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Criminal Appeal No. 21 of 1987, decided on 2nd December, 1987.
(On appeal from the order of the Shariat Court, dated 18-6-1987 in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 39 of 1987).
--- Practice and procedure--Criminal appeal--Normally Supreme Court does not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below unless the discretion is shown to be capricious or against the interest of justice or established principles of administration of criminal justice.--[Practice and procedure].
M. Khalid Saigl v. The State P L D 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 717 and Chiragh Din v. The State P L D 1967 S C 340 ref.
---S. 497--Bail--Grant of bail pending trial--Ordinarily merits of the case are not gone into in deciding bail matters by superior Courts-Superior Courts, while deciding application for bail, should take note of the fact that the appreciation of evidence and drawing of conclusion there from is the exclusive function of the Trial Court--Superior Court are not to anticipate it while dealing with, bail matters.
M. Khalid Saigal v. The State P L D 1961 (W.P.) Lah. 717 d Chiragh Din v. The State P L D 1967 S C 340 ref.
---S. 497--Bail, grant of--Basic principle. It is, the basic principle of law that bail is not to be refused a punishment merely on the allegations that a person has committed offence punishable with death or transportation for life unless reasonable grounds appear to exist to disclose his complicity. The wisdom behind it is that if an accused, in view of the circumstances a given case, is finally acquitted how can he be compensated for his detention, in the judicial lock-up during the trial. The law allows recession of bail to such persons of course pending further inquiry into the guilt.
It is important to remember that bail is not to be withheld as punishment. There is no legal or moral compulsion to keep people jail merely on the allegation that they have committed offences punishable with death or transportation, unless reasonable grounds appear to exist to disclose their complicity. The ultimate conviction incarceration of a guilty person can repair the wrong caused by mistaken relief of interim bail granted to him, but no satisfactory reparation can be offered to an innocent man for his unjustified incarceration at any stage of the case albeit his acquittal in the long run.
Manzoor and others v. The State P L D 1972 S C 81 ref.
--S. 497--Bail--Offences punishable with death or transportation for life--Discretion to grant bail--Limitations--Reasonable grounds-Evidence on record--Consideration of--Detailed examination touching merits of case to be avoided--Tentative assessment of evidence-Desirability--Prejudging material issues of case by superior Courts at bail stage not desirable--Principles detailed.--[Evidence].
For offences punishable with death or transportation for life, discretion to grant bail is subject to the limitation that bail is not to be allowed to an accused person, if it is shown that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he has committed such an offence. In order to ascertain whether reasonable grounds exist or do not exist, the Courts, do not have to probe into merits of the case. They have only to look at the material placed before them by the prosecution to see whether some tangible evidence is available against the accused which may lead to the inference of guilty. Reasonable grounds are not to be confused with mere allegations or suspicion nor with tested and proved evidence, which the law requires for a person"s conviction for an offence. The word "appear" in section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, seems to have been purposely used inasmuch as at a preliminary stage of investigation or inquiry of a case of murder, it is neither possible, nor desirable for a Court to give conclusive finding on the merits of the case while disposing of the application for bail.
It is significant that section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, speaks only of reasonable grounds and not of evidence. It is necessary for the purpose of granting bail to a person charged with the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life that the evidence on the record should be looked into and prima facie view formed as to whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that he is guilty of murder. For this it has to be considered as to whether upon material on the record if no further evidence is called, the accused can be found guilty or not. If it can be, then there will be a case where reasonable grounds exist for forming the belief required under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Court would be justified in refusing bail.
In a case where the ground urged is that the evidence is too weak and the case may ultimately fail, the Court will ordinarily avoid detailed examination touching the merits of the case. Of course, where reasonable grounds are not disclosed but grounds do exist for further investigation and inquiry into the guilt of an accused person, the case will fall under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which case bail is not to be withheld. In such cases the Court has not to make a critical appreciation of the material placed before it but would only make a tentative assessment of the same as to whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. The Court cannot conduct preliminary trial at the bail stage, because it is not possible to determine the points one way or the other without a full appraisal of the evidence that has been led or may be led, and the superior Courts should not be invited to do that, as it would lead to prejudging the material issues in the case, while deciding the bail application. Such an attempt before the higher Courts, in particular, is wholly undesirable, as any expression of opinion by them on the merits of any point of substance in the case is bound to prejudice its ultimate decision.
---Ss. 497 & 498--Bail--Order by Court on bail matter must be carefully balanced and weighed in the scales of justice and requirements of law contained in Ss. 497 & 498, Cr.P.C.--Court"s discretion to grant bail with regard to offences which are punishable with death or transportation for life--Limitations--Reasonableness of ground has to be shown by the prosecution by displaying its cards to the Courts as it may possess or is expected to possess as demonstratory evidence in the case both direct and circumstantial--Principles detailed.
Orders on bail applications should not be considered as routine orders involving, as they do, the liberties of the citizens; they must be carefully balanced and weighed in the scales of justice and the requirements of the relevant law as contained under sections 497 and 498, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is, however, a further limitation on the Court"s discretion with regard to offences which are punishable with death or transportation for life which is that the accused shall not be released on bail in such cases if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed such an offence. The reasonableness of the ground has to be shown by the prosecution by displaying its cards to the Courts as it may possess or is expected to possess as demonstratory evidence in the case both direct and circumstantial. It would, however, be incorrect to say that a person accused of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life cannot be admitted to bail except on grounds of age, -sex or infirmity as section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, also envisages that bail shall be refused if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused has been guilty of offence punishable with death or transportation for life and bail will be allowed if such grounds do not exist to the satisfaction of the Court.
---Ss. 497 & 498--Murder--Bail--Theory of one fire--Matter of further inquiry and probe to ascertain fact that other accused had also fired to be involved in the murder.
--S. 497--Bail--Law is not to be stretched in favour of prosecution for purposes of bail--Where any benefit of doubt arises it is to be resolved in favour of the accused.--[Benefit of doubt].
Amir v. The State P L D 1972 S C 277 ref.
---S. 497(2)--Words "further inquiry" to be construed in accordance with wisdom of the legislature under S. 497(2)--Where a person, on the material made available cannot safely be held liable for the offence charged, it would be said that sufficient evidence within the meaning of S. 497(2), Cr.P.C. is not available to connect the person with the offence charged but there exist reasonable grounds for further inquiry to connect the person with the offence charged.
---Ss. 497(2) & 436--Expression "further inquiry" used in both the sections--Distinction illustrated.
Expression "further inquiry" under section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, has a different meaning in contrast to its meaning under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression "further inquiry" within the meaning of section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure simply means reconsideration of the matter.
A Magistrate, when directed to hold further inquiry under section 436, Cr.P.C., by a superior Court, is not bound to hold further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter comes back to "him for reconsideration. If would, thus, appear that the words "further inquiry" used under section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure, have altogether different meaning in contrast to these words appearing in section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure.
The words "further inquiry" within the meaning of section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, have absolutely different connotation. It means that on the material available at the relevant time, an accused person"s guilt becomes doubtful unless, of course, it stands established during the trial. It would, thus, appear that the words "further inquiry" used under section 436 and section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, have altogether different meanings which they carry in accordance with the wisdom of the legislature in two different situations.
Udit Narayan Patwari v. Emperor A I R 1938 Pat. 369 ref.
---S. 497--Murder--Bail--Affidavits of two persons wherein they disowned their statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. 12 bore gun recovered from accused on 19-12-1986 and the result of Ballistic Expert in respect of gun and crime empties having not so far been placed on the record, presumption being that had the result been made available, it would have gone against the prosecution and the defence case as put forth--Matter being that of further inquiry to connect accused with the offence charged, accused was allowed bail in circumstances.
Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore for Appellants.
Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani for the State.
Sardar Rafique Mahmood for the Complainant.
Muhammad Abbas and Muhammad Ismail, appellants herein, alongwith one other, namely, Muhammad Arif, were put to trial before the District Criminal Court. Poonch, on the charge of murder. The prosecution case is that they have murdered Talib Hussain Shah, deceased, in the circumstances detailed below:--
Two years prior to the occurrence on 17th of December, 1986, at, 1 p.m. Talib Hussain Shah, deceased, got "chiel" tree from one Muhammad Tasaddiq. 15-16 days prior to the incident, according to the prosecution, Muhammad Abbas, appellant, also manipulated to obtain the same tree from Muhammad Tasaddiq and got it fell down. Talib Hussain Shah resented the foul-play in the meeting of respectables of the village whereupon one Jannat Hussain, a Retired Lieutenant, amicably solved the controversy and divided the timber of the tree in equal shares between Talib Hussain and Muhammad Abbas. However, due to some unhappy incident, Muhammad Abbas and Mahmood Hussain, later on refused to abide by the verdict of the Lt. Jannat Hussain. On December 17, 1986, at 1 p.m., as the prosecution case is, Muhammad Abbas, Mahmood Hussain, Muhammad Taj, Muhammad Arif, Muhammad Ismail, Abdul Ghaffar, Muhammad Bashir and Muhammad Ali (all belonging to Gujjar Bratheri) arrived at the scene of occurrence and started cutting the tree. This news reached Tasweer Hussain Shah, complainant, in village Panthal. He rushed on the spot and found Muhammad Abbas, Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Arif, armed with .12 bore guns, in hide in the way. They fired at Talib Hussain Shah, deceased. Muhammad Abbas fired at the deceased with .12 bore gun whereupon the deceased fell down. Thereafter Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Arif also fired at him with .12 bore gun and pistol respectively. The deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained. This incident was witnessed by Mst. Ghulam Sakeena, widow of deceased, Azmat Hussain Shah and Tasweer Hussain Shah, complainant.
2. Muhammad Abbas, Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Arif moved for bail before the District Criminal Court. The District Criminal Court allowed concession of bail to Muhammad Arif while bail to Muhammad Arif and Muhammad Ismail was refused vide order dated 28-2-1987. The Shariat Court, vide order dated 18-6-1987, in revision, concurred, with the District Criminal Court and dismissed the revision petition.
3. This appeal calls in question the said order of the Shariat Court whereby the appellants (accused) were refused bail.
4. Mr. Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, the learned counsel for the defence, argued:--
(i) that prima- facie it is a case of one gun-fire by Muhammad Abbas and that too in self-defence and Muhammad Ismail has been involved innocently on account of his relationship with the principal accused. He submitted that at the present moment it is a case of further inquiry and the Shariat Court and the learned District Criminal Court, both have failed to apply their mind judiciously to the facts of the case which fact has perpetuated injustice. His case is that the finding of both the Courts, being violative of the principle enunciated under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, needs to be vacated;
(ii) that the affidavits of two persons, namely, Tasaddiq Hussain and Lt. Jannat Hussain, wherein they disowned their statements under section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, have not been taken into consideration by the learned Judge in the Shariat Court; and
(iii) that .12 bore guns recovered from the person of Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Abbas on 19-12-1986 and 16-12-1986 respectively, were sent to the Ballistic Expert alongwith the crime empties but the result has not so far been placed on record and, therefore, the presumption would be that had the result been placed-on record, it would have supported the defence case as put forth.
5. In the first instance it would be proper to state that normally the Supreme Court does not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below unless the discretion is shown to be capricious or against the interest of justice or established principles of administration of criminal justice. It is also to be noted that in deciding bail matters ordinarily -the merits of the case are not gone into as held in M. Khalid Saigol v. The State P L D 1961 (W.P) Lahore 717 and Chiragh Din v. The State P L D 1967 S C 340.
6. The Superior Courts, while deciding the applications for bail, should take note of the fact that the appreciation of evidence and drawing of conclusion there from is the exclusive function of the trial Court and the Superior Courts should not anticipate it while dealing with bail matters. In Chiragh Din v. The State P L D 1967 S C 340, dealing with the point, it was observed:--
"The appreciation of evidence and the drawing of conclusion therefrom in relation to all the circumstances is the function exclusively of the trial Court. It cannot be anticipated by a Superior Court dealing with an ancillary matter, e.g. the grant of bail, pending trial."
7. The rule that the Superior Courts rarely enter into the merits of the case for the purposes of granting, or refusing the bail seems to be quite sound because the appreciation of the evidence is the exclusive function of the trial Court. We honour this rule and would avoid going into deep appreciation of the merits of the case.
8. It is, however, the basic principle of law that bail is not to be refused as a punishment merely on the allegations that a person has committed an offence punishable with death or transportation for life unless reasonable grounds appear to exist to disclose their complicity. The wisdom behind it is that if an accused, in view of the circumstances in a given case, is finally acquitted how can he be compensated for his detention, in the judicial lock-up during the trial. The law allows concession of bail to such persons of course pending further inquiry into the guilt.
9. Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmed Jan (as he then was), in a case entitled Manzoor and others v. The State P L D 1972 S C 81, observed:--
"It is important to remember that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. There is no legal or moral compulsion to keep people in jail merely on the allegation that they have committed offences punishable with death or transportation, unless reasonable grounds appear to exist to disclose their complicity. The ultimate conviction and incarceration of a guilty person can repair the wrong caused by a mistaken relief of interim bail granted to him, but no satisfactory reparation can be offered to an innocent man for his unjustified incarceration at any stage of the case albeit his acquittal in the long run."
10. It may be observed that for offences punishable with death or transportation for life, discretion to grant bail is subject to the limitation that bail is not to be allowed to an accused person, if it is shown that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he has committed such an offence. In order to ascertain whether reasonable grounds exist or do not exist, the Courts, as said earlier, do not have to probe into merits of the case. They have only to look at the material placed before them by the prosecution to see whether some tangible evidence is available against the accused which may lead to the inference of guilty. Reasonable grounds are not to be confused with mere allegations or suspicion nor with tested and proved evidence, which the law requires for a person"s conviction for an offence. The word "appear" in section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, seems to have been purposely used inasmuch as at a preliminary stage of investigation or inquiry of a case of murder, it is neither possible, nor desirable for a Court to give conclusive finding ofthe merits of the case while disposing of the application for bail.
11. It is significant that section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, speaks only of reasonable grounds and not of evidence. It is necessary for the purpose of granting bail to a person charged with the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life that the evidence on the record should be looked into and prima facie view formed as to whether there appears reasonable ground for believing that he is guilty of murder. For this it has to be considered as to whether upon material on the record if no further evidence is called, the accused can be found guilty or not. If it can be, then there will be a case where reasonable grounds exist for forming the belief required under section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Court would be justified in refusing bail.
12. In a case where the ground urged is that the evidence is too weak and the case may ultimately fail, the Court will ordinarily avoid detailed examination touching the merits of the case. Of course, where reasonable grounds are not disclosed but grounds do exist for further investigation and inquiry into the guilt of an accused person, the case will fall under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which case bail is not to be withheld. In such cases the Court has not to make a critical appreciation of the material placed before it but would only make a tentative assessment of the same as to whether there are reasonable-grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. The Court cannot conduct preliminary trial at the bail stage, because it is not possible to determine the points one way or the other without a full appraisal of the evidence that has been led or may be led, and the Superior Courts should not be invited to do that, as it would lead to prejudging the material issues in the case, while deciding the bail application. Such an attempt before the higher Courts, in particular, is wholly undesirable, as any expression of opinion by them on the merits of any point of substance in the case is bound to prejudice its ultimate decision.
13. Whether without going into the merits, the case before us is visited by such circumstances which have been ignored by the Shariat Court in refusing bail to the appellants, especially Muhammad Ismail, is the next question to be answered.
14. Mr. Mumtaz Hussain Rathore, it may be stated here, during his arguments, did not seriously contest the case of Muhammad Abbas for bail. He, however, offered bitter criticism to the order passed in refusing bail to Muhammad Ismail.
15. In the first instance it would be profitable to know the concise basis on which Muhammad Ismail, appellant, is refused bail in the Shariat Court. The learned Judge in the Shariat Court, while disallowing bail, observed:--
"In present case, the place of incident is crown land, far away from the houses of the accused persons. Apart from the fact as to whether the tree in dispute was given by its owner to the deceased or Muhammad Abbas accused including the fact of the verdict of the Panchayat, it has to be understood that Talib Hussain Shah was killed by firing at the place of incident on account of dispute over the tree. The deceased was empty-handed and he went on the site to ask the accused to refrain from cutting the tree unless its fate was decided or it was shared equally according to the verdict of the Panchayat. The prosecution version indicates that the deceased had not even reached the destination when he was fired at and was killed. The case of Muhammad Ismail is not distinguishable in the sense as suggested by defence, as he went on the scene armed with .12 bore gun by accompanying principal accused. Thus, prima facie, he appears to be a partisan in the offence of murder occurring by pre-concert of the accused persons. The nature, number an seat of injuries, prima facie, indicate that these injuries were not caused by one fire. Moreover, the Investigating Officer recovered pieces of card-board from the place from which Muhammad Ismail is attributed firing at the deceased. These material particulars placed before the Court do not help to allow bail to the accused."
15. It would appear that even the learned Judge, at the outset, was of the view that Muhammad Ismail, prima facie, is only a partisan in the offence of the murder by "pre-concert of the accused person". No doubt, immediately after the above observations, the learned Judge says that the seat of the injuries, prima facie, indicates that these injuries were not caused by one fire. This observation runs counter to the observations earlier made and it appears that even the learned Judge was not sure as to whether circumstances made available without further inquiry, warrant the conclusion that Muhammad Ismail also fired at the deceased. The order seems to be not happily worded and leaves much to be answered.
16. It is settled law that orders on bail applications should not be considered as routine orders involving, as they do, the liberties of the citizens; they, must be carefully balanced and weighed in then scales of justice and the requirements of the relevant law as contained under sections 497 and 498, Code of Criminal Procedure. There is, however, a further limitation on the Court"s discretion with regard to offences which are punishable with death or transportation for life which is that the accused shall not be released on bail in such cases if there are reasonable grounds for believing that he has committed such an offence. The reasonableness of the ground has to be shown by the prosecution by displaying its cards to the Courts as it may possess or is expected to possess as demonstratory evidence in the case both direct and circumstantial. It would, however, be incorrect to say that a person accused of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life cannot be admitted to bail except on grounds of age, sex or infirmity as section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure, also envisages that bail shall be refused if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused has been guilty of offence punishable with death or transportation for life and bail will be allowed if such grounds do not exist to the satisfaction of the Court.
17. The theory of one fire, as would be seen, is reasonable possibility in the circumstances of the case and it requires further inquiry and probe to ascertain the fact that the appellant, Muhammad Ismail, has also fired to be involved in the murder of Talib Hussain Shah.
18. The prosecution has placed on record the post-mortem report of the deceased which inter se enters the opinion of the doctor to the effect that "the cause of death in this case ii haemorrhage and shock cardio pulmonary arrest due to gunshot fire arm injury to vital organs (lungs, stomach, intestine). Distance About 20 (Twenty) feet. Direction From in between front and left side. Weapon used: .12 bore gun. It would be observed that the doctor, nowhere says that the injuries sustained by the deceased are by two guns. He only says that the injuries are due to gunshot fire arm. It, in no way, without further inquiry, makes a case of two gunshots. Additionally the report of the doctor enters that the distance from which the fire is made on the deceased is about 20 feet but contrary to the report (which may be explained after further inquiry) the site plan shows that the fires have been made from three places by Muhammad Abbas, Muhammad Ismail and Muhammad Arif.
19. In the face of the above, it still remains to be determined as to whether it is the case of two fires or the deceased has been fired at only by Muhammad Abbas, as submitted by the defence. This can only be done by the trial Court after the trial.
20. We are conscious of the fact that medical science is not yet so perfect as to determine the exact time of death or the distance nor can they be determined in a computerized mathematical function so as to be accurate. Whereas the P.Ws. are not in a position to determine as to whether it is a case of one fire or the two, especially in view of the report of the doctor and statement of eye-witness, Mst. Ghulam Sakeena, under section 161, Cr.P.C., wherein she does not say that Muhammad Ismail also fired at the deceased.
21. It is also law that even for purposes of bail, law is not to be stretched in favour of the prosecution. If any benefit of doubt arises it is to be resolved in favour of the accused. This view prevailed in Amir v. The State P L D 1972 S C 277.
22. Broadly speaking every case challaned or otherwise can be" argued to be a case of further inquiry in the sense that the innocence or the guilt of the person accused can only be fixed after complete trial. But the words "further inquiry" for the purposes of bail are to be construed in accordance with: the wisdom of the Legislature under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. So far we understand where a person, on the material made available cannot safely be held liable for the offence charged, it would be said that sufficient evidence within the meaning of "section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, is not available to connect the person with the offence charged but there exist reasonable grounds for further inquiry to connect the person with the offence charged.
23. It may be seen that expression "further inquiry" under section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, has a different meaning in contrast to its meaning under section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The expression "further inquiry" within the meaning of section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure simply means reconsideration of the matter. So, was held in Udit Narayan Patwaril v. Emperor A I R 1938 Pat. 369. It was observed in that case:--
"The order by a superior Court to an inferior Court to hold further inquiry into a complaint which has been dismissed under S. 203, Criminal P.C. has acquired what may be called a technical meaning. It simply means reconsideration. What step is to be taken thereafter will depend upon the circumstances of the case."
24. A Magistrate, when directed to hold further inquiry under section 436, Cr.P.C., by a superior Court, is not bound to hold further inquiry under section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter comes back to him for reconsideration. It would, thus, appear that the words "further inquiry" used under section 436, Code of Criminal Procedure, have altogether different meaning in contrast to these words appearing in section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure.
25. The words "further inquiry" within, the meaning of section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, have absolutely different connotation. It, as already said, means "hat on the material available at the relevant time, an accused person"s guilt becomes doubtful unless, of course, it stands established during the trial. It would, thus, appear that the words "further inquiry" used under section 436 and section 497(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, have altogether different meanings which they carry in accordance with the wisdom of the legislature in two different situations.
26. We have also considered dispassionately the second and third limb of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that the affidavits of two persons, namely, Tasaddiq Hussain and Lt. Jannat Hussain wherein they disowned their statements under section 161, Cr.P.C., have not been taken into consideration by the learned Judge of the Shariat Court; and that the .12 bore gun recovered from the person of Muhammad Ismail, appellant-accused, on 19-12-1986 and the result of the Ballistic Expert in respect of the gun and the crime empties having not so far been placed on the record, the presumption would be that had the result been made available it would have gone against the prosecution and supported the defence case as put forth. We think these arguments, in the circumstances, have also some substance to support the conclusion that it is a case of further inquiry to connect Muhammad Ismail, appellant, with the offence charged.
For the above stated reasons we would partially allow this appeal and setting aside the judgment of the Shariat Court dated 18-6-1987, order that. Muhammad Ismail, appellant, shall be released on bail pending further inquiry. We, thus, order accordingly. Muhammad Ismail shall be set at liberty if he executes bail and surety bonds in the sum of Rupees one lac each to the satisfaction of any Magistrate 1st Class, Pallandari. However, this order would not create any impediment in the way of the trial Court to cancel the bail on its own or on the application of the prosecution if during trial it is found that sufficient evidence has come on record to connect the accused with the offence charged. The appeal of Muhammad Abbas, however, stands dismissed.
M.B.A./202/S.C.A. Order accordingly.
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