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Letters Patent Appeal No. 187 of 1959, decided on 21st December 1959, under section 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of West Pakistan (Lahore) against the order of S. A. Mahmud, J., dated the 30th September 1959.

s. 3 (2) (3) & 29‑Property ceasing to be evacuee after publication of notification re acquisition of such pro perty under subsection (2) remains subject to ejectment orders of Rehabilitation Authorities‑Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XLII of 1956), S. 7 (2) (b)‑Ejectment by Settlement Authorities of persons not in valid possession not open to objection.

Held, that the fact that by reason of the notification issued on the 1st of August 1959 by the Governor of West Pakistan under section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabili tation) Act (XXVIII of 1958), evacuee property mentioned in the notification lost its character as evacuee property would not deprive the Rehabilitation Authorities of the power to pass orders of ejectment from it.

According to section 7 (2) (b), Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XVII of 1956), even with regard to property, which was evacuee property at the time when it was allotted, an order of ejectment can be passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities after the property has lost the character of being evacuee property either by reason of a declaration or by the operation of any law for the time being in force.

The mere fact that the property ceased to be evacuee property at a date subsequent to the one on which it was allotted as evacuee property, does not take away the powers of the Rehabi litation Authorities to pass an order of ejectment with regard to it.

If the order of ejectment was valid at the time it was passed, the change in the character of the property cannot make it invalid unless the law by which the change was brought about says that the validity of orders passed with regard to that property by the Rehabilitation Authorities shall cease. It is nowhere said in the Act of 1958 that orders of ejectment validly passed by Rehabili tation Authorities will cease to have validity when a notification under section 3 is issued, nor bad any other provision of law been cited to show that those orders lost their validity as soon as the notification was issued. As the orders of the Rehabilitation Authorities retain their validity they can be acted upon.

The possession of persons whose ejectment had been ordered by the Rehabilitation Authorities by a valid order is not valid posses sion. It follows, therefore, that the act of the Settlement Autho rities in ejecting such persons under section 29 (as amended by Ordinances I and XLIII of 1959) of the Displaced Persons (Com pensation and Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) is not open to any valid objection.

Findings of fact by Tribunal of special jurisdiction Interference confined to cases where finding is entirely unjustified.

It is only in those cases in which the finding of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction on a question of fact is entirely unjustified that the High Court will exercise its writ jurisdiction.

Where the finding had evidence to support it the High Court declined to interfere.

Maulvi Siraj‑ud‑Din Ahmad and Raja Muhammad Anwar for Appellants.

Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan, Additional Settlement Com missioner, (Legal) for Respondent 1.

Sultan Ahmad Khan Afridi for Respondent 2.

Dates of hearing: 3rd and 4th December 1959.

This order will govern not only this appeal, but the following cases as well, because the main questions that arise in these cases and this appeal are the same :‑

2. This appeal is directed against the order passed by my learned brother S. A. Mahmood on the 30th of September 1959 dismissing a writ petition presented by the appellants wherein it was prayed that a writ should issue to the Rehabilitation Autho rities not to eject the appellants from a house situated in Rawal pindi. When it came up for a preliminary hearing before Bench, of which I was a member, the appeal was admitted only as the argument raised on behalf of the appellant was, that because the house in dispute had ceased to be evacuee property by reason of the issue of the notification regarding the acquisition of the pro perty by the Government, the order of the Rehabilitation Autho rities about the ejectment of the appellants came to an end and the appellants could not be ejected from the house on the basis of that order.

3. The Governor of West Pakistan passed an order which appeared as Notification No. U‑8‑79‑59 (3113) dated the 1st of August 1959; in the Gazette of West Pakistan dated the 28th of August 1959, and reads as follows:‑--

"Whereas the Central Government, in pursuance of the powers conferred by subsection (2) of section 3 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1958) have asked the Government of West Pakistan to acquire, for the purposes of the said Act, all immovable evacuee property situated within the Province of West Pakistan, other than‑

(i) Agricultural land.

(ii) Property for the acquisition or sale of which sanction of the Central Government under the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, or under any law for the time being in force for the administration of evacuee property in Pakistan, has been accorded before the date of this notification.

(iii) Property with regard to which any proceedings are pend ing on the date of this notification under the Pakistan (Adminis tration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, before a Custodian.

(iv) Property situated within the limits of the Murree Muni cipal Committee and the Murree Cantonment Board.

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (2) of section 3 of the said Act, the Government of West Pakistan is hereby pleased to acquire, with immediate effect, all the said evacuee immovable property."

The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and by the other learned counsel, who wanted to have a decision given in their clients' favour, on the ground that after the Notification the Rehabilitation Laws ceased to apply to what was formerly evacuee property, was that the Rehabilitation Authorities could pass orders with regard to ejectment from property only if the property from which a person was sought to be ejected was evacuee property and, therefore, an order of ejectment passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities after the issue of the notification, repro duced above, was invalid. It was also urged that all orders of ejectment passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities before the issue of the Notification, reproduced above, though they may have been valid at the time when they were passed, lost their validity as soon as the property ceased to be evacuee property by reason of its acquisition by Government under that notification. I will deal with the above‑mentioned points before coming to the other questions that arose during the hearing of these cases.

4. The argument, that an order of ejectment cannot be pass ed by the Rehabilitation Authorities if the property which was formerly evacuee property did not have that character at the time of the passing of the order, is, in my view, not sustainable. ejectment from property which was evacuee property could be ordered by the Rehabilitation Authorities under section 7 of the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act (XVII of 1956) hereinafter referred to as the (Act of 1956), the relevant part of subsection (2) of which section reads as follows :‑

"(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by the preceding subsection but subject to the provisions of this Act, a Rehabilitation Authority may‑

* * * * * * * * * *

(b) eject summarily with the use of such force as may be necessary any person in possession of any abandoned land, building, business or undertaking whose possession thereof has not been authorized by the Rehabilitation Authority, or to whom such land, building, business or undertaking has been allotted (whether the stock‑in‑trade or machinery involved in the business or undertaking has been sold to him or not) but who has failed to observe any of the conditions of the allotment, or who has subsequently been found in the opinion of the Rehabilitation Authority to be an unsuitable person to hold the property so allotted, or any person in possession of any property which, after it has been allotted to him as evacuee property, has lost the character of being such property either by a declaration or by the operation of any other law for the time being in force."

It will be noticed that in the end of clause (b) reproduced above, it is clearly stated that even with regard to property, which wasp evacuee property at the time when it was allotted, an order of ejectment can be passed by the Rehabilitation Authorities after the property has lost the character of being evacuee property either 6 by reason of a declaration or by the operation of any law for the time being in force. It is not denied‑anti indeed it could not, have been denied‑that the Notification issued by the Governor of West Pakistan on the 1st of August 1959 under section 3 of the Act of 1958, was validly issued and it follows therefore that the acquisition by the Government terminated the character of the property as evacuee property. But the mere fact that the property, ceased to be evacuee property at a date subsequent to the one on which it was allotted as evacuee property, does not, as is cleat' from clause (b) of section 7 (2) of the Act of 1956, take away the powers of the Rehabilitation Authorities to pass an order of ejectment with regard to it. I would, therefore, hold that the fact that by reason of the notification issued on the 1st of August 1959 by the Governor of West Pakistan under section 3 of the Act of 1958, evacuee property mentioned in the notification lost its character as evacuee property would not deprive the Rehabilitation Authorities of the power to pass orders of ejectment from it.

5. I will now deal with the argument that because the pro perty which was formerly evacuee property has ceased to be property of that character since the above reproduced notification under section 3 of the Act of 1958, an order of ejectment passed by a competent Rehabilitation Authority, even if valid till the time the property remained evacuee property, lost it's validity as soon as the property lost its status of evacuee property and such an order could not be acted upon. I am clear in my mind that this contention has no force. If the order was valid at the time it was passed, the change in the character of the property cannot make it invalid unless the law by which the change was brought about says that the validity of orders passed with regard to that property by the Rehabilitation Authorities shall cease. It is nowhere said in the Act of 1958 that orders of ejectment validity passed by Rehabilitation Authorities will cease to have validly when a notification under section 3 is issued, nor has any other provision of law been cited to show that those orders lost their validity as soon as the notification was issued. As the orders of the Rehabilitation Authorities retain their validity they can be acted upon. In the cases I am dealing with in this judgment, the orders are not being executed by the Rehabilitation Authorities but by the Settlement Authorities appointed under the Act of 1958, and using those orders as the basis for holding that the persons against whom they were passed cannot be deemed to be validly in posses sion of the property, the orders will be passed, and have in some cases been passed, under section 29 of the Act of 1958 as amended by Ordinance I of 1959 and Ordinance XLIII of 1959. That the possession of persons whose ejectment had been ordered by the Rehabilitation Authorities by valid order is not valid possession is hardly open to question, and it follows, therefore, that the Act of the Settlement Authorities in ejecting those persons under section 291 of the Act of 1958 is not open to any valid objection.

6. Besides addressing arguments on the above‑mentioned two points, Raja Muhammad Anwar, Advocate, who appeared for the petitioners in the three writ petitions being disposed of by this order, raised some questions of fact. In Writ Petition No. 533/R of 1959, he argued that the order of the Rehabilitation Authorities that Muhammad Hussain, the petitioner in that petition, was in possession of two Houses was incorrect and that the house in his possession was one. This is a pure question of fact and as it is only in those cases in which the finding of a Tribunal of special jurisdiction on a question of fact is entirely unjustified that this Court will exercise its writ jurisdiction, and the impugned finding has evidence to support it, the question raised has no substance. In Writ Petition No. 536/R it was contended by Raja Muhammad Anwar that as Muhammad Ismail, the petitioner in that petition, had not been given enough opportunity to produce his evidence, interference by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction was indicated. This point could more appropriately be raised by an appeal or a revision petition and does not merit serious consi deration by this Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. No other contention calling for mention was raised and as those raised have been held to be untenable, this appeal and the three writ peti tions mentioned in paragraph 1 above are dismissed with costs.

A. H. Appeal and petitions dismissed.

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