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Writ Petition No.3309 of 1987, decided on 21st July, 1987.

---S.115 & O.XVI, R.1--Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Ss.3(d), 17, 18 & 54-- Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Revision- Compensation for acquired land-- Determination of--Summoning and appearance of witnesses--Respondents-land owners making application is Reference Court for summoning certain official witnesses which was permitted and they were asked to deposit necessary expenses- Petitioners, however, on date fixed for recording of evidence objecting that as the necessary list of witnesses had not been filed in time, statements of summoned witnesses could not be recorded--Reference Court holding petitioner's objection to be valid and passing order that said witnesses could not be examined by respondents--District Judge on .revision petition filed by respondents, after inferring that trial Judge had permitted respondents to summon witnesses and examine them in Court and on finding that provisions of O.XVI, R.1 of C . P.C. were merely directory and not penal accepting revision petition and permitting respondents to summon the official witnesses--Provisions of S.54 of Act having provided that an appeal against the decision of Court, defined in S.3(d), shall lie to High Court, revision did not lie to District Court both on account of want of subordination and value of subject-matter in dispute--Witnesses having been summoned and actually present in Court, refusal of Court to admit their evidence, which otherwise was relevant and possessed of probative force, held, was certainly a "case decided" because in absence of excluded evidence, record of case remains incomplete and on proper case made out, interference in revision could be made--Respondents having been permitted to summon witnesses and deposit their expenses, it was hardly open to Court to deny the opportunity to respondents to record their statements--Rules of procedure are hand-maid of justice and endeavour of Courts is always to reach a just decision which, it fact, is the sole purpose of existence of Courts--Procedural rules cannot be permitted to act as road-blocks to the quest for truth and justice--Court constituted under Land Acquisition Act being subject to revisional jurisdiction of High Court, revision against order of said Court lay to High Court and not to the District Court--Impugned order passed by District Judge, though could be characterised as without jurisdiction yet High Court was not bound to interfere with said order which was substantially just on the facts of case--Revision petition filed by respondents, if held, to be not competent, would be returned to them for being presented before the Court of competent jurisdiction which would be High Court--Order made by Senior Civil Judge having been found to be bad and such that it could not have been made in circumstances of case, Court had no hesitation to maintain order of revisional Court in exercise of jurisdiction vesting in High Court under S.115, C.P.C. because if the order had come to High Court for examination in revision it would have certainly made similar order--High Court can, in discretionary jurisdiction, decline to interfere despite presence of some infirmity in impugned order which otherwise appears to aid and assist the sacred cause of justice--Dispute having arisen out of compensation payable for the land acquired for a public purpose and private owners are crying for determination of just compensation, Court, held, should not stand in their way to prove their rights--Interference declined and petition dismissed.

Sardar Amanullah Khan Niazi for Petitioners.

This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution assails order dated 19-4-1987 of Additional District Judge, Gujrat, passed in Revision petition No.14 of 1986. Necessary f acts giving rise to the dispute in brief are:----

49 Kanals 7 marlas of land situate at Mauza Nawan Shahpur, Tehsil Gujrat, was acquired for construction of a Grid Station for WAPDA. Land Acquisition Collector assessed the compensation for the acquired land and made his award. Private owners, whose lands were acquired, were not satisfied with the compensation and did not accept the award. They applied to the Collector under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for Reference to the Court. Accordingly, Collector referred the question of determination of the compensation payable for the acquired land to the Court. On receipt of the Reference, Court issued notices to the affected parties and after receiving the reply from them, framed necessary issues and post-poned the case for evidence. Copies of the Reference, written statement filed by WAPDA and various orders passed by the Court in course of the trial have not been annexed. Substantial issue, counsel states, is about the compensation payable for the land acquired by WAPDA. Onus of proof in regard to the market value obviously was upon the private owners. It appears that they applied to the Court for summoning certain. witnesses. By order dated 6-7-1986, Court summoned the witnesses. However, on the date fixed for receiving evidence, when the recording of evidence commenced, counsel for WAPDA objected that as the necessary list had not been filed in time, the statements of summoned witnesses could not be recorded. Respondents herein asserted that a list was filed in Court. They also asserted that the provision for filing of the list and the omission of the names of persons therein was not fatal to the examination of the official witnesses, who had already been permitted to be summoned by the Court. After hearing parties, Reference Court, by its order dated 21-7-1986, observed:---

"I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and have also gone through the record and have come to this conclusion that as per report of the Ahmad of this Court, no list of witnesses of the petitioners stands filed on record. The petitioners were required to file the list of their witnesses within seven days after framing of issues as provided by law but they have failed to do the needful, and therefore, the said witnesses could not, have been summoned through the Court by the petitioners for evidence purposes. I, however, do not agree to this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners have already filed any list of their witnesses within the time as prescribed by law for the purpose for the reason that the copy of the list of petitioners' witnesses is available in the Lafafa of their Vakeel while the petitioners/ plaintiffs were duty bound to invite the attention of the Court to this fact of alleged missing of their list of witnesses from the record before the summoning of their witnesses through the Court by means of an application or affidavit thereto, but they have failed to do the needful. Mere availability of the copy of the list of witnesses of the petitioners in the Lafafa of Vakeel of the petitioners is held to be insufficient for proving their version or for the satisfaction of the Court, as the said copy can be manufactured at any time by the petitioners. In this view of the circumstances, it is held that the respondents have raised a valid objection in respect of the examination of the witnesses of the petitioners summoned through the Court. The said witnesses, therefore, cannot be examined by the petitioners for the purpose through the aid of the Court. The said witnesses, however, can be examined by the petitioners on their own responsibility of in the interest of justice. The point in dispute stands disposed off accordingly."

On revision, this order was reversed by learned Additional District Judge, Gujrat. From the perusal of the revisional order it appears that the respondents herein had presented an application before the Reference Court on 6-7-1986 for summoning certain official witnesses and the Court had permitted them to summon these witnesses and had asked them also to deposit the necessary expenses. From this, it was inferred by learned Additional District Judge that trial Judge had permitted the respondents to summon the witnesses and examine them in Court. Learned Additional District Judge also found that provisions of Order 16 Rule 1 C P C were merely directory and not penal. Proceeding on these premises, he accepted the revision petition and permitted the respondents herein to summon the official witnesses, who shall bring the records with them and offer statements in Court. It is this order by which the petitioners are aggrieved.

Sardar Amanullah Khan Niazi, Advocate, in support of writ petition raises two submissions. First is that the District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain an application in revision against the order of the Reference Court. Second is that the impugned order of the Reference Court was not a "case decided."

It was urged that in terms of definition of 'Court', in Section 3(d) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, read with its section 54, the Court hears the Reference and determines the compensation and the related matters referred to it as a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and appeal from its decisions lies to the High Court. It was, therefore, argued that the Reference Court was not judicially subordinate to the District Court so as to make its orders revisable by the latter Court. It was also argued that under section 115(2), Civil Procedure Code, District Court was prohibited to entertain revision in respect of any 'case decided' by a Court subordinate to it, in which the amount or value of the subject-matter whereof exceeded the limits of its appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case counsel argued that the amount of compensation claimed by the respondents admittedly exceeded the pecuniary limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court. In regard to the plea, whether the impugned order was a 'case decided', learned counsel argued that it was an inter-locutory order and by no standards of interpretation can be found to be a case decided" within the meaning of Section 115, C.P.C. On merits, it was argued that the decision of the Court of first instance was absolutely correct and did not require interference.

Two points of importance arise in this case. First, whether the District Court had the necessary jurisdiction, and second, whether the impugned order made by the learned Senior Civil Judge was a 'case decided' and could be revised. Acquisition of land for a public purpose is regulated by Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After various preliminaries are gone into, Land Acquisition Collector gives his award. Any person interested, who does not accept his award, has a right to ask for a reference to the Court as defined in Section 3(d) of the Act, for determination of the referred disputes. Procedure for decision of the Reference is also provided in the Act. Section 54 of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie against the decision of the Court to the High Court. Learned counsel, therefore, was right in urging that the revision did not lie to the District Court, both on account of the want of subordination and the value of the subject-matter in dispute. However, I do not agree with him that the impugned order of Senior Civil Judge was not a 'case decided. Certain witnesses had been allowe4l to be summoned by the Court. Necessary expenses were also permitted to be deposited in Court. Copies of application for summoning official witnesses, order passed thereon by the Court, have not been annexed nor shown at the time of hearing. However, it was admitted to the Court that such an order was made by the Court of first instance. After the witnesses had been summoned and were actually present in Court, there was no serious objection to their examination. If the Court refuses to admit evidence, which otherwise is relevant and is possessed of probative force, its refusal is certainly a 'case decided', because in the absence of excluded evidence, record of the case remains incomplete and on proper case made out, interference in revision can be made. Private land belonging to respondents had been acquired by Government for a public purpose. They were not satisfied with the adequacy of compensation offered for their lands. In exercise of the right conferred on them by law, they sought reference to the Civil Court. In the nature of dispute, the respondents are obliged to prove that the award is incorrect and the market value of the land was higher than that found for them by the Land Acquisition Collector. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not dispute that the evidence sought to be produced was either irrelevant or had no probative force. In fact, it was hinted at that such an evidence may assist the proper decision of market value. Respondents had asserted that they had submitted the list of witnesses in Court. Records belied this assertion. In the absence of necessary enquiry, it could not be said that the respondents' assertion had no force therein. Be that as it may, when an application was made for summoning the witnesses, the Court, after necessary report from its officials had permitted the respondents to summon the witnesses and deposit their expenses also. After this exercise has been made, it was hardly open to the Court to deny the opportunity to the respondents to record the statements of summoned witnesses. Rules of procedure, as has often been observed are handmaid of justice. Endeavour of the Courts is always to reach a just decision. In fact, this is the sole purpose for which the Courts exist. Procedural rules cannot be permitted to act as road-blocks to the quest for truth and justice. On merits,' order of learned Additional District Judge appears to be correct. This brings me to the basic question as to whether the determination of the Court below be annulled on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. As observed above, Reference Court was not subord1nate to the District Court to attract the letter's supervisory Jurisdiction under Section 115(2), Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel, however, could not deny that a Court, constituted under the Land Acquisition Act, is subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. If this be so and which I hold to be a correct statement of law, the revision against the order of the Court of first instance lay to the High Court and not to the District. Court. Though the impugned order, therefore, can be characterised as' without jurisdiction, yet the High Court is not bound to interfere with the order, which is substantially just on the facts of the case. It may be noticed that if in agreement with the learned counsel, I hold that revision was not competent before the District Court, revision filed by respondents before the District Court shall be returned to them to re-present the same before the Court of competent jurisdiction, which in this case would be High Court. When I have examined the whole issue and found that the order made by learned Senior Civil Judge was bad and could not have been made in the circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation to maintain the order of the revisional Court in exercise of the jurisdiction vesting in this Court under Section 115 C P C because if the order had come to this Court for examination in revision it would have certainly made the similar order. Matter can be examined from another angle also. In discretionary jurisdiction, Court can decline to interfere despite presence of some infirmity in the impugned order, which otherwise appears to aid and assist the sacred cause of justice. Parties win or lose on substantial matter and not technical tortures. With the background that the dispute arose out of compensation payable for the land acquired for a public purpose and the private owners are crying for determination of just compensation, Court should not stand in their way to prove their rights. For the reasons given above, interference is declined. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.

S.Q./W-9/L Petition dismissed.

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