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Civil Revision Petition No. 172 of 1954. decided on 13th November 1957, under section 115, Civil P. C. for revision of the order of Muhammad Saleem, Senior Civil Judge, Gujran wale, dated the 26th June 1954.
Expressions capable of ‑both wide and narrow sense or either wide or narrow sense-‑Rule‑Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI of 1887). S. SU‑To be construed so as to maintain jurisdiction of Civil Courts so far as f it is rationally possible.
Where an expression or a word is capable of a limited as well as a wide sense only, that sense should be assigned to it which is in accord with the spirit and the meaning of the section in which it: is used and not inconsistent with those of the other provisions of the Act. But if‑the expression be open to either the wider or the narrower interpretation and neither can be definitely excluded with reference to the language employed in the section or the other provisions of the Act the matter falls to be decided upon certain presumptions, known as rules or principles of interpretation of statutes. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must not be lightly construed as having been taken away and conferred upon a tribunal or Court of special jurisdiction. The jurisdic tion of civil Courts is presumed to continue unless taken away by a statute expressly or by necessary implication. Therefore, it is the duty of Court to so interpret section 50 as to maintain as far as it is rationally possible, without doing violence to the clear intention of the statute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
Where it is possible to place two interpretations, only that should be accepted which would preserve the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and exclude that of the Revenue Court.
Ss. 50 & 77 (3) First Group (g)‑"Compensation refers to compensation permis sible under the Tenancy Act‑-Civil Court competent to entertain suit in regard to damages other than those so permissible‑Suit for compensation for standing crops and damages for illegal arrest cognizable by Civil Court, but not claim for expenses of preparing land for cultivation.
A tenant who does not choose to avail himself of the suit under section 50 can have his remedy in the Civil Court after the lapse of one year regarding his dispossession or ejectment and damages.
A suit under section 50 is only an alternative remedy, given to a dispossessed or ejected tenant in a Revenue Court'; and, obviously, only to sub serve the purposes (if the Act, which do not cover ail the incidents of the relationship between a landlord ands tenant; nor those between the wrong‑doer and the injured person. The suit contemplated by that section is not co‑extensive with a shit which a person in similar circumstances may file in a Civil Court.
Under section 50 a tenant may claim only such compensation as is permissible under the Tenancy Act and which the revenue Courts have been empowered to grant. This conclusion emerges from a Consideration of the various provisions in the Act relating to compensation namely sections 44, 45, 48, 49 and 50‑A and the fourth chapter.
As the cause of action for a suit under section 50 is dis possession or ejectment and the plaintiff leas been given the right to sue for possession or compensation upon that cause of action, it is a logical conclusion that tile compensation In the contemplation of the section is for that dispossession or ejectment alone.
Held, therefore, that the claim of plaintiff to damages the standing crop is cognizable by the Civil court. It was lion a necessary concomitant, or an inevitable consequence, of the plaintiff's dispossession that his crop should have been either damaged or forcibly taken by the landlord, or by any‑one at his instance.
Compensation for standing craps is not contemplated by section 50 at all. Under that section compensation can be claimed only for such loss which is necessarily and inextricably the consequence of dispossession.
But loss of expenses for preparing soil for future culti vation is within, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court is so far as the relief in respect of it is sought against the landlord or his agents. Section 49 (3) gives the right to an ejected tenant to receive a fair equivalent in money for the labour and capital expended by him in preparing the laud; and loss on this account is a necessary and Inevitable consequence of dispossession or ejectment. There are two points. However to be noted in this connection Firstly, it is only the claim for a fair equivalent in money for actual labour acid capital expended by the tenant which is cognizable by a Revenue Court; any other claim by way of damages on this account would clearly be cognizable by a Civil Court.
Claim for damages for illegal arrest of the tenant in pro ceedings for dispossession is cognizable by a Civil Court only.
Baru v. Niadar I L R 24 Lah. 191 rel.
Moti Lai and another v. Kartar Singh and others I L R 11 Lah. 427; Kesar Singh v. Nihal Singh 45 P R 1891 ; Akbar Hussain v. Karam Dad 90 P R 1918; Cheta v. Baija I L R 9 Lah. 38; Baru v. Niadar I L R 24 Lah. 191; Joti v. Kesar Singh 45 P R 1891 and Udham Singh v. Mahesba 80 P R 1891 ref.
S. 48‑Provides a measure of relief to tenant‑-Does not give a right to compensa tion for wrong done to landlord.
Section 48, Punjab Tenancy Act does not give the landlord a right to compensation for wrong done to him or to his lied. I was enacted as a measure of relief for the tenant, who, rider the law, is liable to be ejected. It is the tenant's dis cretion to pay or not to pay the compensation which is awarded only to remedy the tactual injury anal not by way of damages.
S. 50‑A‑‑"Com pensation" has some meaning as in S. 50.
Section 50‑A describes the nature of the suit under' section 50 and, therefore, the word "compensation" in it would have the same meaning as in section 50.
S. 66‑--Applies even if notice of ejectment is unjustified‑-Right to compensation in Civil Court.
By virtue of section 66 a tenant is not entitled to any compensation for improvement begun by him after the institution of a suit for, or service o a notice of, ejectment even through the suit or the notice may be legally unjustified, and may, eventually, fail while, under the general law the Civil Court can, and indeed must, award damages for the same if the tenant is ejected at any time afterward
Sh. Maqbool Ahmad for Petitioners.
Fazal‑ud‑Din for Respondent.
F. M. Anwari for Punjab Province, Respondent 2.
The plaintiff‑respondent Mian Ghulam Mustafa took a lease of 44 Kanals 7 Marlas of land situate within the Municipal limits of Gujranwala from the defendant‑petitioner, Municipal Committee, Gujranwala do the 1st of July 2951 lad obtained possession of the leased pro perty. 'It is alleged by the respondent that he was forcibly dispossessed from the land by the petitioner on the 12th of February, 1953, on the wrong allegation that the lease in his favour had expired. After duly noticing the petitioner in accordance with the requirements of section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the respondent filed the suit, out of which t e present revision petition has arisen, on the 20th of May 1953. He alleged that the lease in his favour was for a period of five, years and had, therefore, not expired on the date of his dispossession. Besides the Municipal Committee, the Province of Punjab, the Executive Officer. Municipal Committee, and Mr. Ahmad Mahmood Saeed, Additional District Magistrate,, Gujranwala were also impleaded as defendants. Although it is not dearly stated in the plaint in what capacity the 4th, defendant, namely, Mr. Ahmad Mahmood Saeed, was implead ed, it appears that the Municipal Committee had beets superseded by the Provincial Government and he had been appointed as the Administrator of its affairs. It was alleged in paragraph No. 3 of the plaint that the greater part of the leased land had been sublet by the plaintiff‑respondent for five years to various persons as he had the right to do so under the terms of the lease in his favour. It is alleged in paragraphs Nos. 7 and 8 that the Administrator of Defendant No, 1. that is to say, the Committee, had the plaintiff arrested and dispossessed forcibly and that the, crop standing on the land was, conse quently, destroyed. The plaintiff prayed for a decree for Re. 6,000, the details of which are stated in paragraph No. 8 as follows:
| Rs.
(1) Loss (nuqsan) to the crop standing on the land in question 4,000 (2) Loss (nuqsan) of expenses for preparing soil for future cultivation 1,000
(3) Damages (nuqsan) on account of mental dis tress caused by illegal arrest 1,000
Total ... 6,000
|
It was stated in paragraph No. 10 of the plaint that in case defendants Nos. land 2 are not found to be liable, then the 4th defendant is' individually liable for his acts and a decree for the amounts specified in paragraph No. 8 may be granted against him. It was indicated in paragraph No. 11 that since a suit for the possession of the land is cognizable by a Revenue Court, the plaintiff will separately sue defendant No. 1 or its servants or the persons who may be in possession through it for possession in that Court.
In view of the written statements filed by the defendants, the learned Senior Civil judge, who tried the case, framed the following preliminary issues:‑‑‑
(1) Whether the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of this suit
(2) Whether due notice under section 80 of the Civil P. C. was given to the defendants If not what is its effect
(3) Whether the members of the Committee who passed Resolutions Nos. 29 dated the 24th of July 1951 and 30 of the 15th of December 1951 are necessary parties
(4) Whether the police officers concerned in the arrest of the plaintiff are necessary parties
The learned Judge, by his order dated the 26th of June 1954, found all the four issues in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Aggrieved by that order, all the defendants, excepting the Punjab Province, have come up to this Court in revision. Learned counsel for the petitioners stated before us that he accepted the findings of the lower Court on issues Nos. 2, 4 and 5 and desired to challenge the finding on the first issue only.
It is contended that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by section 77. subsection (3), clause (g). of the Tenancy G, Act which makes suits by tenants under section 50 exclusively v, cognizable by Civil Courts. Section 50 of the Act provides G
as follows:‑‑
"Relief for wrongful dispossession or ejectment".
In either of the following cases, namely:‑
"(a) If a tenant has been dispossessed without his consent of his tenancy or any part thereof otherwise than in execution of a decree or than in pursuance of an order under section 44 or section 45;
(b) If a tenant who, not having instituted a suit under section 45 has been ejected from his tenancy or any part thereof in pursuance of an order under that section denies his liability to be ejected, the tenant may, within one year from the date of his dispossession or ejectment, institute a suit for recovery of possession or occupancy; or for compensation. or for both".
The present case falls under clause (a) because the plaintiff in this case bas been dispossessed of his tenancy otherwise than in execution of a decree or than in pursuance of an order under section 44 or section 45 of the Act. The sole point for decision in this case is whether the 'various amounts claimed by the plaintiff in this case can be considered as com pensation within the meaning of section 50. Unfortunately, neither the word "compensation" has been defined in the Act; nor is its ambit precisely ascertainable from the provi sions of section 50 itself. Was it intended that compensation under section 50 should be allowed only for the dispossession from tenancy and not for all kinds of damage caused in the course, or as a consequence, of the act of dispossession
Again, is the compensation recoverable under section 50 con fined only to the actual damage or as in tort, to all conse quential damages directly caused by the act complained of
Where an expression or a word is capable of a limited a well 'as a wide' sense only, that sense should be assigned to it which is in accord with the spirit and the meaning of the section in which it is used‑ and not inconsistent with those of the other provisions of the Act. But if the expression be open to either the wider or the narrower interpretation and neither' cart be definitely excluded with reference to the language employed in the section or the other provisions of the Act the matter falls to the decided upon certain presumptions, known as rules or principles of interpretation of statutes. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must not be lightly construed as having been taken away and conferred upon a tribunal or Court of special jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts is presumed to continue unless taken away by a statute expressly or by necessary implication.
Therefore, it is our duty to so interpret section 50 as to main tain, as far as it is rationally possible, without doing violence to the clear intention of the statute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
The correct meaning of an expression can be understood only with reference to the context in which it is used. The immediate and limited context to be considered in this case is section 50 itself and the wider is the Act containing that section. It is, therefore, necessary to first determine the nature and scope of the provisions contained in the said section. The Tenancy Act contains provisions relating to certain aspects of the relationship between a landlord and a tenant. It was pointed out by a Full Bench in Moti W and another v. Kartar Singh and others (1 L R 11 Lah. 427) that the Tenancy Act is not exhaustive and matters nut specially provided therein are still governed by the general law of landlord and, are, therefore, cognizable by Civil Courts. A full bench consisting of three learned judges of the late Punjab carver Court, who decided the case of Kesar Singh v. Nihal Singh (45 P R 1891) agreed with the opinion expressed by Plowden, J in his order of reference that ordinarily a tenant person who has right to hold the tenancy land and does hold it and the "the person described in section 50 is a tenant only by an excep tional use of the term tenant, and only ****** during the period prescribed for bringing this special suit granted to him section 50, and for the purpose of exercising this right to sue. We may respectfully add that the person is a tenant for tile purpose of section 50 because of the proviso that the definitions contained in section 4 of the Act are to hold good "unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context". The ruling in Kesar Singh's case, read with order of reference of Justice Plowden makes it clear that since an ex‑tenant continues to be a tenant only for the purpose of section 50, as also of section 77 (3) (g), it is open to him to sue his ex‑landlord in a Civil Court for possession and com pensation after the expiry of one year after his dispossession. After more than a quarter of a century, however, this ruling was questioned for the first time in certain obiter dicta in Akbar Hussain v. Karam Dad (90 P R 1918), which was decided by a Full Bench of three judges, But this ruling did not overrule, and could not have overruled the earlier ruling in Kesar Singh v. Nihal Singh because the facts upon which it is founded are clearly distinguishable. In Akbar Hussain s case before the suit for compensation was filed, the tenant had already recovered possession of his tenancy by means of a suit under section 50 and therefore was clearly a tenant ate the date of the suit.
Exception was taken in Akbar Hussain's cast to the obser vation of Sir Meredyth Plowden in Kesar Singh's cast that in his view the provisions of section 51 showed that the reel object of section 50 was "to substitute a summary remedy to the wrongfully dispossessed tenant for recovery of possession instead of that given with a shorter period of limitation by section 9 of the Specific Relief Act". The nature of objection was thus stated by justice Chevis who delivered the leading judgment: "But in a suit to recover possession under section 50 the plaintiff hits to prove more than in a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act; it is not enough merely to prove dispossession, he must also prove ‑a right to recover possession, just as he would have to prove in a regular, suit in the Civil Court. and so I fail to see how section 50 can be said to provide a 'summary' remedy". When a person mentioned in clause (b) institutes a suit under section 50, he is in effect filing a suit of the same nature which he was entitled to file under section 45. Section 50 gives him one more chance to file a suit in the Revenue Court and section 51 takes away his remedy under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. Similarly, the person described icy clause (a) is given a remedy in the Revenue Court instead of the ‑summary remedy under the Specific Relief Act. It is true that Sir Meredyth Plowden would have been on safer ground if in the passage quoted above lie had said "to substitute a remedy through the revenue Court" instead of "to substitute a summary remedy; " but this expressional lapse does not in any way detract from the soundness of the conclusion, or the reasoning, of that eminent judge. The correctness of that conclusion was further vindi cated b the insertion in the Act of section 50‑A by section 2 of the Punjab Act. V of 1929, which provides‑
"No person whose ejectment has been ordered by a revenue Court under section 45, subsection (6), or whose suit has been dismissed under section 50. may institute a suit in a Civil Court to contest his liability to ejectment of to recover possession or occupancy rights, or to recover compensation".
It will be noticed that (a) if the provisions of clause (p) of subsection (3) of section 77 had barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, it had been unnecessary to enact this new section and (b) section 50‑A bars a suit in Civil Court by the ex‑tenant only when lie has filed a suit either under subsection (4) of section 45 or under section 50 and has been unsuccessful and not when he chooses to forego his alternate remedy in the revenue Court in favour of his suit in the Civil Court. In Cheta v. Baija (I L R 9 Lah. 38) a Full Bench consisting of five Judges held that a person who has been dispossessed from his tenancy after notice under section 43 and who has been unsuccessful in a suit under section 45 can bring a suit in the Civil Court for possession of the land on the ground that he has a right of occupancy therein; and that section 77 (3) is no bar. Addison, J., delivering a separate judgment, observed in an After dictum that Akbar Hussain v. Karam Dad had been correctly decided. In the subsequent Full Bench case of Baru v. Niadar (I L R 24 Lah. 191), however, Dalip Singh, J, who wrote the lead ing judgment, in which Abdul Rashid and Munir, JJ., concur red, held that Joti v. Kesar Singh (45 P R 1891) was rightly decided. In his separate judgment Tek Chatta. J. also upheld the ruling in Kesar Singh's Case. It must, therefore, now be held that that ruling still holds the field and that a tenant who does not choose to avail himself of the suit under section 50 can have his remedy in the Civil Court after the lapse of one year regarding his dispossession tic ejectment and damages.
It will be seen from the preceding discussion that a suit under section 50 is only an alternative remedy given to a dis-possessed or ejected tenant in a revenue Court; and, obviously, only to sub-serve the purposes of the Act, which, as has been already pointed out, do not cover all the incidents of the relationship between a landlord and a tenant; nor those between the wrongdoer and the injured person. Even a cursory glance at the provisions of section 50 would show that the suit contemplated by that section is not co‑extensive with a suit which a person in similar circumstances may file in a Civil Court. Acts done during the course of, or in con nection with, the dispossession or ejectment may give rise to law claim for damages for physical and mental injury, for lost or damage to property of all kinds and for the loss caused by deprivation of possession for the un-expired period of his tenancy. Section 50 does not cover all these claims. As the clause of action in a suit under that section is limited to mere dispossession or ejectment, the compensation claimable in above suit must, in the absence of any provision in the section to the contrary, necessarily be limited to the loss directly caused by dispossession or ejectment alone. Section 50 of the Act neither creates any right for compensation nor enumerates heads or items for which compensation may be claimed. It therefore, necessarily follows that to a suit under this section g tenant may claim only such compensation as is permissible murder the Tenancy Act and which the revenue Courts have been empowered to grant. This conclusion emerges from consideration of the various provisions in the Act relating compensation. Besides sections 50 and 77 (3) (g), the word compensation" occurs in the Act, only in sections 44, 47, 48, 49; and 50.A and the found chapter.
Section 44 lays down, the procedure for ejectment of a tenant against whom a decree for arrears of rent remains unsatisfied, Subsection (2) provides:
"If the amount is not so paid, the Revenue Officer shall, subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the payment of compensation, order the ejectment of the tenant unless good cause is shown to the contrary".
The compensation contemplated by the subsection is "subject the provisions of this Act", i.e., only such compensation as the Act provides for and not compensation which may be claimable under any other law outside the Tenancy Act. Section 45 relates to ejectment of a tenant from year to year notice. By subsection (4) the tenant has to be informed through the notice for ejectment that "if he does not intend contest fits liability to be ejected and he has any claim for compensation on ejectment he should, within two months from the date of the service of the notice, prefer his claim to the Revenue Officer having authority under the next following subsection . . . . . . ." Subsection (5) provides that in the absence of a ,suit to contest the notice of ejectment a Revenue Officer shall, oil the application of the landlord, order eject ment "subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the payment, of compensation", Section 48 provides that instead of snaking a decree for ejectment of an occupancy term or a ,tenant for a fixed term the Court may ''order him to remedy the injury within a period to be fixed in the order; or order hits to pay into Court, within such a period, such compensa tion as the Court thinks fit" in a suit for ejectment on either, of the following grounds:‑
"(a) that he has used the land comprised in the tenancy in a manner which renders it unfit for the purposes for which lie held it;
(b) where refit is payable in kind, that he, has without; sufficient cause failed to cultivate that lava in the manner, of to the extent customary in the locality in which the Jaud is situate". Strictly speaking, this section does not give the landlord a right to compensation for wrong done to him or no his land It was enacted as a measure of relief for the tenant, who, under the law, is liable to be ejected. It is the tenant's discretion to pay or not to pay the compensation which is awarded only to remedy the actual injury and not by way of damages Similarly section 49 also does not contemplate compensation as damages. Subsection (1) provided that a tenant who is proposed to be ejected has the right to harvest the crops standing on the land at the time of the proposed ejectment and must be allowed reasonable time for the purpose. By subsection (2) the Court or the Revenue, Officer is in, an appropriate case, given rite discretion either to direct the tenant to pay fair and equitable rent for longer occupation of the land or to eject him On payment to him of the value of his uncut and un-gathered crops. In the latter case, tie tenant is not entitled to damages for the loss of his crops; but only, to its value. Section 50‑A describes the nature of the suit, under section 50 and, therefore, the word "compensation" in it would have the same meaning as in section 50.
Chapter VI of the Tenancy Act bears the heading "Improvement and Compensation". Sections 61 and 62 appear under the sub‑heading "Improvements by Landlords" and sections 63 to 68 under "Improvements by Tenants". Section 68 entitles the tenant, on ejectment or enhancement of rent, to compensation for any improvement made by him in accord ance with the provisions of the Act. It should be noticed that by virtue of section 66 a tenant is not entitled to guy compensation for improvements begun by him after the ins titution of a suit for, or service of a notice of, ejectment even though the suit or the notice may be legally unjustified and may eventually fail; while under the general law the Civil Court can, and indeed must, award damages for the same if the tenant is ejected at any time afterwards. This again clearly demonstrates that compensation awarded under the Act is of a limited character and is only such as is provided for by the Act. Section 69 relates to compensation for dis turbance of clearing tenants, the measure of which is peculiarly a creature of the Tenancy Act and is not in accordance with any lave outside that Act. The remaining sections of the Chapter, namely, section 70 to 74, appear wider the sub heading "Procedure in determining Compensation". The heading of the chapter and the sub‑heading of these sections give the impression that these sections lay down the procedure for determination of all kinds of compensation, including that under section 50 which can be awarded by a Court or Revenue Officer under the Tenancy Act. A scrutiny of the provisions of these sections, however, Shows that compensation award able in a suit under section 50 is not specifically provided foe therein the reason for this omission being that it was slot necessary to mention it for the purposes of the special provi sions contained in these sections and the only such compensation can be claimed by a dispossessed tenant which is Men tioned in the Act, namely, in sections 44, 45, 43 and 49.
There is nothing in the Act to indicate that it was intended by the legislature that the Court or the officer acting under the Tenancy Act should have the power of deciding and awarding damages for all kinds of damage available in Civil Court. In this view of the matter, the conclusion is Inescapable that only such compensation can be given under section 50 which is elsewhere provided for by the Act and which is for a loss arising directly and immediately from the dispossession or the ejectment. In a case falling under sub section (b) of section 50 only that compensation can be properly granted which would be available to tile tenant if he bad instituted the suit under section 45. It would appear from a perusal of sections 45, 70 and 71 that in such a case compensation can be awarded only for improvements told for disturbance. It would obviously be unjust that a person who fails to file the suit under section 45 should he entitled to greater compensation if he avails himself of the further indulgence allowed to him by the law under section 50. There does not appear to be any valid reason to think that the word "compensation' must be given a meaning, when read in con junction with subsection (b) of section 50, different to what it would have with reference to subsection (a). As the cause of action for a suit: under section 50 is dispossession or ejectment and the plaintiff has been given tile right to sue for possession or compensation upon that cause of action, it is a logical conclusion that the compensation in the contemplation of the section is for that possession or ejectment alone. It may be possible to argue with some plausibility that the expression includes compensation for all kinds of injuries done during dispossession; but as we have already pointed out in an earlier part of this judgment, while it is possible to place two interpretations only that should be accepted which would preserve the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and exclude that of the revenue court. I am, therefore clearly of the opinion that considering the whole scheme and purpose of the Act and the language of section 50, only a restricted meaning should be given to the word "compensation" in section 50.
Whenever a tenant is ejected through Court, he is entitled to compensation only for two things, improvements and disturbance. The present suit does not relate to either of the two Section 49 provides:‑
"49. (1) Where at the time of the proposed ejectment of tenant from any land his uncut or ungathered crops are standing on any part thereof, he shall not be ejected from that part until the crops have been ripened and he has been allowed a reasonable time to harvest them.
(2) The Court or Revenue Officer decreeing or ordering the ejectment of the tenant may, on the application of the landlord, determine any dispute arising in consequence of the provisions of subsection (1) between the landlord and the tenant or between the landlord and any person entitled to harvest the crops of the tenant and may in its or his discretion:‑
(a) direct that the tenant pay for the longer occupation of the land secured to him under subsection (1) such rent as may be fair and equitable, or
(b) determine the value of the tenant's uncut and un gathered crops, and, on payment thereof by the landlord to the Court or Revenue Officer, forthwith eject the tenant.
(3) When a tenant for whose ejectment proceedings have been taken has, conformably with local usage, prepared for sowing any land comprised in his tenancy, but has not sown or planted crops on that land, he shall be entitled to receive from the landlord before ejectment a fair equivalent in money for the labour and capital expended by him in so preparing the land, and the Court or Revenue Officer before which or whom the proceedings are pending shall, on the application of the tenant, determine the sum payable to the tenant under this subsection and stay his ejectment until that sum has been paid to him."
It should be observed that the word "compensation" has not been used in this section at all. It will also be noticed that although both of them are mentioned in the same section, awards of the value of the crop and of fair equivalent in money for the labour and capital spent on preparing the land stand on totally different footings. Subsections (1) and (2) relate to the standing crop. The first subsection gives the tenant an unqualified right to harvest his standing crop before ejectment. The second subsection qualifies this right by giving a discretion to the Court or the Revenue Officer‑and not to the landlord‑to order payment by the tenant to the landlord of a fair and equitable rent for the longer occupation necessary for harvesting the crop, or, as a second alternative, to eject the tenant on payment by the landlord of the value of the uncut and ungathered crops. Having regard to the language in which the section is couched, it would not be a proper exercise of the discretion on the part of the Revenue Officer to adopt the second alternative without giving the tenant the option to pay rent for longer occupation. The point, however, to be noted is that no right is given by subsection (2) to either the landlord or the tenant, and, therefore, the provisions contained therein would be inapplicable to a case where the exercise of the discretion of a Court is not possible before ejectment or dispossession. It the crops have already been forcibly removed or destroyed by the .landlord before the matter comes before the Court, tile latter is obviously not in as good a position to assess the fair value of the crops as it would have been if they had not been damaged or removed. As regards the claim for the labour and capital spent by a tenant in preparing his land, this stands on a totally different footing, because subsection (3) gives the tenant the right to receive it before ejectment and is not dependent, like the value of the standing crop, upon the discretion of the Court or the Revenue Officer.
For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the claim of plaintiff in the present suit to damages to the standing crop is cognizable by the Civil Court. It was not a necessary concomitant, or an inevitable consequence, of the plaintiff's disposses sion that his crop should have been either damaged or forcibly taken by the landlord, or by anyone at his instance. Rs. 4,000 claimed by the plaintiff on this account may or may not be only the value of the crops. It may also include the whole loss caused to the plaintiff by his being deprived of them. The act by which this loss was caused may be entirely different from the act of dispossession itself. This matter is not directly covered by any authority but the conclusion indicated above derives some support from a decision of the late Punjab Chief Court in Udham Singh v. Mahesha (80 P R 1891). In that case, which was a suit by a tenant against his landlord for damages for wrongful seizure of the produce, it was held that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court because it was "for damages for an act alleged to have been done by the defendant under no law or contract at all." If the Civil Court has jurisdiction over such a matter when the tenant is in possession of his land, there seems to be no reason or principle to deny that Court's jurisdiction in the case of. a dispossessed tenant. On the contrary, it would seem that revenue Courts, which primarily deal with disputes between landlord and tenant, should have jurisdiction in the first case and the Civil Court only in the second case. This decision, therefore, clearly supports the conclusion that compensation for standing crops is not con templated by section 50 at all and that under that section compensation can be claimed only for such loss which is necessarily and inextricably the consequence of that dis possession.
It has not been brought to our notice that the correctness of the decision in Udham Singh's case has ever been subsequently questioned either in this Court or in the late Punjab Chief Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, relied upon the ruling contained in Heta Ram v. Chandan (13 I C 447). This ruling, to my mind, instead of ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a case like the present, rather tends to support it indirectly. The plaintiff in that case was a tenant on batai rent and the defendants, who were the landlords, had removed the crop forcibly when it was ripe and took the whole of it. The plaintiff' sued for the value of the cultivator's share of produce. It was held that "the suit as lodged . . . is clearly a suit falling under section 77 (3) (i) of the Act." It was clearly a suit between a landlord and a tenant arising out of the conditions on which the tenancy was held; or in other words, to‑ borrow the language of Justice Roe in Udham Singh's case it was a suit to recover the value of that part of the crop which had been wrongfully taken by the landlords as rent. The point, however, to notice about this case is that it was not held that all suits for value of the crop are cognizable by revenue Courts only.
As regards the third item mentioned in paragraph 8 of the plaint, namely, damages on account of mental distress caused by illegal arrest, it is obviously not cognizable by a revenue Court; and it was so conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The remaining item, namely, loss of expenses for preparing soil for future cultivation is equally obviously within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue Court in so far as the relief in respect of it is sought against the landlord or his agents. As has been already pointed out in this judgment, section 49 (3) clearly gives the right to an ejected tenant to receive a fair equivalent in money for the labour and capital expended by him in preparing the land and loss on this account is a necessary and inevitable consequence of disposses sion or ejectment. There are two points, however, to be noted in this connection. Firstly, it is only the claim for a fair equi valent in money for actual labour and capital expended by the tenant which is cognizable by a revenue Court; any other claim by way of damages on this account would clearly be cognizable by a Civil Court. There is, however, nothing in the plaint to indicate that the claim made in respect of the second item in paragraph 8 of the plaint is not entirely within the jurisdiction of the revenue Court. It is stated in paragraph 10 of the plaint that in case defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are not found liable to the plaintiff then a decree may be granted against the 4th defendant in his individual capacity. It need hardly be mentioned that the claim is barred only against the landlord.
I am of the opinion that out of the three items claimed by the plaintiff: in the suit, the one mentioned at No. 2 in the 8th paragraph, in so far as the relief in respect of it is sought against the landlord, is not entertain able by the Civil Court in the present suit, which was instituted within one year of the dispossession. The claim with regard to the remaining two items is well within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and can be adjudicated upon in the present suit. Whether it is open to the plaintiff now or not to file a separate suit against the landlord and his agents in the Civil Court with regard to the loss of expenses for preparation of the land is a question on which it is unnecessary for us to express any opinion. The learned trial Court will require the plaintiff to so amend his plaint as to exclude from it the claim which has been held by me not to be cognizable by a Civil Court.
Before parting with this judgment, I may mention that considerable inconvenience and delay is caused by the provisions of section 50, as it now stands. In the interests of simplification of law and procedure and speedy administration of justice, it seems necessary to either amend or delete the section. It would have to be amended in case it is decided to codify the entire law relating to landlords and agricultural tenants; otherwise it would be more consistent and logical to omit that section altogether from the present Act. Whether the authorities concerned would condescend to come to the rescue of the litigants and the law Courts is a matter for speculation. It was pointed out by this Court long ago in Cheta v. Baija (I L R 9 Lah. 38 at pp. 61 & 62), that the provisions of section 77 sub section (3) of the Punjab Tenancy Act are anomalous and unsatisfactory and should be suitably amended; but nothing has been done about it so far.
As indicated above. I partly accept this revision; but on account of the difficulty and uncertainty involved in the ascertainment of the correct legal position by the litigants, or by their counsel, we order that the parties shall bear their own costs.
‑----I agree.
A. H. Petition partly accepted.
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