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Second Appeal from Order No. 147 of 1962, decided on 30th January 1968.

S. 13 (3) (a) (i)‑--True interpretation‑Word "own" not confined to natural or living persons alone but is quite apposite to juristic person as well‑Word "occupation"‑Not synonymous with word "residence"‑Expression " for his own occupation"‑To be interpreted fairly, liberally and with objective realisation of facts before tribunal.

According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word "own" used as an adjective means "of or belonging to oneself or itself." This would indicate that the use is not necessarily confined to natural or living persons alone. The word "own" is quite apposite in its application to juristic persons, legal entities and in animate objects as well. The use of the word "his" in the context will not alter its meanings. Similarly the term "occupa tion" though not defined in the Ordinance is apparently used in the section with its ordinary dictionary meaning. It is not synony mous with the word "residence"; as for instance a warehouse in which the goods belonging to a person may be stored will be considered to be in his occupation though he need not necessarily be residing in it. Though the expression "for his own occupation" employed in section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Ordinance has, therefore, got to be interpreted fairly, liberally and with a sense of objective realisation of the facts before the tribunal.

A premises genuinely needed by an association in order to fulfil the aims and objects for which it is established may be considered to be required for its own occupation. Where, there fore, ejectment of a person from residential part of a mosque was sought for the purpose of housing therein the Khatib of the mosque, it was held that the mosque is meant to hold congregation led by the Imam in accordance with the commandments of Islam and his services are indispensable for the mosque. The house is wanted by the mosque for its purposes and must be considered to be required by the mosque and its managing committee for its own occupation within the meanings of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.

Queen v. The Justices of the West Riding (1912) 2 Q B 198; Baladin v. Lakhan Singh A I R 1927 All. 214; Institute of Radio Technology and others v. Pandurmaji Baburao A I R 1946 Born. 212; K. J. Aiyers' Manual of Law Terms and Phrases, 1958 Edn., p. 375 and Adamali Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai P L D 1965 Kar. 408 ref

Summons and attendance of ‑Party failing to summon his witness in time and/or give his correct address‑No grievance, in circumstance, can be made if such witness not examined.

Ch. A. Waheed Saleem for Petitioner.

M. A. Mannan for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 24th November 1965.

This is a second appeal by the tenant, Agha Muhammad Ilyas, under section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, against the appellate order dated 26th June 1962, passed by the District Judge, Rahimyar Khan, confirming the order of the Rent Controller for his ejectment from the house in question. The Masjid Committee, Canal Colony, Rahimyar Khan through Muhammad Afzal, its President, filed the application under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to is the Ordinance) for the ejectment of the appellant from the house in dispute. It was alleged in the application that the house belonged to the masque, its management was entrusted to the Masjid Committee, the house was let on rent to the appellant and was in good faith required for use by the Khatib of the mosque. The appellant contested his liability for ejectment from the house. He admitted the tenancy but denied that the house was in good faith required for the Khatib and alleged that the application for his ejectment was not a bona fide one, the Masjid Committee was bent upon increasing the rent by adopting this subterfuge and that its President Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Superintendent Engineer, admitted before witnesses that in case the appellant was willing to accept the increase of the rent for the house to Rs. 50/60.00 per month, he could continue there, failing that after the 31st of December 1961, the house would be given on lease to the highest bidder in open auction.

2. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties :‑

(1) Whether the house was required by the Mosque Committee for the personal use of its Khatib

(2) Relief.

After recording the evidence led by the parties, the learned Rent Controller was satisfied that the house was required by the respondent for the personal use of the Khatib of the mosque. He, therefore, accepted the application for the ejectment of the tenant. The appellant went up in appeal before the District Judge, Rahimyar Khan and the Appellate Authority repelled his contention that the Masjid Committee was not the landlord and was not competent to file the application for his ejectment. It was a juristic body and the appellant was liable to pay rent to the Committee who was his landlord. The learned District Judge was of the opinion that the fact that the house was required for use by the Khatib of the mosque was valid ground for the eject. ment of the tenant. The requirement of the house by the mosque, for the Khatib was clearly one of the uses to which the house could be put by the mosque. The learned District Judge, was not impressed with the contention of the appellant that the Rent Controller did not allow him a sufficient opportunity to summon Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Superintending Engineer as a witness. He remarked that the appellant wanted to establish through Ch. Muhammad Afzal that in a talk with Mirza Salim Beg, Pleader, the Superintending Engineer had expressed an opinion that the lease of the house in dispute would be put to auction and given to the highest bidder. But in the opinion of the lower Appellant Authority that did not affect the merits of the case against the appellant because the Secretary of the Masjid Committee had served him with a notice that the house was required for the Khatib of the mosque and even if Ch. Muhammad Afzal had made the statement attributed to him above the proposed auction of the lease, he must have done so in his individual capacity and not in pursuance to any resolution by the Masjid Committee, which was the proper authority to take any such decision. In the end, the learned District Judge has repelled the contention of the appellant that the Masjid Committee wanted to have the house vacated in order to give the same on higher rent to some body else.

3. The main contention, by the learned counsel for the appellant raised before me in this second appeal is that under the law the tenant cannot be ejected from the residential building for use by the Imam of the mosque. Tine law has placed restrictions on the powers of tae landlord to eject his tenants only on grounds recognised by it. It is contended that in order to uphold the order of ejectment it must be proved that the premises was required by the landlord strictly for his own occupation or for the occupation of his children and not for any other person or for some other use. The answer to this contention raised before me depends on the true interpretation of section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Ordinance, which is as under :‑

"Section 13 (3) (a). The landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession.

(i) in case of residential building, if

(a) he requires it in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children;

(b) he is riot occupying another residential building, suitable for his needs pat the time in the same urban area in which such building is situated ; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area;"

According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the word "own" used as an adjective means " of or belonging to oneself or itself". This would indicate that the use is not necessarily confined to natural or living persons alone. The word "own" is quite apposite in its application to juristic persons, legal entities and inanimate objects as well. The use of the word "his" in the context will not alter its meanings.

4. The term "occupation" is not defined in the Ordinance. Apparently it is used in the section with its ordinary dictionary meaning. It is not synonymous with the word "residence"; as for instance a warehouse in which the goods belonging to a person may be stored will be considered to be in his occupation though he need not necessarily be residing in it. Similarly, the sheds in which the cattle of a farmer are tethered is considered to be in his occupation although he may not be living there. The owner may be residing in the main bungalow and the attached quarters in which his servants are living under him shall be nevertheless deemed to be in his occupation. It appears to me that the term occupation in its present context must be liberally construed. In Queen v. The Justices of the West Riding ((1911) 2 Q B 198) Patterson, J. observed:--

"Even acutal occupation' would not necessarily mean residence', because a man might dwell in one parish and rent a house and land in the adjoining one occupying it by his servants."

In the same case Wightmen, J. remarked:‑--

.but the word occupy' is ambiguous. A man may occupy either land or dwelling house without residing."

In Baladin v. Lakhan Singh (A I R 1927 All. 214) in interpreting clause (c) of section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Iqbal Ahmad, J. held that the word occupation' in clause (c) does not necessarily mean residence' only."

5. In re: The Institute of Radio Technology and others v. Pandurmaji Baburao (A I R 1946 Bom. 212) interpreting an analogous provision in section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act (XV1 of 1939), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that the words "his own occupation" mean occupation by himself and all persons who are dependent on him. In K. J. Aiyers' Manual of Law Terms and Phrases", 1958 Edition, on page 375, in explaining the term "occupation and possession", it is mentioned that "occupation has a wider significance than residence. A man may occupy a house without residing in it. An association or a body of persons, the members of which cannot possibly reside together, may require a building for conducting a school or running a business, and for this the building must be in their "occupation", directly if the members conducted or run it, or constructively if it is done through others." Therefore, a premises, genuinely needed by an association in order to fulfill and aims and objects for which it is established, may be considered to be required for its own occupation.

6. The expression "for his own occupation" employed in section 13 (3) (a) (i) of the Ordinance bus got to be interpreted fairly, liberally and with a sense of objective realisation C of the facts before the tribunal. in this connection Qadeeruddin Ahmad; J. in interpreting this section in Adamale Hasanali v. Mst. Rubab Bai (P L D 1965 Kar. 408) has observed that:‑--

"the words for his own occupation' which occur in para graph (a) should be taken to include all genuine requirements of the landlord and not to be restricted to the requirement of a shelter for his own body and the bodies of his children. This is indicated by the words suitable for his needs' which occur in paragraph (b). The needs of the landlord cannot be discriminated so as to separate the inner needs and outer needs of his body because both of them are projected on his environments. His hunger may be projected in the form of a need for a kitchen and his need for physical comfort may be projected in the form of a need for servants; nor can his needs' be restricted to physical needs in contradiction to social, economic, intellectual, emotional and spiritual needs, which may be projected in the form of a need for a sitting room, for an office, for a wife, for children, for a room reserved for prayers or for a room reserved for maintaining a library. The "needs would differ from landlord to landlord and some of those which may be genuine in one case may not be so in another case; nor is it open to the landlord to declare his needs as his own subjective decisions firstly, because his rights reflect the ideas of the society and secondly because his rights are controlled by the society. The character of the social order to which he belongs places the general limits on his needs and his own characteristics place special limits on them."

After all, a landlord, in case he is successful, expects to establish a comfortable house for himself with all the facilities and appurtenances necessary and required by him for the beneficial enjoyment of the premises according to his status, usages and environments; he cannot be forced to lead the life of a recluse in the house meant for his comforts. In shifting to the house vacated for him he may have to carry along with him, the persons attached to his household which are essential and necessary for his homely occupation of the premises.

7. Returning to the facts of the present case, it has been found by the lower authorities that the house in dispute is required by the management in good faith for tile residence of the Imam of the mosque to which it is attached. The mosque is meant to hold congregations led by the Imam in accordance with the commandments of Islam and his services are indispensable for the mosque. The house is wanted by the mosque for its purposes and must be considered to be required by the mosque and its managing committee for its own occupation within the meanings of section 13 of the Ordinance.

8. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the Rent Controller had acted illegally in refusing to grant a reasonable opportunity to the appellant to resummon Ch. Muhammad Afzal, a material witness in the case. The appellant produced Mirza Salim Beg Pleader, Rahimyar Khan to depose that in company with the appellant he saw the Superintending Engineer, Irrgiation Branch who was also the President of the Mosque Committee and during the course of the conversation he had admitted that the notice was sent by the Committee in order to increase the rent and that the house shall be put to auction for lease to the highest bidder. The Superintending Engineer had demanded Rs. 50 as rent from the appellant in case he wished to retain the house as a tenant for the future under the Mosque Committee.

9. The learned Rent Controller had framed the issues in the case on the 16th of March 1962, and adjourned it to the 13th of April 1962, for the evidence. On the conclusion of the evidence of the respondent, on the 13th of April 1962, the case was adjourned to the 18th of May 1962, for the evidence by the appellant. But the appellant summoned his witnesses including Ch. Muhammad Afzal, Superintending Engineer, after a long delay, for the first time on the 11^th of May 1962. He deposited the diet money and the process fee for the witnesses on the E 12th of May 1962. The summons sent to Ch. Muhammad Afzal was returned with the remarks that the witness had already been transferred to Sargodha Zone. According to the statement by Abdus Samad (P. W. 1), the Stenographer to the Superintend ing Engineer, the witness had left Rahimyar Khan on 9th of May 1962. It is, therefore, evident that the appellant was himself to be blamed for not summoning his witness in time and not giving his correct address. Under these circumstances the learned Rent Controller declined to exercise the discretion in his favour and grant any further adjournment to the appellant, on the 18th of May 1962, for the evidence of Ch. Muhammad Afzal. I see no illegality in this order, warranting my interference in this second appeal.

10. For the reasons discussed above, this appeal is bound to fail and is dismissed with costs.

A.E. Appeal dismissed.

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