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Criminal Revision Application No. 303 of 1960/Criminal Miscellaneous No. 125 of lyo2, decided on 17th December 1962.

‑Provisions of Ss. 366 & 367 not applicable to judgments of High Court‑Judgment of High Court becomes final under S. 369 after it has been signed‑Judgment written and signed by one Judge can be pronounced by another Judge of High Court‑Irregularity, if any, curable under S. 537.

Amin Sharif v. Mst. Syeda Khatun and another P L D 1962 S C 97 distinguished.

Gian Singh Munsha v. Amar Singh Jaimal A I R 1939 Lah. 21 ; Muhammad Sattar v. Behari Lal Jain A I R 19.48 All. 339 ; In re Sankara Pillai alias Sankaranaryana Pillai 7 C L J 459 and Abdul Qadir v. The Crown P L D 1956 Lah. 100 ref.

Anis Yusuf for Petitioner.

Z. C. Yalliani and M. A. Naqvi for Respondent No. 1.

Nemo for Respondent No. 2.

Samad Khan for Respondent No. 3.

Abdul Kadir Shaikh, A. A. G. for Respondent No. 4.

Date of hearing : 17th December 1962.

2. I see no force in the present petition. In view of my opinion that the order of Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid was sacrosanct and I could not review it, there was no point in examining the question whether or not a Criminal Court can order partition or demarcation of land into plots. When I expressed the opinion that the order of Mr. Justice Abdul Hamid passed by him in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction was final and could not be reviewed by me, I could not, consistently with this opinion, examine the tenability or otherwise of the plea incorporated in the ground of admission whether a criminal Court can order parti tion or demarcation of land into plots. If I had done so, I would have stultified myself by doing what I had stated I could not do.

3. As regards the other plea taken up by the petitioner in his present application, namely, that the judgment written and signed by me was no judgment inasmuch as it had not been announced by myself but had been announced by Mr. Justice Inamullah, I find it equally untenable. The learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the provisions relating to "judgment" comprised in sections 366 and 367 of the Criminal Procedure Code and has urged that for a judgment to be valid it is necessary that it should be signed and dated by the Judge passing it at the time of pronouncing it in open Court. The learned counsel also pressed into his service Amin Sharif v. Mst. Syeda Khatun and another (P L D1962 S C 97), in support of his contention. I do not think that either sections 366 and 367 or the judgment cited by the learned.counsel for the petitioner, are applicable to the impugned the judgment of mine. It is clear from the wording of sections 366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, that these provisions are applicable to judgments with regard to trials by Criminal Courts of original jurisdiction. There is no reference in these provisions to the judgments of the High Courts. Needless to say, the impugned order of mine was of a Judge of a High Court and had not been written in the exercise of my original jurisdiction as a trial Court. The Supreme Court authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner dealt with a judgment of a Magistrate who had tried a criminal case. What is more, the judgment of the Magistrate, which became the subject‑matter of appeal before the Supreme Court, was never announced. After that judgment had been written by the learned Magistrate, but before he had pronounced it, the complainant presented an application to him for stay of proceedings on the ground that he wanted to apply for transfer of the case, and the Magistrate stayed the proceedings without delivering the judgment. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused‑appellant in that case had contended before the Supreme Court that after a judgment had been signed by a Magis trate, it became unalterable irrespective of the fact whether it had been pronounced or not. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after examining the effect of sections 366, 367 and 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, held that the simple writing and signing of the judgment was wholly ineffective and did not operate as a bar to further proceedings. It is clear from the above that the complexion of the facts with which their Lordships of the Supreme Court dealt is different from the one with which I am called upon to deal. The question before me is whether there is any provi sion in the Criminal Procedure Code prohibiting the announce ment by a Judge of a High Court of a judgment written and signed by another Judge. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been unable to point to any such provision from the Criminal Procedure Code. Nor has he been able to cite any judgment of any High Court in which the view that the judgment of one Judge cannot be announced by another Judge of the High Court, been taken.

4. The learned counsel for the State and the respondents called my attention to numerous authorities in support of the proposition that even in the case of judgments written by one Magistrate and announced by another the error amounted to little more than an irregularity which was curable under section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. To refer to only some of such authorities, I might mention Gian Singh Munsha v. Amar Singh Jaimal (A I R 1939 Lah. 21), Muhammad Sattar v. Behari Lal Jain (A I R 1948 All. 339), In re: Sankara Pillai alias Sankaranaryana Pillay (7 Cr L J 459). In Abdul Qadir v. The Crown (P L D 1956 Lah. 100), it was held that non‑compliance with the formalities of section 367, Criminal Procedure Code, is cured by section 537, Criminal Procedure Code, unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that if the non‑compliance with the provisions of sections 366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, was curable in the case of judgments of Magistrates, to which the provisions had been made expressly applicable, there is all the more reason why the judgment of one Judge of the High Court announced by another Judge, even if supposed to be irregular, should be con sidered as sacrosanct and as not liable to be set aside. I agree with the line of reasoning adopted by. the learned counsel for the respon dents. Besides, it is significant that not only is there no reference in sections 366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, to a judgment of a High Court, but what is more, in section 424, Criminal Procedure Code which deals with judgments in appeal, the judg ments of the High Court in appeal, have been expressly taken out of the mischief of the provisions of Chapter XXVI applicable to judg ments of Criminal Courts of original jurisdiction. Furthermore, in section 369, Criminal Procedure Code, it is specifically laid down that no Court when it has signed its judgment shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error. Since the provisions of sections 366 and 367, Criminal Procedure Code, are not applic able to the judgments of the High Court, section 369 with reference to a judgment of a High Court means that the judgment becomes final after it has been signed. Since my judgment, whose validity is being called in question by the petitioner, had already been signed by me before it was announced by Mr. Justice Inamullah, it cannot be urged with any show of reason that any prejudice has accrued to the petitioner on account of its having been announced by Mr. Justice Inamullah or that my judgment had become illegal or invalid on that score.

5. In the above view of the matter, the petitioner's appli cation is dismissed.

K. B. A.

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