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Writ Petition No. 60 of 1978, decided on 22nd October, 1983.
‑‑ Art. 199 read with Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss. 25‑A & 38‑Dismissal of workers from service after domestic enquiry‑Petition under S. 25‑A, I.R.O. dismissed by Labour Court and appeal also dismissed by Labour Appellate Tribunal‑Plea of petitioner before Tribunal for re‑examination of evidence before Enquiry Officer so as to see whether conclusions drawn were correct on facts‑Conclusion by Tribunal that re examination of evidence was not necessary and that Labour Court and Appellate Tribunal had only to see whether prescribed procedure followed‑Order of Tribunal refusing to adjudicate on facts regarding liability of petitioner based on such conclusion Held, to see without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub etc. PLD1978SC207rel.
----S. 38‑Appeal before Appellate Tribunal‑Appellate Authority required to re‑examine facts and law and then decide matter afresh.
Muhammad Asghar Malik for Petitioner.
Nemo for Respondents Nos., l and 2.
Farooq Zaman for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4.
Date of hearing : 22nd October, 1983.
This order will dispose of Writ, Petition No. 60 of 1978 and Writ Petition No. 2419 of 1978 as these raise same question of law.
2. It is unnecessary to give detailed facts of the cases. The petitioners who were employees of the contesting respondent authorities were dismissed from their service on different dates. They filed petitions under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petitions were dismissed on different dates and so also their appeals by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, vide orders, dated 28th June, 1977 and 26th October, 1977, respectively. Before the Appellate Tribunal plea was raised on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Appellate Tribunal should go into the facts of the cases in order to see whether the charges against the petitioners had been proved or not. In other words, they asked for re‑examination of the evidence before the Enquiry Officer so as to see whether the conclusions drawn were correct on facts. The learned Appellate Tribunal by referring to some decisions came to the conclusion that it was not necessary for the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal to do so. It was a matter for the Enquiry Officer. The Court and the Tribunal had only do so whether prescribed procedure had been followed. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed. Hence the aforetitled Constitutional petitions.
2. Learned counsel for' the petitioners has contended that sub section (5) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has not been kept in view by the learned Appellate Tribunal which requires that "In adjudicating and determining a grievance under sub section (4) the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case." He has referred to and placed reliance on the judgment of the learned Supreme Court reported as Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub etc. (P L D 1978 S C 207).
3. Learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that firstly this point was not taken by the petitioners in their grounds of appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. Secondly, the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal had taken into account some of the facts and the evidence on the record.
4. It is, however, undeniable that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has expressly refused to adjudicate on the facts regarding the liability) of the petitioners on the ground that this was a matter which was to be Adealt with by the Enquiry Officer and was not to be re‑examined by the Labour Court or the Appellate Tribunal. The learned Appellate Tribunal relied upon some reported decisions but these hold no water in view of the statutory provisions aforequoted and moreso, for the explicit exposi tion of the law by the learned Supreme Court in the case referred to above. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the point was not taken in the grounds of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be taken in these proceedings, has really no substance for the simple reason that a Court or a Tribunal entrusted with the duty to decide is required to ascertain facts and, then, apply the law. An appellate authority by the very nature of its function is required to re‑examine the facts and law and, then, to decide the matter B afresh. Therefore, when the petitioners filed appeals, they asked for re‑examination of the cases on facts and law. It may have been different if the petitioners had appealed only on a question of law or on some specific point. Moreover, the respondents too had not objected to the contention raised by the petitioners before the Appellate Tribunal. The point involved is of general public importance concerning large number of cases and having been resolved by the learned Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case quoted above, the petitioners are entitled to relief like anybody else. Therefore, the contention is without force and is rejected.
5. For the foregoing reason, the impugned orders of learned Appellate Tribunal are declared to be without lawful authority and of no C legal effect. These are remitted to the learned Tribunal for fresh decision in accordance with law. Since the question involved was one of law, parties are left to bear their own costs.
A. H. Petition accepted.
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