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Civil Revision No. 2087 of 1986, decided on 1st November 1986

‑‑‑S. 17‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3 & Art. 158‑‑Filing objections to award‑‑Limitation for‑‑Duty of Court‑‑Bounden duty of Court is to see suo motu, if objections to award had been filed by opposing party in time and to see that nothing beyond prescribed limitation period was brought before it‑‑Objections to award, filed in Court by opposing party beyond period of 30 days prescribed under Art.158 of Limitation Act 1908, held, could not be entertained‑‑Courts below rightly overruled objections‑‑Order of Court to make award rule of Court was unexceptionable and could not be set aside in revisional jurisdiction. [p. 652] A

Messrs Ghandhara Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan through the D.P. (Army), Ministry of Defence, Karachi P L D 1982 Kar. 260; Province of Sind and another v. Haji Khan P L D 1983 Kar. 601 and Province of Punjab v. Messrs Industrial Machine Tools, Government Contractors, Lahore 1986 M L D 501 ref.

Muhammad lqbal for Petitioner.

This civil revision calls in question the judgment /decree, dated the 19th of June, 1986 of the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad.

2. The respondent constructed some house type godowns as a contractor and submitted his final bill for payment. However, after finding certain defects in the works, the petitioners tried to deduct proportionate amount from the bill whereupon he brought a civil suit in order to restrain them from effecting recoveries from his bills.

3. The suit was resisted on behalf of the petitioners taking a plea under section 34 of the Arbitration Act that the parties were bound first to refer their case to the Arbitrator as there was an arbitration clause in the main agreement. The respondent‑contractor did not object to it whereupon the matter was referred to an Arbitrator who filed his award in the Court on the 7th of May, 1981. The Court adjourned the proceedings to the 8th of June, 1981 directing that objections to the award may be filed. It appears that the petitioners filed the objections actually on the 8th of June, 1981 urging that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself as also the proceedings.

4. An issue was framed thereabout but in the course of proceedings the respondent claimed that the objections having been filed beyond the prescribed period of thirty days, by Article 158 of the Limitation Act could not be entertained. The Courts below upheld this contention, overruled the objections and made the award rule of the Court. The present revision challenges it.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that without a formal objection as to the limitation, it was not open to the Courts below to rule them out on that plea. The learned Additional District Judge took note of this objection and met it adequately by relying upon case‑law that it was the bounden duty of the Court to see suo motu if the objections had been filed in time. I agree with this view. Under section A 3 of the Limitation Act, it is the plenary function of the Court to see that nothing beyond limitation is brought before it. No exception could be taken to the impugned order on the ground that the opposite party had failed to plead it specifically in the pleadings. The truth of the matter is that the objections could have been filed latest on the 6th of The period prescribed for it was thirty days under Article June, 1981. This period starts running from the date of notice which in 158 ibid case the petitioners amply had because of presence of their counsel this the Court on the 7th of May, 1981 when the award was filed and in direction to present objections to the same was made. Learned counsel directed namely, the 8^th tried to take benefit of the fixation of the next date, June, 1981 for the purpose. He argued that the time to file objections of tended up to the next date that is the 8th of June, 1981 and, therefore, the petitioners were harbouring under a mistake. I have hesitation to accept this reason for failure to file the objections in time. The limitation has been prescribed by Statute with its starting point. In this case it started running from the 8th of May 1981, next after the date when the petitioners acquired notice through their counsel. Personal notice was not necessary.

6. Counsel for the petitioners tried to rely upon Messrs Ghandhara Industries Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan through the D.P. (Army) Ministry of Defence, Karachi P L D 1982 Kar. 260, Province of Sind and another v. Haji Khan P L D 1983 Kar. 601 and Province of Punjab v. Messrs Industrial Machine Tools, Government Contractors, Lahore 1986 M L C 501 in support of the view that it was the bounden duty of the Court to have itself seen if the award was based upon any sound reasoning and that in its absence ought to have remitted it for re‑consideration to the Arbitrator. A perusal of the authorities would show that such an objection was, in fact, taken by the affected party in time. In the present case, failure to file such objections in time will make all the difference. The petitioners missed an opportunity to attack the awared even on this score and, therefore, it will not be open for them to urge that the Court missed to perform its own duty.

7. There is no merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed in liming.

H.B.T./643/L Revision dismissed.

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