Lawyers Directory Listing
Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.
Appeals Nos. ID‑583 and 584 of 1982, decided on 13th June, 1983.
West Pakistan Industrial ‑and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑
‑‑ S. 12 (3)‑Termination of service‑Reason‑"Services no longer required"‑Not sufficient even in case of temporary employee unless post has ceased and such fact is specifically asserted‑Impugned order stating that "services no longer required"‑No indication that post had ceased‑Termination order, in circumstances, set aside by Labour Appellate Tribunal awarding reinstate neat with 50% back benefits‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 25‑A
Sadiq Muhammad Warraich for Appellants.
Ali Sibtain Fazli for Respondent.
Date of hearing : 5th June, 1983.
points involved in the two appeals captioned involved the facts and law above are common, both the appeals are being disposed of together through this single judgment, in which Saleem Sajtd Rizvi will be described as appellant No. 1 and Afsar Zaidi as appellant No. 2.
2. Appellant No. 1 was appellant No. 2 was taken in service on 16th June, 1980. Both of them were terminated on 29th January. 1981, No appointment orders of the two appellants have been brought on the record. According to the appellants, they were orally terminated and that the written orders were prepared afterwards but according to the respondent, the appellants were terminated means of written orders dated 28th January, 1981, copy of which has already been brought on the record. The ground given for termination is "service is no longer required". In the termination order Exh. R‑3 both the appellants are mentioned as temporary work‑charged employees.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants has cited 1977 P L C 695 in support of his arguments that order of termination in writing is necessary. There is no denying the fact that according to Standing Order 12 (3)written order of termination is necessary, but it cannot be said that in the written order present case there is no written order. Firstly, there is no force in the argument that order of termination Exh. R‑3 was passed afterwards and secondly even if it was so, the termination would take effect from the date of the order made in writing. It has not been shown when this order was actually prepared. It would. therefore, be deemed that it was passed on the date it carries.
4. So far as the order of appointment is concerned, no doubt, accor ding to Standing Order 2‑A, it is necessary to pass such an order in writing, but in case where no such order has been passed, it does not mean that the employee is not in service. Learned counsel says that in the absence of order of appointment in writing, it be presumed that the appel lants were permanently appointed and the respondent has intentionally failed to bring on the record the orders of appointment. Such an inference may be drawn in suitable cases but so far as the present case is concerned, one of the appellants admitted that he was temporarily employed and he remained temporary. Saleem Sajid Rizvi clearly stated in cross‑examina tion that he was kept temporary and was never made permanent. So far as Afsar Zaidi is concerned, he neither said that he was permanently employ ed, nor deposed that he was temporary. In cross‑examination he denied the suggestion that he was told that he was engaged 1 denied that Afsar He also said that he worked for 2'..8 days
Zaidi was a permanent employee. The case of the respondent is that both the appellants were temporary employees and that no permanent orders are issued in writing to the temporary employees. Afsar Zaidi, no doubt, said that he worked for 228 days, but he did not call the attendance or pay register to establish this fact. However, the reason no longer required is not sufficient even in the case of temporary employees. The post may be temporary, but by the words no longer required' it does no mean that the post has ceased to exist, unless such an assertion has specifically been made. Explicit and cogent reasons should be given for termination of service and the words no longer required' would not suffice.
5. As a result of the observation made above, I accept the appeals and setting aside the impugned decisions of the learned lower Court, direct the reinstatement of the appellants in service with 50% back benefits.
A. E. Appeal accepted.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer