge‑sheeting and holding enquiry against them were necessary as required by Sanding Order 12 (5) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Admittedly, the respondents were neither charge‑sheeted nor any enquiry was held against them thereafter. So, if they were terminated for the reason that they did not save Murid Hussain the order of termination was not sustainable and was rightly struck down by the learned lower Court. If the order was of simple termination then as the provisions of Standing Order 12 (3) were violated, the order is not maintainable.

4. So far as the claim of the respondents about back benefits is con cerned, affidavits were filed by the respondents before the decision of the case but the learned lower Court did not consider the same. The reason that they are afterthought is not correct. The appellant did not controvert them by any counter‑affidavit either in the learned lower Court or in answer to this appeal. This means that the affidavits were correct. When the termination of services is held to be unjustified and the employees concerned have remained unemployed, they are entitled to back benefits.

5. As a result, the appeals of the appellants are dismissed and the appeals of the respondents are accepted allowing them back benefits.

A. E.

Order accordingly.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.