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‑‑‑S. 7 & Sched.‑‑Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss.7 & 8‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 199‑‑Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula‑‑Contention of husband that wife was not entitled to succeed in obtaining decree from Judge, Family Court for dissolution of marriage as she had not been able to prove her allegations against him on the basis of any independent evidence inasmuch as the only witness examined by her was her own brother‑ Held, such contention was not capable of leading to interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction because there was no legal bar in the evidence of a close relation being accepted in proof of a certain fact‑‑Judge Family Court had the requisite power and such acceptance of evidence could not be considered to be an act without lawful authority.

Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 S C 139 ref.

‑‑S. 7 & Sched.‑‑Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), Ss. 7 & 8‑‑Dissolution of marriage on ground of Khula‑‑Contention of husband that decree passed by Family Court in favour of wife was improper for its having been passed without awarding any compensation for Khula to him‑‑Husband had not made even a feeble effort to claim any consideration and muchless had he proved any benefit to have accrued to her in consequence of the marriage‑‑No demand was made by husband at all for award of any consideration for a decree on the basis of Khula‑‑Held, husband was required to not merely make a demand for payment of consideration for grant of Khula but he had also to insist upon being paid the desired consideration‑‑Since the husband did not claim payment of any consideration, the irresistible conclusion might be that he had not conferred any benefits on wife and since a claim on the point could be abandoned by husband, his failure to insist upon such a payment being made to him was quite capable of being equated with his desire not to seek their return‑ Conclusion of Trial Court that no compensation was capable of being determined for grant of Khula, therefore, was justified in circumstances.

Abdul Majid v. Razia Bibi and another P L D 1975 Lah. 766 and Ghulam Ali v. Haleema and another 1987 C L C 1640 ref.

Ch. Muhammad Rashid Qamar for Petitioner..

Mst. Zeb Mai, respondent No.3 sued out the petitioner for her marriage with him being dissolved on the pleas of non‑payment of maintenance for a period of more than 2 years, misappropriation of her belongings, habitual mal‑treatment and evil repute of the husband. She also prayed for the marriage being dissolved on the ground of Khula. Her claim was contested and necessary issues were settled for trial. In the course whereof apart from making her own statement as P. W.1, she examined her brother Muhammad Ibrahim as P.W.2 and closed her case. In rebuttal, the petitioner examined one Khadim Hussain in addition to his own statement made as D.W.2.

2. After considering the evidence of the parties, by his judgment dated 29‑6‑1987, learned Family Judge decided the various grounds urged in support of the plea against the plaintiff but dissolved the marriage under the seventh issue relating to Khula. This decree is assailed in this constitutional petition filed by the husband Haji Pir Bakhsh.

3. It is contended that the respondent was not entitled to succeed because she had not been able to prove her allegations on the basis of any independent evidence inasmuch as the only witness examined by her was her own brother. This contention is not capable of leading to interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction because there is no legal bar in the evidence of a close relation being accepted in proof of a certain fact and the learned Family Judge has accepted this evidence for the reasons appearing in his judgment. Clearly enough, he had the requisite power and such acceptance of evidence cannot be considered to be an act without lawful authority and muchless is his judgment thereby rendered to be of no legal effect within the meanings of these terms propounded in Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others P L D 1974 S C 139 to become amenable to interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Contention of the learned counsel is, therefore, repelled.

4. The only other argument attempted to be raised by the learned counsel is that the decree is improper for its having been passed without awarding any compensation for Khula to the husband‑petitioner. A copy of the written statement filed by the petitioner appears at page 15 of this record wherein he has not made even a feeble effort to claim any consideration and muchless has he proved any benefit to have accrued to her in consequence of the marriage. There is no demand at all made by the petitioner for award of any consideration for a decree on the basis of Khula. Actually, the petitioner was required to not merely make a demand for payment of consideration for grant of Khula but he had also to insist upon being paid the 13 desired consideration as has been laid down in Abdul Mapd v. Razia Bibi and another P L D 1975 Lah. 766 and Ghulam Ali v. Haleema and another 1987 C L C Lah. 1640. Because the petitioner did not claim the payment of any consideration, therefore, the irresistible conclusion may be that he had not conferred any benefits on her and since a claim on the point can be abandoned by a husband, therefore, the petitioners failure to insist upon such a payment being made to him is quite capable of being equated with his desire not to seek their return. In this situation, a question about the grant of compensation simply did not arise. Learned trial Judge has rightly concluded that no compensation is capable of being determined for grant of Khula. Thus, this contention also fails.

5. There is no force in the writ petition which is accordingly dismissed in limine.

M . B . A . /P‑25/ L Petition dismissed.

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