Lawyers Directory Listing
Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.
Writ Petition No. 19 of 1957, decided on 15th November 1951 under Art. 170 of the Constitution.
Ss. 6, 7, & 13‑‑Order of allotment made by Rehabilitation Authority in pursuance of scheme under S. 6‑-Final order unless disturbed in appeal, review or revision‑Rehabilitation Commissioner whether can make an order under S. 7 (1) destroying finality achieved by an order under S. 13‑Order of Rehabilitation Commissioner quashing "allotments already finalised" and directing fresh allotments to be made in light of fresh instructions ‑Whether can be said to be an order under S. 7.
An order of allotment made by Rehabilitation Authority in pursuance of a scheme under section 6 of the Rehabilitation Act, 1956, is a final order unless it has been disturbed in appeal, review or revision. If, therefore, an order of a Rehabilitation Commissioner quashing the "allotments already finalised" and directing fresh allotments to be made in light of fresh instructions were held to be a special order under section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act, it would have the effect of setting aside a multitude of orders which have become final. No such overriding jurisdiction can be claimed for an order under section 7.
Firstly, it is difficult to see how the total finality con ferred by section 13 of the Act upon "any order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner, or Additional Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner" can be taken away from such order by passing an order under subsection (1) of section 7 and calling it an administrative order. The Act itself makes no distinction between orders if they "aggrieve" a person.
Secondly, assuming that any sort of overriding order can be passed under section 7, so long as it is for the proper discharge of functions, it must not be inconsistent with the Act, which also means inconsistent with anything done under the Act. But if an order has become final under the Act, then an order under section 7 which quashes it is certainly inconsistent with the Act.
Thirdly, section 7 does not claim for itself any supersedural quality by using some such words as "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in the Act" which section 4. for instance employs.
Therefore, no order can be made under section 7, sub section (1), which destroys the finality achieved by an order under section 13.
--S. 11 (4) ‑Rehabilitation Commissioner has no power to pass an omnibus order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction, without giving notice to individuals in manner contemplated by subsection (4).
A Rehabilitation Commissioner has no power to pass an omnibus order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 11 subsection (4) of the Rehabilitation Act, 1956, without giving notice to individuals in the manner contem plated by subsection (4) of the Act.
Where, therefore, the Rehabilitation Commissioner first heard the allottees of one Chak collectively, and thereafter' called in persons from the other thirteen Chaks and informed them of the substance of the order intended to be passed.
Held, that the requirements of subsection (4) of section 11 were not complied with.
---S. 11 (5) ‑‑Power of Rehabilitation Authority to review its own order --Extent.
A review of its own order is undertaken by a Rehabilitation Authority when an error or omission is apparent on the face of the record. This power does not extend to the merits of a case.
Where the Rehabilitation Commissioner reviews an order before any error or omission becomes apparent and the extent of review is also indeterminate, it is reviewing a case on merits, which the law does not contemplate.
Muhammad Ramzan v. Rehabilitation Commissioner Lahore P L D 1956 Lah. 642 ref.
Kh. Abdur Rahim for Petitioners.
M. Anwar, Assistant Advocate‑General for Respondent.
Dates of hearing: 22nd, 23rd, 29th and 30th October 1957.
‑These sixteen petitions under Article 170 of the Constitution seek relief against two identical orders of the Rehabilitation Commissioner dated the 11th November 1956 and the 23rd November 1956 (each covering a different set of revenue estates) by which he quashed the "allotments already finalised" in fourteen estates of Pakpattan Tehsil and directed fresh allotments to be made in the light of fresh instructions. The number of allottees involved in these petitions is ninety-three, of whom eighty five were sitting allottees and only eight non‑allottees. Sitting allottees or temporary allottees were refugees in whose favour temporary allotments had been made soon after the partition, in a particular estate, while non‑allottees in respect of that estate were those who had either no allotments made to them or had received them in different estates.
The impugned order opens with a statement that it had come to the notice of the Rehabilitation Commissioner that allotments in these fourteen estates had not been made in accordance with the provisions of the Rehabilitation Settle ment Scheme and that "a very large number of sitting allottees had been deprived of their rights". The question of "revising" these allotments had, therefore, been under his consideration, and with a view to satisfying himself as to "the legality and propriety" thereof, he had summoned all con cerned through proclamation and had heard them estate wise at Pakpattan. It had been "frankly conceded" before him that "non‑allottees had been allowed to get allotments . . . . . against the interests of the sitting allottee‑claimants".
Having said this, he quashed the allotments and issued the following directions for fresh allotments:‑
"(i) Persons eligible for allotment will be these:‑
(a) who were temporary allottees and gave their claim forms for this very estate and whose claims had been received by or were pending on the date noted against each estate in the margin of the first paragraph of this order when the first or the most of the confirmations were made,
(b) who were temporary allottees and had registered their claim forms for different estates but had got the same transferred to this estate on or before the date specified above.
(c) who were Government servants or such other non -allottees of the estate who bad been permitted to be treated. as allottees in accordance with paragraph 7, Part II of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme and had put in claim forms for this very estate and whose claim forms were pending satisfaction on the said date.
(d) Government servants and other classes of claimants mentioned in item (c) above, who had given claim forms for a different estate but hid got them transferred to the said estate on or before the said date."
The claims of the persons mentioned in the four sub -clauses above will be met in full if land is available. The claims were in terms of produce units, which have been increased by the Government since they. were first calculated, but clause (iv) of paragraph 3 says that in calculating the entitlement, "regard should not be paid to the increase in produce indices ordered subsequent to the specified date".
I other words, if, the increase was ordered before the 'specified date", it should be taken into consideration.
In the fourth paragraph the Rehabilitation Commissioner adverted particularly to four of these fourteen Chaks, namely, 133; 155, 251 and 253, where "orders in revisional proceedings have already been passed by me", and as those orders had normally become final, he directed that they should be "considered as reviewed to the extent to which they may be found to differ from the principles enunciated in this order " He referred to these cases as "revisional appli cations Nos. 206, 165, 200 and 169". Three of those four estates are involved in Writ Petitions Nos. 64, 107 and 173.
It will be noticed from clause (i) (a) of the third para graph of the impugned order that persons eligible for allotment will be temporary allottees in the estate for which they gave their claim forms "and whose claims had been received by or were pending on the date noted against each estate in the margin of the first paragraph of this order when the first or the most of the confirmations were made". In subsequent sub‑clauses, "the date noted against each estate" has been described as "the specified date" and it is this date, different in each estate, which has provided the amplest target for attack. The nature of the objections can be illustrated by reference to a single estate, No. 69 for instance, which is the subject‑matter of Writ Petition No. 19. The first round of allotments in this estate took place on the 24th October 1951 and the second round on the 7th January 1952 covering perhaps the whole estate. According to the impugned order, the "specified date" to be taken into account when making fresh allotments in this estate will, be the 15th June 1954, with the result that persons who had transferred their claims to this estate even after the 7th January 1952, when all existing claims had been finalised, or persons who were "Government servants or such other non‑allottees of the estate who had been permitted to be treated as allottees in accordance with paragraph 7, Part 11" of the Scheme, whether they had preferred their claim forms for this estate or for a different estate, so long as they had preferred or transferred them by the 15th June 1954, were to be treated on an equal. footing with persons who had preferred their claims from the earliest times for this very estate. This new date will naturally increase the number of claimants in each estate, and the area of land to meet the claims being inadequate, each claimant whose claim has already become finalised will receive a proportionately smaller area of land than was allotted to him previously.
The Rehabilitation Commissioner has quashed the existing allotments on the alleged ground that they are not in accord with the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. It is contended, however, that the execution of his order will profoundly militate against the Scheme itself, first, by introducing Arbitrary dates which hop the effect of increasing the number of claimants, and, secondly, by giving full value, to the increase in produce units. For clause (iv) of paragraph 3, although innocently dressed in prohibitive language‑‑"regard should not be paid to the increase in produce indices ordered subsequent to the specified date"‑carries a formidable sting‑in the tail, the "specified date" being a date by which the most substantial part of the increase in the produce indices has swept the field of claim.
The main contention in these petitions is that the Rehabi litation Commissioner has no power to pass an omnibus order in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under section 11 sub section (4) of the Rehabilitation Act. 1956, without giving notice to individuals in the manner contemplated by sub section (4), and that he could not review his own orders on (merits, as he had done in the case of the four estates mentioned in paragraph 4.
The learned Assistant Advocate‑General, Mr. Muhammad Anwar, maintained that the order in question had been passed under section 7 of the Act, which empowered a Rehabilitation. Commissioner to pass "such general or special orders, not inconsistent with this Act, as he may consider necessary for the proper discharge of his functions". He said this was a special order intended to cover fourteen estates, and was an "administrative" order as opposed to a "judicial" order passed in revision. This was necessary in view of the fact that big claimants, although entitled as sitting allottees, had managed to get their entire claims satisfied in one Chak to the detriment of smaller claimants. Thus in Chak No. 69, while there were only 52030 produce units available for allot ment, the claims of sitting allottees alone amounted to 62864 units, which had now increased to 73093 by the revision of produce indices. This will now be divided in "the same round", as required by paragraph 7 of the Scheme, of course proportionately. When it was pointed out to Mr. Anwar that one effect of introducing "specified dates" would be to increase the claims from 62864 produce units to 73093 by reason of the increase in produce indices and to include more claimants, he admitted that the fixation of dates was not justified. We do not expect this admission to be agreeable to the Rehabilitation Commissioner for, if we do not fix a date, then we must go by the date on which the first round of allotments was made and consider how each individual allottee will be affected by the produce units of his rivals on that particular date, ignoring claims which were transferred thereafter, ignoring also the inflation in produce units‑and that exactly is the individual attention which these petitioners demand. Further, we can see that in the absence of these artificial dates, the Rehabilitation Commissioner will not consider it worthwhile to revise the existing allotments, because the principal object apparent to us‑the accommo dation of claims transferred between 1950 and 1953 or 1954 (in one case 1956)‑--will be defeated.
We notice from Mr. Anwar's argument that although according to the order itself the basis for the great quashment was that non-allottees had been allowed to get allotments under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme against the interests of the sitting allottee‑claimants" the order is also feeling aggrieved against sitting allottees who had reaped a rich harvest at the expense of other sitting allottees. We do not see any such apparent meaning in the order, but the larger ground on which we propose to give our decision will not be influenced by these minor considerations.
The Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme was prepared under section 7 (1) of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordi nance, XIX of 1948, as amended in 1949, by an order of the Central Government dated the 15th June 1950. The exact date on which it came into operation has not been given to us, but we know that it was already operating in October 1930. The Ordinance of 1948 and other enactments which amended be succeeded it have been repealed now by the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, XVII of 1956. Except that certain sections have been differently numbered, the Act of 1956 is substantially a reproduction of the earlier enactments. Section 7, for instance, under which the Scheme was prepared, is now section 6.
The Act defines a 'Rehabilitation Authority" as meaning any Rehabilitation Board, Rehabilitation Commissioner, or Additional, Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner appointed under the Act, and section 3 provides for the appointment of these officers (except the Rehabilitation Board) "for such areas or purposes as may be specified". Section 10 provides for the setting up of Rehabilitation Boards consisting of such Rehabilitation Commissioners and other consisting as may be specified "for the allotting of industrial undertakings". The Board for West Pakistan consists of the joint Secretary to the Central Rehabilitation Ministry as 'Chairman, with four members, namely, the Rehabilitation Commissioner for West Pakistan, the Director of Industries and a nominee each of the Finance Ministry and the Rehabili tation Ministry in the Province. This is apparently a higher‑powered body than the Rehabilitation Commissioner by himself.
The general power of Rehabilitation Authority to allot evacuee property is stated in section 7. subsection (2), clause (d) oft this Act, but this allotment is confined to the settlement of refugees. Under section 18 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act. 1957, however, he can allot such property to any person, for the purpose of social and economic rehabilitation. The scheme of section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act was to provide for general and special powers in the first subsection and for particular purposes in the second subsection‑a common fashion of the draftsman, who can for the time being visualise only certain matters in which orders would be given, but who wants to provide for matters which may arise hereafter, and the particular cases covered by the second subsection are there fore; without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by the preceding subsection'. But in either case, the orders must be "subject to the provisions of this Act,. or 'not inconsistent with this Act".
''In the original enactment, both subsections related to the powers of the Rehabilitation Commissioner. Subsequently, the words "Rehabilitation Commissioner" in the second sub section were replaced by "Rehabilitation Authority". This gives one an impression that the Rehabilitation Commissioner bras reserved for "general or special orders", while the orders specified in subsection (2) were to be passed by all Rehabili tation Authorities. At least that is now the only possible interpretation. If by the date of this alteration, the Central. Government had begun to discern a distinction between the two classes of orders‑‑the general or special orders of sub section (1) and the particular orders of subsection (2)‑the distinction‑bas not been disclosed to us. Hut we do not fail to see that the sense of draftsman ship which harmonised the two subsections has now vanished; for when you say in the first part of a section, with reference to a Rehabilitation Commissioner, that he will; have certain general powers to achieve the purposes of the Act and in the second part you say that he will, "in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the powers" conferred in the first part, have certain specified powers, you are thinking of one authority in both 'contexts and not of two different authorities.
Then there is section 6, which gives a special power to the Central Government to authorise a Rehabilitation Commis sioner "to pool" evacuee property and allot the same, whether to evacuees or residents; whereupon the Rehabili tation Commissioner will prepare a scheme for pooling and allotting such property.
Lastly, section 11 is of interest. It provides for appeal, review or revision, to be availed of by "a person aggrieved by an order under this Act". If the order is by an Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, the appeal will be to the Deputy rehabilitation Commissioner, and if by the latter, to the Rehabilitation Commissioner, who may transfer it to an Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner. It follows that there is no appeal froth an order of the Rehabilitation Com missioner himself, but in section 12 there is provision for revision from his order to the Central Government and in practice it is heard by the Custodian.
'The Rehabilitation Commissioner himself exercises his Revisional powers thus: He may, of his own motion or on application, call for the record of any proceeding relating to any of the purposes of the Act, which is pending before or has been disposed of by an Additional, Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner, for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the "legality or propriety" of any order passed in the said proceeding, and may, "after perusal of the record" as such order as he thinks fit. but if any person is to be effected" by any such order, he must have an opportunity of being heard. This is subsection, (4),
In subsection (5), there is power in any Rehabilitation Authority to review its own order, after notice to the parties, "so far as justice may require, to correct errors or supply omissions which are apparent upon the face of the record" We have held in this Court that such power does not extend to the merits of a case. Muhammad Ramzan v. The Rehabilitation Commissioner (General), Lahore (P L D 106 Lab. 642: P L R 1956 (W P)1625). Section 13 says that, subject to the provisions of sections 11 and 12, any order passed by a Rehabilitation Commissioner or his subordinates shall be final. This means that if an order allotting land has been made by an authority subordinate to the Rehabilitation Commissioner, then unless there has been an appeal or revision under section 11, it becomes final. In the event of appeal or revision, the order in appeal or revision will be final. If there has been a review, the order in review will be final. .
Consequently, an order of allotment made by a Rehabilitation Authority it, pursuance of the scheme is a final order unless it has been disturbed in appeal, review or revision. If, therefore, the impugned order was a special order under section 7, as Mr. Anwar claims, it has the effect of setting aside a multitude of orders which have become, final and the question is whether any such over‑riding jurisdiction can be claimed for an order under section 7.
'Firstly, we do not ‑see how the total finality conferred by section 13 upon "any order passed by a Rehabilitation, Com missioner, or Additional, Deputy or Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner" can be taken away from such order by passing an order under subsection (1) of section 7 and calling it an administrative order. The Act itself makes no distinction between orders if they "aggrieve" a person, but if by an administrative order is meant an order which does not "affect" or "aggrieve" anybody, then we have no objection to adopting the term, for subsection' (2) of section 7 itself contains clause which contemplate such orders. Thus, under clause (g), they Rehabilitation Authority may arrange for the re‑opening of any abandoned business, and under clause (h), it may incur expenditure in connection with the assumption of possession or control or management of any abandoned property.
Secondly, assuming that any sort of over‑riding order can be passed under section 7, so long as it is for the proper dis charge of functions, then it must not be inconsistent with the Act, which also means inconsistent with anything done under the Act. But if an order has become final under the Act, the an order under section 7 which quashes it is certainly incon sistent with the Act.
Thirdly‑‑and this is really a further elaboration of the second point‑section 7 does not claim for itself any supersedural quality by using some such words as "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in the Act" which section 4 for instance, employs.
We, therefore, think that no order can be made under section 7, subsection (1), which destroys the finality achieved by an order under section 13,
But this was only an argument of Mr. Anwar. The Rehabilitation Commissioner himself has no doubt that he is "revising" the allotments in exercise of his revisional jurisdic tion under subsection (4) of section ll, for apart from the, use of the word "revision" and its grammatical variations in several places, apart from the fact that the order is named as "Revi sion Side No. 2292, 1956‑57", he reproduces the essence of subsection (4) when he says that be had summoned all the allottees of these estates "with a view . . . . . . . to satisfy myself as to the legality or propriety of the allotments made . . . . :' Then, in the fourth paragraph, he calls attention to certain orders made by him in four different revisional pro ceedings. each bearing a "revisional application" number, as though he felt that a revisional order could not be further revised, though it could be reviewed. So he considers, and directs others to consider, that those orders stand reviewed to the extent to which they may be found different from "the principles enunciated in this order".
It is obvious that the Rehabilitation Commissioner was fully alive to the requirements of subsection (4). Only he did not exactly comply with those requirements. He did not call for the record of each separate proceeding and he did not give the petitioners an opportunity of being heard in that separate proceeding. A Tehsil peon informed some men in the village a day or two before the 11th November 1956, that if anybody wanted to appear before the Rehabilitation Commissioner in connection with the revision of allotments, h should do so at Pakpattan. On the 11th November, 1956 that Rehabilitation Commissioner first heard the allottees o Chak 33 collectively, and thereafter called in persons fro the other thirteen Chaks and informed them of the substance of the order intended to be passed. These are definite allegations in the petitions, and the reply to them is that "due publicity was made of the Rehabilitation Commissioner's arrival at Pakpattan through Tehsil peons in the estates effect ed and the persons from each Chak came and their arguments were heard by the Rehabilitation Commissioner . . . . ."
We do not think this amounts to "giving such person an opportunity of being heard", "such person" being the person affected by the order. The order itself shows that the Rehabi litation Commissioner had heard "the persons present sepa rately from each Chak". which confirms the petitioners contention that people from each Chak were dealt with in groups. In the estate as a whole, allotments may have been made irregularly, but even in such an estate there may be individuals who could show that they were sitting allottees, that their entire claim was not satisfied in the village, that rival sitting allottees had fared no worse, and that person who had transferred their claims by that particular date hay also received proportionate allotments. If, notwithstanding these findings, he "thinks fit" to quash the allotment, we car have no legal objection even if we are of the contrary opinion, as we should be. Bat he will not then be able to say even to himself that this particular man has profited at the expense of the sitting allottees, and that a good reason exists for quashing numberless allotments with one order. No such general order is contemplated in a revision petition.
As regards the "review" which should be "considered" to have been made if it should be found out subsequently that review was called for, we regard, this a very unorthodox method of reviewing an order. A review is undertaken when an error or omission is apparent on the face of the record Here, the Rehabilitation Commissioner reviews an order before any error or omission becomes apparent, and the extent of review is also indeterminate depending upon what may turn out to be the case after the new dates and the new claim become operative. This is also reviewing the cases on merits which the law does not contemplate.
We have no doubt that the exercise of the two jurisdic tions, revisional and review, has knocked subsections (4) and (5) out of section 11. Dispensation of justice must be in recog nized legal forms, so that at some stage in his struggle for existence a person in these surroundings could heave a sigh of relief and say to himself: "This is my own, my second native land".
But in substance also, the order violates the scheme in several important details. It has already been stated that the scheme was authorised by the Central Government in June 1950 and that by October of that year it was already in opera tion. It is shown in two Parts, though Part I alone purports to be the scheme, a brief statement in 23 paragraphs of how land' is to be granted in lieu of land left in India. By para graph 23 the Rehabilitation Commissioner empowers himself to issue detailed instructions from time to time as problems arise for "the proper implementation of the scheme", and the result in Part II. For all practical purposes, therefore, the references are to Part II of the Scheme, and when we speak of paragraph 7, as an instance, we mean paragraph 7 of Part 11.
Land was allotted permanently after tire claims of dis placed persons bad been verified by the Central Record Office. To begin with, Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioners were allowed to meet fully the claims of persons who were entitled to allotment up to 20,000 produce index units and to apply a cut of 50%, in respect of the balance, but not to exceed 36.000 units in any case. (Pare. 3, 11th July 1950). As, however, people showed preference for certain areas and caused a con gestion therein these areas came to be termed "congested districts". These districts are Lyallpur, Multan. Montgomery. (except Pakpattan and Dipalpur Tehsils) and Shahpur. In these districts the maximum allotment was fixed at 2000 units. (Pare. 4). In the congested districts land was to be allotted only to "sitting allottees", while in other places both sitting allottees and non‑allottees were to be treated "in the same round", that is, at one time, on as equal footing. (Pare. 7. 29th June 1950). But if land was insufficient, preference was to be given to sitting allottees and the non‑allottees were to be accommodated thereafter in the same or adjoining estate. Where laid available in an estate could not satisfy the entire claims even of sitting allottees, each was to receive a certain minimum and beyond the minimum an addition more or less proportionate to the magnitude of his claim, relying for the balance on other estates. (Para. 11, 20th November 1951). Government servants and local owners were to be deemed "sitting allottees" if they had originally registered claims for that estate and' (in the case of the former) had near relatives settled in the estate. (Para. 7‑A, dated 6th October 1953). An allowance‑holder settled in a congested district, who had registered his claim in that district, was preferred to non -allottees but subordinated to sitting allottees. (Para. 8, 1st November 1951). If a temporary allottee gets his claim transferred or retransferred in the village where he already holds allotment before the allotment of the area in question is finalised ‑in favour of some other claimant, he shall have a preferential right to it But if in the meantime it has been finally, allotted to some other party, die shall have no claim to it. (Para. 9‑A, 21st July 1953). In the case of claimants whose claims or objections have not yet been verified (appa rently through no fault of theirs), an area equal to 75 percent of the claim was to be reserved for them. But no one was to be allowed to benefit by this provision if he had not got this claim registered until the 1st pf October 1951, except after sufficient area had been reserved for the older claimants. (Para. 20. 2nd November 195).
These are some of the important instructions on which rehabilitation officers had to act, apparently immediately on receipt thereof, and the first instalment of these instructions as shown in para. 7 was received in June 1950. by these first instructions., and was to be allotted both to allottees and non‑allottees in non‑congested areas like Pakpattan "in the same sound"; preference being given to the former where availability was limited. In pursuance of those instructions, final allotments were made both to allottees and non‑allottees on certain dates. As an. instance, Chak No. 59 was "settled" on the. 24th October 1951 in the first round and on the 7th January 1952, in the second round. Subsequently, certain advantages were given, to allowance‑holders (para. 8) and Government servants and local owners (para. 7‑A). but they would naturally not disturb the allotments already finalised. The reservation of TS per cent, was also restricted to those whose claims had been registered before the 1st October 1951. (Para. 20). Finally, in July 1953, provision was made for the transfer of claims also, but so as not to disturb those whose claims had been finalised. (Para. 9‑A). All these finalities will now disappear, and their beneficiaries "in the dust be equal made" with fresh claimants. All the limitation dates given in these instructions will be advanced to the 15th June 1954 (in the case of Chak 69), so as to make fresh allot ments "in accordance with the provisions of the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme". Nothing could be more in dis‑accord with the Scheme.
After all the, work of rehabilitation consists in the settling of refugees, not in their unsettling, and since it is not suggested that a refugee claimant receives more than what he had left behind, we do not see how the fat kine can swallow they leaf kine, if another pasture can be made available for the latter. The rights hate been artificially created, the earliest, settlers to receive precedence over the later claimants, arid subsequent amendments, however beneficial, could not be used to unsettle those whose claims have been finalised. If the Rehabilitation Commissioner still considers that the scheme has operated unjustly, the only remedy is retrospective legislation.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that these petitions should succeed, and we quash the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner 'accordingly. The petitioners will receive their costs. "
K. B. A. Order quashed.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer