Unlock direct contact details for up to 10 lawyers so you can call or WhatsApp the right legal professional and move your matter forward with confidence.
Writ Petitions Nos.3290, 3291, 3292 and 3293 of 1986, decided on 1st April, 1987.
‑‑S.4(1)‑‑West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI of 1958), S.17(1‑B)‑‑Civil service‑‑Suspension, a necessary term and condition of service‑‑Suspension order passed attains finality within meaning of S.4(1) of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 on implementation.
Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer in Chief Pak Army and others 1981 P L C (C.S.) 123 ref.
‑‑S.4(1)‑‑West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act (XXXI of 1958), S.17(1‑B)‑‑WAPDA employee‑‑Suspension‑‑Order of suspension having been implemented attained finality‑‑Labour Court or Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon matter being coram non judice.
Ch. Ghulam Hussain Gulshan for Petitioner.
Mian Mahmood Hussain for Respondent No.1.
Nemo for the Remaining Respondents.
Date of hearing: 1st April 1987.
This order will dispose of writ petitions Nos.3290/86, 3291/86, 3292/86 and 3293/86, since a common question of law is involved in all the four cases and all these four writ petitions emanate out of the same impugned order, passed in appeal by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 14‑5‑1986.
2. The short legal question involved in these cases is as to whether in view of the provisions enshrined in section 17(1‑B) of the Pakistan Water & Power Development Authority Act, 1958, read with S.4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Labour Court, Lahore had the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the matter.
3. Vide order dated 8‑11‑1986, passed by this Court, respondent No.1 was required to put in appearance and to come prepared to argue the main case. Mian Mahmood Hussain, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.1, in all the cases, has appeared.
4. Since short question of law is involved and I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties at length, therefore, I admit the petitions to regular hearing and the main petitions are disposed of by this order.
5. Brief facts which are common to these four writ petitions, except for dates, are that respondents, in all the four cases, were suspended on account of charges of misconduct. The suspension orders, in all the four cases, were implemented and given effect to.
6. The learned counsel for respondent No.1, Mian Mahmood Hussain, has advanced an argument that suspension order is not a final order; therefore, does not fall within the mischief of section 4(1) of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, thus the Service Tribunals had no jurisdiction and the proper forum was a recourse by way of petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and consequently; an appeal to the Punjab Labour Appellate Court. On the other hand, learned counsel for petitioner says that in view of section 17(1‑B) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958, respondents are civil servants and suspension order being necessary term and condition of service, which on account of its implementation, had attained finality; thus squarely falls within the jurisdiction of Service. Tribunal within the meaning of section 4(1) thereof. In this connection, reliance has been placed on the case of Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer in Chief Pakistan Army and others, reported in 1981 P L C (C.S.) 123 wherein their Lordships in the Supreme Court have held that a suspension order, once implemented, attains finality within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
7. In view of the above judgment, I hold that since suspension orders passed in the instant cases, stood implemented, thus attained finality within the 'meaning of section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. There is no controversy that "suspension" is a necessary term and condition of service. There is equally no controversy that respondent No.1, in all these petitions, falls within the definition of civil servant as contemplated by section 17(1‑B) of the Pakistan WAPDA Act, 1958.
8. In this view of the matter, I hold that the two Courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the matter, therefore, the impugned orders are set aside, being coram non judice. Accordingly these writ petitions are allowed. There shall be no orders as to cost.
M.B.A./P,7/L
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer