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Writ Petition No.2054 of 1987, decided on 24th June, 1987.

---Para. 25(6)--Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits} Rules, 1977, R.4(4) & (5)--Vines of Rr.4(4) & (5) of Punjab Land Reforms Rules, 1977--Provisions of R. 4(4) & (5) making the remedy more effective by directing Trial Court to dispose of the matter within specified time, held, had not travelled beyond the scope of parent law viz. para. 25(6) of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 and were thus not repugnant to such parent law--Rule 4(4) & (5) of Rules, 1977, were designed to aid further and advance the objective of Land Reforms Regulation, 1972.

Muhammad Aslam v. The Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore and 4 others 1983 C L C 915 and Muhammad Rafiq etc. v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Sargodha etc. 1981 S C M R 1181 ref.

---R.4(4) & (5)--Object and scope of R.4(4) & (5)--Provision of R.4(4) lays down a period of sixty days within which suit would be disposed of--Consequences of non-adherence to such schedule--Effect of not deciding such suit within specified period, would be that suit would automatically .stand transferred to Court of Collector and Trial Court (Revenue) would become functus officio--Any order passed by Revenue Officer after expiry of specified period would be nullity in the eye of law.

---R.4(4) & (5)--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Constitu tional jurisdiction, exercise of--Order passed by Trial Court (Revenue) after expiry of specified period--Validity of--Where order relating to ejectment suit was passed by Revenue Court beyond period specified in Punjab Land Reforms Rules, 1977, such order passed by a person, who was functus officio was nullity in law and was thus set aside by High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction.

Malik Noor Muhammad Awan for Petitioner.

Malik Muhammad Nawaz for Respondents Nos. 2 to 11.

Date of hearing: 24th June, 1987.

This judgment will dispose of writ petition Nos.2054/87, 2055/87, 2056/87, 2072/87 and 2974/87, as they are directed against the same order and same question of law is involved in all the cases.

2. Since the learned counsel for the parties have argued the entire matter at length, therefore, I have admitted these petitions and are being decided accordingly.

3. The un-controverted facts are that respondents No.2 to 11, filed suit for ejectment against petitioner before A . C .I, Kallur Kot District Bhakkar, on 1-6-1986, on account of default in payment of Batai for Kharif 1985 and Rabi 1986. On 2-8-1986 when the case came up for arguments, petitioners moved an application in view of the provisions envisaged in rule 4(4) read with sub-rule (5) of the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) submitting that Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter beyond 60 days, and requested that the matter be referred to the Assistant Commissioner for adjudication. This application was dismissed on the same day, holding that the suit was instituted on 1-6-1986, and 1-8-1986 was Friday, therefore, it was within the statutory period. After disposing of the application the suit was decreed on the same day. Petitioners challenged that order before the Assistant Commissioner Kallur Kot which was also dismissed on 22-9-1986, by observing that the lapses committed in the proceedings by A.C.I., are not of such a nature as to render them void. Petitioners preferred revision petitions before the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Sargodha Division, being Revision Petition Nos.1430/ACR of 1986 to 1435/ACR of 1986; which were accepted vide order dated 8-12-1986; and the cases were remanded to the A.C/Collector Kallur Kot for decision afresh. Respondents 2 to 11 challenged this order before the Board of Revenue, through revision petition Nos. ROR 230 to 235 of 1986; which were accepted by the learned Member Board of Revenue on 27-4-1987, setting aside the order of the learned Additional Commissioner holding that judgment/ decree passed by A . C .I . /Tehsildar, in ejectment cases even after expiry of 60 days is valid. This order has been impugned in the present petitions.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the statutory provisions incorporated in rule 4(4) read with sub-rule (5) of the Rules and vehemently contended that the learned Member Board of Revenue has taken an erroneous view of the law in holding that A. C: I/Tehsildar has the jurisdiction to decide ejectment suits even beyond the statutory period of 60 days. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the cases of Muhammad Aslam v. The Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Lahore and 4 others (1983 C L C 915) and Muhammad Rafi etc. v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Sargodha etc. (1981 S C M R 1181).

5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents, inter alia, argued that Rule 4(4) and (5) of the Rules are ultra vires of para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 115) (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) for having prescribed stringent time schedule; further that writ is a discretionary remedy, therefore, it may not be invoked, that there is concurrent finding of facts recorded in this case, and lastly that the petitioners conduct does not merit relief in constitutional jurisdiction.

6. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The crucial question which determines the fate of this case is rule 4(4) and (5), text of which is being reproduced hereinunder:--

"4. (4) The said Court shall dispose of the plaint within sixty days of its receipt:

(5) If the said Court fails to decide a case within the stipulated period of sixty days the. case shall stand transferred to the Court of Collector concerned to be tried in the same manner as in the original Court. The case so transferred shall be disposed of within thirty days and the order passed by the Collector shall be final."

7. In view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents, before adverting to the efficacy of these Rules, it would be appropriate to examine vires thereof.

The Rules were framed by the Land Commission in exercise of the Rule making power conferred under para. 6 of the Regulation. By virtue of para. 25 of the Regulation, special forum has been created, and the obvious intention of the legislature is that ejectment proceedings between landlord and tenant should be decided in the speediest possible manner. This intention of the law-giver has been advanced by the rules. The rules have not travelled beyond the scope of the parent law. Actually it has made the remedy more effective by directing the trial Court to dispose of the matters within the shortest possible time, failing which matter should be transferred to the Assistant Commissioner, who, will adjudicate upon the same with the desired speed so that the momentum of the litigation is not deferred for one reason or the other. The rules are not repugnant or ultra vires or in any manner contrary to the parent law, but, are in fact designed to aid, further and advance the objective of the Regulation.

8. Now to appreciate the connotations of the Rules, it may be observed that the Rule making body, in furtherance of the objective and with a view to translating the obvious intendment and spirit of the parent statute into letters of the law has framed Rule 4(4) and (5) of the Rules, by prescribing mandatory time frame work, Rule 4(4) lays down a period of 60 days within which suit shall be disposed of whereas rule 4(5) lays down the consequences that would flow out of non-adherence to the schedule. The phraseology deployed therein demonstrates the intention of the law-giver which is couched in a deeming fashion; in that if the matter is not decided within 60 days, the suit automatically shall stand transferred to the Court of the Collector concerned and the A.C.I/Tehsildar ceased to have any jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter. He becomes functus officio. Any order passed by him would be nullity in the eye of law. It does not even require any transfer order from the concerned functionary. It is automatic per force. It' would be deemed as if no file is pending on the cause list of the A.C.I./Tehsildar consequent upon the expiry of statutory period of 60 days; and if any order is passed thereafter the law looks upon it as if it is being written on a self-erasable material. I am fortified in this view by the opinions expressed in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

9. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the suit was instituted on 1-6-1986 and in simple mathematical terms, 60 days expired on 31-7-1986, thus, Friday was not relevant for the purposes of the suit. The matter was taken up on 2-8-1986. On that date it would be deemed as if there was no lis pending on 'the cause list of the A.C.I/Tehsildar, therefore, he could not have passed any order whatsoever. The only lawful course open to the A.C.I. /Tehsildar would have been to refer the case file to the Assistant Commissioner/ Collector concerned. The impugned order is void ab initio, over which no superstructure could have been raised.

10. In the light of the aforementioned view of the law other points raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, such as that writ petition is a discretionary remedy, etc. are not relevant for the purposes of resolving the present controversy.

11. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. The matter is deemed to be pending in the Court of Assistant Commissioner/Collector Kallur Kot, who shall decide the same in accordance with law. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.

A. A./M-349/L Case remanded.

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