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Writ Petition No. 569‑R of 1961, decided on 19th November 1962.

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-----Impleading Chief Settlement Commissioner "by name" as respondent‑grit petition not specifically directed against orders of Subordinate Officers‑Effect‑Writ, will not bind such subordinates‑Issuance of grit not of any practical utility‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1956), Art. 170.

S. 16‑Settlement Schemes‑Rules‑Provisions "subject to rules framed under Act" prevail over provisions of Schemes to extent of repugnancy.

The Schemes made under section 16, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, are subject to the rules framed under the Act. The rules for permanent transfer notified on the 13th of May 1961, to the extent of repugnancy, therefore, prevail over the provisions of the Scheme. Thus, instead of the title‑deed contemplated in paragraph 41 of Scheme 1, the entry in the register mentioned in rule 3 of the Rules will confer permanent proprietary rights on the transferees.

S. 10‑Transfer order passed by Deputy Settlement Commissioner, no legal bar to entertainment of subsequent applications of transfer.

The simple fact that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had passed an order of transfer will not, by itself, take the property out of the compensation pool as contemplated in section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and the argument that this section was a bar to the entertainment of another application is, therefore, not tenable.

Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Altaf Hussain P L D 1962 Lah. 189 distinguished.

S. 21 (1) (b)‑Party not served with notice- Order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner passed in absence of party who got such order set aside by the Additional Settlement Commissioner‑Settlement Commissioner subsequently passing order against such party which was upheld by Chief Settlement Commissioner‑Party given due hearing by latter officers‑Party not to make a grievance, in absence of prejudice, that original order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner was passed in his absence‑Constitution of Pakistan (1956), Art. 170‑Writ‑Natural justice.‑[Yusuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 104 distinguished.].

S. 16‑Settlement Scheme No. I, para. 16‑Order of transfer‑Order passed by Settlement Commissioner in revision not invalid on ground that order of transfer could only be passed under para. 16 by a Deputy Settlement Commissioner.

S. 2 (6) read with S. 2(5) ‑ Central Govern ment's Notification published in Gazette Extraordinary dated 26‑10‑1959‑Non‑allottee entitled to benefit of Notification only if no other person is otherwise entitled.

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---Impugned order within jurisdiction of Tribunal passing same‑Order will not be interfered with merely because order was irregular on such as should not have been passed [Belated admis sion of application for transfer of house‑Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), Sch., para. 1]‑[Mst. Mahmooda Begum v. Chief Settlement Commis sioner P L D 1962 Lah. 911 ref.]

Ch. Qadar Bakhsh for Petitioner.

Sh. Mazhar‑ul‑Haq for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondent No. 2.

The Chief Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated the 24th February 1961, transferred a portion of house No. 84, Block No. 6, Sargodha, to respondent No. 1 Mst. Sairan. The petitioner has challenged this order, as being without jurisdiction and has claimed that she (the petitioner) was entitled to its transfer and the order of the Deputy Settlement Commis sioner, dated the 30th December 1959, to that effect, was valid end operative.

2. The facts, which gave rise to this petition, are, that House No. 84, Block No. 6, Sargodha, was occupied by nine different persons. Four out of them, namely, Abdul Shakoor, Nur Muhammad, Mst. Maryam and Mst. Bakho, the petitioner, put in C. H. Forms for the transfer of the house. All of them were claimants. Abdul Ghani, Allahbanda, Abdul Hafeez, Ghulam Shabbir and Muhammad Din, who is the son of respondent No. 1, did not submit any claim form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner considered the applications for transfer on the 30th of December 1959, and, to ascertain the entitlement of the occupants, he also took into consideration the claim of the other persons, who were the occupants and could have applied for the same property. Ultimately, he divided the house into two portions and transferred the left side to Abdul Shakoor and Nur Muhammad (not parties in the case) and the right side to Mst. Maryam (not party in these proceed ings) and Mst. Bakho, the petitioner. After the transfer Mst. Sairan applied for the transfer of the house to the Additional Settlement Commissioner on the 5th of January 1960. She was a claimant and her son, Muhammad Din, was an allottee of a portion of this house. The applications, had to be submitted under paragraph 2 of the Settlement Scheme No. 1. The Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a notification asking for the submission of applications for the transfer of house before the 15th day of July 1959. This date was extended by a subse quent notification, dated the 28th of October 1959, to the 10th of November 1959. This date was again extended by the notification, dated 26th of December 1959. The belated applications could be accepted only by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Additional Settlement Commissioner, by his order dated the 7th of January 1960, entertained this petition of the respondent and marked it to the Deputy Settlement Com missioner II, Sargodha. (A certified copy of the order, though not originally filed with petition, has been placed on the record.) The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, in pursuance of the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, considered the case of tine respondent and by his order dated the 11th of January 1960, maintained the original transfers but modified them to the extent that the respective areas in possession of respondent Mst. Sairan and ones Nazar Muhammad, son of Muhammad Hussain, (not a party to these proceedings), were transferred to them. No notice of the application of respondent was given to the petitioner and other persons who were transferees under order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated 30th of December, 1959.

3. The original transferees, Abdul Shakoor, Nur Muhammad, Mst. Maryara and the present petitioner, all felt aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated the 30th of December 1959, and also by the supplementary order, dated the 11th January 1960, and preferred appeals before the Additional Settlement Commissioner. It was stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeals were preferred against the supplementary order, dated the 11th of January 1960, only; but a reference to the, appellate order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner shows that the appeals were against both the orders of transfer and the person benefiting by virtue of the original and supplementary orders were ail impleaded as the respondent. The appeal was heard and disposed of by Raja Ghulam Mehdi, Additional Settlement Commissioner, Sargodha, by order dated the 13th of February 1960. Mst. Sairan respondent was eliminated on the grounds firstly that she put her C. H. Form after the property had been transferred by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and, secondly, that she being an indirect appellant could not have preference over the persons who were in actual possession of the property. So far as the rights of the applicants inter se were concerned, the Additional Settlement Commissioner transferred the left side to Abdul Shakoor and Mst. Maryam and right side to Nur Muhammad and Mst. Bakho petitioner. Effect of this order was that Nur Muhammad and Mst. Maryam had to interchange between themselves their respective portions.

4. Mst. Sairan and Nur Muhammad only filed revision petitions against the order of the Additional Settlement Commis sioner. The petition of Nur Muhammad was rejected, but the peti tion of Mst. Sairan was allowed against the present petitioner. The result was that Nur Muhammad and Mst. Sairan respondents were now to be the transferees of the right side of the building. The petitioner filed a second revision petition against this order before the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Mr. Farzand Ali, Settlement Commissioner with the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, under section 20 (2) of the Act, dismissed the revision petition and observed that it had been conceded before him that the petitioner, although a claimant, was not an allottee of any portion of the house, and Muhammad Din, the son of the respondent, was found to be an allottee as a matter of fact. He also repelled the contention raised by the petitioner that Mst. Sairan respondent was not in possession. The petitioner felt aggrieved and challenged the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner by this petition on the grounds : (a) that application for transfer of the property by Mst. Sairan respondent was submitted on the 5th of January 1960, when the property had already been transferred. There was no property in the compensation pool and, as such, no application could be entertained because only property in the compensation pool could be transferred under section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 ; (b) that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner; dated the 11th of January 1960, transferring the property to Mst. Sairan respondent was a nullity inasmuch as he could not transfer the property which had already been transferred and his order amounted in law to be a review of his earlier order, which he could not do without the permission of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and without a notice to the petitioner; (e) that after the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated the 11th of January 1960, was set aside by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, the order which was passed thereafter for the transfer of the house in favour of the respondent, was that of the Settlement Commissioner and he could not do so because the powers of transfer could only be exercised by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner under Settlement Scheme No. 1; (d) that Mst. Sairan respondent applied through her son and, therefore, she was an indirect applicant ; hence she could not be considered for the transfer when the persons otherwise entitled to a transfer of the house were there to compete with her ; and (e) that Mst. Sairan was claiming the transfer of the property through her son Muhammad Din, under paragraph I of the Schedule. Muhammad Din had also submitted an application, and, as such, she was not entitled to its transfer. The learned counsel for the respondent controverted all the points raised by the petitioner.

5. Before I deal with the points raised by the petitioner, there is a formidable objection to the acceptance of this petition. The petition has been filed only to have the order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan quashed and he is also impleaded as a respondent. Mst. Sairan was transferred the property in fact by the order of the Settlement Commissioner dated the 14th April 1960, and the order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, exercising powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, was only one of affirmation. Even if the order of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan is quashed, the aforementioned order of the Settlement Commissioner will still remain operative. The petitioner in order to have the effect of transfer in favour of the respondent completely removed should have asked for quashment of all the orders which resulted in a transfer of the property in her favour. The decision of the case, however, would have been different if instead of Mr. Farzand Ali Khan, the Chief Settlement Commissioner, had been made a party. The Chief Settlement Commissioner is the head of the Settlement Department, and in the event of a writ being issued against him, he would have obeyed the orders and the authorities subordinate to him also would have carried it out. In my opinion, therefore, the issuance of a writ will not be of any practical utility.

6. As to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the application of the respondent for the transfer of the house could not be entertained on the 5th of January 1960, when the house had been already transferred and was no longer in the pool, I have only to refer to paragraphs 16, 23 and 29 of the Settlement Scheme No. 1. These clearly show that the transfer of the property is not effected by the mere fact that an order is passed in this behalf by a Settlement Authority. Other necessary formalities have also to be observed, e.g., the price of the property has to be ascertained by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner who sends a notice of the transfer conveying his decision in form as specified in Appendix IX or Appendix X and directing the transferee to comply with the directions contained in such notice within a period of fifteen days. If the entire price is not paid, the amount of each instalment for the liquidation of the debt and the dates on which these are to be paid have to be determined by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, who then delivers to the transferee an instalment order in the form of Appendix XI. It is, thereafter, that the provisional transfer order is issued in the form of Appendix XII. The matter does not end here. The property still remains vested in the Central Govern ment‑and it is only after a permanent ‑transfer has, been made under para. 38 of the Scheme and a title‑deed given as required under Para. 41 of the same, that the property vests in the transferee and the Government is divested of its ownership. The Government has, in exercise of the powers conferred on it by section 35, made rules for permanent transfer of property under section 10 of the Act. Under rule 3 of these Rules, it is only after the provisional transferee has paid the transfer price, the Settlement dues and all public dues in full that a record of the permanent transfer of the property in the name of such transferee is to be made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in a register kept for this purpose and, thereupon, the property vests in the transferee free from all encumbrances. A reference to section 16 would show that the Schemes made there-under are subject to the rules framed under the Act. The rules for permanent transfer notified on the 13th of May 1961, to the extent of repugnancy, therefore, prevail over the provisions of the Scheme. This is mentioned only to show that under the present law instead of the title‑deed contemplated in paragraph 41 of the Scheme, the entry in the register mentioned in rule 3 of the rules will, confer the permanent proprietary rights on the transferees. Therefore, the simple fact that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had passed an 'order of transfer of the 30th of December, 1959, will not; by itself, take this property out of the compensation pool as contemplated in section 10 of the Act and the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that this section was a bar to the entertainment of the application of the respondent is, therefore, not tenable. No other provision of law has been brought to my notice, which may support this contention of the petitioner. However, in support of this contention he referred to the observation in Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Altaf Hussain (P L D 1962 Lah. 189 at p. 208), wherein all that had been observed was that if the factum of the transfer had been brought to the notice of the Authority who entertained the belated application, it would not have accepted it. This observation can hardly be considered to be a proposition for the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Moreover, there is no force in what was urged because the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated the 30th of December 1959 was not a final order as it could still be challenged in appeal and revision as provided by the Statute.

7. The order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated the 11th of January, 1960, was passed in the absence of the petitioner and without notice to her. She challenged this order before the Additional Settlement Commissioner, who set it aside and in subsequent proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner the petitioner was a party and had been heard in support of her case. She has not been prejudiced at all. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Yusuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia (P L D 1958 .S C (Pak.) 104). It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows :‑

"If on the basis of a void order subsequent orders have been passed either by the same authority or by other authorities, the whole series of such orders; together with the superstructure of rights and obligations built upon them; must, unless some statute or principle of law recognizing as legal the changed position of the parties is in operation, fall to the ground because such orders have as little legal foundation as the .void order on which they are founded."

The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court have been quoted in extenso with a view to show that‑ the principle laid down therein applies only when subsequent orders: are passed on the strength of an earlier order which is void. Here the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner set aside the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner which order, according to the petitioner, was void: it was only by a subsequent order of the Settlement Commissioner, dated the 14th of April 1960, that the entitlement of the respondent was again acknowledged. That order was not passed on the basis of the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, but it has been passed on the merits of the case without, in any way, taking the assistance from the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated the 11th of January 1960. A perusal of the order of the Settlement Com missioner would show that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner has not even been remotely referred to This decision, therefore, is of no assistance to the petitioner.

8. It was also urged that the Deputy Settlement Commis sioner passed an order without giving a notice to the petitioner as required by section 21 (1) (b) of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and it was otherwise in violation of the principles of natural justice. The fact that the original order was passed without notice does not mean that the order has necessarily to be set aside. It is not possible to lay down such general rule. The proceedings, as a whole, have to be considered and the best criterion to determine is if any pre judice has been caused by the fact that the party was not heard by the Authority that passed the original order. In this case if I consider the original, appellate and revisional proceedings together it becomes clear that the petitioner had presented her case substantially as she wanted to do. No prejudice whatso ever has been caused to her. The decision of the Chief Settle ment Commissioner is, therefore not bad merely on the ground that notice was not given to her by the first Tribunal i.e., the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The non‑compliance of the procedure necessary under the law was an error which can hardly be doubted, but as I have come to the conclusion that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner has not worked to the prejudice of the petitioner, I see no reason why the entire proceedings of the Settlement Authorities should be declared inoperative.

9. It is next contended that the order of the Settlement Commissioner transferring the property to the respondent is without jurisdiction because as laid down in paragraph 16 of the Settlement Scheme No. 1, only the Deputy Settlement Commis sioner could transfer the property. There is no force in this argument, because the Settlement Commissioner has not passed the order of transfer. He has passed the appropriate orders which he was competent to pass in the exercise of his revisional powers.

10. As to the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that under paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act the respondent could apply for the transfer of the house only if her son Muhammad Dm had not claimed it under the Schedule, I may only say that this has been made on the assumption that Muhammad Din was also an applicant. A reference to the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, dated the 30th of December 1959, which is Annexure A' to this petition, would show that Muhammad Din is mentioned at serial No. 6 and it is further stated against his name no form'. It would thus be clear that Muhammad Din was not an applicant for the transfer of the house. A reference was made to Annexure A' of the respondent's written statement wherein against the column Name of applicant' it is mentioned Sairan Bibi‑‑Muhammad Din' and it was argued that this annexure proved that Muhammad Din was also an applicant. I have seen that annexure and examined it in details. This deals with the belated application of Mst. Sairan, dated the 5th of January 1960, for the transfer of the house. The application is thumb‑marked by her. Again serial No. 5, which is meant to show if the house is in the possession of the applicant's parent, son, daughter or spouse, it is men tioned by her herself and my son in possession with family'.

It would be clear from this that she was the applicant and she had made a reference to her son only with a view to indicating the persons who were in possession. These particulars again bear the thumb‑impression, of Mst. Sairan alone. I have, therefore, no doubt that the application was made only on behalf of Mst. Sairan, and Muhammad Din at no time had submitted an application for the transfer of the house. It was, however, contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an admission bad been made in paragraph 1 of the written state ment dealing with the fact that Muhammad Din had applied for the transfer. The learned counsel for the respondent stated that this was an erroneous admission and that not only that the admission was repudiated as incorrect but it was otherwise demonstrated to be wrong by the entries in Annexure A' to the written statement. I do not think that the admission made in paragraph 2 of the written statement should, in any way, militate against the respondent. It is clear from the record that Muhammad Din never applied for the transfer of the house. This contention of the petitioned therefore, also has no force.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that if respondent had been the only applicant for the transfer of the house, she could take the benefit of possession of her son and get the property transferred at a price determined on evaluation basis; but since there were more than one appli cant, she could not file the application and take advantage of paragraph 1 of the Schedule. I have no dispute with this pro position of law. The fact of the matter, however, is‑that once property No. 84, Block No. 6, Sargodha was divided by the Settlement Authorities into four different parts, all those parts by virtue of the definition in section 2 (4) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, became houses. The portion transferred to the petitioner, therefore, was also a house. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Muhammad Din was in possession as an allottee of the premises but it was contended that since his case was considered by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on the 30th of December 1959, and rejected, the petitioner alone became entitled to the transfer of the premises. It was conceded that she had no allotment in her favour, but it was urged that notwithstanding the same, she, by virtue of a notification of the Central Govern ment issued in pursuance of section 2 (6) of Act XXVIII of 1958, (published in Gazette Extraordinary on the 26th of October 1959) was to be deemed to be in possession, because by the elimination of Muhammad Din she remained in undisputed possession of the house. To appreciate properly this argument the notification is reproduced in extenso:‑

"In exercise of the powers conferred by the second proviso to clause (6) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 (XXVIII of 1958), the Central Government is pleased to direct that a claimant, a non‑claimant displaced person or a local who has not obtained possession of a house or a shop in pursuance of an order passed by a competent authority on or before the twentieth day of December, 1958, shall, for the purpose of the aforesaid Act, be deemed to be in possession thereof, if he has been in. undisputed occupation of the house or the shop since before the twenty‑first day of December 1958, and no other person is otherwise entitled to the transfer of such house or shop in pursuance of a final order passed by a competent authority before that day:

Provided that the rent and other public dues in respect of such house or shop have been paid by the occupant from the date of his occupation and, if he is a claimant, such amount is adjusted against his claim."

The relevant and significant portion of the notification has been italicised. Muhammad Din, of course, has been eliminated but this is by the order dated the 30th of December 1959. The peti tioner could be deemed to be in possession only if no other person was otherwise entitled to the transfer of such house or shop in pursuance of a final order passed by a competent authority before the twenty‑first day of December 1958. It may be stated here that the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act came into force on the 28th of March 1958 and the first notifica tion under paragraph 2 of the Settlement Scheme No. 1 inviting applications for the transfer of houses was made on the 19th of May 1959. No transfer under the said Act was, therefore, pos sible before the 21st December 1958. The entitlement of transfer mentioned in the notification, is obviously with reference to .the right of a person to have a property transferred under Act XXVIII of 1958. Under the said Act only a person in possession could be transferred a house as laid down in the Schedule to the said Act. The word "Possession" is defined under section 2 (5) in the following terms :‑

" Possession', except for the purposes of section 30, does not include possession obtained on or after the seventeenth day of February 1958, but includes possession so obtained in pursuance or as a result of an order passed before that date by the Re habilitation Commissioner or by the Custodian."

It is, thus, clear that only an allottee was entitled to the transfer of the house before the 20th of December 1958. The petitioner, Mst. Bakho, therefore, would be deemed to be in possession if on the 21st of December 1958 no other person was entitled to its transfer. Muhammad Din admittedly was an allottee of the premises as from a date earlier than the 21st of December 1958. As such he was, entitled to the transfer of premises being a displaced person That being so, the notification, referred to above, could be of no avail to the petitioner and she could not be deemed to be in possession. Since she was not in possession, she could no apply for the transfer of the house and for that reason there was no bar to the respondent applying for the transfer of the house.

12. Lastly, it was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Additional Settlement Commissioner accepted the belated application of the respondent without complying with the provisions of law. The belated applications, it was urged, could be entertained, only in pursuance of notifications of the Settlement Commissioner issued on the 28th of October 1959 and the 26th of December 1959, and the delay in putting in applications for the transfer of houses could be condoned only in deserving and exceptional cases and not automatically. He said that since such circumstances were not stated by the Additional Settlement Commissioner in his order dated the 7th of January 1960, it was not in accordance with the provisions of the above mentioned notifications and that being so, the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner was a nullity. This conten tion was resisted on the ground that such abjection was not taken in the petition wherein all that had been alleged was that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had accepted the belated applications. Notwithstanding that such an objection was not taken, still I have looked into this aspect of the case. It is clear from the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner, which has been placed on record by the respondent during the hearing of this petition, that all that he wrote on the application was "admit". No reasons for the same had been mentioned. This, in my opinion, is not strictly in accordance with the instructions issued. He has committed an irregularity but this, by itself, is not sufficient to have the entire proceedings quashed. The learned counsel for the respondent, in order to meet the contention of the petitioner's learned counsel, referred to the case of Mst. Mahmooda Begum v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (P L D 1962 Lah. 911 at d. 9 15). It was held by their Lordships Mr. Justice Shabir Ahmad and A. S. Faruqui as follows:‑

"It is not a proper exercise of jurisdiction of this Court to come to the conclusion that a writ should issue because the Chief Settlement Commissioner had pissed an order which though it was within his jurisdiction did not appear just to the Court, because if the Chief Settlement Commissioner has the jurisdiction to pass the order, the fact that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner though legal may not appear to this Court to be just cannot be a ground for issuing a writ. There is a fundamental difference between the power of hearing appeals or revisions and the power to issue writs. A Court which is competent to hear an appeal or revision is competent to set aside the order of a Court sought to be appealed from or revised on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the order was not proper or just, but when tit question to consider is whether or not a writ should issue, At consideration before the Court has to be whether or not the order against which the issue of a writ is sought was within the jurisdiction of the authority which had passed it, and a writ will not issue on the ground that though the order was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal or authority which had passed it, the circumstances of the case demanded that it should not have been passed. What I am emphasizing is that there is a vast difference between the expression the order could not have been passed' and the expression the order should not have been passed'. If what is mentioned in the first of these two expressions has happened, occasion for issue of a writ arises, but it does not arise if what is mentioned in the second of the above mentioned two expres sions is all that can be urged against an order."

The order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner was within his jurisdiction. It is not an order which be could not pass. All that can be urged is that he should not have passed the order in the manner he did. This is hardly a ground for an interference by this Court and, especially, when after the passing of that order proceedings in appeal and revision were taken before the Settle ment Authorities.

13. In view of what I have stated above, I find no force in the writ petition, which is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

A. H. Petition dismissed.

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