Find a Lawyer

Writ Petition No. 111 of 1961, decided on 10th May 1962.

East Bengal Emergency Requisition of Property Act (XIII of 1948), S. 3‑Property requisitioned from one Government servant for another‑Order, held, not for "public purpose" in the circum stances‑Question of public purpose has to be decided on facts of each case.

B. N. Chowdhury for Petitioner.

K. M. Subhan for Respondents Nos. 1‑4.

The petitioner, Krishnadhan Sarkar, is a citizen of Pakistan and a Government servant, namely, an employee in the Postal Department, posted in the G. P. O., Dacca. He claims to be a tenant of premises No. 40 Subhas Bose Aveeue in Ward No. 1 within the Municipality of Dacca and under Sutrapur Police Station. He has stated in his petition before us that originally he was a tenant in respect of portion of tile said holding and that subsequently he too the entire premises on lease when, at the instance of Evacuee Property Management Committee which took possession of the same, several person in un-authorised and unlawful occupation of tile holding were evicted.

2. The said premises was requisitioned by Additional District Magistrate, Dacca on the 3rd of December 1959, but subsequently the order of requisition was vacated as communi cated to the petitioner by a notice, dated the 28th of April 1960. Thereafter a letter was addressed by the Deputy Commissioner of Dacca to the Secretary, East Pakistan Evacuee Property Management Committee, Dacca, for allotment of the aforesaid premises to one T. Hossain, a Confidential Assistant of the Deputy Commissioner. In reply thereof, the Secretary of the said Committee wrote the Deputy Commissioner to the effect that the premises in question could not be allotted to the said T. Hossain inasmuch as the petitioner was a tenant in respect thereof. The Secretary of the aforesaid Committee, however, added that the said premises might be requisitioned and allotted to Mr. T. Hossain if necessary. Subsequently on the 10th of March 1961, the said premises was again requisitioned by the Additional Deputy ' Commissioner of Dacca. It is stated by the petitioner that although the order of requisition purports to be made for the accommodation of a Government officer, it was really in respect of a particular 'Government officer, namely, Mr. T. Hossain. The petitioner has made the following statements in paragraphs 16 and 17 of petition :‑

"That the said Mr. T. Hossain, Confidential Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Dacca has been living as tenant at No. 2, Farashganj Lane, Sutrapur, Dacca for several months for which the owner of the said holding No. 2, Farashganj Lane Sutrapur, Dacca led a suit being Money Suit No. 61 of 1961, in the Court of 3rd Subordinate Judge, Dacca and the same is pending."

"That your petitioner understands that another house being holding No. 5, Madan Mohan Das Lane, Farashganj, Dacca, belonging to Shambhu Nath Das has been requisitioned for the accommodation of the said Assistant Mr. T. Hossain and a writ petition challenging the said requisition is pending in this Hon'ble Court."

It is not necessary to set out the rest of the petition, the main contention of the petitioner being that the impugned requisition order was mala fide and, furthermore, that it was not in the public interest to requisition a property which is in the occupa tion of one Government servant for the benefit of another Government servant. In the affidavit‑in‑opposition which has been filed on behalf of the respondents, the averments in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the petition, as stated above, have been controverted and are in fact admitted by learned counsel for the respondents. However, a mass of irrelevant matters have been imported in the said affidavit‑in‑opposition, which rather establishes the petitioner's ease that the ‑requisition order was mala fide. It has been stated in the said affidavit‑in‑opposition that the petitioner is an undesirable neighbour and that there are complaint of serious nature against him from the neighbour ing people. These are extraneous matters which cannot be taken into consideration to decide as to whether there is public purpose behind the order of requisition and there can be no manner of doubt that such extraneous matters had been at the back of the mind of the requisitioning authority when the order of requisition was made. In the further affidavit that has been filed on behalf of the respondents it is alleged that the requisi tion order was passed for augmenting a pool of houses so that Government servants may be accommodated. We are not impressed by this affidavit or averments therein made on behalf of the Government. We have very little doubt this is merely an after‑thought inasmuch as the petitioner's allegation that the order of requisition was passed for the benefit of the said T. Hossain is corroborated by the facts and circumstances of this case and we unhesitatingly accept the petitioner's allegation. The undisputed fact is that the said T. Hossain had been living in another premises where he defaulted in paying the rents for near about two years and a money suit. (not an ejectment suit) was instituted against him for realisation of rents. Further, it transpires, as has been stated in petition, that another premises was requisitioned for the accommodation of the said T. Hossain whereupon the owner of that premises obtained a Rule nisi from this Court calling upon the respondents to show cause why the requisition order as passed by them should not be set aside. We are informed that the Rule has been disposed of inasmuch as the said order of requisition has been cancelled.

It also transpires that the said T. Hossain has been able to pursuade the authorities concerned to requisition one house after another for his benefit and, in the present instance, as we have already stated, we are satisfied that the impugned order of requisition was made at his instance and for his benefit.

3. On behalf of the respondents a case has been sought to be made, as indicated above, that the order of requisition was made on behalf of Government servants generally. We have already stated that we find it difficult to place any reliance on this averment on behalf of the Government. The order that was served on the petitioner states that it was made for accommo dation of "Government officer", and not officers, which shows that it was requisitioned for accommodation of a particular Government officer and the respondents have admitted that initially the premises in question was allotted to the said T. Hossain. It is now the respondents' case that they have subsequently allotted the said premises to another officer. We feel that the present allotment to another incumbent is an after‑thought in order to give some colour of validity to the order of requisition that was already made.

4. It has also been urged on behalf of the respondents that an order of requisition for providing accommodation to Government servants is a public purpose. We do not think that this proposition can be stated so broadly as that. It is true that under certain special circumstances, which have to be made out, an order of requisition for providing accommodation to a Government servant may be a public purpose; but the question whether there is a public purpose or not behind such an order, will have to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is not correct to say that it invariably amounts to a public purpose if an order of requisition is made merely to accommodate a Government servant. In this particular case one fact stares us in the face and this has, in fact, been vigorously urged before us on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner admittedly is an employee of the Postal Department under the Government of Pakistan and that his service belongs to the category of "essential service". The learned Advocate for the petitioner has strenuously urged that in these circumstances, there cannot be any public purpose in depriving one Government servant of his residence in premises for the sake of making it over to another Government servant, no alternative and suitable accommodation having been made for the servant so sought to be evicted. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has vigorously urged that this was really robbing Peter to pay Paul. This contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner has force and substance and must be accepted by us. Thus on this ground also the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

5. The result, therefore, is that we make the Rule absolute and direct the respondents to cancel the impugned order of requisition, namely, the order dated 10‑3‑61, passed in Requisition Case No. 1587 of 1961.

6. The petitioner is entitled to costs of this application which we assess at five gold Mohurs.

SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.---‑I agree.

S. B./A. H.

Rule made absolute.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.