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Civil Appeal No. K‑6 of 1962, decided on 9th April 1963.

(On appeal from the Award of the Central Industrial Court of Pakistan at Karachi, in Industrial Dispute No. 24 of 1960, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, dated the 29th April 1961).

Granted to consider question whether Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to make award in conflict with Factories Act (XXV of 1934), or with Standing Orders framed by Government‑Constitution of Pakistan (1956), Art. 160.

, S. 49‑B, Explanation read with S. 49‑A(2)‑S. 49‑B does not prescribe any maximum or standard leave‑Leave can be subject of award, arrangement, or contract‑S. 49‑A (2) is not confined to "existing" award, arrange ment, or contract of service ‑ Interpretation of statutes‑Words cannot be imported into Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so‑Court would prefer to adopt beneficent construction out of two constructions‑Award declaring 265 days' work as sufficient for entitlement to annual leave, held, unexceptionable‑Central Govern ment's Standing Order No. 8 (I)‑[Alembic Chemical Works Company Limited v. The Workmen A I R 1961 S C 647 ref.].

Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim Advocate Supreme Court instructed by S. M. Hanif Attorney for Appellants.

Respondent No. 1: Ex parte.

Respondents Nos. 2 & 3 did not want to defend.

Date of hearing: 9th April 1963.

.‑This appeal has been filed with the special leave granted by this Court to consider one point, namely:

"Whether the Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to make, an award which is in conflict with the provisions of the Factories Act and the Standing Orders framed by the Central Government regulating the conditions of employment of labour in industrial concerns."

There is no dispute as to the facts. An industrial dispute having arisen between the Rashid Textile Mills Limited, Karachi (hereinafter referred to as the Mills') and its employees (herein after referred to as the Union'), and the conciliation proceedings having failed, the Union made an application under section 5 (5) of Ordinance III of 1960, and rule 9 Of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1960 for adjudication of the industrial dispute which consisted of 17 demands. During the proceedings two demands were dropped and the parties filed a Memorandum of Settlement with regard to 13 demands, thus leaving Demands Nos. 6 and 8 for adjudication of the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court allowed Demand No. 6 but rejected Demand No. 8. Hence we are concerned in this appeal only with Demand No. 6 which was in these terms

"(a) The present system of granting annual leave to all the workers of the mills is unjustified and this should be granted to all the workers who have completed one year's service with the mills. The claim of which are not denied on account of absence, and also the workers should not be deprived of their legitimate right of annual leave on the plea of absence.

(b) Those workers who have not availed their annual leave since 1958, due to the unjustified method of calculating the annual leave adopted by the Management, should get their annual leave from 1st January 1958, to date."

The award in respect to the above demand was as follows

"I am of the opinion that 265 days should be the maximum number of days by which a worker must work to entitle him to the benefit of annual leave and I award accordingly."

The learned counsel has contended that the award being in conflict with the Explanation to section 49‑B of the Factories Act and the Standing Order No. 8 (1) was bad in law. Standing Order No. 8 (1) provides that:

"Holidays with pay shall be allowed as provided for in Chapter IV‑A of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934), and other holidays in accordance with law, contract, custom and usage."

Sections 49‑A and 49‑B of the Factories Act which occur in Chapter IV‑A are in these terms

"49‑A. Application of Chapter.‑(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to a seasonal factory.

(2) The provisions of this Chapter shall not operate to the prejudice of any rights to which a worker may be entitled under any other enactment, or under the terms of any award, arrangement or contract of service.

49‑B. Annual holidays.----(1) Every worker who has com pleted a period of twelve months' continuous service in a factory shall be allowed, during the subsequent period of twelve months, holidays for a period of ten or, if a child, fourteen consecutive days, inclusive of the day or days, if any, on which he is entitled to a holiday under subsection (1) of section 35.

(2) If a worker fails in any one such period of twelve months to take the whole of the holidays allowed to him under subsection (1), any holidays not taken by him shall be added to the holidays to be allowed to him under subsection (1) in the succeeding period of twelve months, so however that the total number of holidays which may be carried forward to a succeeding period shall not exceed ten or, in the case of a child, fourteen.

(3) If a worker entitled to holidays under subsection (1) is discharged by his employer before he has been allowed the holidays, or if, having applied for and having been refused the holidays, he quits his employment before he has been allowed the holidays, the employer shall pay him the amount payable under section 49‑C in respect of the holidays.

.‑A worker shall be deemed to have completed a period of twelve months continuous service in a factory notwithstanding any interruption in service during those twelve months brought about by sickness, accident or authorised leave not exceeding ninety days in the aggregate for all three, or by a lock‑out, or by a strike which is not an illegal strike, or by intermittent periods of involuntary unemployment not exceeding thirty days in the aggregate; and authorised leave shall be deemed not to include any weekly holiday allowed under section 35 which occurs at the beginning or end of an interruption brought about by the leave."

Now the question is Does section 49‑B purport to prescribe maximum annual holidays, which may be awarded to a worker The words of the section do not indicate that the intention of the Legislature was to make provisions for maximum leave, which could be claimed by a worker. If it was so, they could have easily used appropriate expressions in that behalf. In view of the language of the section it would be difficult to hold that the Legislature intended to standardise annual holidays of the workers. Furthermore the intention of the Legislature was not to standardise the holidays is also clear from subsection (2) of section 49‑A which recognises some exceptions to leave prescribed by section 49‑B of the Act.

The said subsection (2) of section 49‑A says

"The provisions of this Chapter shall not operate to the prejudice of any rights to which a worker may be entitled under any other enactment, or under the terms of any award, arrange ment or contract of service."

The learned counsel attempted to argue that the saving provision would apply only to existing enactments, existing awards and existing agreements or contract of service. If the Legislature meant to exempt only the existing enactments and existing awards it could have easily said so. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. We however, see no reason to justify reading in or implying such words in this subsection (2). Here the words used are capable of comprehensive import and therefore we see no justification to restrict the saving provision only to existing enactment, existing award and existing agree ments. This view which appears to us to be plain enough on the words of the said subsection is further enforced by another consideration namely that adoption of the limited construction canvassed before us would mean that even by future Legislation) tote lot of the workers could not be improved in the matter of, leave. Such a construction of this beneficent legislation would defeat the very purpose of the Act. If it is assumed that the words in this subsection are capable of two construct ons ones of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, the Court would prefer to adopt the latter construc tion. In any view of the matter the words of this subsection cannot be confined to existing enactments and awards.

It may be mentioned here that section 79 (1) of the Indian Factories Act, which is similar to our section 49‑A (2) came for interpretation in the case of Alembic Chemical Works Com pany Limited v. The Workmen (AIR 1961 SC 647) and the Supreme Court of India also refused to confine the saving provision only to existing enactments and awards.

For the reasons stated above we see no good ground for interference with the award.

The learned counsel has submitted that the maximum number of 265 days for which a worker must work to earn annual leave should be made applicable only in the second and subsequent years of service and that in the first year the worker must work for 265 + 10 = 275 days to be entitled to annual leave. From the discussion in the award it appears that the Tribunal while computing 12 months of service made certain deductions including 10 days of annual leave. Obviously this deduction of 10 days will be applicable only from the second year of service. Hence we see no reason for further clarification of the award.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

A. H Appeal dismissed.

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