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(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑

‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199‑‑Consti tutional petition‑‑Maintainability‑‑Petition directed against order of remand of case to Trial Court passed by Labour Appellate Tribunal and proceedings before Trial Court pursuant thereto not in question‑ Pendency of proceedings after remand, held, could not offer a ground for dismissal of Constitutional petition.

(b) Constitution of

Pakistan

‑‑‑Art.199‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑Alternative remedy‑‑Adequacy‑ Petition opposed on contention that alternative remedy was available to petitioner before Trial Court to whom case was remanded by Labour Tribunal‑‑Adequacy of alternate remedy, held, would depend on question as to whether order of remand was ‑illegal or not which was yet to be decided by High Court.

(c) Constitution of

Pakistan

‑‑‑Art.199‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Constitutional petition ‑‑Laches‑‑No specific time framework laid‑‑Matter heard at length‑‑Petition entertained for disposal on merits.

(d) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art 199‑‑ Dismissal of workman‑‑Failure of Trial Court to decide crucial issue whether dismissal of worker was in accordance with law or not‑‑Effect‑ Appellant company challenging order of Labour Appellate Tribunal whereby Tribunal remanded case to Trial Court for recording its finding on merits of dismissal order of respondent worker from service and whether dispute between parties stood finally settled‑‑Trial Court failing to decide issue that charges against worker as alleged were levelled on account of fact that he was an executive member of Mazdoor Union‑‑Trial Court also had not decided crucial issue whether dismissal of worker on facts and evidence adduced was in accordance with law or not or a final settlement was reached between parties‑‑Order of remand, held, carried no fault in circumstances.

M.S. Bokhari for Petitioner.

H.R. Haider for Respondent No.1.

Date of hearing: 7th April, 1987.

Petitioner has called in question order passed by Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal in appeal No.LHR‑56/83‑Punjab, dated 21‑3‑1984, whereby the Tribunal has remanded the case to the trial Court for recording its findings on merits of the dismissal order; and Secondly, as to whether the dispute between petitioner and respondent No.1, stood finally settled in view of Annexure 'F' referred to in the trial Court as Ex.R/4.

2. Brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 joined the service of petitioner as workman initially on 10‑1‑1946; however, his services were dispensed with on the event of Indo‑Pak war in 1965. Subsequently, alongwith other workers, he was re‑employed by petitioner on 15‑2‑1966. He was served with the charge‑sheet (alongwith two others), dated 9‑12‑1979 on the allegation that petitioner incited workers of Unit No.422, i.e. the Unit, he was working in, to go on strike. After the inquiry, he was dismissed on 18‑6‑1980. Respondent No.1, thereafter served a grievance notice as contemplated by section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, followed by a grievance petition filed on 8‑9‑1980, before Labour Court No.2. This petition was dismissed vide order, dated 30‑1‑1983, on the ground that after having instituted the petition, he had settled his claim finally with petitioner as recorded in Ex.R/4. Respondent No.l dissatisfied with the result of the petition, filed an appeal before Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal on 3‑2‑1983, which was decided on 21‑3‑1984, i.e. the impugned order.

3. Petitioner feeling aggrieved with the remand order has instituted this petition.

4. Learned counsel for petitioner has contended that respondent No.1, having finally settled his claim with petitioner as per Ex.R/4, was left with no grievance, thus the remedy provided by section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was not available to him. Secondly, that the allegations levelled in the charge‑sheet fall within the expression "misconduct" and complete inquiry procedure was adopted leading to the dismissal order.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.l has contended that petition id premature, thus is not maintainable; since no final order as yet, has been passed by the Labour Court, to whom the matter has been remanded, by the learned Tribunal, and the next date for recording the evidence of the parties is 30‑4‑1987. In this regard, he has placed reliance on an unreported judgment of this Court in writ petition No.3283/83 titled Crescent Jute Products v. Muhammad Ramzan etc. The second contention is that there is an alternate remedy available to petitioner for contesting the case before the trial Court, where the matter is pending. Thirdly, that the petition suffers from laches having been instituted after a period of three months of the passing of the impugned order.

6. I take up the contentions raised by the learned counsel for respondent No.l before I advert to the case of petitioner.

7. This petition is directed against the remand order; and the proceedings before the trial Court, pursuance thereto are not in question. As a matter of fact, the vires of the very impugned order are being questioned. Thus, the pendency of proceedings after remand does not offer a ground for dismissal of this petition. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel is distinguishable on the facts, in the sense that in that writ petition the trial Court had held that petitioner was not a workman; thus the petition was not maintainable. In appeal the Labour Appellate Tribunal disagreeing with the trial Court gave a verdict that petitioner is workman; consequently, remanded the case for trial on merits. And their Lordships on those facts very rightly, dismissed the writ petition as premature, which is not a case here.

8. The second contention which the learned counsel for respondent No.l has raised is as to the availability of alternative remedy. The adequacy of the alternate remedy would depend on the question as to whether the remand order was illegal or not to which I will advert little in this judgment. Thirdly, in so far as the question of laches is concerned, though there is no specific time framework laid down in such like cases, I am of the view that since this matter has been at length, therefore, I would like to dispose it of on merits.

9. Now coming to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for petitioner. I have examined the impugned order as well as the order passed by the trial Court and evidence led by the parties. Respondent No.l in his statement which is attached as Annexure 'G' to this petition has clearly stated that the charges have been levelled against him on account of the fact that he is an executive member of the Bata Mazdoor Union. He has reiterated this stance twice in his statement. Not a single question has been put to him in cross-examination with a view to disproving his averment. Therefore, this point goes unrebutted. The trial Court has not touched this aspect of the matter, nor has given any finding on it. Secondly, it appear from the judgment of the trial Court that he has not decided the crucial issue as to whether the dismissal order, dated 18‑6‑1980, on the facts of this case and on the basis of the evidence adduced before him was in accordance with law or not. Such a finding is lacking in the judgment of the trial Court. The third issue is as to whether a printed form of disclaimer tending to state that the complete and final settlement of claim has been arrived at as recorded in Ex. R/4. The trial Court has also fallen into an error by not giving a specific findings on this issue as to whether it constituted waiver or, not. I find no fault in the remand order passed by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The matter has been remanded to the trial Court where, as per statement of the learned counsel for respondent No.l, it is at evidence stage. The trial Court is directed to give a specific finding on the issues involved after recording evidence of the parties. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

M.Y.H./B‑13/Lb.

Order accordingly.

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