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Writ Petition No.62 of 1982, decided on 15th November, 1986.

---S. 15--Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199--Constitutional jurisdiction, exercise of--Findings of facts recorded by court of competent jurisdiction even if erroneous, held, could not be challenged by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court--Appellate Authority legally empowered to reverse finding of Rent Controller on question of payment or otherwise of rent--High Court in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction could not enter into realm of facts and finding recorded by such authority when no instance of misreading of any part of evidence was pointed out.

Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. PLD 1981 S C 246 ref.

---S.13 (2) (vi)--Eviction of tenant on ground of reconstruction- Requirements--Where due to dangerous condition of premises, Municipal Corporation itself issued notice requiring landlord to demolish existing structure of rented premises, there was, held, hardly any occasion to obtain specific sanction from Corporation for reconstruction.

Mst. Amina Begum and another v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir P L D 1981 Lah. 694 and Aziz Begum v. Gurantee Life & Employment Insurance, Lahore P L D 1975 Lah. 494 ref.

A.S. Zahid for Petitioner.

Aitzaz Ahsan for Respondent

Date of hearing: 15th November, 1986.

Property No. 130-B/1, Samanzar Street, Baghbanpura, Lahore, which is admittedly owned by Ch. Abdul Waheed respondent No.l (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) was rented to the petitioner in 1971 at a monthly rent of Rs.200.

On 16-2-1976, the respondent filed an ejectment application before a learned Rent Controller, Lahore, seeking eviction of the petitioner, inter alia, on the grounds of default, misuse of the premises and thereby impairing their value and the property being needed by the landlord for demolition and re-construction.

The petitioner, of course, vehemently opposed the ejectment application and denied the allegations of default, misuse and the plea of reconstruction.

2. In the light of the parties pleadings the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues;-

(1) Whether the Petition is not maintainable in view of preliminary objection No. 2

(2) Whether the premises in dispute were let out for residential purposes and the respondent has converted it into a school, if so with what effect

(3) Whether the respondent has damaged the premises in question and it has materially impaired its value and utility

(4) Whether the petitioner requires the property in dispute for reconstruction, if so, with what effect

(5) Whether the respondent has paid or tendered the rent due to the petitioner since 1-5-1973, if so, with what effect

(6) if issue No.5 is answered in the affirmative, whether the respondent is a defaulter

(7) Relief.

3. After recording the parties' evidence, the learned Rent Controller decided issues Nos. 2 to 6 in favour of the petitioner-tenant and consequently dismissed the eviction application vide his order dated 7-11-1977.

The respondent preferred an appeal and the learned appellate authority, viz. an Additional District Judge vide his judgment dated 8-10-1981, accepted the appeal, reversed the finding of the learned Controller on issues Nos. 2 to 6 and resultantly ordered the eviction of the petitioner. She was, however, allowed three months time for vacating the tenanted premises.

4. The aforementioned judgment dated 8-10-1981, passed by the learned Additional District Judge has been assailed through the present constitutional petition.

5. It has been mainly urged that the evidence led by the parties before the learned Rent Controller has been misread by the learned appellate authority and that the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance relating to reconstruction or re-erection were also misconstrued.

In regard to the first contention it has beer, contended on behalf of the petitioner that by the evidence brought on the record it has been amply proved that she was not liable for any default in payment of rent and an otherwise finding recorded by the learned appellate authority was, therefore, based on misreading. This contention has been thoroughly considered and minutely analysed. The case of the petitioner before the learned Rent Controller was that wife of the respondent used to receive the rent from the petitioner every month but no' receipt was issued by her. The wife of the respondent has come into the witness-box as' the respondent's witness and she has denied this assertion. 'Admittedly the petitioner is running a school- in the premises in question. She is the headmistress of .the, school: She is maintaining all types of registers according to her own showing. In case the wife of the respondent approached her in the tenanted premises for receiving the rent, a receipt could be scribed in a register or at least an entry relating to payment could be made in the register and the signature of the wife of the respondent could be obtained. No such evidence has been produced. In such circumstances, the onus lay very heavily on the petitioner to prove the alleged payment of rent without obtaining receipt. Such an onus does not appear to have been discharged. Moreover, the learned appellate authority could lawfully reverse the finding of the learned Rent Controller on the question of payment or otherwise of rent and this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot enter into realm of facts and a finding recorded by a Court of competent jurisdiction even if erroneous cannot be challenged by invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, even if on the basis of evidence produced before the trial Court an otherwise finding could possibly be arrived at. In Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. P L D 1981 SC 246 it has been observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, "It has been repeatedly held that a Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide the matter is competent to decide it rightly or wrongly and the mere fact that another conclusion could be arrived at from the evidence does not make it a case for interference in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction." In any case, no instance of misreading of any part of evidence adduced by the petitioner has been pointed out.

6. Regarding the second plea it has been urged that on the ground of reconstruction or re-erection sanction for such reconstruction or re-erection was a sine qua non and in the absence of such sanction by the Local Municipal Corporation, the respondent could not get vacated the premises on the plea that he required the same for reconstruction. It is a common ground between the parties that the Municipal Corporation had issued notice to the respondent for demolishing the premises in question as they were in dangerous condition. When the Municipal Corporation itself issued a notice requiring the respondent to demolish the existing premises there was hardly any occasion to obtain a sanction from the Corporation for reconstruction. The petitioner herself in her cross-examination admitted that she received a notice sent by the Lahore Municipal Corporation to the effect that the building of the premises in question was in dangerous condition and should be demolished. In Mst. Amina Begum and another v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir PLD 1981 Lah 694, it was held: "In so far as the bona fides and reasonableness qua reconstruction is concerned, there cannot be a stronger case than the present one. On a complaint with regard to the dangerous condition of the structure, the Municipal Committee had launched proceedings against the owner as well as the tenants. Overwhelming evidence was available on the record to give a finding that the requirement for reconstruction was in good faith and reasonable."

In Aziz Begum v. Guarantee Life and Employment Insurance, Lahore PLD 1975 Lah 594, it was, of course, held that the landlord intending to demolish existing structure and seeking eviction of tenant on ground of reconstruction must obtain necessary sanction for construction from the relevant authorities. In Aziz Begum's case however, there was no notice by the relevant Municipal Committee requiring the landlord or the tenant to demolish the building on account of its structure being in dangerous condition. This case is, therefore, distinguishable on facts from the under consideration case.

7. In the light of above discussion it is concluded that in the circumstances of the present case the Lahore Municipal Corporation itself has served a notice on the owner and the tenant to demolish the structure of the tenanted premises as the same were in dangerous condition, there was hardly any occasion to obtain a specific sanction for the purpose. No other ground has been urged on behalf of the petitioner to challenge the correctness or vires of the impugned order.

8. For the foregoing conclusions, it. is held that there is no merit in this writ petition, which is, therefore, dismissed with costs. The petitioner, however, is given two months time, effective from today, for vacating the tenanted premises.

H . B . T / Z-8 / L Petition dismissed.

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