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Writ Petition No.1498 of 1987, decided on 7th May, 1987.

‑‑‑Art.199‑‑Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.409,467,468,420 & 411 Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S.5(2)‑‑Acquittal of hank employee from criminal charges‑‑Apart from criminal charges petitioner was proceeded against departmentally and dismissed from service‑ Entitlement of petitioner to be re‑instated in service on account of acquittal from criminal charges‑‑Acquittal of petitioner from criminal charges, held, would not per force entitle him to be re‑instated in service‑‑Instruction of Government that acquitted employee should be re‑instated in service not shown to be applicable to establishment of petitioner, could not be availed of by him‑‑Disciplinary matter could not be subjugated or subservient to criminal law‑‑Order of dismissal having been passed thirteen years ago could not be set aside by resort to constitutional jurisdiction‑‑Constitutional petition being devoid of merit was dismissed in limine.

Muhammad Ghani for Petitioner.

Upon perusal of the petition, it transpires that while petitioner was posted as supervisor‑cum‑sub‑accountant at Sunni View Branch, Lahore, of respondent No.1, a case was registered against him tide FIR No.548/73 under sections 409/467/468/420/471, P.P.C. read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for having misappropriated a sum of Rs.90,000 for which he was tried and finally acquitted by the learned Special Judge, Banking Court, vide order dated 30‑1‑1986. Apart from these criminal proceedings petitioner was proceeded against departmentally and was dismissed from service on 30‑9‑1974, against which petitioner filed an appeal. It is stated that no decision was communicated to him. After acquittal the petitioner preferred an appeal before the respondents on 2‑6‑1986, which was rejected by the impugned order, dated 31‑8‑1986.

The contention of the learned counsel for petitioner in pith and substance is that petitioner having been acquitted of criminal charges merits to be re‑instated in service. In this connection, he has referred to instructions issued by the Government of the Punjab applicable to various departments to the effect that where an employee has been proceeded against departmentally as well as on criminal side, then upon acquittal, he should be reinstated in service.

I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for petitioner. I am afraid the analogy is misconceived. The learned counsel has not been able to refer to any such instructions prevalent in the establishment of respondent No.1, therefore, here is no parallel between the two situations and the distinction repels the arguments of the learned counsel per se. Apart from this, in terms of inherent features, in criminal administration of justice, law is applied with much more stringency than in the civil administration.

The modus operandi adopted by the petitioner appears to be that he had his personal Bank account in the branch, where he was posted. In his official capacity, he had the authority to pass cheques upto Rs.5000/‑. He had opened an account in the name of his minor daughter under the name and style of 'Mat. Farah Anwar' 'being account No.A/C 62, with Commercial Bank, Lahore. Petitioner using loose cheques, used to withdraw amounts upto Rs.5,000/‑ from various customers' accounts, the same used to be deposited in the account of his minor daughter, which he was operating. Thus, he managed to misappropriate a sum of Rs.90;000/‑ by deploying this device. Those entries have been found by the learned Judge Banking Court to be in the hands of the petitioner. It finds no mention anywhere that the corresponding amount do not find mention in the account No.62, of Mst.Farah Anwar (the minor daughter of the petitioner) of which petitioner had the operating authority. Inter alia, what has been disbelieved in the observation of the learned Judge Banking Court is that the cheques in question have not been produced by the bank. Those cheques are missing from the bank. Presumption would be that only an interested party would have removed and destroyed the same so as to destroy the evidence. Thus, I am of the view that acquittal in such circumstances does not per force entitle petitioner for re instatement in service. If one is to go by the arguments of the learned counsel, then taking the same to its logical conclusion then all disciplinary matters shall be subjugated and become subservient to the criminal law; I am sure that is not the scheme of the law, as it presently stands.

Independent of the above, by virtue of this petition, what the petitioner in actual fact is seeking, is setting aside of the order of his dismissal dated 30‑9‑1974 i.e. nearly after a period of 13 years. The judgments were passed by the learned Judge Banking Court on 30‑1‑1986, against which an appeal was preferred before the respondent No.1 which was turned down on 31‑8‑1986. I wonder if such an appeal was competent after such a long delay under the rules of service prescribed by respondent No.1. It appears that this appeal was instituted so as to make out a spring board for institution of the present petition to call in question order of dismissal which was passed 13 years ago; even the so‑called impugned order was passed some 7 months ago, for which there is no rational explanation.

In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to interfere in dismissed extraordinary jurisdiction; accordingly the writ petition is dismissed in limine.

A.A./M‑319/L.

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