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Petition No. 317 of 1957, decided on 24th February,
S. 9‑Government's gesture acceding to owner's wish that compensation should he in form of land instead of cash‑Not an agreement enforceable through Court.
S. 66 (3) Applicability of Act to Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894)‑Extent.
S. 23 (3) [as added by Punjab Town Improvement Act (IV of 1922), Sch., Cl. 10 (3)] ‑Market value‑"According to use to which land was put," con tracted with other considerations to be kept in view in fixing market value‑[Gajapatiraju v. Rev. Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam A I R 1939 P C 98 ; Secretary of State v. Makhan Das I L R 50 All. 470 and Babu Kailash Chandra Jain v. Secretary of State 73 Indian Appeals 131 ref.].
S. 299 (2)‑"Compensa tion "‑Meaning‑" Equivalent in money "‑‑Adjectives, "just ", " adequate ", " reasonable " unnecessary: [Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana v. Punjab Province P L D 1955 Lah. 88 and Jibendra Kishore's case P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 9 ref.].
Sch. cl. 10‑Violates principle of "compensation" enunciated in S. 299, Government of India Act, 1935‑Not applicable to satellite towns " Compensation" to be assessed purely under Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894).
Clause 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, violates the principle of compensation enunciated in section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and would have been bad law if it had not been a "law in force at the date of the passing of" the Government of India Act, 1935, and, therefore, protected by subsection (4) of section 299 thereof. This protection was extended in" 1951 by the addition of subsection (4‑A) to laws made "within a period of three years next after the establishment of the Federation", and in 1956, the period of three years was extended to five years retrospectively. Since the amendment of 1953 is neither existing law, nor a law made within five years of the Federation in so far as it conflicts with section 299, it is beyond the competency of the Legislature.
Held, that clause 10 of the Schedule cannot, to this extent, be applied to satellite towns, and that compensation for the acquisition of land for such towns should be assessed purely under the Land Acquisition Act.
S.‑299 (4‑A) (b)‑Clause (b) given restricted meaning‑Not to apply so as to unsettle legitimate local interests without adequate compensation‑Clause analysed.
Particular words followed by general‑Latter to be interpreted ejusdem generis with former [R. v. Edmundson (1859) 28 L J M C 213 ref.]
Mahmud Ali and Nasim Hasan Shah for Petitioner.
Ghias Muhammad for Advocate‑General for Respondents.
Dates of hearing : 21st October 1959 and Reheard on 1st February 1960.
This petition for a writ was instituted in March 1957 by twelve owners of land in the neighbourhood of Lyallpur town who are dissatisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Collector by which he assessed the price of 142 kanals 10 marlas of land at Rs: 1,627‑6‑0 per acre. This land lies in Chak No. 224/R.B., being partly in square No. 53 and partly in square No. 31. It is situated on the main Lyallpur‑Satiana metalled road and is within the proposed new boundary of Lyallpur Municipality. Square No. 31 is adjacent to the present municipal boundary with a road frontage of 440 feet. Square No. 53 had a road frontage of nearly 1,100 feet and was about two miles from the centre of the city.
2. The petition says that the land in question was required for a satellite town which subsequently came to be known as the Peoples Colony. The original scheme envisaged the acquisition of large tracts of land owned by Muslim and non‑Muslim owners. On the representation of the Muslim owners the Government decided that instead of paying cash compensation to them they would be given land of equal utility and value and that the new acquisitions should be confined to evacuee property.
3. Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on the 20th January 1953 and that under section 6 on the 10th March 1953. On the 10th July 1953, notices under section 9 intimating that the Punjab Government intended to take possession were issued and when the petitioners appeared before the Land Acquisition Collector they were called upon to file copies of fard jamabandi of the land which they would like to obtain in exchange. The petitioners complied with this direction and handed over possession in October 1953. The Provincial Govern ment meanwhile asked the Financial Commissioner, Rehabilitation and Colonies, to issue instructions to various Deputy Commis sioners to provide alternative land in accordance with para. 70 of Standing Order No. 28. The Land Acquisition Collector also took steps to examine copies of the jamabandis which had been filed by the petitioners for equivalent land, but as a large portion of these lands was subsequently included for acquisition in the extension of the original Peoples Colony Scheme, the petitioners were asked to make further suggestions. The petitioners there upon put in new jamabandis for other lands. On the 27th of January 1956; fresh notices were served on them under section 9, inviting claims for compensation, and when the petitioners contended before the Land Acquisition Collector that it had been agreed that they should be given alternative land as compensation, that officer explained to them that a cash award was necessary even in cases where compensation in the form of alternative land was to be given. The petitioners, therefore, entered their claims for compensation, demanding Rs. 80,000 per acre, together with 15% for compulsory acquisition. The, petitioners have pointed out that this was not an exaggerated demand because in the. same vicinity some of them had leased out 6 kanals and 18 marlas of land to Kilas Nos. 21 and 22 in square No. 9 for a period of twenty years at , the rate of Rs. 5,565 per acre per year for the first five years, gradually increasing to Rs. 13,912 per year in a period of twenty years. A copy of the lease deed was placed as annexure C' (page 37 of the paper‑book). They pointed to another case in which the Land Acquisition Collector, while acquiring 13 acres 3 kanals 13 marlas of land for the purposes of the National Silk and Rayon Mills Limited, had in 1955 awarded Rs. 16,245 per acre apart from 15% for compulsory acquisition. While this land was about 550 feet from the metalled road between Lyallpur and Jaranwala and 3J miles from the centre of the city, the land of the petitioners was on the metalled road and only two miles from the centre. In the present case, however, the Collector had awarded only Rs. 1,625‑6‑0 per acre, ostensibly on the ground of an arbitrary classification by which the petitioners' land was described as agricultural. In doing so the Land Acquisition Collector had suddenly switched over in January 1957 to the provisions of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, which has defined market value of the land as market value according to the use to which the land was put at the relevant date.
4. The petitioners' contentions are (1) that the Government was bound by an agreement with them to give them land in exchange, (2) that the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, did not apply to the present case, and (3) that, in any case the Punjab Town Improvement (Amendment) Act (II of 1953), which made the principal Act applicable to satellite towns, was ultra vires.
5. On behalf of the Government it has been strenuously denied that there was any agreement with the petitioners by which they were to be awarded' land in exchange. It was admitted, however, in para. 8 of the written statement that a reference had been made by the Urban Development Commissioner to the Financial Commissioner requesting him to allow the use of Crown land" for compensating the Muslim owners according to para. 70 of Standing Order No. XXVIII and that the Financial Commissioner had agreed and issued instructions accordingly on the 5th of October 1954. Instructions had also been issued by the Urban Development Commissioner regarding the acquisition of evacuee property for compensating the Muslim owners but it had been found that no land was available for acquisition. The written statement says nothing about the non‑availability of State lands. That the Government was' considering the award of equivalent land to the petitioners is also clear from the fact that Mr. Ghias Muhammad who appeared for the State obtained two adjournments from this Court to enable the Government to implement its decision, and Mr. Mahmud Ali appearing for the petitioners has shown to us what purports to be an uncertified copy of a letter from the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Lyallpur, stating that State land, which had originally been allotted to refugees and who had been compensated elsewhere, was still available. But while it is true that Government has placed itself under a moral obligation to compensate the petitioners in kind, we do not see how any such gesture can be regarded as an agreement which could be enforced through a Court of law, and Mr. Mahmud Ali has not discussed this issue any further.
6. The next question is whether the Punjab Town Improve ment Act is applicable. ' By subsection (3) of section 1 of this Act its applicability has been confined "to the whole or to any part of a municipality and to any locality adjacent thereto", and if a satellite town is not adjacent to the municipality, then the Act will apparently not apply to it. This difficulty, however, was got over by the Amendment Act II of 1953, which added the following paragraph as subsection (3) to section 66:‑--
" Whenever the Provincial Government acquires land for the purposes of the setting up of a satellite town, whether within or beyond the local limits of a municipal committee, or other local authority or trust, or for any other purpose which in the opinion of the Provincial Government is connected with the setting up of the satellite town concerned, the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) shall, as far as possible, apply to such acquisition."
7. Subsections (1) and (2) of section 66 require that when ever a municipal committee or other local authority acquires land for the purposes of laying out new public streets or constructing new buildings on such public streets or reclaiming unhealthy or insanitary localities, the Land Acquisition Act shall be deemed to have been modified to the extent indicated' in the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act. In this Schedule, the follow ing two provisions are relevant :
Clause 2 (1)‑" The first publication of a notice of on im provement scheme under section 36 of this Act shall be substituted for and have the same effect as publication in the Official Gazette and in the locality of a notification under subsection (1) of section 4 of the said Act, except where a declaration under section 4 or section 6 of the said Act has previously been made and is still in force.
(2) " Subject to the provisions of clauses 10 and 11 of this Schedule, the issue of a notice under subsection (1) of section 32 in the case of land acquired under that subsection, and in any other case, the publication of a notification under section 42 shall be substituted for and have the same effect as a declaration by the Provincial Government under section 6 of the said Act, unless a declaration under the last‑mentioned section has previously been made and is still in force."
Clause 10 (3)‑" At the end of section 23 of the said Act " (the Land Acquisition Act), "the following shall be deemed to be added, namely :
(3) For the purposes of clause first of subsection (1) of this section
(a) the market value of the land shall be the market value according to the use to which the land was put at the date with reference to which the market value is to be determined under that clause."
8. Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act is as follows :
" 23 (1).‑In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration ---
First. The market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, subsection (1) ;
(2) "In addition to the market value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition."
9. Now, it will be clear from clause 2 of the Schedule that when land is acquired for the purposes of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, notices under sections 32, 36 and 42 of that Act take the place of notices under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The object of these notices under both Acts is more or less identical, except that there is no provision in the Punjab Town Improvement Act equivalent to section 17 (4) which dispenses with the hearing of objections in urgent cases. It is not necessary, however, to recount the advantages of the procedure under the Punjab Town Improvement Act because we notice in clause 2 (1) of the Schedule that the procedure of sections 32, 36 and 42 is applicable "except where a declaration under section 4 or section 6 of the said Act has previously been made and is still in force", and a similar exception has been provided in clause 2 (2).
10. But the third objection is substantial. It relates to the validity of the amendment effected in 1953 by the addition of subsection (3) of section 66 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, making the provisions of that Act applicable to satellite towns. We have seen that under section 23, Land Acquisition Act, the Court, in determining the amount of compensation takes into consideration "the market value of the land at the date of publication of the notice under section 4", and that under clause 10 (3) of the Schedule attached to the Punjab Town Improvement Act, market value assumes an artificial definition as "the market value according to the use to which‑the land is put at the date with reference to which the market value is to be determined". In other words, if the land is actually used for agriculture, but within twenty yards of it fashionable buildings are springing up, and in open market its potentiality as a building site has increased its value, then although for the, purposes of the Land Acquisition Act the value of the land will be that which it will fetch in the market, for the purposes of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, it will be treated as ordinary agricultural land and naturally fetch less price. For the market value of land is not determined merely by the use to which it is put, nor even by the quality of the land alone, but also by the situation it enjoys, which may confer upon it an additional advantage over other land. Generally speaking, it may be possible to determine market value by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for similar land. " But sometimes it happens", said their Lordships of the Privy Council in Gajapatiraju v. Rev. Divisional Officer Vizagapatam (AIR 1939 PC 98), "that the land to be valued possesses some unusual, and it may be, unique features as regards its position or its potentialities. In such a case, the arbitrator, in determining its value, will have no market value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain as best he may from the materials before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities. For it has been established by numerous authorities that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined, * * * * * but also by reference to the use to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future. No authority indeed is required for this proposition ; "‑and we may be forgiven for citing this authority‑" it is a self‑evident one. No one can suppose in the case of land which is certain, or even likely, to be used in the immediate or reasonably near future for building purposes but which at the valuation date is waste land or is being used for agricultural purposes: that the owner, however willing a vendor, will be content to sell the land for its value as waste or agricultural land, as the case may be It is plain that in ascertaining its value, the possibility of its being used for building purposes would have to be taken into account".
11. Mr. Mahmud Ali, however, carried the argument beyond its reasonable potentialities when he said that " market value according to the use" may be nil if the land is not being used for any purpose at the relevant date, and he based his argument on Secretary of State v. Makhan Das (I L R 50 All. 470), where a similar amendment of the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919, was in question. For the State, Mr. Ghias Muhammad pointed out that the Privy Council had not accepted this reasoning in Babu Kailash Chandra Jain v. Secretary of State (73 IA 131). At the same time, what the Privy Council said in Babu Kailash Chandra's case prominently brings out the difference between market value under the Land Acquisi tion Act and market value "according to the use "
" It would appear that, in the view of the Full Bench in Makhan Das's case, neither a plot of land used by its owner as a garden at the relevant, date, nor a plot of agricultural land lying follow at the relevant date, is being put to any use' within the meaning of section 23, because the owner is deriving no profit there from; consequently, in the view of the Full Bench, the owner is not entitled to any compensation on its compulsory acquisition. Their Lordships are unable to assent to this view. On the true constructions of section 23 the former plot ought to be valued as a garden and the latter plot ought to be valued as agricultural land. The effect of section 23, subsection (3), (a) of the Act of 1894, as so amended is that the possibility of the garden or agricultural plot being used (e.g.), for building purposes in the future must be disregarded."
12. Now, we come to the question whether the amendment was competent. It was effected in 1953, when the Government of India Act, 1935, governed the Constitution. Section 299 of that Act applies to the present case:
299. Compulsory acquisition of land, etc.‑(1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
(2) Neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for giving compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, it is to be determined and given.
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of any law in force at the date of the passing of this Act.
(4‑A) Nothing in subsection (2) shall be construed to invalidate‑
(a) any provision in any law of the kind referred to in that
Subsection which purports to fix the amount of compensation or to specify the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of that subsection or that com pensation is not provided for or is inadequate:
Provided that such law has been made or passed within a period of five years next after the establishment of the Federation.
13. It was held by one of us in Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana v. Punjab Province (P L D 1955 Lah. 88), that "compensation" means the rendering of "an equivalent in money", and when it was argued that the omission of the word "just" or "equitable" as an adjective qualifying "compensation" could suggest that compensa tion need not represent the full, money equivalent, the reply was that‑
" That is a notion too preposterous for words. Indeed I am not going to say, for the benefit of a head‑note in a law journal, that compensation means just compensation', for it means neither more nor less than what it means to the English language. It means counter‑balancing', rendering of equivalent', requital', weighing one: thing against another', (Oxford Dictionary Volume II), but it does not mean weighing D copper against gold. Therefore, you cannot compensate a man without requiring him for his land', without the rendering to him of an equivalent in money. If the Government acquire the Shah Din Building on The Mall for twenty‑five rupees, will the owner be compensated 7 Then if the Court is not to decide whether a person has been compensated' under section 299, and the reference to the District Court is also excluded by the amending Acts, let it not be said in this new era of freedom and conscience that this is a fundamental principle of British Jurisprudence and International Law let us not profane the Fundamental Rights of Man.
"The use of the word just' or adequate' with compensation' is, I shall permit myself to say, a tautological aberration."
14. And the Supreme Court in Jibendra Kishore's case (P L D 1957 S C (Bak.) 9) made more or less similar observations in relation to Article 15 of the Constitution of 1956, which corresponds to section 299, Government of India Act. Their Lordships quoted the following passages from Nichol's "Eminent Domain"
" Compensation' as used in the constitutional provision as a limitation upon the power of eminent domain, implies a full and complete equivalent (usually monetary) for the loss sustained by the owner whose land has been taken or damaged. Many of the State constitutions require that the compensation shall be just', reasonable', or adequate', but these words are mere epithets rather than qualifications and add nothing to the meaning. The phrase just compensation' means the value of the land taken and the damage, if any, to land not taken. More than this it does not imply. The adjective just' only emphasises what could be true if omitted,‑namely, that the compensation should be the equivalent of the property."
Having quoted these passages, their Lordships proceeded thus.
"This being the meaning of compensation' it has to be admitted that the Act in question is essentially a confiscatory enactment beacuse taking a man's property by paying him, say twice the annual net income of that property, cannot possibly be held to be an acquisition for compensation."
15. This being the true meaning of compensation, it is plain that clause 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improvement Act, by introducing a new definition of market value, has the effect of reducing it invariably by superseding the advantage of situation, so that, in a case like the present one, the owners are "compensated" with the payment of about one‑tenth of the real market value. For we see no reason at present why the market value of the petitioners land should have been fixed at Rs. 1,625 per acre, while, at no great distance from them, though at a greater distance from the heart of the town, the National Silk arid Rayon Mills should have paid Rs. 16,245 per acre.
16. The written statement says that was so because, firstly, the National Silk and Rayon Mills are in Chak No. 214, not in Chak No. 224‑as though the name of a Chak increased market value‑and, secondly, because that land was acquired in 1955 and this was acquired in 1953‑as though in two years the value had gone up ten times. The real reason for the difference in market value, as stated in the Award, is that since "the market value of the land shall be the market value according to the use to which the land was put", and "the land under award was agricultural land", it was "to be assessed accordingly".
17. Clause 10 of the Schedule to the Punjab Town Improve ment Act, 1922, therefore, violates the principle enunciated in, section 299 of the Government of India Act, and would have been bad law if it had not been a "law in force at the date of the passing of " the Government of India Act, 1935, and, therefore protected by subsection (4) of section 299 thereof. This protec tion was extended in 1951 by the 'addition of subsection (4‑A, to laws made "within a period of three years next after the establishment of the Federation", and in 1956, the period of three years was extended to five years retrospectively. Now, since the amendment of 1953 is neither existing law, nor a law made within five years of the Federation in so far as it conflicts with section 299, it is beyond the competency of the Legislature. We, therefore, hold that clause 10 of the Schedule cannot, to this extent, be applied to satellite towns, and that compensation for the acquisition of land for such towns should be assessed purely under the Land Acquisition Act.
.
18. We were on the point of announcing the above order on the 16th November 1959, when Mr. Ghias Muhammad, counsel for the Government, made a written request for a further hearing of the case because, in his arguments, he had overlooked the provisions of clause (b) of subsection (4‑A) of section 299, Govern ment of India Act. We have acceded to the request, without. standing on formality.
19. The provision on which Mr. Ghias Muhammad now relies reads thus‑
Section 299 (4‑A).‑"Nothing in subsection (2) shall be con strued to invalidate‑
(a)* * * * * * * * * *
(b) any law having reference either to the administration or acquisition of any property which is, or is deemed to be, evacuee property under any law for the time being in force, or to the remedying of the dislocation in the social and economic life of Pakistan caused by the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan."
20. It is argued that the Punjab Town Improvement (Amendment) Act (II of 1953) was an Act to which the second part of clause (b) applies because it has reference to "the remedy ing of the dislocation in the social and economic life of Pakistan caused by the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan". Act II of 1953 is a short Act and may be reproduced so far as relevant :‑
" Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, in the manner hereafter appearing with a view to make provision for the improvement and expansion of towns in the ‑ Pun jab by setting up satellite towns to relieve congestion in the existing towns caused by the influx of refugees;
" It is hereby enacted as follows :‑--
"1. Short title and commencement. ‑* * * * * *
" 2. Amendment of section 66 of Act IV of 1922.‑
After subsection (2) of section 66 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, the following new subsection shall be added, namely":----
Then follows subsection (3) which has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment.
21. It will be noticed that the first part of clause (b) excludes from the mischief of section 299 any law relating to the administra tion or acquisition of evacuee property and that the reference is expressly to evacuee property. Mr. Ghias Muhammad, therefore, argued that the second part could not necessarily relate to evacuee property because if that were so, it would be unnecessary to make any addition to the clause with reference to the "remedying of dislocation", etc. The preamble of the amending Act, he further argued, clearly showed that satellite towns were being set up "to relieve congestion in the existing towns caused by the influx of refugees".
22. It is true that if the mere language of the preamble were followed, it places the matter within the second part of clause (b), and if that were the only guide to the interpretation of clause (b), Mr. Ghias Muhammad's argument is unexceptionable. But, so far as we can see, the intention of the aforesaid clause was to meet two situations, one arising out of the other. The non‑Muslims had gone and left behind extensive properties which required looking after. They were called evacuees. The Muslims from India had migrated to Pakistan, virtually without means, and they were to be settled. They were called refugees and the process of settlement came to be known as "rehabilitation". In theory‑the problem was simple: The refugees were to be settled on the property of the evacuees. Both processes went side by side, but although property had to be acquired somehow, it was impos sible to apply the compensatory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act to a case where the owner himself was absent. Clause (b), therefore, provided on the one hand for the " administration or acquisition" of such property and, on the other, for the rehabilita tion of refugees on such property. Some of the preambles of the Rehabilitation Acts or Ordinances which followed the partition were expressed in words which are more or less identical with the words used in the second part of clause (b). Thus, the Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance (XIX of 1948) opened with an intention "to make provision. for the restoration and maintenance of the social and economic life of Pakistan and the orderly settlement of persons who have taken refuge therein", and the same words were repeated in the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XVII of 1956). The Pakistan Rehabilitation Ordinance (XLII of 1956), in addition to these words referred also to "circumstances arising out of the mass movement of population from and into Pakistan". It was therefore, not enough to provide merely for the "administration or acquisition" of evacuee property, for the process of administration does not necessarily include the remedying of dislocation in the social and economic life of the country nor even the settlement of refugees on such property. In order that the matter should be beyond doubt, two distinct sets of law were enacted, complementary to each other, one for the "Administration of Evacuee Property", the other for "Rehabilitation", one administered by a Custodian, the other by a Rehabilitation Commissioner. It could not have been within the contemplation of the Legislature to repair dislocation by dislocating the local population, to unsettle legitimate interests except in the ordinary course‑and settle the refugees, and if the country as a, whole felt responsible for the accommodation of refugees, a refugee‑tax was levied and other taxes were increased: But there certainly was no intention to throw the entire burden of social and economic rehabilitation on Salimullah petitioner and a hundred and one other unfortunate persons who, like him, owned lands in the neighbourhood of big towns, and whose only fault was the fault of neighbourhood.
23. If clause (b) is capable of yielding two interpretations, one wide and the other restricted, we should prefer the restricted interpretation, partly because it is suitable to the context of evacuee property, partly because where a restriction is imposed on a beneficial provision, such as section 299 contains, the restric tion should be restricted to the barest minimum.
24. The ejusdem generis rule is also in favour of this inter pretation. " I accede to the principle laid down in all the cases which have been cited", said Lord Campbell in R. v. Edmundson ((1859) 28 LJMC 213) referred to at page 168 of Craies on Statute Law, fifth edition), "that where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified". Further, it is stated at page 170 of the same book that "general words following particular words will not include anything of a class superior to that to which the particular words belong". Clause (b) of subsection (4‑A) opens with particular reference to evacuee property, and the general words which follow in relation to the "remedying of dislocation" etc., could not refer to property which is superior in title to evacuee property.
25. We are, therefore, inclined to the view that clause (b) of subsection (4‑A) of section 299, Government of India Act, 1935, does not accommodate clause 10 (3) of the Schedule appended to the Punjab Town Improvement (Amendment) Act (II of 1953), and that, consequently, compensation should be assessed in the present case under the general provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The petition is accepted with costs, and a writ of certiorari will issue, quashing the proceedings conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer.
A.H. Petition accepted.
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