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Civil Revision No. 313 of 1961, decided on 25th March 1963.

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----Distinguished from licence-- Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S. 105‑Easements Act (V of 1882), S. 52‑Agreement with canteen‑keeper to run his business on piece of land provided by Road Transport Board against payment by canteen‑keeper of a monthly sum‑Held, to be a licence and not a lease‑West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (V. of 1959), Ss. 2 (i), 13‑"Tenant"‑Licensee not "tenant" within scope of S. 2 (i)‑Not entitled to protection of S. 13‑Licensor not bound to apply to Court to eject licensee [Halsbury's "Laws of England," Third Edn., Vol. 23, para. 1022 Azim Khan v. State of Pakistan P L D 1957 Kar. 892 ; Acting Secretary, Board of Revenue v. The Agents, South Indian Railway Company Ltd., Trichnopoly A I R 1925 Mad. 434; Sajid Ali Khar v. Muhammad Ahmad Farooqi P L D 1959 Kar. 25 ; Ashfaq Hussain v. Karachi Municipal Corporation P L D 1957 Kar. 918 Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bhupalchandra Ray Chaudhuri 129 I C 177 and Chief Administrative Officer v. Habibullah Butt P L D 1960 S C 78 ref.]

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---‑Contractual licence‑‑‑English law‑Similar principles applicable in Pakistan‑‑Licensee entitled to notice before eviction‑Contractual licence‑Breach of, by licensor‑Licensee may sue for damages but not for permanent injunction‑Principles underlying Easements Act (V of 1881), applicable as rules of justice, equity and good conscience‑‑‑Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 54 not applicable‑‑ [Jagat Singh v. The District Board, Amritsar I L R 22 Lah. 413 and Prosonna Coomar Singha v. Ram Commar Ghose I L R 46 Cal. 640 ref].

S. 60‑Licensee raising permanent superstructure on land of licensor against express term of licence‑Licensee not entitled to challenge revocation of licence by licensor‑[Shahishan Begum v. Munna A I R 1927 All. 342 ; Muhammad Abdul Jamil v. Manzoor Ahmad A I R 1932 All. 572 ; Thakur Prasad v. J. Thomekinson A I R 1927 Oudh 206 and Guman Singh v. Pyarelal A I R 1929 Nag. 141 distinguished.]

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---Case not set up in plaint‑Not arising out of pleadings‑Not allowed to be raised in Second Appeal (Revision) in High Court.

Khirayat Ali for Petitioner.

Khalilur Rahman and Raza Hussain Shamsi for Respondents.

Dates of hearing : 1st, 4th and 6th March 1963:

This second appeal by Muhammad Hashim has to be treated as a revision.

2. The facts of' the case are that On the 14th of June 1956 an agreement was entered into between the Punjab Road Transport Board acting through the District Manager of the Lahore Omnibus Service and Muhammad Hashim proprietor Madina Hotel, Naulakha, Lahore, relating to the working of a canteen at the railway station sub‑office of the Lahore Omnibus service on a temporary basis for a period of six months with effect from the 4th of March 1956 on the following terms and conditions :‑

(a) That the business can be terminated without notice and without cause assigned and the licensee shall vacate the premises immediately when directed to do so, without any objection and hesitation.

(b) The licensee shall not construct pacca type of building ; only temporary structure will be put up at his own cost, for which no compensation will be payable by the Board.

(c) The licensee shall pay Rs. 60 p.m. for providing space to run his business to the Lahore Omnibus Service, Lahore, regularly in advance each month.

(d) Furniture, electricity charges, crockery etc. etc., will be at the licensee's cost.

(e) The licensee shall sell the refreshments etc., at the rates to be fixed and intimated to him in due course by the Lahore Omnibus Service and will be responsible to supply them to the staff of the Lahore Omnibus Service at reasonable rates to be intimated to him.

The case of the plaintiff is that a space measuring 18 x 90 fee was provided to him, on which he set up a. building consisting of a store‑room, a canteen hall, a tea‑stall, a lassi shop, a kitchen, a pan shop and a fruit cabin at an expense of Rs. 3,500 and he also bought a Radio Set. He also raised the level of the earth by three feet and laid a pacca floor over it. On the 26th of September 1956, the General Manager of the Punjab Road Transport Board sent letter Exh, P. 2 to the plaintiff stating that they had received offers from certain contractors, who were willing to pay Rs. 150 p.m. for the business of canteen at the sub‑office near the Lahore Railway Station, and as such the amount of Rs. 60 p.m. paid by him was too low, and he should confirm by the return of post whether he was willing to pay Rs. 150 as rent of the premises, and the question of contract will be considered after his reply is received. The petitioner's reply, if any, is not on the record. The General Manager then sent notice Exh. P. 3 on the 10th of December 1956, to the effect that a final notice was being served on him to vacate immediately the space occupied by him in the Central Bus Station site, which was being used as a canteen and the premises must be vacated within 30 days of the receipt of the notice, failing which legal proceedings would be taken against him. A copy of the letter was sent to the District Manager with directions that the canteen contractor should be asked to deposit rent at Rs. 150 p.m. from the date of expiry of the six months' period of the contract. The plaintiff filed the present suit on the 14th of March 1957 for issue of a permanent injunction against the General Manager, the District Manager of the Road Transport Board and the West Pakistan Road Transport Board restraining them from ejecting by demolition the petitioner from a store‑room, canteen hall, tea- stall, lassi shop, kitchen, pan shop and a fruit cabin constructed by the plaintiff, without resorting to Civil Courts, i.e., except in due process of law and not to act against the law and not to interfere with his possession and also not to cut off the water supply and the electric connection. The defendants resisted the suit on various grounds and an issue was framed whether the plaintiff could be ejected except in due course of law. On the 30th of October 1957 two more issues were added namely, (1) whether the plaintiff was a licensee and not a tenant; and (2) whether the plaintiff had put up the structure with the permission of the defendants, if so, what was its effect

3. The plaintiff examined four witnesses on the first issue, and after the framing of the two issues, added subsequently, he examined three more witnesses. The defendants examined two witnesses. The trial Court, struck off the issues under Order XIV, rule 5, C. P. C., as in his view the suit could be decided on the pleadings of the parties, and it was unnecessary to formally decide any issue. Holding that as it was common ground between the parties that the plaintiff had occupied the premises with the permission of the defendant under circumstances which created the relationship of the landlord and tenant between them, a landlord could not evict a tenant or licensee by use of direct force, he gave the plaintiff a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from evicting the plaintiff from the premises in his possession, except in due course of law. The parties were left to bear their own costs. (It may be mentioned that in the meanwhile the plaintiff had made an application before the Controller under the Rent Restriction Ordinance for fixation of fair rent). The defend ants appealed to the District Judge, who accepted the appeal, and set aside the judgment and, decree of the trial Court on the grounds that the necessity' for the suit or for the relief claimed therein had ceased to exist on the coming into force of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and that the plaintiff‑respondent had no cause of action for maintaining the suit as he had no reasonable apprehension of being ejected otherwise than in due course of law and there was therefore no jurisdiction for decreeing the suit. He was of the view that by the time the suit ripened for decision, the plaintiff had no case for an injunction on the allegations made in the plaint. Muhammad Hashim then moved this Court in second appeal.

4. Before me the learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the relationship of landlord and tenant came into being between the parties, and it was not possible for the respondents to eject the plaintiff except by a suit for ejectment, especially after the promulgation of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and as they were threatening to eject him forcibly, he had a cause of action for obtaining a decree for permanent injunction and the lower appellate Court had erred in holding to the contrary. On behalf of the respondents it is urged by their learned counsel that it was never admitted by the defendants that relationship of landlord and tenant was created between the parties that the plaintiff was no more than a licensee, and that it was open to the defendants to eject the plaintiff- petitioner from the premises with the use of minimum force, and that the plaintiff as licensee had no locus standi to institute a suit for permanent injunction. He also urges that the defendants bad never threatened to act against the law and, therefore, the decree prayed for could not be granted. With regard to the superstructure, it is urged that as the plaintiff had constructed it contrary to the terms of the agreement, no advantage could be taken of it by him, and it is open to him to remove it.

5. The first and foremost question which falls for deter mination in the case is whether under the contract dated the 14th of June 1956 the plaintiff became a tenant or was a mere licensee, because, it is argued, that if he was a mere licensee, his license came to an end on the expiry of six months, or on its revocation by notice dated the 10th December 1956 and he had no right to remain and no case for the grant of an injunction.

6. In determining whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licensor and licensee, the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties, according to Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 23, paragraph 1022. The parties to an agreement cannot, however, turn a lease into a licence merely by stating that the document is to be deemed a licence or by describing it as such. The relationship of the parties is determined by law on a consideration of all relevant provisions of the agreement; nor will the employment of words appropriate to a lease prevent the agreement from conferring a licence only, if from the whole document it appears that it was intended merely to confer a licence. A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to ex elusive possession thereof or the circumstances and conduct of, the parties show that all that was intended was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. If the agreement is for the use of property in a certain way and on certain terms, while the property remains in the possession and control of the owner, the agreement will operate as a licence even though the agreement may employ words appropriate to a lease. The instance of agreements which have been held in English Courts to create licences include the letting of bookstalls on a railway platform, letting of space for a stall in an exhibition, permission to use a shed for particular purposes, an exclusive right to put pleasure boats on a canal, power to dig for fire‑clay, liberty to fasten a coal‑halk to a mooring in a river, liberty to lay and stack coal on land, liberty to search and dig for coal and permission to erect or affix advertisements, etc., etc. The relationship of landlord and tenant arises as a rule when one party confers on another the right to the exclusive possession of land, mines or buildings for a time, which is either subject to a definite limit originally, as in the case of a lease for a term of years. or which, though originally indefinite, can be made subject to a definite limit by either party, as in the case of a tenancy from year to year. As a rule, there is incident to it the right to receive from the tenant payment for the use of the property in the shape of rent. The fact that the agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy ; but it is a consideration of the first importance.

7. If the plaintiff falls within the definition of "tenant", then he is protected and the lessor cannot eject him without having recourse to a Court of law, as was held in Azim Khan v. State of Pakistan (P L D 1957 Kar. 892). This protection, however, does not apply to the case of a lessor, who is also a master nor should be treated as applying to the case of a licensor against a mere licencee.

8. A licence' is defined in section 52 of the Easements Act as follows:‑

"Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons; a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a license".

What has been conferred upon the petitioner is a right to do in or upon immovable property of the grantor which he could not lawfully do otherwise. He was permitted to put up a catering stall, which would have been unlawful for him to do without the licence, and it conferred no exclusive interest in the property. A lease' is defined in section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain tenure express or implied or in perpetuity, in con sideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value to be tendered periodically or on specified occasions, to the transfer by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. Thus while in the case of a licence there is conferred a right to do something on the immovable property of another which he could not otherwise lawfully do, there is in the case of a lease a creation of interest in and a right to enjoy such property. This is the essential distinction between them. The distinction in some cases may be difficult to draw, but there is a distinction as indicated above.

9. The principles which differentiate, the case of a license from a lease are clearly discernible also from the Full Bench case Acting Secretary, Board of Revenue v. The Agents, South Indian Railway Company Ltd., Trichnopoly (A I R 1925 Mad. 434), which held ;‑

"The difference between a lease and a licence is that in the case of a licence there is no interest in the immovable property transferred to the licensee, while in the case of a lease there is a transfer or carving out of such interest in favour of the person in whose favour the lease is granted. One chief consideration is whether there is any right of exclusive possession given. If the effect of the document is to give the holder an exclusive right of occupation of the land, it will be a demise of the land, but it is not a mere question of words but of substance. The mere calling a document a licence would not affect the question, but in arriving at a conclusion where the terms are not clear, one has to see what the circumstances are to judge the intention of the parties. It is relevant to consider what the rights of the parties were and what the object of the agreement was. The mere fact that there are restricted covenants would not by itself make a lease a licence if the other terms are clear, but in considering what the intention of the parties was, it is relevant to see what control one party has over the property on which another party is allowed to do certain things.

Provisions that the grantor should have free access at all times', that the grantee should not sublet or transfer his rights without the grantor's consent, that upon the determination of the licence, the grantor might re‑enter upon and re‑take and absolutely retain possession etc., do not establish a lease whether the other terms and circumstances show that no interest in immovable property was transferred or that exclusive possession of land was not given. Conditions such as the ones referred to above, which restrict the lsicencee's rights and which, as the licencee cannot claim such rights even in absence of such provisions, are unnecessary in a licence and would be natural in a lease, may be due to extra caution on the part of the parties and do not necessarily indicate that a lease was intended."

In this case certain documents by which lease was given by a railway company to stack coal in station‑yards were held to constitute a licence and not a lease. The definition of "lease" given in the Transfer of Property Act was also taken into consideration.

10. A recent case of this Court is Sajid Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ahmad Farooqi (P L D 1959 Kar. 25). Three rooms and a kitchen situate on the first floor of the Customs House, Karachi were leased out to the respondent by the Assistant Collector of Customs by a letter. One of the terms of the contract was that the general control of the restaurant would rest with the Assistant Collector of Customs who may give the necessary suggestions regarding the rates of refreshments, catering arrangement, etc., etc. The rates were fixed by a separate schedule, and the respondent was selling refreshments according to them. The premises belonged to the Government and three rooms and a kitchen were allotted to him for the purpose. The plaintiff- respondent filed a suit on the allegations that he was a tenant of the three rooms and a kitchen, that a notice was given to him cancelling the lease directing him to vacate the premises, but on his refusal the defendant‑appellant had locked and sealed the rooms and thus committed trespass, and as the dispossession was illegal, the locks be ordered to be removed and a mandatory and permanent injunction should be granted to restrain them from interfering with the possession of the respondent. The learned Judges held :‑

"It is true that the test of exclusive possession is very important in determining the relationship of landlord and tenant and in certain cases the relationship can be that of a lessor and lessee in spite of some reservations which may be existing in favour of the lessor, but we do not think that this test when applied to the facts of the present case leads to the conclusion that there was a lease because firstly, the contract was a catering contract only and the use of the premises was allowed to the respondent so that he could cater for the staff of the Customs Department. He had to pay a certain charge for the use of the premises, and it was described ac rent, but the use of the word rent' could not convert the relationship into that of landlord and tenant, because the business for which the contract was given was controlled by the authorities of the Customs Department. The respondent could not use the premises for any purposes he liked, nor could he carry on the business for general public. This restriction was‑so strict that he had to close his business after office hours and not to open his restaurant on holidays. These reservations are not consistent with the exclusive possession of those premises which are given on lease."

Relying on some English cases, the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the catering contract fell within the category of a licence, and the use of the premises allowed to the respondent was a licence, and not a lease.

11. Again, in Ashfaq Hussain v. Karachi Municipal Corporation (P L D 1957 Kar. 918) it was held that in determining whether a grant is a lease or a licence, the chief consideration to be borne in mind is whether any right of exclusive possession is given to the grantee or not. Where a person puts up a wooden cabin on the street with the permission of the Municipal Corporation, he is a mere licensee, for no interest in the land, much less exclusive possession, is delivered to such a cabin‑holder. The moment the permission is withdrawn, the act of keeping the cabin becomes unlawful.

12. In Azim Khan v. State of Pakistan, it was also held that the essential feature which distinguishes a lease from a licence is the presence of exclusive possession in the case of lease, and its absence in the case of a licence. In this case the petitioner was a building contractor, who was called on the eve of Partition for executing certain major works for the Government of Pakistan, and was allowed the use of the plot in question for purposes of building a godown to store construction materials, and to accommodate his staff. The constructions entrusted to the petitioner were completed and the Department wanted him to vacate the premises, but he prayed that the plot be allotted to him on payment of rent. This was agreed to, and the petitioner was allowed to remain in possession on payment of Rs. 100 per mensem. Subsequently as the Government required the plot, they cancelled the allotment and called upon the petitioner to vacate the premises. He filed a writ petition to challenge his forcible ejectment without recourse to any Court of law. It was held that the petitioner, though originally a licensee, was accepted as a lessee by the Government, and it was beyond doubt that the petitioner was in exclusive possession of the plot, and had put up a construction on it.

13. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bhupalchandra Roy Chaudhuri (129 I C 177). In this case, under a kabuliyat for a fixed term in respect of a hat, the executant bound himself to pay Rs. 190 annually as land tax (rent) for the land and Rs. 3,260 as licence fee for realising tolls of the hat, that is to pay a total jama of Rs. 3,450 annually, and the control of the hat was in the executant subject to certain restrictions and reservations. The learned Judges looked at the substance of the matter and not merely at the expressions used and upon a true construction of the document came to the conclusion that the kabuliyat was in fact a lease of the land itself, with the object of holding a hat thereon, and not a mere licence, that the so‑called licence fee payable to the grantor was rent, and cess was payable on the aggregate amount of Rs.3,450. It was observed that the question whether a transaction is a lease or a licence was not a question of words but one of substance. If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder an exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is in law a demise of the land itself.

14. But the case of Chief Administrative Officer v. Habibullah Butt (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 78) is instructive. In this case a house was taken on lease by the Governor‑General of Pakistan on the 31st of October 1947, from its owner Bakhshi Dina Nath. The Station Headquarters, Rawalpindi, allotted it for residence to respondent Habibullah Butt, who was posted as Officer Supervisor, M. S. Branch, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi, the house being on the pool of the Station Headquarters of the C. A. O. Habibullah Butt retired from service on the 13th March 1954, and was asked to vacate the bungalow immediately, and to hand over possession to the Garrison Engineer, Rawalpindi. He failed to do so, and asked for time, so that he might get alternative accommodation from the Rehabilitation Authorities. He was a refugee from India. He was finally asked to hand over the possession of the house to the Military Estate Officer by the 31st of August 1956. He along with his father‑in‑law, applied to the High Court for the writ of mandamus on the plea that they had obtained the premises in question on lease from the owner, and had been subsequently allotted the house by the Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the Rehabilitation Authorities had recognised the lease rights of the Defence Department, and continued to receive the rent from them. Habibullah Butt himself had been requesting the Military Authorities from time to time to effect repairs to the premises through the M. E. S. There was, therefore, no doubt that he occupied the house as a mere licensee under the Defence Ministry for so long as he was in service. His right to occupy the premises was determined as soon as notice was given to him to quit the premises and it was his legal duty to surrender the possession to his licensor. After that notice, no legal right to retain possession inhered in him. Here though the possession of Habibullah Butt was exclusive, he was held to be a licensee in view of the other circumstances of the case, namely, that the control of the house vested in the Military Authorities.

15. In the light of the principles stated above, what is the status of the petitioner Is he a lessee of the site, or a mere licensee to benefit by the licence granted to him for carrying on the business of catering food and refreshments for the consumption of the employees of the Road Transport Board, and those who were to travel by its buses The learned counsel for the petitioner argued emphatically that the petitioner is a lessee and not a mere licencee, for the reason that he was in exclusive possession of the site and the permanent structure built on it. In this connection he referred me to the evidence of Mian Iftikhar Ali (D. W. 1) who stated that he had seen the building from outside. From this he argued that the Manager of the Road Transport Board or its employees did not ever enter the building and had no control over it, but I cannot agree with the contention that he was a lessee. My reasons are these. It has been stated already that one of the characteristics of the lease is the conferment on another of a right to the exclusive possession of land, mines, or buildings. A lease creates in the lessee an interest in the property. But it is noticeable in the present case that no interest was created in any land and the Road Transport Board only agreed to provide space for running a particular business. The agreement was in effect and substance entered into for the purposes of authorising the plaintiff to carry on the business of a caterer for the benefit of the employees of the Road Transport Board and those who travelled by its buses. The other important ingredient of a lease is a right to exclusive possession of the site and this is also missing, because the employees of the Road Transport Board remained at the spot of most of the time, and had in their hands overall control and manage ment of the Sub‑Office of the Road Transport Board, where the building is situate. It cannot be denied that the supervisory control vested in the Road Transport Board and its employees. The case is similar to Acting Secretary, Board of Revenue v. The Agents, South Indian Railway Company Ltd., Trichinopoly, where space in station‑yard was provided for stacking coal. Further, the arrangement is in the nature of a catering contract as in Sajid Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ahmad Farooqi. The use of the space provided was in many respects controlled by the employees of the Road Transport Board. The petitioner was only permitted the use of the space provided for setting up a temporary structure, i.e., a canteen, a cabin or a stall, and the sale price of the refreshments was also controlled. It was not open to the petitioner to set up any other business or to use the space provided in any manner as he chose. The petitioner was thus controlled in the essential modes of enjoyment of the space, and what was granted was a restricted licence to profit by using whatever space was provided for the business of supplying refreshments, which was in the nature of a catering arrangement. The agreement was liable to termination at the will of the Road Transport Board. The agreement in itself recited that the parties were in the position of a licensor and a licensee. Though the use of these words by itself is not sufficient to hold that it was a mere licence, the terms of the agreement clearly indicate that what was granted was no more than a licence and was not a lease. When the petitioner was allowed to put up a temporary structure, the permission given was to put up cabins or stalls for the period of the licence, i.e., until the licence was revoked. The most important considerations in such cases are what were the rights of the parties' and what was the object of the agreement'. Taking these into consideration, I have no doubt that what was conferred on the petitioner was a mere licence and not a lease.

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner finally relies on the definition of "tenant" in section 2 (i) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 19.19 and argues that as the petitioner falls within this definition, he cannot be ejected except under the provisions of the Ordinance. If the petitioner is a tenant, he has the protection of the Ordinance, now in force, even though it was not in force at the time of the institution of the suit. Therefore, let us see if he is a lessee or a tenant for the purposes of the Ordinance. A "tenant" means under section 2 (i) any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land, and "rented land" means under section 2 (f) any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. "Landlord" means under section 2 (c) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit of any other person. These are no doubt words of wide import, but rent is payable by a tenant in relation to transfer of an interest in and a right to enjoy a particular land, which is not the case here. What has been conferred here is a permission to do something on the land, i.e., to do catering business on the land, which is a licence. The difference is no doubt subtle but it is not difficult to see it. The words landlord' and tenant' have to be interpreted in the like manner. I cannot, therefore, hold that the petitioner is a 'tenant' within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the Ordinance, and has its protection.

17. For the reasons given above I am of the view that the plaintiff was merely granted a licence to set up a catering stall on a portion of the Sub‑Office of the Road Transport Board for carrying on the business of supplying refreshments on certain terms and conditions and is a licensee and not a lessee. The licence was to be terminable without notice and without cause assigned. It was granted for a period of six months only from 4th March 1956. The period of licence expired on the 4th of September 1956. It was also determined by notice served on the 10th December 1956, and the plaintiff-petitioner had no right left to remain on the land, as was held by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Chief Administrative Officer v. Habibullah Butt (P L D 1960 S C (Pak.) 78). His right to occupy the premises having been determined by notice given to him to quit the premises, it was his legal duty to surrender possession to his licensor. After that no legal right to retain the possession inhered in him. His remaining on the land even became unlawful and it was not necessary for the licensor to apply to a Court to eject the licensee, whose licence had been determined, which protection is only available to a lessee in Pakistan.

18. The question may now be examined whether a licensee after the determination of the licence has a right to bring a suit for permanent injunction. Under the English Law, a mere licence does not create any estate or interest in the property to which it relates; it only makes an act lawful which without it would be unlawful. A gratuitous licence is revocable by notice at any time. A contractual licence may be revocable or irrevocable according to the express or implied terms of the contract between the parties. If the licencee under the revocable licence has brought property on to the land, he is entitled to notice of revocation and to a reasonable time for removing his property, in which to make arrangements to carry on his business elsewhere. If the revocation of the licence amounts to a breach of the contract, the licensee can recover damages from the breach, but he is not entitled to bring a suit for injunction. In the present case the licence was contractual for six months and it was determinable by notice at the will and pleasure of the licensor. The licensee was only authorised to put up a temporary structure in the nature of a stall or cabin, and the setting up of a building of a permanent character was not permitted. If the petitioner constructed a quasi‑permanent or permanent super structure on it, as alleged by him, in violation of the grant, he cannot claim an enforceable right to remain on the premises by reason of his illegal act. For the duration of the licence the petitioner was no doubt entitled to derive benefit from the enjoyment of the licence, but the licence was clearly revocable, and no right was conferred to the perpetual enjoyment of the right or of any property or to hold it permanently. There has been no breach of the licence on the part of the licensor and even if there was a breach, the only remedy open to the licensee was to sue for damages and not for a permanent injunction, because if any injunction is granted, it will make that irrevocable which the parties had by their special contract thought fit to make revocable. The position is the same in India and in Pakistan. The principles underlying the Easements Act are applied as rules of justice, equity and good conscience, as held in Jagat Singh v. The District Board, Amritsar (I L R 22 Lah. 413), which holds that the principles established by decisions of the English Courts (e.g., in Hurst v. Pictures Theatres Ltd.) have been adopted in this country. In Personna Commar ingha v. Ram Coomar Ghose (I L R 46 Cal. 640), it has been held that a licence to use the land of another, unless coupled with a grant, is revocable at the will of the licensor, subject to the right of the licensee to damages, if revoked contrary to the terms of any express or implied. contract. In this case, there was revocation of the licence contrary to the terms of the contract, and it was held that the law was the same as laid down in the case of Wood v. Leadbitter (18 M & W 838) and the lower Courts were wrong in granting an injunction in the suit. I am clearly of the view, therefore, that no suit for injunction lies even in those cases where there is a breach of the licence by the licensor, which means that no such suit lies where there is no breach. Consequently the plaintiff's suit did not lie and has to be dismissed.

19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on section 54 of the Specific Relief Act in support of the argument that a suit for injunction lies. That section has no application to the facts of the present case. There is no case of apprehended breach of an obligation existing in favour of the petitioner, nor of an invasion of the petitioner's right to enjoyment of property nor is the invasion such that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief.

20. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the licence could not be revoked, as a pucca superstructure had been built on the land demised and relied on Shahishan Begum v. Munna (A I R 1927 All. 342), Muhammad Abdul Jamil v. Manzoor Ahmad (A I R 1932 All. 572), Thakur Prasad v. J. Thomekinson (A I R 1927 Oudh. 206) and Guman Singh v. Pyarelal (A I R 1929 Nag. 141). The first is a case where a licence was granted to build houses on the site and it was held that as the licensees had erected a work of permanent nature on the site, ‑the licensor could not, in view of the provisions of section 60 of the Easements Act, revoke it, but this was a case of lease which was held to be of permanent nature and this distinguishes it from the present case. The second is a case in which a wall was built on the upper storey of a house which rested on the lower wall belonging to the defendant. The defendant who had knowledge of the construction, allowed it without any protest. The wall was of a permanent character and expenses had been incurred in its execution. It was held that there was an implied grant of licence by the defendant to the plaintiff and that under section 60 (b) the licence could not be revoked and section 64 applied only to those cases where there was no work of a permanent character. In the third case, it was held that where a person takes possession of land with the express permission of the owner he becomes a licensee and not a trespasser and section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be so interpreted as to give the transferee a right of revocation of a licence, which would not be exercisable by the transferor himself. A building constructed of mud walls and thatched roof built for the purposes of school and which was in existence and kept under regular repair for about 30 years was held to be of a work of a permanent character. In the fourth case it was held that a licence cannot be revoked even when a part only of a work of a permanent character has been executed by the licensee. These cases are clearly distinguishable from the present case. The terms of the contract in this case did not authorise the petitioner to put up any permanent structure. If he put up any such structure, it was at his own risk with eyes open and with full knowledge that the structure was unauthorised. Sanction of the Corporation was also not obtained for putting up the construction, and it is liable to demolition on this ground alone. There is, therefore, no case of the petitioner putting up a permanent structure on the faith or the belief that it had the. approval of the Road Transport Board. Can it be said in the case that the putting up of the permanent structure was with the knowledge and approval of the Road Transport Board No such evidence has been led. What is important is that it is not the case set up by the petitioner in his plaint. It does not arise out of the pleadings and cannot be allowed to be raised at this stag because the defendants have had no notice of it and have not led evidence thereon.

21. As in my view, the contract was not a contract of lease, but was a licence which was determined, the petitioner had no right to file a suit for injunction. He does not have any protection under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and he cannot remain on the premises on any legal basis, for the act of his remaining is no longer lawful and he cannot remain on the basis of the super structure put up by him. The plaintiff has managed to hold on for over six years because of the suit, when the licence was only for a period of six months, and was also determined by notice dated the 10th December 1956. The plaintiff had no right to remain on the land on the determination of the licence and this revision petition is dis missed. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.

A. H. Petition dismissed.

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