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Civil Appeal No. 75‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 76‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 77‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES, CIRCLE II, DACCA‑‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 78‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 79‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE VI, CHITTAGONG‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 80‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE II, DACCA‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 81‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE II, DACCA‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 82‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE, II, DACCA‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 83‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 84‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE II, DACCA‑Appellant
Civil Appeal No. 85‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 86‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES‑CIRCLE IV, CHITTAGONG AND ANOTHER‑Appellants
Civil Appeal No. 87‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE IV, CHITTAGONG AND ANOTHER‑Appellants
Versus
Civil Appeal No. 88‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE IV, CHITTAGONG AND ANOTHER‑Appellants
Versus
Civil Appeal No. 89‑D of 1966
THE INCOME‑TAX OFFICER, COMPANIES CIRCLE V, CHITTAGONG AND ANOTHER‑Appellants
Civil Appeal No. 90‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 91‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 92‑D of 1966
Civil Appeal No. 93‑D of 1966
Civil Appeals Nos. 75‑D to 93‑D of 1966, decided on 28th November 1969.
(On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of East Pakistan, Dacca, dated the 1st December 1964 in Petitions Nos. 478, 489, 490, 497, 502, 503, 504, 505, 507, 508, 522, 523, 526, 528, 529, 531, 532 of 1963 and 8 of 1964, read with the order dated the 2nd December 1964, in Petition No. 133 of 1964).
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Rule with regard to retrospective operation.
No rule is more firmly established than the rule with regard to retrospective operation of a statute Law. It is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retros pective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication.
It follows from this rule that retrospective effect to a statute may be given either by express words or that the same may be inferred from the language employed.
The use by the Legislature of words, such as "shall" or "hereafter", is taken to indicate an intent that the statute is to be construed as prospective only; on the other hand the use of words denoting past time, such as "has been" or "hereto before" constitute an explicit declaration that the Act is to be construed retrospectively.
When retrospective effect to a statute is not given by express words, one must, apart from the language employed, "look to the generals cope and purview of the statute, and. at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former state of the law, and what it was that the Legislature contemplated".
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 221 and Treaties on Statute Law by Craies, 4th Edn., p. 334 ref.
S. 34(2‑D) read with Finance Act, 1964‑Words "has been" denote past time‑Must be cons trued as referring to assessment or re‑assessment annulled prior to enforcement of Finance Act, 1964.
The words "has been" used in subsection (2‑D) clearly denote past time. On the date of commencement of the Finance Act of 1964, the words "has been" occurring in sub section (2‑D) could not be construed except retrospectively, and these words, on the said date, must be construed as referring to assessment or re‑assessment annulled prior to the coming into force of the Finance Act of 1964 on the 1st July 1964.
Subsection (2‑D) of section 34, the very language of which points to its retrospective operation, cannot but be held to be applicable also to cases where assessments or re‑assessments had been annulled before the Finance Act of 1964 was enacted.
S. 34(1), (2‑D) read with Ss. 22 (4) & 23 (2)‑Assessment of escaped income annulled‑Fresh notice under S. 34(1), held, not necessary for re‑assessment.
It was argued that since the instant case was a case of assess ment of escaped income, a fresh notice under subsection (1) of section 34 should have been issued after the annulment of the original assessment and that n3 such notice having been issued, the Income‑tax Officer acquired no jurisdiction to make reassessment in that case on the basis of the impugned notices under sections 22 (4) and 23 (2) of the Act:
Held, subsection (2‑D) of section 31 is a complete answer to this contention, because that subsection expressly empowered the assessing authority to start the proceedings from the stage next preceding the stage at which the assessment was annulled with out re‑issuing any notice which had already been issued under the
Act. In the said case, a notice under subsection (1) of section 34 had been issued before assessment, and it was not therefore, necessary to re‑issue a further notice under that subsection.
Afzalul Haq, Senior Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Abdul Matin Khan Chowdhury, Senior Attorney for Appellants (in all Appeals).
Abu Md. Abdullah, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (A. H. Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Md. Nurul Haq, Senior Attorney for Respondents (in Civil Appeals Nos. 75‑D, 76‑D, 86‑D to 90‑D of 1966).
D. C. Bhattachariya, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (B. B. Roy Chaudhry, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by A. S. M. Shamsuzzanian, Attorney for Respondents (in Civil Appeals Nos. 77‑D, 78‑D and 84‑D of 1966).
D. C. Bhattachariya, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (B. B. Roy Chowdhury, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Abu Backkar, Senior Attorney for Respondents (in Civil Appeal No. 79‑D of 1966).
K. A. Bakar, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M. R. Khan, Attorney for Respondents (in Civil Appeals Nos. 80‑D to 82‑D of 1966).
Ismailuddin Sarkar, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Abu Backkar, Senior Attorney for Respondent (in Civil Appeal No. 85‑D of 1966).
A. H. Mirza, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Md. Nurul Haq, Senior Attorney for Respondent (in Civil Appeal No. 91‑D of 1966).
Abu Md. Abdullah, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Rafiqul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed by Md. Nurul Haq, Senior Attorney for Respondent (in Civil Appeal No. 92‑D of 1966).
Md. Nurul Haq, Senior Attorney for Respondents (in Civil Appeals Nos. 83‑D and 93‑D of 1966 (not contested).
Dates of hearing: 25th, 26th and 30th June 1969.
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