Find a Lawyer

Regular Second Appeal No. 210 of 1960, decided on 15th March 1961.

Court's power to dissolve partnership‑Remains intact even if there is any provision to contrary in agreement of partnership-- Ss. 32 and 44 do not override each other‑Agreement of partnership made subject to provisions of Act by S. 11‑Partners cannot con tract themselves out of right to have recourse to Court for dissolution of partnership, nor can Court be deprived of power to dissolve by agreement between partners‑Suit for dissolution riot barred notwith standing agreement of partnership providing for retirement of partners.

Held, that even if parties to a deed of partnership had agreed that any of them would be at liberty to retire, by giving notice of this fact, and would not have recourse to litigation for having the partnership dissolved the power of the Court to order dissolution remained unaffected, nor was the right of the partners to claim dissolution taken away by such an agreement.

Section 11 of the Partnership Act, which provides for the determination of rights and duties of partners, by agreement between them, has been made subject to the provisions of the Partnership Act, meaning thereby that no such agreement can override the provisions of the Partnership Act, but would be sub ordinate to it. No limitation is placed on the power conferred by section 32 of the Act, on a partner to retire from the partnership, by agreement with the other partners but this does not mean that such an agreement between them can override any other provisions of the Act, specially those of section 44, which permit a Court to dissolve a firm under certain conditions. Sections 32 and 44 of the Act being both independent provisions of law, one cannot override the other and, hence, the argument that an agree ment entered into between the partners, permitting one of them to retire; would take away the power of the Court to dissolve such a partnership under section 44 of the Act, has no force.

Rehmatunnissa Begum and others v. Price and others A I R 1917 PC 116rel.

Cowasjee Nanabhoy v. Lallbhoy Vullubhoy and others 1 Bom. 468 and Vali Venkataswami and others v. Gannabathulla Venkataswami A I R 1954 Mad. 9 ref.

Sint. Dropadi v. Bankey Lal and others A I R 1939 All. 548 considered.

Managing partner making use of firm's money to satisfy personal needs‑Firm running at loss‑Criminal litigation between partners‑Firm rightly dissolved.

(c) Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S. 44 (c)‑Partner guilty of miscouduct‑Cannot sue for dissolution of firm‑[Ram Singh v. Ram Chand I L R 1 Lab. 6 ref.].

(d) Partnership Act (IX of 1932), S. 44 (f)‑No profits earned during 4 years of partnership‑Firm rightly dissolved‑[Rehmat‑un nissa Begum and others v. Price and others 22 C W N 601 ref. English and Empire Digest, Volume 3,6 p. 508, para. 1742 considered].

(e) Accounts‑"Production" of accounts at meetings of part‑ners‑Does not amount to "rendering" of accounts so as to defeat a suit for rendering accounts by a partner‑[Firm of Kirparam Brij

Lal v. Firm of Sukh Dev Bakhsh AIR 1922 Lab. 195 and Radhikaprasad Dani v. Nandkumar Laxman Prasad and others A I R 1944 Nag. 7 ref.]

(f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XX, r. 15‑Shares of partners ascertainable from agreement of partnership‑Preliminary decree for dissolution and accounts not invalid for failure to specify shares‑Amount of shares to be ascertained by Commissioner appointed to go into accounts.

Ghulam Abbas Jafri for Appellants.

M. Bashir for Respondents.

Dates of hearing : I st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 7th March 1961.

On the 21st of July 1954, Maulvi Muhammad Yasin, Muhammad Yamin and Hafiz Abur Rahim Khan appellants and Haji Muhammad Yasin and Abdul Karim respondents, entered into an agreement for the running of a motor transport ,company known as the Thal Transport Company Service (Registered) Kallurkot. Haji Muhammad Yasin, respondent, invested a sum of Rs. 70,000 in the business. It was agreed that out of the profits, Maulvi Muhammad Yasin, appellant, would be entitled to 1/4th share and out of the remaining 3/4th share, 1/2 was to be taken by all the partners, in equal shares, and the remaining half by them in proportion to the investments made. One of the terms of this agreement was that if any difference arose between the partners, efforts should be made to reconcile theta, but if no reconciliation could be made, any of the partners would be at liberty to retire, after giving three months' notice, before the end of the financial year. Maulvi Muhammad Yasin, appellant, was to act as the Managing Director, but if it was found that‑ he had been dishonest, he could be removed by the partners. On the 28th of December 1955, the Company entered into an agreement with Hakim Abdur Rashid appellant, in accordance with which he invested a sum of Rs. 10,000 and was taken as one of the partners in the Company.

2. Differences having arisen between the partners concerning the business of the Company, two of them, namely, Haji Muhammad Yasin and Abdul Karim, respondents filed, a suit in Civil Court at Bhakhar praying for the dissolution of partner ship and rendition of accounts. It was alleged by these respondents that although one of them, namely, Haji Muhammad Yastit, had invested a sum of Rs. 70,000 in the business of the Company, and although nothing was invested by the remaining partners, the appellants had appropriated to themselves all the profits and not, a single pie had been paid to the respondents. Allegations of misappropriation and fraud were also made by them against the appellants. The suit was contested by all the four appellants, who also raised a preliminary objection to the effect that, in accordance with clause 5 of the agreement of partnership, the respondents could not sue for dissolution of partnership and instead, should have retired from the business by giving the other partners three months' notice in writing, as required by the agree ment. On merits, the appellants contended that.the accounts ‑had been rendered from time to time by the Managing Director and that as no profits were earned by the Company and as one of the respondents, namely, Abdul Karim, had put hindrances, in the smooth working of the concern, .no decree for dissolution of partnership or rendition of accounts, could be passed. The trial Court framed the following five issues :‑

(1) Whether clause No. 5 of the agreement Exh. P. 1 is a bar to the institution of the suit

(2) If issue No. 1 is answered in the positive did the plaintiffs comply with the procedure laid down in clause No. 5 of the agreement Exh. P. 1

(3) If issue No. 2 is not proved what is its effect on the present suit

(4) Are the defendants or any one of them liable to render accounts, if so, for what period ,

(5) Are there sufficient reasons for ordering dissolution of partnership between the parties

3. The first three issues were disposed of by the trial Court by means of an order dated the 6th of July 1959. On the first issue, the finding of the Court was that clause 5 of the agrsemont of partnership enabled one of the partners to retire, if he so desired, bat that it was not obligatory for such a partner to do so. On the second issue, the finding was that the procedure laid down in clause 5 of the agreement had not been followed. The finding on the third issue was that the non‑compliance of the procedure laid down in clause 5 had no effect on the suit. The remaining two issues were disposed of by the trial Court, by means of its judg ment dated the 30th of September 1959, and the suit was decreed as prayed for.

4. The present appellants filed

an appeal in the Court of the learned District Judge, Mianwali, who dismissed it on the 5th of the March 1960. The lower appellate Court, in a well‑considered judgment, expressed its agreement with the views of the trial Court and came to the conclusion that clause 5 of the agreement, of partnership did not stand in the way of dissolution of the partner ship by a decree of the Civil Court. The lower appellate Court also came, to the conclusion that the case was covered by clauses (c) (g) and (f) of section 44 of the Partnership Act and, hence, the trial Court was justified in ordering dissolution of the partnership and in passing a decree for rendition of accounts. The present appeal has been filed by the four defendants, who were appellants in the lower appellate Court, to challenge the findings of the two Courts below..

5. The main contention raised. before me; by the appellants' counsel, in this appeal, was that in view of clause 5 of the agree men) of the partners, the trial Court was not competent to order dissolution of the partnership and that even if that . power was there, no case had been made out for ordering dissolution. It was also contended that, without determination of the respective shares of the partners, in the profits of the business, no preliminary decree for accounts could be passed and that as accounts had been rendered from time to time by the Managing Director, Maulvi vln, ;:::.;liai: Yasin, the Courts below were not justified in directing the appellants to rend'6r accounts again.

6. Clause 5 of the agreement of the partners, on which the appellants' main contention is based, is worded as follows :‑

‑"If at any time any of the partners feels doubt in respect of the Management of the Company or its accounts or loses con fidence (in the Management), he would be at liberty to inform the Managing Director by giving him a registered notice. In that case, it would be the duty of the Managing Director to satisfy such a partner about the accounts and other affairs. If in spite of it; the said partner does not feel satisfied, on an application of the Managing Director or of any of the partners, a joint meeting of all the partners would be convened and an attempt would be made to restore confidence (in the Manage ment). If differences continue to exist and the partner does not agree, he would be at liberty to sell his share to the Company and give up his connection. Such a partner will give a notice to the Managing Director, three months before the 31st of March, of his intention to retire and would be able to retire after the Managing Director has prepared the accounts and balance sheet for that year. If any dishonesty on the part of the Managing Director is established the partners will have right to remove him, but the share (in the profits) to which he is entitled will remain."

7. 1 have read this clause more than once, with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, and have come to the con clusion that there is nothing in it to indicate that it was obligatory for any of the partners to take action for his retirement, if he was not satisfied with the affairs of the Company, and that it had been agreed upon between the parties that no one will resort to litigation for having the Company dissolved. This clause, no doubt, enables one of the partners, if he so desires, to retire from the partnership, but there is nothing in it to indicate that all the partners had agreed to relinquish their right to sue for dissolution of partnership or to deprive the Court of its power to dissolve the partnership. if this view of mine is correct, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in this respect, will have no force and the power conferred by section 44 of the Partnership Act, to dissolve a partnership under certain conditions, remains un affected.

8. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that in accordance with clause 5 of the agreement of partnership, it was agreed upon between the partners that none of them will resort to litigation, for having the Company dissolved and that the only remedy available to an aggrieved partner was to retire from partnership, the question would arise as to whether, by. entering into such an agreement, the partners could relinquish their right to sue for dissolution, and to deprive the Court of the power con ferred by section 44 of the Partnership Act. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the agreement between the parties fell within the purview of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 32 of the Partnership Act and a notice of retirement having been given by the two respondents, they could not sue for dissolution of partnership, and that, in any case, they were estopped from doing so. So far as the plea of estoppel is concerned, the same cannot have any force, for the simple reason that there can be no estoppel against law. The only point that would require decision would be whether the partners could, by agreement between themselves, deprive the Court of the power conferred by section 44 of the Act. Sections 32 and 44 of the Partnership Act, which have a bearing on this case, are worded as follows

"32.‑(1) A partner may retire‑

(a) with the consent of all the other partners ;

(b) in accordance with an express agreement by the partners ; or

(c) where the partnership is at will, by giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his intention to retire.

(2) A retiring partner maybe discharged from any liability to any third party for acts of the firm done before his retirement by an agreement made by him with such third party and the partners'of the reconstituted firm, and such agreement may be implied by a course of dealing between such third party and the reconstituted firm after he had knowledge of the retirement.

(3) Notwithstanding the retirement of a partner from a firm, he and the partners continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them‑which would have b.‑en an act of the firm if done before the retirement, until public notice is given of the retirement Provided that a retired partner is not liable to any third party who deals with the firm without knowing that he was a partner.

(4) Notices under subsection (3) may be given by the retired partner or by any partner of the reconstituted firm."

"44. At the suit of a partner, the Court may dissolve a firm on any of the following grounds, namely :‑

(a) that a partner has become of unsound mind, in which case the suit may be brought as well by the next friend of the partner who has become of unsound mind as by any other partner ;

(b) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has become in any way permanently incapable of performing his dutiei as partner ;

(c) that a partner, other than the partner suing, is guilty of conduct which is likely to affect prejudicially the carrying on of the business, regard being had to the nature of the business ;

(d) that a partner, other than the partner suing, wilfully or persistently commits breach of agreements relating to the Management of the affairs of the firm or the conduct of its business, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the business that it is not reasonably practicable for the other partners to carry on the business in partnership with him ;

(e) that a partner, other than the partner suing, has in any way transferred the whole of hit interest in the firm to a third party, or has allowed his share to be charged under the pro visions of rule 4 ) of Order XXI of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or has allowed it to be sold in the recovery of arrears of land‑revenue or any dues recover able as arrears of land‑revenve due by the partner ;

(f) that the business of the firm cannot be carried on save at a loss ; or

(g) on any other ground which renders it just and equitable that the firm should be dissolved."

9. Section 11 of the Partnership Act, which provides for the determination of rights and duties of partners, by agreement between them, has been made subject to the provisions of Partner ship Act, meaning thereby that no such agreement can override the provisions of the Partnership Act, but would be subordinate to it. No limitation, however, is placed on the power conferred by section 31 of the Act, on a partner to retire from the partnership, by agreement with the other partners,‑ but this does not mean that B such an agreement between them can override any other provisions, of the Partnership Act, specially those of section 44, which permit a Court to dissolve a firm under. certain conditions. Sections 32 and 44 of the Act being both independent provisions of law, one cannot override the other and hence, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that an agreement entered into between the partners, permitting one of them to retire, would take away the power of the Court to dissolve such a partnership under section 44 of the Act,, has no force.

10. The learned counsel for the appellants relying on a case of the Allahabad High Court, as Smt. Dropadi v. Bankey Lal and others (1), contended that such an agreement can take away the Court's power to dissolve a partnership. At page 551 of this reported judgment, after discussing the various authorities on this subject, their Lordships observed as follows :‑

"In our opinion, section 11, Partnership Act, has deliberately been so worded by the Legislature as to make it clear that the relationship of the partners shall be determined by the contract between them, subject of course to the, provisions of the Act it seems to us that the case before us*is governed by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 3 1 A 200 ; where their Lordships had laid down that it is open to partners to enter into an agreement by which they renounce their right of dissolution."

In my opinion the interpretation placed on the Privy Council case referred to in this case is not correct and, as I will presently show, their Lordships of the Privy Council did not express the opinion that it was open to the partners to enter into an agreement to renounce their right to claim dissolution of a firm. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to a case of the Madras High Court, as Vali Venkataswami and others v. Gannabathulla Venkata swami (2), in which, after discussing the Allahabad case, as well as two cases decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council, the Court came to the conclusion that the power conferred by section 44, on a Court, to. order dissolution cannot be taken away by agreement between the partners, nor can they, deprive them selves of such a right by an agreement. At page 11 of this reported judgment, the Court observed as follows :.

"But the principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee in my opinion is clear and unambiguous. It is to tneeifectthat the right to seek dissolution through Court is not based on contract but is based on statute, and, therefore, the contract cannot override the right conferred by the statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . In my opinion, therefore, when the Legisl iture enacted section 11 it must have been aware of the decision in A I R 1917 P C 116 and must have deliberately introduced the expression subject to the provisions of the Act' with a view to make it clear that the right under section 44 cannot be taken away by the contract between the partners."

The Allahabad and Madras cases are both based on the views expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council, but those views have not been interpreted, in the two authorities in a like manner. It would, therefore, be necessary to find out what was decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council.

11. In the first case as Cowasjee Nanabhoy v. Lallbhoy Vullu bhoy and others (3), I do not find any observation to the effect that partners could, by agreement, deprive a Court of law of the power to order dissolution of a partnership or themselves of their

(1) A I R 1939 All. 548 (2) A I R 1954 Mad. 9

(3) 1 Bom. 468

right to sue for this purpose. At page 474 of this reported judgment, their Lordships observed as follows :‑

"So, even putting it in the light most favourable for Cowasjee that the partnership was originally intended to exist at least during the time of his life, it remains to be shown that there is any provision in this agreement from which it can be fairly inferred that his co‑partners relinquished the right which they would have of applying to the Court for winding up the business if it could not be carried on at a profit, or, in the event of their exercising this right, undertook to pay him compensation

Their Lordships, after giving their best attention to the whole of this agreement, have come to the conclusion that by no fair and reasonable intendment can it be inferred that the partners relinquished their right of dissolving or applying to have the company dissolved under the circumstances mentioned, or that they agreed, if they did exercise this right, to pay Cowasjee compensation."

The question as to whether such an agreement was valid and binding on the partners and whether it could deprive the Court of the power to order dissolution of a partnership was not discussed in this reported judgment and, therefore,it is not understood how the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court came to the con clusion that their Lordships of the Privy Council "have laid down that it is open to partners to enter into an agreement by which they renounce their right of dissolution." Even if there had been any doubt about the views of their Lordships the same was set at restin their subsequent decision as Rehmatunnissa Begum and others v. Price and others (1). At page 118 of this reported judgment their Lordships observed as follows :‑

"A partner's claim to . a decree for dissolution rests, in its origin, not on contract, but on his inherent right to invoke the Court's protection on equitable grounds, in spite of the terms in which the rights and obligations of the partners may have been regulated and defined by the partnership contract

No man can exclude himself from the protection of the Courts, and yet, if the view of the Appellate Bench is to prevail, this is what the Nawab has done, for a decree for dissolution would be the protection appropriate in the circumstances of this case." The view of their Lordships, which has been clearly expressed in this case, was that the power conferred‑on a Court of law to order dissolution of a firm cannot be taken away by agreement between the parties. No doubt, both the cases decided by the Privy Council did not deal with the question of retirement of one of the partners, in accordance with the agreement between them, and dealt with the power of the Court to order dissolution before the expiry of the period for which the partnefship had been entered into, but the view of their Lordships, was clearly expressed and leaves no room for doubt that the power of the Court to order dissolution, under certain circumstances, cannot be taken away by agreement between the parties. Whether that power is to be

(1)AIR1917PC116‑

exercised during, or after, the period for which a partnership was entered into, or whether that power is to be exercised, in the presence of an agreement between the partners enabling one of them to retire, would not be very material, because whatever might be the factual position, the power of the Court to order dissolution would still be there.

12. In view of these clear authorities, I am of the opinion, that even if the parties had agreed that any of them would be at liberty to retire, by giving notice of this fact, and would not have recourse to litigation for having the partnership dissolved, the power of the Court to order dissolution remained. unaffected, nor was the right of the partners to claim dissolution taken away by l

such an agreement. The contention raised by the learned counse ll for the appellants is, therefore, overruled.

13. The next question requiring decision is whether the Courts below were justified in exercising the power conferred b) section 44 of the Partnership Act and ordering dissolution of the firm. That order was based on three grounds. Firstly, that the Managing Director was guilty of misconduct in so far as he hac been utilizing the assets of the partnership for his personal needs, C secondly, that although the partnership was carried on for more than two years not a pie in the shape of profits, was paid to the financing partner, namely, Haji Muhammad Yasin respondent and thirdly, that the relations between the parties having become straind, on account of criminal litigation, it was just and equitable to dissolve the firm. In my opinion, these findings were based on good and sufficient evidence and cannot be successfully challenged in this appeal. Maulvi Muhammad Yasin appellant, when he appeared as a witness, admitted that he has been using the money of the firm, for his personal needs, but added that that money was debited to his own account. When it was alleged by Maulvi Muhammad Yasin himself that the firm was running at a loss, he had no justification for taking money, from the capital money for utilizing on his personal needs. It was also admitted by him that for more than four years, during which the partner,,hip business was carried on, not s single pie, on account of profits, was paid to Haji Muhammad Yasin respondent. It‑ was further admitted by him and some of the witnesses, that a case of dacoity was regis tered against Abdul Karim respondent and security proceedings were also taken against the parties. In these circumstances clauses (c), (f) and (g) of section 44 of the Partnership Act were rightly held applicable to this case and, hence, the Courts below were justified in ordering dissolution of the firm.

14. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to a case of the Lahore High Court as Ram Singh v. Ram Chaad (1), i n which it was held that a partner who is himself guilty of misconduct was not entitled to sue for dissolution of partnership. There is no quarrel with this proposition of law, but the appellants have not been able to establish by production of reliable evidence, that Haji Muhammad Yasin respondent was guilty of misconduct. On the other band, it is an admitted fact that a sum of Rs. 70,000 was invested by him in the partnership business and that in spite,

' (1) I L R 1 Lab. 6

of such a huge investment, he was not allowed Co take any effective part in the management, nor was he paid anything in the shape. of profits. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants is, therefore, of no help to him.

15. The learned counsel for the appellants also referred to page 508 of the English and Empire Digest, Volume 36, para graph 1742, which is worded as follows :‑

"By Partnership Act, 1890, the Court may decree a dissolution of partnership when the business can only be carried on at a loss : Held, this means that there must be a practical impossi bility of profit, and if there are special circumstances to which the loss can be attributed, the Court cannot infer impossibility of profit."

On the basis of this authority, it was contended that as the firm had to incur huge expenditure, in the beginning, for making certain kacha roads, and as after two years the Company was granted route permits for pucca roads, there was every prospect of the firm earning profits, if this litigation had not been started. There is nothing on the record of this case to indicate that during the two E years when the firm had been plying motor vehicles on pucca roads, it was earning profits. On the other hand, the appellants' case, as set out in the written statement, was that during the whole of the period of four years no profits were earned by the firm. This being the position the authority relied upon by the learned counsel is of no help to the appellants.

16. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to a case of the Privy Council as Rahmat‑un‑Niassa Begum and others v. Price and others (1), in which it was held that when it was esta blished that a partnership business could not be continued without a loss, the Court has jurisdiction in the exercise of its sound discretion, to order its dissolution, though the partnership was not terminable at will.

17. For reasons given above, I am of opinion that the Courts below acted rightly in ordering dissolution of the firm.

18. With regard to the matter of accounts the learned, counsel for the appellants contended that as accounts had been rendered from time to time, in the meetings of the firm, of which minutes were kept, the respondents could not sue for the purpose. No doubt, in some of the meetings attended by the partners accounts were produced by the Managing Director, but the pro duction of accounts would not amount to rendering of accounts, t nor is there anything before me on which I can give a finding that the accounts produced before the Commissioner were the very accounts which had been produced in the various meetings. Ln any, case, as the accounts were not complied and no balance‑sheet wasl drawn up, it cannot be said that the accounts were duly rendered to the partners. Reference, in this connection may be made to a case of the Lahore High Court, as Firm of Kirparam Brij Lall v. Firm of Sukh Dev Bakhsh (2), in which it was held that where a partner withheld the annual profits of a concern from a member of the firm, the partner excluded coidd bring a suit for accounts

(1) 22 C W N 601 (2) A I R 1922 Lab. 195

t and for his share of the profits. Reference may also be made to a case

of the Nagpur High Court as Radhikaprasad Dani v. Nandkumar

t Laxman Prasad and others (1), in which it was held that a unilateral

presentation of a statement of accounts, by one side, would not

amount to an adjustment of accounts between two parties.

19. Keeping in mind the views expressed in these cases and the facts of this case, I am of opinion that the Courts below were justified in passing against the respondents (a decree) for rendition of accounts.

20. Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that as during a period of one year, one AbdurRazzaq, a Mukhtar i‑Am of Haji Muhammad Yasm was working as Manager of the partnership firm, at least, accounts for that period should not have been ordered to .be rendered. In advancing this argument, the learned counsel overlooked the fact that Maulvi Muhammad Yasin continued to hold the office of the Managing Director even during the period when Abdur Razzaq was working as the Manager. Being a mere employee of the company, Abdur Razzaq could not have had effective control over the affairs of the concern and hence, on this ground alone, the Managing Director could not escape the liability of rendering acccounts for a part of the period.

21. As to the contention that without determination of the respective shares of the partners in the profits of the business, no preliminary decree, for accounts, could be passed and that it was obligatory for the trial Court to first determine the shares of the partners, in the profits, as required by Order XX, rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Code, much need not be said. As stated above, according to the terms of tfie agreement of the partnership one' fourth of the profits was to be taken by Maulvi Muhammad Yasin and out of the remaining three‑fourths, one‑half was to be taken by all the partners, in equal shares, and the remaining half by them in proportion to the investments made. Without going into the accounts, it is not possible to give a finding on the question as to G how much money was invested by each of the six partners, because the appellants claim to have invested some money in the business. After the accounts of the parties have been gone into and the Commissioner appointed by the trial Court submits a report, it would be possible to determine the shares of the parties in the profits. This would be done before the final decree is passed in the case. In my opinion, the trial Court, in passing the preliminary decree in terms of Order XX, rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Code, without determining the respective shares of the partners in the profits, did not violate this provision of law and, therefore, the validity of the decree cannot be challenged on any such ground.

22. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the appellants. For reasons given above, this appeal, being without any force, is hereby dismissed with costs.

A. H.

Appeal dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.