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Civil Revision No. 1974 of 1986, decided on 14th October,1986

‑‑‑0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑Temporary injunction, grant of‑‑Registration of car in dispute admittedly in favour of respondent‑‑Question whether respondent had obtained said registration in her name rightly or wrongly was yet to be decided on merit‑‑Till final decision of the case invalidity of registration of car in favour of respondent could not be presumed‑ Ingredient of prima facie case, being in favour of respondent as she was not‑ only in possession of car, but registration of same was also in her favour, petitioner in circumstances could not be granted temporary injunction.

‑‑‑0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑Temporary injunction, grant of‑‑Where compensation in money could be assessed and claimed, petitioner claiming relief of temporary injunction in respect of such thing, held, would not be considered suffering from irreparable loss if such relief was refused to him.

‑‑‑0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑Status quo‑‑Order for‑‑Reversal of‑‑Application under 0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for reversal of order of status quo already passed, held, would not be maintainable as such relief could be granted through decree and not through temporary injunction.

‑‑‑S. 115 & 0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑Temporary injunction, refusal of‑ Concurrent decision‑‑Interference in revision‑‑Concurrent decision of Courts below against grant of temporary injunction to petitioner arrived at by exercise of discretion, held, would not call for interference by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Muhammad Sharif Chauhan for Petitioners.

The petitioners filed a suit for a declaration that they were the successors of Ch. Muhammad Rafique deceased and were entitled to get his car in dispute and as a consequential relief prayed for the custody of the said car. They also filed an application for temporary injunction praying that till the disposal of the suit the car may be taken into custody through a bailiff of the Court and may be given in the custody of arrange or on Supardari to the petitioners. The application was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, Lahore vide order, dated 23‑6‑1986 and the appeal filed there against was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore vide order, dated 7‑10‑1986. Hence this revision petition.

2. I have perused the record and have heard the arguments. Petitioner No. 1 is a widow and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are minor son and daughter of Mr. Muhammad Rafique who is said to have been murdered on 27‑7‑1985. Respondent No. 1 is the second wife of the said deceased while respondent No. 2 is his daughter from respondent No. 1. It may be pointed out that the petitioners did not in so many words admit in the proceedings before the learned lower Courts that the respondents were wife and daughter of the deceased. However, in para. 2 of the present revision petition, this relationship has been conceded although it is alleged that the marriage was contracted secretly and without the permission of the first wife (for that matter perhaps of the permission under the Family Laws Ordinance, 1961). This matter need not be decided in the present petition because it will be seen when the case proceeds on merits, as to whether the second marriage even if performed without such permission is valid or not. It is alleged that the said Muhammad Rafique deceased purchased the car in dispute in his own name and obtained an open letter of transfer from the seller but after his death respondent No. 1 fraudulently misused the said open letter and obtained the registration of the car in her own name. On this plea the petitioners claimed custody of the car as heirs of the deceased. The delivery letter of the car is in favour of the said deceased. Similarly, the affidavit of the seller relating to the transfer of the car is also in the name of the deceased. It is mentioned in the said two documents that open letter of transfer had been handed over to the deceased. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said delivery letter and the affidavit suffice to show that the car was purchased by the deceased himself and it was to be registered in his own name. The said documents which are, dated 6‑2‑1985 can help both the parties, the petitioners, because the same are in favour of the deceased and the respondents on the ground that if the car had to be transferred in favour of the deceased there was no necessity of giving an open letter of transfer and instead the name of the deceased would have been mentioned therein as a transferee as also on the ground that when delivery letter was given on 6‑2‑1985 there was no necessity for the deceased to wait till his death for its registration. Therefore, the petitioners cannot base their claim for the issuance of a temporary injunction only on the said documents. The registration of the car admittedly is in favour of respondent No. 1. It will have to be decided when the case proceeds on merits as to whether she obtained the said registration rightly or wrongly. Till then the validity of the registration in her favour cannot be disputed and in other words invalidity thereof cannot be presumed. The possession in fact is a symbol of ownership and coupled with the registration in favour of respondent No. 1, the ingredients of prima facie case lean in favour of respondent No. 1.

3. It cannot be said that by the non‑delivery of the car the petitioners will suffer irreparable loss. It is a case property in the murder case and will have to be kept intact by respondent No. 1 and will have to be produced by her in the Court concerned whenever required and as such the chances of its damage or deterioration are too small. The petitioners, in case of success of their suit, can also claim compensation in money. It is well settled law that when compensation in money can be assessed and can be claimed it cannot be taken that a petitioner who claims the relief of temporary injunction will suffer an irreparable loss if the relief is refused. Therefore, by the reufsal of the relief of temporary injunction the petitioners will not suffer an irreparable loss.

4. The application _ filed by the petitioners for issuance of a temporary ' injunction in fact is' not for maintenance of status quo; it is on the other hand an application for reversal of the status quo. Such a relief can be granted through a decree but not through a temporary injunction. Further the two Courts below have exercised their discretion against the grant of relief and I find no reason to interfere in their concurrent decision. The petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine

H.B.T./646/L Revision dismissed.

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