Lawyers Directory Listing
Chat with us free on WhatsApp — tell us your city and legal matter and our team connects you with the right lawyer. No form, no fee.
Criminal Review Petition No. 1 of 1968, decided on 10th October 1968.
(On review from the judgment of this Court dated the 14th December 1967, in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1968).
Art. 62 and Supreme Court Rules, 1956, O. XXVI‑Review‑Mere fact that one of the Judges had given a judgment dissenting from majority view‑No ground for review of judgment.
On principle it cannot be accepted that wherever there is a dissenting judgment, the majority judgment becomes liable to review. Each judgment is based upon its own reasons and it is not necessary that a judgment should anticipate the points of dissent, if any, and deal with the same in advance. This cannot be a ground for the review of a judgment, for, then in every case in which there is a dissenting judgment the majority judgment must be reviewed. This would mean that there would be no end to litigation.
M. Ismail Bhatti, Senior Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Muhammad Nazar Khan, Senior Attorney for Petitioner.
Nemo for the State.
Date of hearing : 10th October 1968.
This is a petition for the review of the judgment of a majority of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1967.
The petitioner was, along with two others convicted under sections 302/34 and 394 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The High Court upheld their convictions and confirmed their sentences but special leave to appeal was granted by this Court to consider whether the Courts below had correctly found that the petitioner and his co‑accused were identified on the spot.
This Court, after hearing the appeal at length, by a majority upheld the conviction and sentence of the petitioner but acquitted the rest. A. R. Cornelius, C. J., as he then was, dissented from this view and wrote a dissenting judgment acquitting all the deceased persons. The petitioner seeks to have the order of the majority reviewed on the ground that the points which weighed with the learned Chief Justice have not been considered or taken into account in the majority judgment. The judgment of the majority has taken one view of the evidence in the case but the dissenting judgment, which was written thereafter, has taken a different view of the same evidence and has, no doubt, laid greater emphasis on certain points which were not given the same weight in the majority judgment.
The question now is whether this is a sufficient ground for the review of the judgment of the majority. It seems to us that on principle it cannot be accepted that wherever there is a dissenting judgment, the majority judgment becomes liable to review. Each judgment is based upon its own reasons and it is not necessary that a judgment should anticipate the points of dissent, if any, and deal with the same in advance. This cannot be a ground for the review of a judgment, for, then in every case in which there is a dissenting judgment the majority judgment must be reviewed. This would mean that there would be no end to litigation.
We see no reason, therefore, to review a fully considered majority judgment of this Court. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Leave refused.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer