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First Appeal from Order No. 22 of 1968, decided on 23rd February 1968.
O. XXXIX, r. 4 read with O. XLIII, r. 1 (r)‑Temporary injunction‑Order to vary or modify temporary injunction‑Order passed under r. 4, O. XXXIX Not necessarily to correspond with nature of prayer in applica tion‑Order varying or modifying temporary injunction though application containing prayer for bigger or different relief‑Never theless an order under O. XXXIX, r. 4 and appeal able under O. XLIII, r. 1 (r), Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908).
Where the contention was that if an order under rule 4, Order XXXIX, C. P. C. is an order discharging an injunction, then it should have been passed on an application seeking discharge of the injunction. If it is an order varying any injunction then it should have been passed on an application seeking variation of the injunction and similarly if it is an order setting aside an injunction then it should have been passed on an application seeking the setting aside of the injunction. It was further contended that the nature of the application must correspond to the nature of the order passed by a Civil Court under this rule before it can be called to be an order appeal able under Order XLIII, rule 1(r), C. P. C
Held, that the contention cannot be accepted. All that the rule requires is that the injunction should have been discharged, varied or set aside on an application but it is not necessary that the prayer in the application should have been the same as the order ultimately turns out to be. As for example, a party may apply to set aside the injunction but the Court instead of setting it aside, may vary or modify it. In such a case, since the order will be of a variation and will be made on the application of a party (though claiming a bigger or a different relief), the order will nevertheless remain an order passed under rule 4 of Order XXXIX.
O. XLIII, r. 1(r)- Appeal from orders of temporary injunction‑Caution observed by High Court in expressing opinion in respect of matters still sub judice before lower Court.
Dr. M. G. Ghani, Vice‑Chancellor, University of Dacca v. Dr. A. N. M. Mahmood P L D 1966 S C 802 ref.
O. XXXIX, r. 1 ---Temporary injunction‑Principles governing reasonableness of tempo rary injunctions.
In matters of temporary injunctions, prima facie case is not the only requirement, but a Court is also required to examine the concepts of balance of convenience; irreparable loss; conduct of the parties; nature of suit; the time likely to be absorbed in it; the stakes of the parties involved and the workability and reason ableness of the orders proposed to be passed. If by issuing an order it is intended to relieve a party from certain oppression care should be taken at the same time as not to create oppression for the other party. Similarly, the aim should be to prevent the recurrence of a future injury, if any, and not to grant compensa tion and damages for past alleged injuries.
Ebadur Rahman and others v. The Collector of Customs and another P L D 1966 S G 762 ref.
Mehmud All, Bhoopani, Rafiq Ahmad Sheikh, Aftab Ahmad Khan and Umar Mahmood for Appellants.
Raza Kazim and Riazul Hassan for Respondent.
Date of hearing : 16th February 1968.
Pakistan Cement Industries Limited (hereinafter called the plaintiff) filed a suit against Sui Nothern Gas Pipelines Limited (hereinafter called the defendant) claiming the following reliefs:---
(i) A declaration to the effect that the present rates fixed by the defendant‑company for the supply of gas are illegal and ultra vires ;
(ii) permanent injunction to the effect that until the defendant‑company frames fresh rates for the supply of gas in accordance with law it shall not present any bill whatsoever to the plaintiff‑company or compel any payment thereof, directly or indirectly;
(iii) a declaration to the effect that the plaintiff‑company is entitled to demand accounts from the defendant‑company for the monetary loss of Rs. 2.76 crore till the date of filing of the suit and Rs. 10.00 lac per month thereafter till such time as the required supply of 7 million cu. ft. gas per day is provided regularly to the plaintiff‑company and, further, the plaintiff‑company is entitled to obtain a settlement of the aforesaid account from the defendant‑company by adjustment against the defendant‑company's claims against the plaintiff company for the supply of gas according to legal charges for the same to the full extent of the plaintiff‑company's claim ;
(iv) permanent injunction to the effect that the defendant. company shall not demand or compel directly or indirectly any payment from the plaintiff‑company and, shall keep all lawful financial demands against the plaintiff company suspended till such time as the plaintiff‑company has fully paid off its aforesaid creditor banks to the extent of the plaintiff company's liabilities outstanding towards them on the date of the filing of this suit ;
(v) permanent injunction to the effect that the defendant. company shall supply to the plaintiff‑company regularly without let or hinderance 7 million cu. ft. of gas per day and in the event of genuine lack of adequate gas supply for reasons beyond its control, the defendant‑company shall, after prior notice, ensure that the plaintiff‑company's gas supply is maintained at a minimum which is proportionate to the gas supplied to the other cement factories in the Rawalpindi area on the basis of their respective production capacity rated per day by the manufacturers of the respective cement plants;
(vi) any other appropriate remedy; and
(vii) costs of suit.
2. The case of the plaintiff‑company, so far as relevant for the purposes of the present appeal, was that the defendant company supplies, gas to its customers and under rule 18 of the Natural Gas Rules, 1960, framed under section 2 of the Regulation of Mines and Oilfields and Mineral Development (Federal Control) Act, 1948 (XXXIV of 1948), "all rates and charges made, demanded or received by any licensee for, or in connection with, the transportation or sale of gas and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable." In sub‑rule (2) of rule 18, it is further provided that, "except with the permission of the Authority, no licensee shall with respect to any transportation or sale of gas make or grant any undue preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any undue prejudice or disadvantage or maintain any unreasonable difference in rates, charges, services, facilities, either as between one locality and another or as between one class of consumers and another, when the gas is supplied in the same conditions of supply and for the same class of use." It is contended that the defendant‑company which is a licensee for supplying gas could charge from the plaintiff‑company only such rates which are "just and reasonable". Learned counsel for the plaintiff company avers that the defendant‑company demands Rs. 2.60 per mcf. for first 10,000 mcf; and for the supply above 10,000 mcf., is charged at the rate of Rs. 2.55 per mcf., subject to minimum of Rs. 75.00 per month as per agreement contained in Annexure "H‑1" dated the 30th of August 1965. The case of the plaintiff company is that the rates mentioned in this agreement are not just and reasonable and, therefore, the defendant‑company has no right to charge for the supply of gas at those rates. In the plaint it is further stated that due to the aforesaid excessive charges, the plaintiff‑company has suffered a substantial damage which if set against the future demands, will not make the plaintiff company liable to pay anything for a considerable time to come. With these averments apart from the various other pleas contained in the plaint, the reliefs mentioned hereinbefore were claimed by the plaintiff‑company.
3. As against this, the case of the defendant‑company, as represented to me during the course of the arguments, was :‑
(a) that the rate of Rs. 2.60 per mcf., was communicated to the plaintiff company on the 21st of March 1964, as per Annexure "B" and that the same was not taken exception to and was rather accepted on the 2nd of July 1965, by the plaintiff‑company as per Annexure "F". It was after this that the plaintiff‑company signed the agreement on the 30th of August 1965, as contained in Annexure "H‑1". After having accepted these rates, it is contended that it is not open to the plaintiff‑company to take exception to the same. At least the acceptance of the plaintiff‑company shows that the rates prima facie appeared to be just and reasonable to it and that is why that the plaintiff‑company signed the aforesaid agreement. Until these rates are manifestly shown to be unjust and unreasonable, the plaintiff‑company is bound to pay the said agreed rates ;
(b) that the plaintiff-company had a remedy of getting the matter referred to the Bureau of Mineral Resources, Govern ment of Pakistan under rule 19 of the Natural Gas Rules, 1960, in case there was a dispute of rates and charges; and without availing of that remedy the present case could not have been instituted; and
(c) that the matter is not justiciable and the suit in its present form is not maintainable.
4. In this suit, the plaintiff‑company filed an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 and section 151, C. P. C. In para. 6 of that application it was written:
"6. That on the facts and grounds stated above and in the supporting affidavit and in the plaint it is necessary in the interest of justice to issue a temporary injunction in order to prevent the defendant‑company from taking unfair and inequitable advantage of the plaintiff‑company's inability to pay the defendant‑company's illegal bills and save the plaintiff company from irreparable harm resulting directly from the defendant‑company's own fraud.
Wherefore, it is humbly prayed that the defendant‑company be restrained by interim injunction from committing any breach of, or deviation from the undertaking given by it to the plaintiff‑company in terms of paragraph 2 of the letter No. P. 18/15(a) dated 25th January 1967, or in any other manner acting prejudicially towards the plaintiff company till the final determination of the plaintiff‑company's present claims against the defendant‑company.
It is further prayed that since the observance of the terms of the aforesaid undertaking are within the defendant company's exclusive knowledge and control and since the defendant‑company's good faith cannot be assumed in view of the nature of the present dispute, therefore, in order to ensure due observance of this Hon'ble Court's interim injunction the defendant‑company should be further ordered to submit to this Hon'ble Court regular weekly statements showing (a) daily available gas supply in this region and (b) quantity of gas made available to and consumed daily by the plaintiff‑company and Wah Cement Works respectively."
5. The letter, dated the 25th of January 1967 to which reference is made, is Annexure "C/1" and its paragraph 2 reads as follows : ‑
"We propose that in view of our contractual commitments both to your good selves and Wah Cement Works the available gas supplies at Wah should be equally deviled between Wah Cement Works and your goodselves. On present indications, this will amount to approximately 3 to 3 million cubic feet per day for each of the two Cement Works until completion of the pipeline connecting the Sui and Dhulian gas systems and the looping of the section between Galli Jagir and Wah which work is planned for completion by July of this year and after that date we anticipate being in a position to meet the full gas requirements of your Cement Works."
On the aforesaid application of the plaintiff‑company the trial Court passed on 24‑7‑67 an ex parte very brief routine order of one line reading as follows :‑
The defendant‑company put in two applications one on the 21st of September 1967 and the other on the 7th of October 1967, asking the Court to clarify its aforesaid order. The learned Civil Judge disposed of these applications by means of his order, dated the 7th of October 1967, and held that plaint and affidavit were to be read along with the temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff‑company. Since in Para. 31 (2) of the plaint, a prayer had been made that the defendant company should not present any bills till fresh rates were settled therefore, injunction to that effect had already been issued. The learned Civil Judge further held that the defendant‑company should go on supplying the gas to the plaintiff-company though the plaintiff‑company may not make ready payments and that the plaintiff‑company can present post dated cheques (of any date). It was further held by the learned Civil Judge that the amounts shall remain outstanding against the plaintiff company and shall form a charge over its properties which it should not alienate. Against the aforesaid order, dated the 7th of October 1967, whereby the learned Civil Judge varied and modified his earlier order, the defendant‑company has filed an appeal which is the subject‑matter of adjudication before me today.
6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff‑respondent raised two preliminary objections. The first objection was that this appeal is barred by time. The contention has no force and is to be noticed simply for being rejected. The impugned order was passed on the 7th of October 1967, and the appeal was filed on the 25th of October 1967. Limitation for such an appeal under Article 152 of the Limitation Act is thirty days from the date of the order appealed from. The appeal was filed within time in the Court of the learned District Judge wherefrom it was later on transferred to this Court. The objection, in these circumstances, has no merit.
7. The second preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel was that an appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1(r), C. P. C., lies from an order passed under rule 1, rule 2, rule 4 or rule 10 of Order XXXIX. It was contended that though apparently the order, dated the 7th of October 1967, was an order which varied the earlier injunction issued by the learned civil Judge on the 24th of July 1967, but since it was not passed on an application seeking variation, therefore, this was not an order under rule 4 of Order XXXIX and was as such not appeal able. Rule 4 of Order XXXIX, C. P. C., reads as follows :‑
"4. Order for injunction pray be discharged, varied or set aside.‑Any order for an injunction may be discharged, or varied, or set aside by the Court, on application made thereto by any party dissatisfied with such order."
8. To put it in other words, the contention of the learned counsel was that if an order under this rule is an order discharging an injunction, then it should have been passed on an application seeking discharge of the injunction. If it is an order varying any injunction then it should have been passed on an application seeking variation of the injunction and similarly ii it is an order setting aside an injunction then it should have been passed on an application seeking the setting aside of the injunction. The learned counsel contended that the nature of the application must correspond to the nature of the order passed by a Civil Court under this rule before it can be called to be an order appeal able under Order XLV, rule 1 (r). I am afraid I cannot accept this contention. All that the rule requires is that the injunction should have been discharged; varied or set aside on an application but it is not necessary that the prayer in the application should have been the same as the order ultimately turns out to be. As for example, a party may apply A to set aside the injunction but the Court instead of setting it aside, may vary or modify it. In such a case, since the order will be of a variation and will be made on the application of a party (though claiming a bigger or a different relief), the order will nevertheless remain an order passed under rule 4 of Order XXXIX. In the instant case, the defendant‑appellant put in an application/applications for clarification of the earlier ambiguous and very brief order and the learned Civil Judge thereon passed the order, dated the 7th of October 1967, which definitely varied, modified and improved upon the earlier order, dated the 24th of July 1967. Such an order, therefore, could be made the subject‑matter of appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1 (r), C. P. C. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff company is rejected.
9. Coming to the merits of this appeal, learned counsel for the defendant‑appellant argued that the plaintiff‑company had no prima facie case and, therefore, the order, dated the 7th of October 1967, was unwarranted in law. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiff‑respondent‑company argued that his client did have a strong prima facie case. In this behalf, I note the pleas which were advanced by the learned counsel as against one another:
Mr. Mahmood Ali Kasuri, learned Advocate for the defendant‑appellant‑company argued that there was not an iota of evidence on the record to show that the defendant‑company had at any stage agreed to charge less rates from the plaintiff company. Rather, as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment, the defendant‑company, in 1964, vide letter placed at page 193 of the file intimated that the rate to be charged from the plain the company will be Rs. 2.60 which was accepted by the plaintiff‑company vide its reply placed at page 199 of the paper book. This was followed by a formal agreement (Annexure H‑1), placed at page 313 of the paper book. Later on, the plaintiff‑company acted on this agreement and went on paying the bills at the aforesaid rates. In these circumstances, Mr. Kasuri contended that it was not open to the p1aintiff company to take exception to these rates. Assuming without conceding that there was any agreement to charge lesser rate, lie argues, even then plaintiff‑company acquiesced in the breach of that alleged contract and under these circumstances was not entitled to a temporary injunction on the principle laid down in section 56 (h) of the Specific Relief Act.
As against this Mr. Raza Kazim, learned counsel for the plaintiff‑respondent‑company submitted that under section 23 of the Contract Act, if the consideration or object of an agreement is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that if permitted it would defeat the provisions of any law then such a contract is void. He submitted that under rule 18, mentioned earlier, the defendant‑company was entitled to charge only just and reasonable rates. According to the learned counsel the rate of Rs. 2.60 being unjust and unreasonable, if the contract containing those rates is allowed to continue or stand then it will defeat the provisions of the aforesaid rules and, as such, should not be allowed by a Court to remain in operation in its present form. He further argued that in cases of present kind where a company or a concern or a corporation is authorized to charge reasonable rates from its customers, the Courts can always investigate into the matters as to whether the charges levied by the said company or concern are just and reasonable or not. Reliance for this proposition was placed on Chicago Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Corporation v. Minnesota (134 U S 418). In that case the State Court of Minnesota had issued a writ of mandamus to the Railway Corporation directing it to comply with the orders of the Railway Commissioners and change its tariffs to bring; them into conformity with the rates fixed by the State law. The Supreme Court there made the following observation :‑--
"The question of the reasonableness of a rate charged for transportation by a railway company, involving, as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial determination requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the use of its property and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself without due process of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits for their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the law."
The second case relied upon is that of Smyth v. Ames (169 US 466) where a similar statute of the State of Nebraska fixing railway rates was challenged by means of a suit. There had been extensive enquiries undertaken by a statutory board upon the basis of whose recommendations the law fixing the railway rates had been based. It appears that the whole process of examination of all the relevant circumstances, including extensive accounting, was gone through again before the trial Court, and the conclusions reached were firstly, that the companies were entitled to a fair return upon the value of their property laid out for the public convenience, secondly, that the public were entitled to be charged no more than the services were reasonably worth, and thirdly, that the rates fixed by law in 1893 were such that if they had been applied to the working of the three previous years, the Companies would have suffered actual loss. These views were upheld in the Supreme Court and the law was declared unconstitutional. In the course of its judgment, the Supreme Court made the following observation :‑-
"While rates for the transportation of persons and property, within the State are primarily for its determination, the question as to whether they are so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of such compensation as the Constitution secures, cannot be so conclusively determined by the Legislature of the State or by regulations adopted under its authority, that the matter may not become the subject of judicial enquiry."
An interesting feature of the latter case is that the Supreme Court confirmed a direction by the State Court to the effect that should economic conditions change for the better so that profitable working at the rates fixed by the State law became possible, the State was to be at liberty to move the Court, by supplemental bill or otherwise as they may be advised, for a further order in this behalf. Both these cases were followed and quoted by our Supreme Court in the famous case of Saiyyid Abul A'la Maudoodi arid others v. The Government of West Pakistan and another (PLD 1964 SC 673 at pp 710‑‑712) Mr. Raza Kazim also quoted Abdul Aziz v. The Mullan Electric Supply Company Limited (P L D 1958 Lah. 614) where in the matter of Multan Electric Supply Company, Civil Court‑(in which capacity the High Court was acting in the said case)‑did interfere in the subject of fixation of rates at which the supply of electricity was to be charged from the consumer therein. In this respect it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiff‑company that in that case the Court even granted a temporary injunction requiring the Multan Electric Supply Company to make supply to the plaintiff therein at some moderate rates during the pendency of the suit. This statement was not doubted by the learned counsel for the defendant‑appellant though he argued that the dispute in that case was on different basis. As regards the contract (Annexure H‑1), Mr. Raza Kazim submitted that apart from his pleas already noted, this contract was not entered into with a free and independent consent on the part of the consumer and that it purported to give an undue advantage to the supplier company. At the relevant time the consumer, company had advanced so much in the adventure of raising a factory on the assurance of the defendant‑company of supplying gas to it that it had no choice but to accept with the usual businessman like courtesy, good‑humour and gesture‑whatever rates the supplier might have demanded, and to start with the work, it had also to pay the bills for a period of seven months or so. But soon realising that the exhorbitant rates will cripple its position, it lost no time in seeking redress from a Court by instituting a suit only within a short period from the date of the execution of the contract. As regards rule 19 ibid, Mr. Raza Kazim argued that this at the most amounted to an arbitration clause which the defendant‑company could not now invoke under section 34 of the Arbitration Act; because it has taken steps in the case where after the said clause lost its significance.
10. I need not give any considered finding on the pleas which are being advanced because (i) the case is still sub judice to the Court below and if I express my opinion, howsoever tentative it maybe, it is likely to prejudice one party or the other and (ii) also because even the matter of temporary injunction has not yet been finally disposed of by the learned Court itself. A caution to observe such a care though in a different context was administered by the Supreme Court in Dr. M. O. Ghani, Vice‑Chancellor, University of Dacca v. Dr. A. N. M. Mahmood (PLD 1966 SC 802). All that is proper and fair at this stage is simply to observe that the case raises substantial questions of law and facts which it is not possible to determine merely in a summary manner and especially on the bare pleadings of the parties or documents which are yet to be explained or proved. With this observation, I think I should confine myself mainly to the fact as to whether there was any justification for the learned Civil Judge to vary or modify his order dated 24‑7‑67 in the manner in which he has done it in this case‑and which matter of variation and modification alone is the subject matter of appeal before me under Order XLIII, rule 1 (r) of the C. P. C. To me it appears that there is no justification to compel the defendant‑company to make supply to the plaintiff company on a long term credit of post‑dated cheques a situation which was exploited by the plaintiff‑company to a good extent inasmuch as for the bill for the supply of gas for the month of July 1967‑the plaintiff company sent a post‑dated cheque of year 1976, to the defendant‑company and if this order is allowed to continue, learned counsel for the plaintiff‑company submitted that his client will be well‑within the limits of law if it sent a post‑dated cheque of a still far off period say even of one hundred years or four hundred years. The learned Civil Judge probably did not appreciate that his order could lead to such critical results. It may be pointed out that though apparently the impugned order of the learned Civil Judge directs supply of gas against post‑dated cheques without any restriction of time in practice it affords a sort of free supply of gas to the plaintiff company. On my enquiry whether it was the intention of the plaintiff company to have a free‑supply of gas during the pendency of the suit, its learned counsel replied "no". On a further question as to what rate would suit the plaintiff company during the pendency of the suit, the learned counsel, after consultation with an official and attorney of the plaintiff company, submitted that his client was prepared to make ready‑payments against bills at the rate of Rs. 1.60 per 1,000 mcf., and for the balance at the rate of Rs. 2.60 per 1,000 mcf., or at such rate at which the decision in the case ultimately turned out to be, his client was prepared to execute a bond to the satisfaction of the Court. This would show that the learned Civil Judge granted to the plaintiff‑company such a large relief in the form of a temporary injunction which, as it has now transpired with a little and careful scrutiny, was not expected or desired by the plaintiff‑company itself. Anyhow, as against this the reply of the learned counsel for the defendant‑appellant was that the form of security bond should be somewhat more stringent and that it should rather be a bank guarantee. It is to be remembered that the defendant‑company is a public utility concern and the average price of gas supplied to the plaintiff‑company, as indicated to me by the learned counsel for the parties, comes to rupees four to five lacs a month. It was a matter of serious thought as to whether a concern of this type should have been compelled to make supplies worth such a huge amount free or on an indefinite credit without any serious threats to its own financial position. In that context, it was further worth examining as to what was the financial position of the plaintiff company and could it conveniently make payments at a moderate rate, because the point in temporary injunction was only about future rates‑the past payments having already been made and there being no arrears till the institution of the suit. On my enquiry, the learned counsel for the plaintiff company stated that the earning capacity of his client was Rs. 63,000.00 per day. Surely on the basis of these factors, a more convenient and workable formula could have been evolved than the one adopted by the learned Civil Judge. I may caution that I have mentioned all these factors simply to demonstrate as to how oblivious the order of the learned Civil Judge is of all these aspects. In matters of temporary injunctions, prima facie case is not the only requirement, but a Court is also required to examine the concepts of balance of convenience; irreparable loss; conduct of the parties; nature of suit the time likely to be absorbed in it; the stakes of the parties involved and the work ability and reasonableness of the orders proposed C to be passed. If by issuing an order it is intended to relieve a party from certain oppression care should be taken at the same time as not to create oppression for the other party. Similarly, the aim should be to prevent the recurrence of a future injury, if any, and not to grant compensation and damages for past alleged injuries. In Ebadur Rahman and others v. The Collector of Customs and another (P L D 1966 S C 762) it was held by the Supreme Court as per headnote (b) at page 763:‑
"That while granting a stay the Court should be satisfied that action or in‑action of the authority concerned was clearly in violation of something having the force of law. A person merely by filing a writ petition should not be alleged to gain an advantage to which he may not be entitled.
In a proceeding of this extraordinary nature where the High Court exercises power to stay operation of any impugned order or notification, it must exercise that power with great care so that a person may not manage to obtain a direct benefit from the case in contravention of law."
I think the principle enunciated above can be kept in view while issuing temporary injunctions in Civil Suits as well, because the principle is not peculiar merely to writ petitions but is of general importance and prudence. The plaintiff‑company has asserted that it has already over‑paid the defendant‑company which amount it claimed to set‑off against future demands and supplies. 1t is yet to be determined as to whether there has, in fact, taken place any over‑payment‑or as to what are the reasonable and just rates vis‑a‑vis the alleged over‑payment. It is yet to be thrashed out as to what is the effect of the plaintiff's own contract and subsequent conduct thereto in honouring the bills which were being transmitted to it by the defendant. The form of suit regarding the claim of set‑off, as made out in the plaint, is still to be determined as also the question of Court‑fee thereon under Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act which requires:‑-
"Plaint (written‑statement pleading a set‑off or counter claim) or memo. of appeal nor otherwise provided for in this Act or of cross‑objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in section 3."
To bear ad valorem Court‑fee. If the injunction order dated 24‑7‑67 when simply read with the temporary injunction application‑made no sense to the learned Civil Judge, the better course was to dispose of the temporary injunction matter once for all instead of introducing radical changes therein. When confronted with this situation, learned counsel for the parties submitted that I should myself determine the matter of temporary injunction by transferring the suit to this Court and then retransfer the same to the trial Court after deciding that limited point. I am not prepared to adopt such a course. However, finding that the order, dated the 7th of October 1967, is uncalled for at the present stage of the case, I set aside the same. I do not wish to issue any temporary injunction conditional or unconditional myself as the matter is still sub judice before the learned trial Judge, when I wish to leave absolutely free. The observations which I have made in this judgment are simply to be confined to the subject‑matter of this appeal‑(namely variation or modification as contained in the order appealed against) and should not be considered to fetter or conversely enlarge the jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge on the matter before him.
11. The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is accepted and the order of the learned Civil Judge, dated the 7th of October 1967, is hereby set aside. The appellant‑company shall get its costs. Since the matter is of an important nature, I direct that the learned trial Court (District Judge) should dispose of the same within a fortnight and report compliance of this direction. The parties are directed to appear before the said Court on the 27th of this month. Record should be sent by special messenger.
A. E./K.B.A. Appeal accepted.
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