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Suit No. 4 of 1961, decided on 28th November 1962.
-Garnishee-Amount deposited by defendant with Karachi Stock Exchange Ltd. for carrying on business of stock broker-Not property of garnishee-Mere floating security-Not assuming character of fixed or specific security-Garnishee cannot refuse to pay money in Court and has no right to raise objection against order of attachment before judgment.
Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Ltd. (1910) 2 K B 979 ; Syud Tujj'uzzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoo Nath Pershad (1871) 14 Moo. I A 40: Hutt v. Shaw (1887) 3 T L R 354 ; Hari Das Acharjee Chowdhury v. Baroda Kishore Acharjee Chowdhury (1899-1900) 4
C W N 87 ; Bahadurmull v. Tricumdas A I R 1925 Cal. 561 ; Gajraj Sheokarandas v. Sir Hukamchand Sarupchand A I R 1939 Bom. 90 ; In re : Louis Thomas Pinto A I R 1941 Sind 193 ; S. N. Dass v. Muthia Cherry A I R 1920 L Bur. 46 ; Jetha Devji & Co* v. Durgadutt Ramnivas A I R 1927 Born. 365 ; Karutha v. Subramanaya (1886) I L R 8 Mad. 203 and Jagdesh Narain Singh v. Mst. Ramsakal Kuer (1929) I L R 9 Pat. 478 ref.
Muhammad Naseem for Plaintiff.
K. A. Ghani for Aziz Munshi for Defendant.
Date of hearing : 22nd October 1962.
The plaintiff, Kurban Ali M. Merchant and the garnishee, namely the Karachi Stock Exchange Ltd., are keenly contesting the question as to whe ther the plaintiff is entitled to preserve for its benefit by attachment before judgment the whole or a part of Rs. 15,000 which the defendant had deposited with the garnishee as security for carrying on the business of a Stock Broker. The contest is valuable for the plaintiff because as explained by me in paragraph 3 of my order dated the 7th of February 1961, there are reasons to apprehend that the defendant may not be able to satisfy the plaintiff's claim but the garnishee is keen on not delivering up the deposited amount or any part of it because attachment and recovery of such amounts can adversely affect its own trade.
2. Occasions had formerly arisen at which I had ordered the attachment and payment of certain sums which were similarly deposited by other members of this garnishee. Perhaps in the present instance, the garnishee's object is to get the legality of such orders fully tested. Mr. Munshi has appeared for the garnishee and I must say to his credit that he has placed for consideration certain legal aspects which were not brought to my notice before. They are of general importance because security deposits are made in a large variety of circumstances, as for instance to make safe the relationship of master and servant, when the servant is entrusted with valuable property of principal and agent in certain conditions of employers and contractor in certain circumstances and of bailor and bailee particularly when the bailor parts with a property conditionally or with obligations attached to it. All of these transactions are not completely alike but they are often found to possess a few common features ; therefore, decisions given in respect of these features are likely to affect many cases.
3. I shall examine in some detail the questions that arise in this dispute because the judgments that have been cited by Mr. Munshi have left me unconvinced in favour of his side or the other. Firstly, I shall state the facts which form the back ground of this dispute, then set out the Article of Association and Rules and Regulations which govern the deposits received by the garnishee, expressing at the same time the view that I take of those provisions and after that discuss the contentions raised by Mr. Munshi to draw conclusions from the discussion.
4. The facts are that the plaintiffs made an application dated the 6th of January 1961, under Order XXXVIII, rule 5 and Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 and section 151, C. P. C., request ing for an order to restrain the defendant from realising Rs. 15,000 which were deposited with the Karachi Stock Exchange Ltd., and certain shares and securities which were in the possession of the American Express Co. Inc., and also requesting that these two companies be restrained from paying' or parting' with this money shares and securities. The application was accepted by me with Order XXI, rule 46, C. P. C. in view, in terms of my order dated the 7th of February 1961, and a Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against it which was dismissed on the 2nd of May 1961.
5. In these proceedings I do not have to deal with that part of my order which affects the shares and securities which are with the American Express Co. Inc. The Karachi Stock Exchange Ltd., whose objections are to be examined, did not for over a year object to the order of injunction ; therefore, the plaintiff applied on the 22nd of February 1962, under section 151, C. P. C., for a garnishee notice to this company to deposit in Court the amount of Rs. 15,000 or such lesser amount as may be in its possession. Notice of this application was ordered by Sir George Constantine, on the 19th of March 1962, and the garnishee has raised the following objections to the order of attachment as well as to the garnishee notice in a counter-affidavit dated the 15th of September 1962 : '
(1) That the money had been deposited by the defendant under certain rules for the payment of the claims of other members of the garnishee ; therefore, it does not constitute a debt and neither the defendant nor her creditor is entitled to recover it.
(2) That Muhammad Talib Chima and Syed Muhammad Ahmad have sent to the garnishee claims dated the 31st March 1962 and the 28th of April 1962, against the defendant which are still under investigation.
The plaintiff, the garnishee and an employee of the defendant have in view of the garnishee's objections submitted, their replies and counter-replies in the form of a Rejoinder Affidavit, Counter Affidavit and Affidavit dated the 13th and 15th of October 1962. The Counter Affidavit which has been submitted on behalf of the defendant supports the plaintiff. According to it the claims of Muhammad Talib Chima and Syed Muhammad Ahmad do not relate to forward dealings in shares, nor is there any claim against the defendant relating to forward transactions in shares. The garnishee has added two more reasons in reply to the plaintiff's reply for further strengthening its resistance to the claim of the plaintiff. They are
(3) that Z. S. Davar has filed a suit for accounts against the defendant ; and
(4) that the practice of the garnishee is that it does not refund the security deposit of a member if the claim of any other member against him is outstanding.
6. No arguments were addressed in these proceedings on behalf of the defendant ; therefore arguments of counsel for the plaintiff and the garnishee only were heard by me. During the arguments Mr. Munshi has produced copies of the letters to the garnishee from Syed Muhammad Ahmad and Muhammad Talib Chima (marked A' and B') of the Memorandum and Articles of Association and of the Rules and Regulations governing the Forward Delivery Contracts (marked D' and 'E') that govern the garnishee and its business. Counsel for the plaintiff has produced a copy of a notice dated the 13th of January 1961, issued by the garnishee (marked C') to its members informing them that the defendants had suspended "her business on the Karachi Stock Exchange Ltd., as from Friday the 13th of January 1961, till further notice." Mr. Munshi has admitted the notice but has stated without producing any supporting document that the defendant had later on resumed her business.
7. The total effect of the facts stated in the two preceding paragraphs is that the defendant supports the plaintiff but the garnishee is opposing the order of attachment as well as the garnishee notice on four grounds. The garnishee was not a party to the appeal ; therefore, it is not bound by its decision beyond the interest of the defendant. Taking up the grounds of objection by the garnishee I may state that the third and fourth grounds have no force at all ; therefore they need not be discussed.
8. In support of the first and second grounds Mr. Munshi has basically relied on Article 9 (c) of the Articles of Association (marked D') and rules 3 (iv), 16 and 17 of the Rules and Regulations (marked 'E'). Article 9 (c) is as follows
"(c) All moneys received by the Exchange in respect of Entrance fees, annual subscriptions, fines, penalties and otherwise whether under these Articles or the Rules and Regulations in force from time to time shall belong to the Exchange abso lutely and may be dealt with in such manner as the Directors from time to time think fit."
The word "otherwise" is used in it along with the words "entrance fees, annual subscriptions, fines and penalties" which denote the property of the garnishee and there is nothing to suggest that the expression "otherwise was meant to denote any other relationship of the garnishee with those things to which this general expression may apply. Therefore, this expression should be read ejusdem generis and contrary to the contentions of Mr. Munshi so as not to include deposits. Rules 3, 16 and 17 are as under
"Rule 3 (i) :-Every member desiring to do Forward Contract Business shall notify the Secretary in writing of such desire and send in a Cheque for Rs. 2,500 as Basic Deposit.
(ii) The Basic Deposit of Rs. 2,500 shall entitle a member to do business of not more than 2,500 shares outstanding at the time of submitting the contracts to the Exchange each day.
(iii) Members desiring to do business of more than two thousand five hundred shares shall deposit with the Exchange further amounts as follows before doing business in more shares.
(1) From 100 share to 10,000 shares... Re. 1 per share.
(2) From 10,000 shares to 25,000shares A further sum of Rs. 1-8 per share.
(3) From 25,100 shares and over ..A further sum of Rs. 2 per share.
(4) Deposits to be made and with drawn in multiples of Rs. 100.
(iv) All deposits shall be subject to a first lien for payments to be made in Forward Settlement.
Rule 16:-Any Extra Deposit except the Basic Deposit of Rs. 2,500 that be found over and above that required for his outstanding business shall be returned to the member, at his request, within 24 hours.
Rule 17 :-The Basic Deposit of Rs. 2,500 can only be with drawn on production of proof that no business or dues from the member are outstanding and that the member has stopped all Forward Contract Business."
The words "first lien" in rule 3 (iv) and the words "returned to the member on his request within 24 hours" as well as the words "can only be withdrawn" in rules 16 and 17 respectively are to be noted because they determine the nature of the deposits as well as the extent of control by the garnishee over them.
9. These rules disclose that the business relationship of the members of the garnishee imposes on them a liability to deposit varying amounts of money in proportion to the volume of their business. The deposited money remains the property of the depositors but the garnishee is entitled to retain and utilize it under rule 3 (iv) towards the payment of the depositors' future liability arising from "Forward Settlement". What is to be appreciated in this connection is that deposits are not made for the payment of existing claims but to be appropriated if and when an occasion arises for it. The "lien" mentioned in rule 3 (iv) is thus a possessory lien which partakes of the nature of a floating security. The distinction between ownership and posses sion as security is to be kept in mind, without for the present thinking of the equities that may attach to the deposits, because this distinction may be easily overlooked when we come across judgments on other aspects of such transactions and this aspect is not discussed in them.
10. Before considering the equities in the next paragraph, I have to explain that if in essence the lien that is created under the Rules and Regulations constitutes a floating security, as I think it does, then there cannot be a charge for any specific sum on the deposited amounts so long as a specific claim has not actually arisen from a "Forward Settlement". This is another aspect of such transactions which often escapes notice. In order to lay stress on this aspect I refer to the valuable discussion on floating security in Evans v. Rival Granite Quarries, Ltd. ((1910) 2 K B 979), though the discussion is with respect to the floating security created on the assets of a Company for the benefit of its debenture-holders. For applying this analogy to the case now before me, the defendant can be said to occupy the position of that Company and the garnishee the position of its debenture-holders. The ;observations to which I refer are as follows
"I cannot conclude my judgment without making a citation from the speech of Lord Macnaghtan in the case of Government's Stock Investment Co. v. Manila Ry. Co. He says
A floating security is an equitable charge on the assets for the time being of a going concern. It attaches to the subject charged in the varying condition in which it happens to be from time to time. It is of the essence of such a charge that it remains dormant until the undertaking charged ceases to be a going concern, or until the person in whose favour the charge is created intervenes . . . . .' ." (p. 990).
Further
"I should have thought there was not much difficulty in defining what a floating charge is in contrast to what is called a specific charge. A specific charge, I think, is one that without more fastens on ascertained and definite property or property capable of being ascertained and defined ; a floating charge, on the other hand, is ambulatory and shifting in its nature, hovering over and so to speak floating with the property which it is intended to affect until some event occurs or some act is done which causes it to settle and fasten on the subject of the charge within its reach and grasp." (p. 994)
Further
"A security of this kind must be either floating or fixed. While it is a floating security the company has a right, not a mere licence, to carry on its business until the debenture holder intervenes, and when the debenture-holder does inter vene he must do so with the intention of making his security a fixed security. In my opinion it is a breach of contract on the part of the debenture-holder to interfere in the conduct of the business so long as his security is only a floating security . . . . . ." (pp.997-998).
11. Now it is clear from the two preceding paragraphs that the money deposited by the defendant with the garnishee is not the property of the garnishee and that the garnishee has no interest in any portion of the money so long as the floating security has not assumed the character of a fixed or specific security. It is possible in a particular case that the character of the security has changed but accounts are yet to be gone into to discover the change and the exact amount of the fixed charge. The equities of such a situation will demand that a reasonable time be allowed to the depositary or garnishee to settle the account. But the burden will be on the depositary or garnishee to establish the amount of that charge. There is judicial authority in support of this allocation of the burden of proof but section 102 of the Evidence Act is the highest authority in support of it. It is also obvious that the garnishee cannot demand indefinite or unreasonable time for settling the account.
12. Complications do sometimes arise owing to the respon sibility of the garnishee as a bailee towards the bailor because the bailee or depositary is to protect the deposited money like a man of ordinary prudence who is entrusted with the custodv of others' property. The consequences of this responsibility are C often disputed but they cannot be disputed in this case because the liability of the bailor himself towards the plaintiff is being enforced against the bailee. Moreover, the title of the plaintiff in this case is superior to that of the bailor. Here I may quote the following passage from page 396 of G. W. Paton's book on Bailment In the Common Law : because it summarises the general principles conveniently
"The bailee is not protected by the mere fact that he has surrendered the res under an order of the Court at the suit of a third party. If he is sued, it is his duty to give notice to the bailor so that the latter may defend the action and see that the Court is apprised of the true facts. If he neglects to give this notice, the Bailee is protected only if the third party's claim could have been sustained against any defence which the bailor might have raised. The defence is not eviction by order of the Court, for a proceeding in personam binds only the parties to it-the defence is eviction by title paramount which means that the title of the third party could have been conclusively proved even if the bailor had proved the true facts."
13. What can be then the nature of valid resistance by the garnishee The answer is fairly obvious and it is that the garnishee cannot refuse to pay the money into Court for the plaintiff on account of its contract with the defendant ; nor can it do so on account of the defendant's interest in the money, but it can resist the plaintiff's claim on the basis of its own right. The next question which arises from the answer is : what is the garnishee's own right in or over the deposited amount Before answering this question I should re-call that in terms of 'rule 3(iv), the garnishee has the first lien on the deposited amount for payments that may have to be made by the defendant by virtue E of "Forward Settlement". This lien, I should further re-call, amounts to a floating security as explained above and does not constitute a specific charge on the deposit. Moreover, there is no allegation that any payment has become due or, in other words, that the security has become specific for any amount. The allegation merely is that claims have been made by two or three persons but they are not alleged to have arisen from "Forward Settlement". Had they arisen from a "Forward Settlement", the actual dues would have been known a long time ago. The fact that they are only claims as yet should, according to the ordinary course of forward business, be taken as not to have arisen from "Forward Settlement". The defendant is, therefore, apparently right in alleging in his counter-affidavit dated 15-10-1962, that there is no claim against her regarding forward transactions. The answer to the second question therefore is that the garnishee has no interest in the money but it has only a right to possess it as a floating security.
14. This right to possess being dependent entirely on the contract that created floating security and the equities of the' transaction, the contract and the equities determine its scope 1. Rules 16 and 17 lay down that the contract of more than Rs. 2,500 which the garnishee may retain is controlled by the volume of the depositors' business, but the garnishee has not even mentioned its volume. This omission alone reduces the retainable amount to Rs. 2,500 only ; therefore, the rest of the money which is Rs. 12,500 is refundable in terms of rule 17. Whatever equities there are can thus attach to the retainable amount only .and not more, but the equities present no great problem because the retainable amount can be attached subject to such equities as may be shown to exist. Since no equities have been shown to be attached, as explained in the preceding paragraph the retainable amount as well as the other amount is available for the plaintiff.
15. The above is my appreciation of the provisions that govern this case, but Mr. Munshi has approached the problem by citing judgments to direct my mind to a different conclusion. He has cited
(1) Syud Tujjazzool Hossein Khan v. Rughoo Nath Pershad .14 Moo. I A 1871 ;
(2) Hutt v. Shaw (1887) 3 T L R 354 ;
(3) Hari Das Acharjee Chowdhury v. Baroda Kishore Acharjee Chowdhury (1899-1900) 4 C W N 87 ;
(4) Bahadurmull v. Tricumdas A I R 1925 Cal. 561 ;
(5) Gajraj Sheokarandas v. Sir Hukamchand Sarupchand A I R 1939 Bom. 90 ;
(6) In re : Louis Thomas Pinto A I R 1941 Sind 193 ;
Dissenting views have been expressed in these judgments from the views expressed in-
(7) S. N. Dass v. Muthia Cherry A I R 1920 L B 46 ;
(8) Jetha Devjl & Co. v. Durgadutt Ramnivas A I R 1927 Bom. 365 ;
(9) Karuthan v. Subramanaya (1886) 1 L R 8 Mad. 203 ;
(10) Jagdish Narain Singh v. Mst. Ramsakal Kuer (1929) I L R 9 Pat. 478.
16. In the first case the decision was that the decree-holder could not attach a claim of the judgment-debtor which was yet in arbitration because it was merely an "expectancy and a mere right of suit". This judgment is not relevant.
17. In the second judgment the decision was that an amount deposited by a stock-broker is a security for the moneys that may become due ; which means that it is not repayable to the stock-broker on demand. So much of that amount as was free from any existing claim against it could be repaid only if the transactions of the depositor's business had been closed, but the depositor who only could close them, had not in fact done so and the plaintiff could not intervene to compel him to do this. The report shows that the decision was given under Order XLV. I do not know what precisely that provision of the law was in England in 1886-87. The present Order XLV, rule 1, as reproduced in Vol. I of the Annual Practice (1959, London) shows that it deals with the attachment of "debts owing or accruing" from third person but the provision applicable to the case now before me is Order XXI, rule 46 of our C. P. C. which is different. It is as under
"46.-(1) In the case of-
(a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument,
(b) a share in the capital of a corporation,
(c) other movable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor, except property deposited in, or in the custody of, any Court, the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting,-
(i) in the case of the debt, the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the Court ;
(ii) in the case of the share, the person in whose name the share may be standing from transferring the same or receiving any dividend thereon ;
(iii) in the case of the other movable property except as aforesaid, the person in possession of the same from giving it over to the judgment-debtor.
(2) A copy of such order shall be axed on some conspicuous part of the Court-house and another copy shall be sent in the case of the debt, to the debtor, in the case of the share, to the proper officer of the Corporation, and, in the case of the other movable property (except as aforesaid), to the person in possession of the same.
(3) A debtor prohibited under clause (i) of sub-rule (1) may pay the amount of his debt into Court, and such payment shall discharge him as effectually as payment to the party entitled to receive the same."
18. Our provision is much wider than Order XLV, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules of England in at least two respects, which are that it is not restricted to a debt that is "owing and accruing" and includes movable property ; yet the English judgment has influenced many decisions made under Order XXI, rule 26, C. P. C. It has been cited and followed in the 4th, 5th and 6th of the above-mentioned ten judgments: The emphasis in the English judgment on the inability of the garnishee to close the transactions should also be discounted because the doctrine of frustration of contract has fully developed after it during the last two World Wars.
19. The 3rd and 4th judgments are concerned mainly with the consideration as to whether the debts sought to be attached were perfected or not, The decision in the 3rd judgment is that future maintenance is not such a debt and the decision in the 4th judgment is that the money did not form a part of .the considera tion of sale, therefore the defendant had no interest in it. These judgments are not helpful in these proceedings.
20. The 5th is the most important of the ten judgments. It deals under Order XXI, rule 46, C. P. C., with the attachability of Rs. 5,000 that were deposited by a member of the East India Cotton Association and were liable to forfeiture in certain events as well as subject to certain liens. Beaumont, C. J., and Rangnekar, J., have held that the deposit was not attachable on three grounds : firstly, that it was not property in terms of Order XX1, rule 46 (c) which required that tangible property capable of possession and of being deposited in Court only could be attached under it and that the interest of the depositor did not possess these qualities ; secondly, that on the one hand the Association could under its rules invest the money as its own and on the other hand there was no evidence that any movable property was available to be attached ; thirdly, on the principles of the above-mentioned second English judgment in Hutt's case there was no debt until the transactions were closed because the money was re-payable subject to the contingency of the closure of transactions.
21. With utmost respect and in all humility I shall attempt to comment on these three arguments in so far as Mr. Munshi has sought to use them in this case. The second argument is not applicable to this case because no rule has been brought to my notice under which the garnishee may use the deposited money as his own. On the contrary, the above quoted rules point to the contrary intention of the depositor and the deposi tary. The third argument is a reproduction of the English view without emphasis on the difference in the Indian Law, which is our law also. Under Order X XI, rule 46 (a), C. P. C. any debt "not secured by a negotiable instrument is attachable". If a debt is contingent then in terms of this provision, it is attachable subject to the contingencies provided that the contingencies are not such as to deprive it of the character of a "debt"-a debt simpliciter and not a debt which is "owing and accruing" in terms of Order XLV,
rule 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. But neither uncertainty of the amount, nor the contingency of deferred payability changes the character, as explained in O'Driscoll v. Manchester Insurance Committee ((1915) 3 K B 499) even under the English provision. The conclusion, therefore, is that the money deposited by the defendant is an attachable debt under our law, although it may be subject to the equities explained above (paragraph 11).
22. Actually no equities come in the way of the plaintiff because, as already explained (paragraph 14), no facts have been disclosed to show as to what was the volume of the defendant's business. There is, therefore, no obstacle in terms of rule 16 in the re-payment of Rs. 12,500. This means that this part of Rs. 15,000 is to be repaid under that rule on "request within 24 hours". As to the balance of Rs. 2,500, rule 17 prescribes that this amount can be withdrawn on production of proof by the depositor that no dues are outstanding and that forward business has been stopped by him, but this situation can be met by the plaintiff by pointing out that the defendant had suspended her business vide the notice marked C' ; that the garnishee has claimed nothing in terms of rule 3 (iv) as due on account of "Forward Settlement", lastly, that the plaintiff is not bound to carry out the terms of the contract that was made between the defendant and the garnishee. The liability of the garnishee is also discharged owing to eviction by title paramount of the plaintiff, the establishment of jus tertii and frustration of the contract.
23. The above considerations, however, do not apply at all if the amount deposited by the defendant is taken to have been attached under Order XXI, rule 46 (c), C. P. C., as movable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor " and not "deposited in or in the custody of any Court". The defendant had deposited Rs. 15,000 which was movable property. But on this aspect the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court have held (first argument paragraph 20. above) that the rupees deposited by the judgment-debtor ceased to be movable property because the depositor could not lay hand on the same rupees which were deposited by him. They have observed at page 91 that
"The judgment-debtor handed over Rs. 5,000 to the Associa tion, but those particular rupees he has no right to recover. He has a right in certain events to receive a sum of Rs. 5,000, but there is no property at the present moment representing those particular Rs. 5,000. The learned Advo cate-General has argued that movable property' in sub rule (c) must be given the wide meaning attributed to it in the General Clauses Act, 1897, that is to say, all property which is not immovable, but definitions in the General Clauses Act are all subject to anything repugnant thereto, and here it seems to me that the sub-rule predicates that the movable property referred to must be capable of being in the possession of the judgment-debtor, and must, therefore, be property of a tangible character. This is further empha sized by the exception of property deposited in or in the custody of any Court'." (Italics are mine).
24. The emphasis on the expressions "capable of being in possession", "deposited" and "custody" in the above quotation with reference to the definition of the term "movable property" is perhaps not as important a part of the argument as the view, expressed by the italicised words, that where rupees are not returnable in specie, they only represent a right, cease to be property, and that therefore there can be no attachable money. This is a hard proposition to accept, because pieces of paper or of metal do not constitute money. In a society like ours, anything is money that is coined or stamped by the authority of the State to serve under the law as a unit of wealth as well as the medium of exchange. In the language of the American Jurisprudence, Vol. 36, page 459
"Money is in its nature severable, and our coin or note has the same essential qualities of value possessed by any other of like denomination. Consequently, under a statute requiring a public officer to pay out the same money that he receives, it has been held that he does so within the meaning and intention of the statute when the public creditors receive directly from his hands or from banks or his drafts money having the same value or essential qualities as that paid to him."
The same idea is expressed at page 5 of Vol. 27 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Ed.) as follows
"Where English law is the proper law of the contract under which a debt is payable, the mode in which the debt is to be discharged (in the absence of express provision of another mode) is by payment in whatever at the time and place of payment is, according to the law of that place, legal currency and legal tender."
25. Moreover, there is a difference between the attachment of "movable property" and that of "specific movable property" ; the latter property is attached under Order XXI, rule 31, C. P. C.,1 but under Order XXI, rule 46 (c) "movable property" is attached. G If the garnishee has money, which the defendant can demand on account of the money deposited by her, then that money is movable property and the plaintiff can get it attached irrespec tive of whether it consists of those particular notes or coins which she had deposited or not. The garnishee could contend that the attached money was wholly or partly its own property but then the objection would not be to the attachability of the money but to the adverse effect on its interest in the money.
26. Proceeding now to the last five judgments, mentioned above (paragraph 15), a glance through them will show that it is not necessary to discuss them after the detailed consideration in the foregoing paragraphs of the basic ideas which impress me against the stand of the garnishee. I can, therefore, draw here the final conclusion that follows, which is that garnishee should deposit Rs. 15,000 in Court.
27. I, accordingly, reject the objections of the garnishee and order that the amount be deposited within 15 days' time.
K. M. A./A. H.
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