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Civil Revision No. 214 of 1986/BWP, decided on 30th June, 1986.

‑‑O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑‑Order recalling earlier order passed on a discovery made to the effect that same was procured improperly‑‑No right of a party, held, could be said to have been involved‑‑Question of affording opportunity of personal hearing of such party also not arising‑‑Petitioner's extra supply of water was stopped by authorities on verification that there existed no garden for which extra water supply was sanctioned‑‑Earlier order of sanction being, therefore, without jurisdiction, recall of same without hearing petitioner could not, held, be termed as violative of principles of natural justice.

‑‑‑O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 b 2‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 3, Art. 14‑ Suit‑‑Limitation‑‑Suit filed by petitioner after a lapse of almost a year and a half since cause of action, if any, accrued to him and prayer made by petitioner suffered from laches‑‑Petitioner, held, was not entitled to exercise of discretion in her favour.

‑‑‑O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2 a S. 115‑‑Revisional jurisdiction Temporary injunction‑‑Courts below refusing to grant injunction by exercising discretion on sound principles‑‑Courts below, held, could not be said to have acted either fancifully or arbitrarily and their order of refusal could not be held amenable to exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another P L D 1970 S C 139 and Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 S C 53 rel.

‑‑‑S . 115 s 0 . XLII I , R . 3‑‑Failure of appellant to comply with requirement of 0. XLIII, R. 3, C.P.C., held, would render appeal as not entertainable in law.

Mrs. Dino Manekji Chinoy and 8 others v. Muhammad Matin PLD 1983 S C 693 rel.

M. Akhtar Shabbir for Petitioner.

On 18‑11‑1984, petitioner filed a suit to challenge the order, bearing No. 1183 and dated 26‑5‑1983, passed by the Chief Engineer, Bahawalpur whereby supply of extra water for garden sanctioned in her favour since 18‑6‑1965 was cancelled. She challenged the said order on the ground that it was passed without prior notice and in absence of a hearing granted to her and was, therefore, a nullity. She also prayed for a decree for permanent injunction being passed to restrain it from being effectuated in any manner, Therein, she also applied for issuance of a temporary injunction to the same effect. Learned trial Judge found that the impugned order had been passed in the wake of a joint checking by the revenue and irrigation officials wherein it was discovered that there was no garden at all existing at the spot even after 18 years and, being unable to disbelieve the conclusion so reached on site inspection, he rejected the application by his order dated 6‑1‑1986. Petitioner's appeal there against has also been dismissed by a learned Additional District Judge by affirming the approach and view of the trial Court and with the observation:‑" ....in the present case the impugned order was passed on the allegation that basic order allowing the extra water for so‑called garden to the plaintiff was obtained by misrepresentation and fraud and after conducting a thorough inquiry the case of the plaintiff alongwith similar type of matters was referred to the Chief Engineer who passed the impugned order. Thus, the basic order on the basis of which plaintiff has come in the Court is itself allegedly issued on misrepresentation of facts."

Learned Judge in appeal below refused to give effect to the petitioners contention that opportunity of hearing was denied to her before passing the impugned order and, apart from noticing that requirements of rule 3 of Order XLIII of the C.P.C. had not been complied with due to her omission to give the required notice, he also took note of the fact that whereas the impugned order had been passed on 26‑5‑1983, challenge thereto was thrown by the petitioner after a lapse of more than a year and a half.

2. She has now come up to this Court on revision. Learned counsel contends that the order challenged in the suit was a mere nullity for its having been passed contrary to the requirements of law and principles of natural justice so that it was liable to be ultimately struck down and that in the event of its being implemented in the meanwhile petitioner is bound to suffer irreparable loss. I do not find any force in this contention because it seems uncontrovertible that where an order to recall an earlier order is passed on a discovery made to the effect that the same was procured improperly, there no right of a party can be A said to have been involved because such an act is one of mere retracing of steps by nullifying the proceedings already taken. Such is the view expressed in Alfred Zahir v . Siraj‑ud‑Din A I R 1944 Lah. 165. Moreover, since the pre‑condition for sanction of extra water supply has been found to have never in fact existed in this case, therefore, a jurisdictional factor for passing the earlier order would be missing and thus, that order will be deemed to have been passed without the necessary jurisdiction vesting in the concerned authority and its recall by the same authority upon a discovery made to that effect, without B hearing the petitioner cannot be termed as being violative of the principles of natural justice. A direct authority on the point is a Division Bench judgment in the case Mst. Shahzadi Asifa Sultana Begum v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and 4 others P L D 1964 Pesh. 114. In the circumstances of this case, there was no legal formality in need of being observed for revoking such an order.

3. Even this is undeniable that the suit below was filed by the petitioner after a lapse

of almost a year and a half since the closure of such water supply and apart from its being hit by Article 14 of the C Limitation Act, the prayer made by the petitioner therein also suffered from laches which itself sufficed for disentitling her to the exercise of discretion in her favour.

4. The two Courts below have exercised their discretions on sound principles to refuse to issue the temporary injunction and they cannot be said to have acted either fancifully or arbitrarily within the rule of law laid down in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another P L D 1970 S C 139, as re‑affirmed in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 S C 53 and, hence, their orders cannot be held amenable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. More so, because due to the petitioners failure to comply with the requirements of rule 3 of Order XLIII of the C.P.C. her appeal below was rendered not entertainable in law, as held in Mrs. E Dino Manekji Chinoy and 8 others v. Muhammad Matin P L D 1983 S CI 693.

5. Hence, petition dismissed in limine.

M . Y . H . Petition dismissed.

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