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Civil Original No. 1 of 1958, decided on 18th July 1960.
, S. 195‑Magistrate serving show‑cause notice on A (who had given alleged false infor mation) why complaint under S. 182, P. P. C. be not lodged against him‑A in showing cause entitled to lead evidence- Complaint could only be lodged after Magistrate had prima facie found that information was deliberately false.
If a person is directed to show cause why a complaint under section 182, P. P. C. should not be filed against him and he pleads that he had made the report under misapprehension, he is entitled to lead evidence to that effect and a complaint can be lodged only after the Magistrate came to a prima facie con clusion that the information given was deliberately false.
, S. 195‑Officer making complaint has to make up his own mind‑Magistrate filing complaint under orders of Deputy Commissioner‑Complaint liable to be quashed.
A Magistrate bad filed a complaint under section 182, P.‑P. C. under the directions of the Deputy Commissioner.
Held, that on this sole ground the complaint could be quashed because the officer who makes a complaint has to make up his own mind. He cannot file a complaint under the orders of someone else. In that case it is that other person who is filing the complaint and he had no authority to do so.
False imprisonment‑Burden of proof‑Plaintiff to prove imprisonment‑Defendant to prove justification.
In a suit for false imprisonment all that the plaintiff need prove is that he was imprisoned and it is for the defendant to prove justification.
Halsbury's Laws of England Para. 67, Vol. 33, Second Edition.
S. 1 Application‑Belief in good faith‑Explained‑Onus to prove good faith‑Evidence Act (I of 1872), S. 106.
If the judicial officer had jurisdiction to make the order of arrest or detention which is made the basis of a suit by the person arrested or detained, there is no cause of action for the suit. If, on the other hand, such jurisdiction did not exist the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages will be decided in accordance with the proviso to the section, i.e., if the judicial officer believed in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of he will not be liable in damages.
Belief in good faith referred to in the section has been held to be a belief based on reasonable grounds. "A belief based on no probable or plausible grounds, and arrived at inconsiderately and without due enquiry, cannot be considered a belief in good faith within the meaning of the Act, which has been construed to require reasonable care and attention in the performance of official duty on the part of one who does or orders the act com plained of."
The defendant, therefore, has to show either that he had jurisdiction or that he had reasonable grounds for believing that he had jurisdiction. The onus as to there being grounds for reasonable belief would be on him, on the wording of section 1 in which this protection ‑ appears in the form of a proviso, as also on account of section 106 of the Evidence Act which provides that the onus of proving a fact within the special knowledge of a person is on him.
Collector of Sea Customs v. P. Chithambaram I L R 1 Mad. 89 and Emperor v. Muktar A I R 1944 Cal. 4 ref.
Where a Magistrate had ordered arrest of a person allegedly under the provisions of National Calamities Act, without reading the Act or without referring to any section of the Act in the warrant, the, case was not held to fall under proviso to S. 1, Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850.
, S. 64‑Appli cation‑Magistrate can order arrest only where what he sees appears to him to be prima facie an offence at time he sees it.
Section 64 will apply only where the Magistrate sees some thing which prima facie at the time appears to him to be an offence. It does not apply to a case where at the time he did not know at all that an offence was being committed but subsequently on evidence which he examined he came to the conclusion that what had been done in his presence was an offence.
Section 64, Cr. P. C. is not intended to apply to a case where a Magistrate seeing an act being done does not know that some offence is being committed. At the same time, the section only applies to a case where the accused himself is present. Then the Magistrate can himself arrest or order his arrest. The section does not justify the issue of a warrant against an absent accused on the basis of evidence examined by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate has to issue a warrant only after examining witnesses and coming to a conclusion he can do so not under section 64 but if he takes cognizance of the offence.
, S. 1, proviso‑Magistrate on account of annoyance issuing in first instance non‑bailable warrant of arrest for offence under section 182, P. P. C. without there being a complaint before him‑Proviso held inapplicable.
Measure‑False imprisonment‑No yard stick- Suit brought more for vindication of honour than money‑Rs. 500 awarded in suit for Rs. 20,000.
Ghias Muhammad for Plaintiff.
Karam Elahi Chauhan and at the instance of the State M Z. Kitchlew for Defendant.
Dates of hearing : 15th, 16th and 17th June 1960.
This judgment will dispose of a civil suit filed by Ghulam Qadir Khakwani against Mr. A. K. Khalid, Magistrate 1st Class with section 30 powers, Multan, for damages for false imprison ment amounting to Rs. 20,000.
2. In the month of October 1955, a part of Multan District was affected by floods and the defendant was appointed an Emergency Officer for the purpose of taking such steps as may be necessary to afford relief to the flood‑affected area. On the 14th of October 1955, he was camping at Vehari. A resident Magistrate holds Court at Vehari and he too was in charge of a section of the flood‑affected area, but he was acting under the directions of the defendant. The plaintiff is a big landlord of Multan District and resides in Multan City. The case of the plaintiff is that he received information at Multan on the 14th of October 1955 to the effect that the lands of his brother Ghulam Haider in village Karim Wah were under water on account of floods and that there was grave danger to his own lands which were adjacent. At this, he went to Vehari, and at the Rest House spoke to Haji Shah Muhammad, Deputy Superintendent of Police. Haji Shah Muhammad took him to the defendant. The plaintiff informed the defendant of the danger to his lands and asked‑for help. The defendant directed him to proceed to the spot, saying that he will follow him after taking his lunch. The plaintiff proceeded towards the spot which is near Sauro Minor, but on the way he had some trouble with his car and he reached the spot only after two or three hours. In the meantime, the defendant reached Sauro Minor. The defendant waited for the plaintiff for some time and then went to Karampur Rest House. The defendant was deeply annoyed by the fact that the plaintiff had failed to reach the spot and the defendant had to walk a distance of more than three miles at a time when it was quite warm. The plaintiff, after his car was put right, went to the spot and, finding that the defendant was not there, went to Karampur Rest House. At that time, the defendant was leaving the Rest House. The defendant had already given instructions to the Station House Officer, Vehari, who was at Karampur Rest House, that the plaintiff should be arrested. The Station House Officer arrested the plaintiff, actually handcuffed him, and took him on foot in handcuffs to Sauro Minor, which is at a distance of about three miles from Sauro Minor, the plaintiff was taken in a vehicle to Vehari where he was confined to the judicial lock‑up. The defendant had gone to take his dinner with Shah Muhammad and other Khichis who were the political opponents of the plaintiff and he returned at about 10‑30 p.m. to Vehari. At that time, the plaintiff was produced before him at the Rest House, again in handcuffs, and was then released on bail by the defendant who remarked that the plaintiff had been sufficiently punished. The plaintiff was directed to appear before the defendant the very next day. Next day when the plaintiff appeared before the defendant his signatures were taken on some blank papers and he was informed that he had been acquitted, having been sufficiently punished. The plaintiff alleged that lie had not committed any offence and that the imprisonment orders given by the defendant were mala fide and without any justification. The . defendant, it was stated, already bore him ill‑will because of two previous incidents, one relating to the house in which the defendant was residing and the other to the requisitioning of a car belonging to a member of the plaintiff's family. At the same time, the defendant was very friendly with the Khichis who were the political opponents of the plaintiff's family. The defendant had deliberately, in order to disgrace the plaintiff, got him arrested, handcuffed and confined.
3. The case of the defendant is that on the 14th of October 1955, the plaintiff came to him and told him that two parties, heavily armed, had collected near Sauro Minor, one of which intended to cause a breach in the said Minor for the purpose of causing a flow of flood water from their own fields and the other was bent upon preventing the breach, and that there was not only a serious apprehension of breach of the peace but that great havoc would be caused by the flood unless suitable action was taken. The defendant proceeded to the spot and found the whole story of the plaintiff to be untrue. No persons were present there and enquiries also did not show that any persons had actually gathered. The plaintiff did not reach Sauro Minor at all. The defendant then proceeded to Karampur Rest House and there he dictated to the Station House Officer, Vehari, a notice under the National Calamities Act and a warrant for arrest of the plaintiff under the National Calamities Act as well as under section 182, P. P. C. The plaintiff had been arrested in consequence of the warrant issued by the defendant and the defendant had full authority in law to issue the warrant. The plaintiff had not arrived at Karampur Rest House when the defendant left for inspection of the food affected area. He went to Mailsi where he took his dinner with Mr. Waheed, Magistrate, and returned at about 10 p m. to Vehari where the plaintiff was produced before him and he released him on bail. The next day, which was the day for which the warrant had beer issued, the plaintiff appeared before him. The plaintiff was served with a notice to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under section 182, P. P. C. The plaintiff apologized, saying that he had acted on the basis of unverified information but that he had not done so deliberately and, therefore, should be pardoned. The defendant then passed orders directing his prosecution under section 182, P. P. C.
4. The defendant also raised some preliminary objections, and the following issues were framed in the suit by the Civil Judge before whom this case was pending before it was transferred to this Court:‑
(1) Whether the non‑bailable warrant issued against the plaintiff was based on any malice If so, what was that malice
(2) Whether the plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned wrong fully and illegally
(3) If issues Nos. 1 and 2 are proved, to what amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled
(4) Whether the action of the defendant is protected under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act (XVIII of 1850)
(5) Are the Civil Courts barred from trying such suits under the Judicial Officers' Protection Act
(6) Is it necessary to stay the proceedings of this case till the hearing of criminal case under section 182, P. P. C. pending against the plaintiff
(7) Relief.
5. The plaintiff produced eighteen witnesses in support of his case. P. W. 1 Muhammad Nawaz is a commission agent of Vehari. While going from his chak to Vehari, he happened to stop at Vehari Rest House. The plaintiff came there and spoke to Haji Shah Muhammad, Deputy Superintendent of Police. He said that he had received information from his brother Ghulam Haider that the land of Ghulam Haider was already under water and his own land was in danger of being flooded. He requested Haji Shah Muhammad to take appropriate measures. Haji Shah Muhammad told him that this was the duty of the Magistrate whom the plaintiff should approach. The plaintiff then went along with Haji Shah Muhammad to the defendant and requested him to take steps to save his land. The defendant asked the plaintiff to go to the spot and wait for his arrival. Bahu Khan (P. W. 2) stated that he was present at Karampur Rest House when a Magistrate, along with Haji Shah Muhammad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and some police officers, came there. After some time, the plaintiff also arrived, but on seeing the plaintiff the Magistrate left the Rest House in company with Shah Muhammad Khichi and Ahmad Khan Khichi in a car. When the plaintiff reached the Rest House, he was arrested by the Sub-Inspector and hand cuffed in the presence of about two hundred or two hundred and fifty persons, and led on foot towards Sauro Minor. P. W. 3 Ghulam Murtaza Shah, a businessman of village Karampur, stated that on the 14th of October 1955 the defendant arrived at Karampur Rest House at about 2‑30 p m. along with the Deputy Superintendent of Police and some other police officers and the plaintiff arrived about half an hour later. When the plaintiff was at a short distance from the Rest House, the defendant got into a car and left for Mailsi. When the plaintiff reached the Rest House, he was arrested and handcuffed by a Sub‑Inspector and taken towards Sauro Minor. P. W. 4 Muhammad Aslam Khan is a zamindar of Multan City. He stated that the plaintiff belonged to his brotherhood ; that the defendant had been a tenant in his house on account of an order of requisition passed by the Deputy Commissioner ; that when the Requisition Act expired, he applied that the defendant be ejected ; and that the defendant did not want to vacate the house, but was ultimately forced to do so. P. W. 5 Abdul Qadir Khan is the first cousin of the plaintiff's father. He stated that in 1954 his car was requisitioned by the defendant for flood duty. P. W. 6 Ghulam Haider Khan is the brother of the plaintiff. He stated that he had given information to the plaintiff as to the houses and the lands of the plaintiff being in danger of floods on the 14th October 1955. P. W. 7 Behram Khan is a zamindar of Multan City. He stated that on the 14th October 1955, he was at Abdullahwah, where some of the lands of the plaintiff are situate. The plaintiff had told him that he (plaintiff) had met the defendant and had requested him to take precautionary measures by causing a cut in Sauro Minor or otherwise as he had received information that the flood was galloping towards his land. The witness accompanied the plaintiff to Sauro Minor along with the brothers of the plaintiff. They reached Sauro Minor only at about 3 p.m. because the road was under water and they had to pass through fields and small mounds. They then went to Karampur Rest House. At that time, the defendant was sitting in a car belonging to the Khichis along with Mr. Waheed, 'another Magistrate, and Haji Shah Muhammad, Deputy Superintendent of Police. On seeing the witness the chaprasi of the defendant who knew the witness informed the defendant and the defendant once got out of the car, but on seeing the plaintiff again got into it and went away without seeing the witness. The defendant was known to the witness and their relations had been cordial. The Sub‑Inspector of Police, Vehari, then arrested the plaintiff and handcuffed him. The witness enquired from the Sub‑Inspector as to why the plaintiff was being arrested. The Sub‑Inspector informed him that the plaintiff had told a lie and had not appeared on the spot. The witness told the Sub‑Inspector that their car had got stuck in the mud and, therefore, they could not reach the spot in time. The witness asked the Sub‑Inspector to show him the warrant of arrest. The Sub‑Inspector replied that he had warrant with him but that he would not show it to him. The witness insisted, but the Sub‑Inspector simply enquired as to whether the witness had no confidence in him. He asked the Sub‑Inspector to release the plaintiff on bail, but the Sub‑Inspector told him that the warrant was non‑bailable and he could not accept bail. The plaintiff was then taken to the place where the police wagon was and then to Vehari, where he was confined in the lock‑up. Tae defendant reached Vehari at about 10‑45 p.m. and the plaintiff was admitted to bail and released at about 12‑15 a.m. The plaintiff was directed to appear the next morning before the Magistrate the plaintiff did appear accordingly and the defendant told him that this had been sufficient punishment for him and that he could go. When cross‑examined he stated that the plaintiff was his cousin, that he had been calling on the defendant and that the defendant had always met him cordially. P. W. 8 is Taj Muhammad, Station. House Officer, Vehari. He was produced by the plaintiff to prove the fact of arrest. Taj Muhammad stated that he had arrested the plaintiff on account of the non‑bailable warrant issued against him and had taken him to Vehari because the defendant‑ had already left for Mailsi about five or ten minutes before the plaintiff arrived at Karampur Rest House. At 10‑30 in the night, he had handed over the plaintiff to some constables in order that the plaintiff may be produced before the defendant at Vehari Rest House where he was released on bail. He admitted that the plaintiff had been handcuffed when he was arrested and that from Karampur Rest House up to the place where the police lorry was the plaintiff was 'taken on foot. It was this witness who had written the notice which was issued by the defendant on the 14th October 1955 as well as the non‑bailable warrant. P. W. 9 is Qazi Shah Muhammad, Lambardar of Kot Qazi. It should be explained here that of the two parties from whom according to the plaintiff, there was an apprehension of breach of peace in respect of a cut in Sauro Minor, one belonged to Kot Qazi and the other to Dinwah. The one which belonged to Kot Qazi wanted to prevent the breach because in the case of breach their village would be affected by the flood. Qazi Shah Muhammad, who was the leader or one of the leaders of the party of Kot Qazi, stated that on the 14th October 1955 he was present at Sauro Minor when the defendant, the Deputy Superintendent of police and the Sub‑Inspector arrived there. The defendant then went to Karampur Rest House and the witness accompanied him. The defendant wrote something on some papers and handed over the papers to the Sub‑Inspector. He then got into a car for going towards Mailsi. He was yet in the car when the plaintiff and his relatives reached there. The Sub‑Inspector arrested the plaintiff and in handcuffs took him towards Sauro Minor. The witness had been told by the Deputy Superintendent of Police that the plaintiff had made a report against him. The report was that the witness was protecting the bund and in this way while he was saving his own lands he was subjecting the lands of the plaintiff to floods. The witness stated that on that day there were no persons of his village protecting the bund but that on the 'previous day some persons had been posted there for the purpose. The witness further stated that on the next day the plaintiff, when he appeared before the defendant at Vehari, had been told by the defendant that he had been acquitted. P. W. 10 is Chaudhri Rahim Bakhsh, an Arain and an arhti of Mailsi. He stated that on the 14th of October 1955 when he was in his shop he came to know that the defendant was in the Rest House with the khichis. He and Irshad Ahmad (P. W. 11) went to the defendant to ask for help but the defendant instead put them on duty in connection with flood relief. The defendant was saying that he had taken the pride out of the plaintiff, having got him handcuffed. Shah Muhammad, Ahmad Khan and other Khichis were present there and they took the defendant to their village Doda for dinner. Irshad Ahmad (P. W: 11) made a similar statement. P. W. 12 Wali Muhammad is a first cousin of the plaintiff. He stated that on the 15th of October, 1955 the plaintiff had been told by the defendant that the case against him had been dropped but that he should take care in future, Ghulam Jafar (P. W. 13) is a brother of the plaintiff. He stated that the plaintiff had received information at Multan from Ghulam Haider, the third brother as to his lands being in danger. The plaintiff was unable to reach the spot in time because the car had got stuck on the way. He and the plaintiff were at a distance of about sixty or seventy yards when the defendant left Karampur Rest House in the care of the Khichis. P. W. 14 is Hamid Ullah, a first cousin of the plaintiff. He stated that his brother's wife was coming in a car from Lahore and when the car passed by the house of the defendant, it was stopped. The defendant was approached in order that he may let the car go but he said that he had got hold of a car belonging to Khakwanis and that he would not let it go because the Khakwanis wanted to turn him out of his house. The witness then informed his father who spoke to the Deputy Commissioner and the car was ultimately released. P. W. 15 is Abdul Aziz, Assistant Record Keeper in the Police Office. He simply produced copies of reports made at the police station in connection with the confinement and release of the plaintiff. P. W. 16 is Sadiq Muhammad Khan Khugani of Vehari. He accompanied the plaintiff to Vehari Rest House. The plaintiff had told the defendant that his village was in danger of floods and that he should be given help to the form of trucks etc. The defendant had stated that he would reach the spot after taking his lunch. P. W. 17 is Nur Muhammad Khan, another Khugani of Vehari. He had gone to the Police Station, Vehari, after the plaintiff had been arrested and he had received information that the defendant had gone to take his meal with the Khichis. P. W. 12 is the plaintiff himself who has generally supported his case.
6. The defendant produced four witnesses. The first is Haji Shah Muhammad, Deputy Superintendent of Police. He stated that on the 14th of October 1955 the plaintiff came to, him and told him that there were two big parties, one of which wanted to make a breach in Sauro Minor and the other wanted to prevent it and that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace. He took the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant was of opinion that Mr. Jafri, Magistrate; Vehari, may be directed to deal with the situation, but the witness advised the defendant to proceed to the spot himself. The defendant did proceed to the spot but no parties were present there and some unknown, persons from whom enquiries were made did not support the plaintiff's story. D. W. 2 is Mr. Akhtar Ali Jafri, Magistrate, Vehari. He stated that on the 14th October 1955 the plaintiff came to Vehari Rest House and in his presence stated that persons belonging to Kot Qazi and Dinwah had collected heavily armed, that one of the parties wanted to make a breach in the Sauro Minor while the other wanted to prevent it, and that there was grave danger of breach of the peace. The plaintiff stated further that he had himself gone to‑the spot and had seen all this with his own eyes. I may mention here that this part of the statement of the witnesses is not supported either by Haji Shah Muhammad or by the defendant. D. W. 3 is Iftikhar Rasul, camp clerk of the defendant. He formally proved the orders by which defendant was appointed Emergency Officer in flood‑affected area. He at the same time stated that on the 15th October 1955 the plaintiff had been served with a notice to show cause why he should not be prosecuted under section 182, P'. P. C., that his statement had been recorded and that an order had been passed by the defendant directing the filing of a complaint against him. D. W. 4 is the defendant him self who generally supports his case. Reference will be made later wherever necessary to portions of his statement.
7. Before proceeding further it is necessary to give the details of the documents prepared under the orders of the defendant. They are important documents which have a. direct hearing on the decision of this case. The first document is a notice which, under the directions of the defendant, was recorded by Taj Muhammad, Station House Officer, Vehari, at Karampur Rest House. In this notice it is stated that on the 14th of October 1955 at 12 noon at Rest House Vehari the plaintiff had, in the presence of Deputy Superintendent of Police, given information that in respect of the making of a breach in Sauro Minor, there was a serious dispute between two parties both of which were standing armed at the spot and there was grave apprehension of breach of the peace ; that the defendant along with some police officers had gone to the spot and he had not found any armed party there nor was there any apprehension of Sauro Minor being cut for the purpose of diversion of water; that the plaintiff had given wrong and baseless information, and had wasted the time of the defendant which was to be spent on relief to the flood victims ; and that the plaintiff should show cause why he should not be held guilty under the National Calamities Act. No section of the National Calamities Act was mentioned. On the back of this notice, which is, as already stated, in the handwriting of Taj Muhammad, Station House Officer, Vehari, appear words in Urdu in the handwriting of the defendant himself the English transla tion of which would be as follows :‑---
"S. H. O Vehari to arrest Ghulam Qadir Khan".
The second document is the warrant of arrest which is again in the handwriting of Taj Muhammad. It is a short document and it will be convenient to reproduce its translation verbatim :‑----
"Crown v. Ghulam Qadir Khan accused
Offence :‑Under section 182, P. P. C.
Non‑bailable warrant of arrest.
S. H. O. Police Station Vehari.
In the Court of A. K . Khalid, Magistrate Section 30, Camp Vehari.
To
Ghulam Qadir Khan son of Abdul Karim Khan Khakwani of Multan, now at Abdullahwah, Police Station Luddan, Tehsil Vehari. Arrest under section‑National Calamities Act (Pakistan) and section 182 P. P. C. and produce before us on 15th October 1955 at Vehari at 10 a.m."
These are the only two documents recorded on the 14th October 1955. There was no order, apart from these documents, for the issue of a notice or warrant. On the back of the warrant, there is an endorsement to the effect that the plaintiff had been arrested in execution of the warrant. On the notice there is ho endorsement at all.
8. In the notice no date had been fixed for appearance. In the warrant the date for appearance had been fixed as the 15th October 1955. On that date the plaintiff appeared before the defendant and the defendant then served upon him a notice relating to an offence under section 182, P. P. C. only, to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under that section. The record shows that this notice was read over to the plaintiff and he was asked to make a statement in reply to it. Following is the statement which he is alleged to have been made :‑
"I had given this information under a misapprehension. I beg to be excused. I will not commit such a mistake again. Somebody had given me this information which I was unable to verify and being in a perturbed state I came straight here and gave the information. I had not deliberately given wrong information (ye ghalti danista na thi)."
The plaintiff was then asked as to whether he had to add anything and he said : "No, I may be pardoned." On the back of this document appears the order of the defendant of the same date the translation‑of which is the following :‑---
"Ghulam Qadir Khan confesses his guilt. He admits that he had given wrong information. Under the circumstances, a complaint under section 182, P. P. C. should be drafted and sent to the Resident Magistrate, Vehari. The accused will be bound by the security furnished. The Court concerned will pass orders summoning him for a proper date:"
9. I proceed now to appraise the evidence. Let me state before I begin that, while the plaintiff is a respectable zamindar of Multan, the defendant was, during the pendency of this suit in the Court of a Civil Judge at Multan, still a section 30 Magistrate in the Multan District and this has to be kept in mind while considering the value of evidence. The whole of the evidence in the present case, except a part of the statement of the plaintiff, was recorded by the Civil Judge at Multan and the witnesses of the plaintiff knew that they were deposing against a Magistrate who had got the plaintiff handcuffed and put in the lock‑up.
10. I am prepared to accept the version of the defendant as to the information which the complainant had given him at Vehari. According to the plaintiff, he had simply asked for help because his lands were in danger, while according to the defendant the plaintiff had told him that there were two parties both armed, one of whom was bent upon making a breach in Sauro Minor and the other was bent upon preventing the breach. The plaintiff did not explain what help the defendant was to give and it becomes clear on a perusal of the record that the help which the plaintiff wanted was in connection with a cut in Sauro Minor. In fact, Behram Khan (P. W. 7) has made a clear statement in this respect. According to Behram Khan the plaintiff had asked for the help of the defendant by means of a cut. Qazi Shah Muhammad (P. W. 9) too has stated that a day before this incident people of Kot Qazi were protecting the bund. The plaintiff has thought fit to suppress this part of the statement, probably in view of the complaint against him under section 182, P. P. C. The statement of the defendant is, in this respect, supported by the notice which was issued as well as by the statement of Haji Shah Muhammad. However, while I accept that the plaintiff had given information to the defendant as to the collection of parties at the spot, I am not accepting that the plaintiff had deliberately given any false information. He had no motive whatever for doing that he was taking the defendant to the spot where the defendant could very well verify the correctness of the plaintiff's allegation. He had followed the defendant to Karampur Rest House. He reached late but there is no reason for disbelieving his statement that he had been delayed because his car got stuck. Qazi Shah Muhammad, Lambardar of Kot Qazi, has admitted, that on the previous day people had gathered for the purpose of protection of the bund. He is the Lambardar of the village whose inhabitants were protecting the bund. It is also quite natural, if the main tenance of the bund would result in the land of the plaintiff being damaged, that the plaintiff and others whose lands were to be damaged should want to make a cut and it was not at all improper that they should approach the Emergency Officer for this purpose. The Emergency Officer could direct the bund to be cut if this were to result in diminishing the damage caused by the flood. The plaintiff had received information from his brother, at Multan. That information may well have related to the previous day and on the previous day people had collected. So while I accept that the plaintiff, probably in view of his prosecution under section 182, P. P. C., has suppressed a part of the statement, I see no reason on this record for holding that he had deliberately given wrong information to the defendant.
11. Although the defendant had received the information as to there being a serious danger of breach of the peace, when he went to the spot he did not find any persons collected there. The plaintiff did not reach the spot. The defendant, as was admitted before me, had to walk more than three miles and it was about noon. He felt annoyed, very much annoyed indeed, and what followed can be explained only on this basis. The plaintiff did not reach Karampur Rest House soon after the defendant and, as appears from the evidence, some search was made for him but he could not be found. In the written statement the defendant had taken up the position that the plaintiff "had disappeared in the meantime and, therefore, his warrants were issued", but the correct position appears to be that the plaintiff was not available to the defendant at all before the warrants were issued. When the defendant found that the plaintiff had given wrong information, had not reached the spot and had‑caused him to walk in the sun for more than three miles, he wanted to pull him up. He issued at first a notice under the National Calamities Act. He had no grounds for believing that the plaintiff had committed any offence under the National Calamities Act. In the notice no section of National Calamities Act was mentioned, and when I called upon learned counsel for the defendant to point out to me any section of the National Calamities Act by misinterpreting which the notice may have been issued to the plaintiff, he did not even make an attempt to refer to any such section. Not satisfied with the notice the defendant then wrote on the back of the notice in his own hands an order that the defendant should be arrested by the Station House Officer, Vehari, and produced before him the very next day.
12. The defendant now alleges that the warrant under section 182, P. P. C. and the National Calamities Act was written at the same time as the notice. There is no doubt at all that the two were not recorded at one and the same time. There are a number of reasons why I should reach this conclusion. If the notice was recorded at the ‑same time as the warrant, there is no reason why there should not be notice under section 182, P. P. C. also. The next .day, it is to be remembered, a notice had to be served on the plaintiff to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under section 182, P. P. C. Yet in this notice there is no mention of section 182, P. P. C. Then there is the order passed on the back of the notice directing the Station House Officer to arrest the plaintiff. This order would be without any meaning if a non‑bailable warrant had already been recorded. The case of the defendant is that the notice and the warrant were dictated at one and the same time to Taj Muhammad, Station House Officer and that he made the endorsement on the notice after the warrant had been recorded. There is no explanation what soever as to why, if a warrant had been written already, there should be need for an order of arrest and that order too is on the back of a notice to show cause. Also Taj Muhammad has admitted that the warrant was recorded after the return of the defendant to Karampur Rest House. With respect to this statement, it was objected by learned counsel for the defendant that there was no story as to the return of the defendant to Karampur Rest House. True, that story is not there but the plaintiff could not be knowing the return if the defendant had left Karampur Rest House in his absence and had returned, and in any case the statement. of Taj Muhammad cannot be said to be meaningless. It is obvious from his statement that the notice and the warrant could not have been recorded at one and the same time. The defendant it appears to me directed only the service of notice under the National Calamities Act He then gave a direction for the arrest of the plaintiff also under that. Act by an endorsement on the notice. Later he appears to have thought better of it and to have added section 182, P. P. C. At what stage this was done is not clear. It is not possible to say whether the warrant had or had not been recorded at the time when the plaintiff was arrested. Behram Khan P. W. had stated that the Station House Officer had not shown him the warrant of arrest. I am not inclined to disbelieve Behram Khan, but still my mind is not quite satisfied as to when the warrant came into existence. In this connection, reference has been made by learned counsel for the defendant to issue No. 1 which refers to a non‑bailable warrant. I do not attach much importance to the fact that in the issue the words "non‑bailable warrant" were used. The plaintiff did not know whether there was a warrant or an order. He only knew that he had been arrested and that the arrest was in execution of an order which did not allow any bail.
13. I am inclined to accept the statement of the plaintiff hat the defendant had left Karampur Rest House after seeing him. There is the statement on this point of Behram Khan, who appears to me to be a reliable witness even though he is a cousin of the plaintiff, and there is also the statement of Qazi Shah Muhammad. Even according to Taj Muhammad, Station House Officer, the defendant left only 5/6 minutes before the arrival of the plaintiff. This is pot very far from the truth. I believed also that the defendant left Karampur Rest House with the Khichis. He has not dared to contradict this. He simply says that he did not know whether he had gone with Shah Muhammad Khichi, a statement which does not impress me.
14. These are my conclusions as to what happened on the first day. On the 15th October, according to the plaintiff, the defendant told him that he had been sufficiently punished and was acquitted. The case of the defendant was that he first served a notice on the defendant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under section 182, P. P. C. and when the notice was read over to the plaintiff, he recorded his statement and then he passed the order. This statement was corroborated by Iftikhar Rasul, Camp Clerk of the defendant, according to whom, after recording the statement of the plaintiff, the defendant ordered the prosecution of the plaintiff.
15. The record leads me to no conclusion other than this that the plaintiff's version as to his having been acquitted is cornet. The case put forward on behalf of the defendant in his examination‑in‑chief and in the statement of Iftikhar Rasul was that the order directing the lodging of the complaint against the plaintiff was passed at the time when the plaintiff's statement was recorded. A reading of the plaintiff s examination‑in‑chief and the statement of Iftikhar Rasul would show that this is the only case which the plaintiff had to put forward. However, during the cross‑examination the defendant was confronted with the earlier statement which he had made in the criminal case against the plaintiff and the plaintiff was forced to change his position. He admitted that he wanted to drop the proceedings against the plaintiff, but that he was directed by the Deputy Commissioner, Multan, to proceed against the plaintiff and that it was in consequence of this direction of the Deputy Commissioner that he had passed orders for the filing of a complaint against the plaintiff. Now, this direction from the Deputy Commissioner he had, as admitted before me by the defendant himself, been received by telephone only on the night between the 15th and 16th October. It is obvious, therefore, that the order directing the complaint to be filed against the plaintiff could only have been passed some time during the night between the 15th and 16th October. If till that night he had not passed any orders in the case, then what was the order which he announced to the plaintiff 7 Obviously it could not be an order informing him that a complaint had been lodged against him. It could, therefore, only have been an order telling him that he had been acquitted and was not to be proceeded against. He had been allowed to go and had not been given any date for appearance. When the defendant was obliged under cross‑examination to admit that the complaint had been filed after receipt of a telephonic message from the Deputy Commissioner, he took up the position that he had not announced any order to the plaintiff and had told him that orders would be announced later. But his witness Iftikhar Rasul, who had been examined before the defendant had not made any such statement and the defendant himself had not said so in his examination‑in‑chief. The record of the proceedings too is against the defendant. It does not say that the plaintiff was to be informed later. Also if the statement of the defendant be accepted it would mean that after receipt of the telephonic message‑ Iftikhar Rasul w is sent for at dead of night and an order bearing date 12th October 1955 was then recorded. Nobody says so and if somebody said so it would not be acceptable in the face of all the circumstances. The story that orders were to be pronounced later is not only opposed to the record but is falsified by the fact that admittedly no orders were in fact ever communicated after the 15th October to the plaintiff.
16. There is further corroboration of the view that I take, in the order that was passed by the defendant. I have already reproduced a translation of that order. That order says : "The accused confesses his guilt". As a matter of fact, the accused had not confessed his guilt at all. In the witness‑box, the defendant has admitted that the statement which the plaintiff made before him was exculpatory. The plaintiff had stated that he had not intentionally given any false information. Yet when directing a complaint to be filed against the plaintiff, the defendant said that he had confessed his guilt. It appears clear that the defendant found no way out of the situation except to write an order in this manner. He had already told the plaintiff that he was not to be proceeded against. Afterwards he received a direction from the Deputy Commissioner that he should file a complaint. It would not have been proper to issue a notice to the plaintiff to appear again. The plaintiff would come and assert that he had been acquitted. Also the plaintiff was entitled to show that there was no pr‑ma facie case against him and was entitled to lead evidence. So, the defendant got out of the difficulty by passing an order to the effect that the plaintiff having "admitted his guilt" was to be proceeded against. I may also observe here that this was a most improper land unjust proceeding quite apart from its bearing on the present case. If the plaintiff had been directed to show cause why a complaint should not be flied against him and the plaintiff was pleading that he had made the report under misapprehension, the plaintiff was entitled to lead evidence to that effect and a complaint could have peen lodged only after the defendant came to a prima facie conclusion that the information given was deliberately false. Also the defendant had filed a complaint under the directions of the Deputy Commis sioner. On this sole ground the complaint against the plaintiff could be quashed because the officer who makes a complaint has to make up his own mind. He cannot file a complaint under the orders of someone else. In that case it is that other person who is filing the complaint and he had no authority to do so.
17. I have just assumed without reaching any conclusion myself that the reason why the defendant changed his mind was a direction from the Deputy Commissioner. This is the defend ant's case. There may in fact be some other reason for the defendant changing his mind.
18. I have not accepted that the defendant bore the plaintiff any malice before the incident. The evidence as to the previous incident is insufficient for coming to any such conclusion. I accept that the defendant was friendly with at least one. Khichi that is Shah Muhammad whose presence at Karampur Rest House is established. There is no rebuttal of the statement of the plaintiff and some of his witnesses that the car in which the defendant left Karampur Rest House belonged to the Khichis. I am also inclined to accept that the defendant had gone to take his dinner with the Khichis. The defendant said he had dined with his brother Magistrate Mr. Waheed, but he did not produce Mr. Waheed though he was at the time the evidence of the defendant was being recorded, in Multan. However, I do not accept that on account of friendly connection with Khichis the defendant wanted to harm the plaintiff. He was personally annoyed with the plaintiff.
19. I will now state my conclusions in brief before I proceed to examine the questions of law involved. The defendant received information from the plaintiff that there were two parties, one wanting to make a cut and the other bent upon preventing the cut in Sauro Minor, between whom there was grave apprehension of breach of peace. The defendant went to the spot and did not find any persons collected there. The plaintiff did not reach the spot at all. He could not reach because of some trouble with his car, but the defendant at that time did not know this fact. The defendant had walked a distance of more than three miles in the sun. He was deeply annoyed. He first thought of the National Calamities Act, wrote out a notice under it and then also passed an order on the back of it directing the arrest of the plaintiff. Some time afterwards, it is not clear when, he came to the conclu sion that the National Calamities Act would not be applicable and that he should think of some other provision. The non -bailable warrant was then prepared. Although section 182, P. P. C. was bailable and even a summons case, he did not make any provision for bail because he wanted the plaintiff to be confined. He left Karampur Rest‑House although he had seen the plaintiff arriving because otherwise he would have to grant bail, but from the very beginning he had not the intention of taking any true legal proceedings against the plaintiff. He just wanted him to be handcuffed, confined for some time and then let off. That is why he issued warrants only for the next day and that is why when he came back from Mailsi on the 14th at about twelve in the night, he did grant bail. At that time, he said the plaintiff had been sufficiently punished. The next day when the plaintiff appeared before him he served upon him a notice to show cause why he should not be proceeded against under section 182, P P. C. The plaintiff apologized and the defendant told him that he had been sufficiently dealt with and no further proceedings were to be taken against him. Later, however, the defendant changed his mind and without informing the plaintiff filed a complaint against him under section 182, P. P. C. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff was tried by a 1st Class Magistrate of an offence under section 182, P. P. C. and on conviction was awarded the maximum non‑appealable sentence, that is, a fine of Rs. 50.
20. While stating these conclusions, I have assumed the incorrectness of the allegation made on behalf of the plaintiff that he had only signed blank papers on the 15th October. I have not reached any positive conclusion that the plaintiff had not signed blank papers, but it appears to me more probable that a statement was recorded and in any case on this point the plaintiff should fail for want of any proof.
21. Now I proceed to consider th6 law applicable and to see what is the result of the above findings. The suit is one for false imprisonment. In a suit for false imprisonment all that the plaintiff need prove is that he was imprisoned and it is for the defendant to prove justification. In support of this proposition, I would only reproduce the relevant portion from Halsbury's Laws of England (Para. 67 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 33, Second Edition) :‑----
"An action of false imprisonment lies at the suit of a person unlawfully imprisoned against the person who causes the imprisonment.
Any total restraint of the liberty of the person, for however short a time, by the use of threat or force or by confinement, is an imprisonment. To compel a person to remain in a given place or to go in a given direction against his will is an imprisonment ; but merely to obstruct a person attempting to pass in a particular direction or to prevent him from moving in any direction but one is not imprisonment.
The gist of the action of false imprisonment is the mere imprisonment ; the plaintiff need not prove that the imprison ment was unlawful or malicious, but establishes a prima facie case if he proves that he was imprisoned by the defendant ; the onus then lies on the defendant of proving a justification."
In a case for false imprisonment the plaintiff will succeed if the defendant could not show justification for the imprisonment. If the defendant had jurisdiction to order arrest and detention, the suit will be dismissed. If on the other hand the defendant had no jurisdiction to order arrest and detention, ordinarily the suit would succeed, but in a case where the defendant is a Magistrate, the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850, would come to his assistance and even in the absence of jurisdiction the plaintiff would not succeed if section 1 of the said Act be applicable. Section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850, runs:
"No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction ; provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of ; and no officer of any Court or other person bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same."
If the judicial officer had jurisdiction to make the order of arrest or detention, there is no cause of action for the suit. If, on the other hand, such jurisdiction did not exist the question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages will be decided in accordance with the proviso to the section, i.e., if the judicial officer believed in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of he will not be liable in damages. Belief in good faith referred to in the section has been held in Collector of Sea Customs v. P. Chithambaram (I L R (1) Mad. 89) to be a belief based on reasonable grounds. To reproduce the words of Morgan C. J., "a belief based on no probable or plausible grounds, and arrived at inconsiderately and without due enquiry, cannot be considered a belief in good faith within the meaning of the Act, which has been construed in several cases to require reasonable care and attention in the performance of his official duty on the part of him who does or orders the act complained of." No authority to the contrary has been cited and I would respectfully agree with the proposition stated above. The defendant, therefore has to show either that he had jurisdiction or that he had reasonable grounds for believing that he had jurisdiction. The onus as to there being grounds for reasonable belief would be on him, on the wording of section 1 in which this protection appears in the form of a proviso, as also on account of section 106 of the Evidence Act which provides that the onus of proving a fact within the special knowledge of a person is on him. In Collector of Sea Customs v. P. Chithambaram as well as in Emperor v. Muktar (A I R 1944 Cal. 4), which is a case relied upon by the defendant, the onus of proving reasonable ground's for belief had been cast on the defendant.
22. Let me now consider whether this imprisonment was either within the jurisdiction or within the proviso to section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. There are before me two orders for the arrest and detention of the plaintiff. The first is the order on the back of the notice. The second is the non-bailable warrant. So far as the first is concerned, the defendant has no defence to make at all. As I have already stated, not only does the defendant accept that no offence had been committed under the National Calamities Act, but no section of that Act has been pointed out to me on a misinterpretation of which the warrant for arrest could have been issued. The case for the defendant is that he had not read the National Calamities Act when he passed this order. It is not stated why, without reading the Act, he had issued an order of arrest which allowed no bail. The first order of arrest, therefore, is neither with jurisdiction nor within section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. If the arrest was made on the basis of this order, the defendant would be liable for damages. It is contended, however, that I should regard the arrest as having been made under the non bailable warrant issued later and not under this order. Now, this order had been issued earlier. I may repeat here that as a matter of fact I am not quite clear as to whether the non‑bailable warrant had been issued at all before the plaintiff was arrested. On behalf of the plaintiff it has been pointed out that there is no order at all on any file that a warrant be issued and that warrants are issued only after the Court passes such an order. In fact, the writing out of a warrant is the duty of some ministerial officer who gets the warrants signed by the presiding officer after he writes it out. But I am going to assume, for the purpose of deciding the questions that are before me, that this warrant did exist before the arrest, as it is not positively proved that it did not. So far as the warrant is concerned, it will be observed that it is a joint warrant, i.e., it is a warrant in respect of two offences ; the first is an offence under the National Calamities Act and the second is an offence under section 182, P. P. C. In so far as the warrant relates to an offence under the National Calamities Act, the position is the same as it was with respect to the first order of arrest. It is clearly without jurisdiction and it is not within the protection of section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act. No section of the Nation Calamities Act is referred to in the warrant and as already observed the defendant does not state why he issued an order of arrest without reading the Act or what grounds he had for believing that he had jurisdiction to order arrest. If in the case of a warrant relating to two offences, the plaintiff can succeed if he shows that so far as at least one of the sections is concerned, he has a right of action, then the plaintiff would obviously succeed in the present case. But I would go a step further in favour of the defendant and assuming that if arrest under one of the two sections could be justified, the defendant will still be exonerated, I will consider whether he had any jurisdiction to issue a warrant under section 182, P. P. C. On behalf of the defendant it is conceded that he could not and was not taking cognizance of the offence under section 182. The contention put forward on his behalf is that he had authority under section 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to arrest the plaintiff. It will be proper to reproduce section 64 below:‑
"When any offence is committed in the presence of a Magistrate within the local limits of his jurisdiction, he may himself arrest or order any person to arrest the offender, and may thereupon, subject to the provisions herein contained as to bail, commit the offender to custody."
Under this section, if an offence is committed in the presence of a Magistrate, he can himself arrest or order any person to arrest the culprit. It is argued on behalf of the defendant that the giving of false information to the defendant himself was an offence which had been committed in the presence of the defendant. One point may be clarified here. The false informa tion, according to the complaint under section 182 filed by the defendant, had been given to him not as a Magistrate but as an Emergency Officer acting under the National Calamities Act. So the contention amounts to this that the defendant in his capacity as Magistrate had witnessed the commission of an offence under section 182 committed in relation to him as Emergency Officer and, therefore, he could at any time order that the plaintiff be arrested.
23. There are a good many difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this argument. The first is that section 64 will apply only where the Magistrate sees something which prima facie at the time appears to him to be an offence. It does not apply to a case where at the time he did not know at all that an offence was being committed but subsequently on evidence which he examined he came to the conclusion that what had been done in his presence was an offence. In the present case, the defendant believed the plaintiff at the time when he received information from him. It was only three or four hours later that he came to the conclusion after inspection of the spot and after question ing some persons that the information given to him was incorrect. Could he then issue a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff It may be observed here that according to the contention of learned counsel for the defendant for the applicability of section 64 it is not material that the false information should be given to the Magistrate himself. All that is needed that the Magistrate should have witnessed the giving of false information. Learned counsel for the defendant has to concede that if I accept his contention, then, if a Magistrate happens to be present at any time when an information is given to a public servant or a statement is made in Court, then that Magistrate, even if ten years later he himself comes to the conclusion that that statement made to a public servant or to a Court (for the matter of that, it may be a High Court) was false, can issue a warrant for the arrest of that person. According to learned counsel the fact that cognizance of the offence under section '182 or 193 can be taken only on a complaint by the officer or Court does not stand in the way of the applicability of section 64 because it only speaks of the commission of an offence. If as a chance visitor in the High Court he heard a statement being made and years later came to the conclusion that the, statement was false, he could, though no complaint had been filed by the High Court, issue warrants for his arrest. It is impossible to accept such a pro position. I would not accept that section 64, Cr. P. C., was intended to apply to a case where a Magistrate seeing an act being done does not know that some offence is being committed. At the same time, the section only applies to a case where the accused himself is present. Then the Magistrate can himself arrest or order his arrest. The section does not justify the issue of a warrant against an absent accused on the basis of evidence examined by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate has to issue a warrant only after examining witnesses and coming to a conclusion he can do so not under section 64 but if he takes cognizance of the offence.
24. There is another hurdle in the way of the defendant. The warrant relates to two offences. It is admitted that so far as an offence under the National Calamities Act was concerned, the warrant was being issued on the basis that the defendant had taken cognizance of the offence, but with respect to the other section it is contended that the warrant was not issued because the Magistrate was taking cognizance of the offence but under section 64, Cr. P. C. It is admitted that he could not take cognizance of an offence under section 182. I am not prepared to accept that he was taking cognizance of one of the two offences and in respect of the other was acting under section 64. The fact that section 182 is mentioned along with an offence of which cognizance was being taken will help in showing that section 64 is only an after‑thought. The section was not mentioned in the warrant. If really the defendant had section 64 in mind and was acting under it he would mention it in respect of section 182 or rather the warrant for section 182 would be separate.
25. Section 64 is inapplicable and there are no grounds for holding that the defendant in good faith believed himself to be authorised by section 64. It has not even been urged that at that time the defendant knew of the contents of section 64 and he misinterpreted the section. The case of reasonable belief has not been argued before me in respect of section 64 the only contention before me being that section 64 did apply. But I have myself considered the question and see no ground at all fox holding that the defendant was under any misapprehension. He had not read the National Calamities Act and still had passed an order of arrest and issued non‑bailable warrants in respect of an un‑named offence under the Act. The intention of the defendant was to get the plaintiff handcuffed and confined by the use of some provision and after some time to release him. He never intended to take any proceedings against the plaintiff. Afterwards either under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner or for some other reason which I will not guess, he changed his mind.
26. If I were to find that there was possibility of the applica bility of section 64, I would still hold that the act of the defendant in issuing a non‑bailable warrant under section 182, P. P. C., was mala fide. An offence under section 182, P. P. C., is a summons case. Ordinarily, a summons would issue. Even if a warrant is to be issued, it should be a bailable warrant because the offence is a bailable one. What was the reason then for issuing a non‑bailable warrant Here was an offence for which in the first place, there had to be complaint before it could be taken cognizance of, secondly, a summons was to issue, thirdly, it was a bailable offence; and yet the Magistrate issued a non- bailable warrant. In fact he was taking proceedings under section 182, P. P. C., only in his capacity as Emergency Officer as is clear from the complaint that he filed. But I will overlook this objection, and consider it an ordinary case where the defendant wanted to proceed as Magistrate. If he had the jurisdic tion to issue a bailable or a non‑ bailable warrant, I would have no hesitation in holding that he issued a non‑bailable warrant on account of annoyance and, therefore, the act was without jurisdic tion. This is not an exercise of a discretion which is within the law. If there are two alternative orders which can be made in the discretion of a judicial officer, he cannot make one of those orders on the ground of malice. This would be abuse of jurisdiction and all that is abuse is excess.
27. I find the act of the defendant to be high‑handed, malicious and without jurisdiction.‑ The contention embodied in issue No. 6 was not argued before me. The only point that remains to be decided is the amount of damages to be awarded. It is true that the defendant had received information which he found to be incorrect and he had to walk more than three miles in the sun (it was October and it could not be very hot) and he was annoyed. But I do not think the defendant is entitled to very great consideration on this account. Had he applied his mind he would have realised that the plaintiff did not stand to gain anything by making a false report. The plaintiff had apparently acted on the basis of information: On the previous day as stated by Qazi Shah Muhammad there were persons who were protecting the bund and the information the plaintiff received at Multan may well have related to the previous day. The plaintiff is (or rather was before the land reforms) an owner of 47 squares of land. He is a District Darbari and was a Zaildar when zaildaris existed. The defendant admits that the plaintiff comes of one of the important families of Multan District though he offered an insult to the plaintiff by saying that the circumcision of a Khakwani, according to Multan Gazetteer, costs a pitcher of sharbat only and his marriage costs only the fee of the Mulla. For the assessment of damages there is no yard‑strick and the suit has been brought more for vindication of the plaintiff's honour than for money. I think it will be sufficient if I award Rs. 500 as damages.
28. The suit is decreed for Rs. 500 with proportionate costs.
A. H. Order accordingly.
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