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"It is no doubt true that for justifying a committal for breach of a prohibitory order it is not necessary to actually prove service of the order upon the party against whom it has been granted but, we regret, we are unable to accept the contention that any kind of report of such an order will be sufficient to fix the party with notice of such an order. In a proceeding of a Criminal or quasi-criminal nature it is a fundamental rule that before a person can be saddled with the penal consequences of a breach of an order he must at least be shown to have had some definite and authentic information of the nature of them order which he is alleged to have violated. What amount of proof will be sufficient to fix a person with such knowledge will of course depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but this much can safely be stated that the mere verbal assertion of a rival party can hardly be regarded as sufficient for this purpose. In our opinion, it would be placing a party in a very difficult position if he is not held to be entitled to insist that the information conveyed should be of an authentic nature which he ought to accept as reliable. Otherwise valuable rights of parties under decrees or orders of Courts may well be defeated by mere oral assertions of any man in the street that the order sought to be executed has been stated by a superior Court. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants had acted in any unreasonable manner in refusing to accept the ipse dixit of the opposite-party or in insisting upon the production of authentic proof of the order having been made. It is significant that in this case as soon as the learned Advocate, who appeared to obtain the stay order in the High Court, gave the information that such a stay order had been made and offered to make such an endorsement on the back of the warrant, the appellants immediately stayed their hands and did not proceed any further with the execution. This does not show that they were minded either to deliberately flout the stay order granted by the High Court or to show any contumacious disregard thereof."

In view of the above observation of Supreme Court, the Courts below should have first determined the positive knowledge of the status quo order on the part of petitioner before passing any order under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3), C.P.C. The admitted position in the case before me C is that no direct service on the petitioner regarding status quo order was effected. It was the case of the respondent that status quo order was served on one Saeed and Ghafoor who were closely related to the petitioner. It was also the case of the respondent that the petitioner was otherwise aware or became aware of status quo order at the time of dispossession of the respondent's family from the premises. The wife of the respondent it was alleged in the evidence before the trial Court, had shown a copy of the stay order to the petitioner at the time of dispossession but he allegedly tore the same. Unfortunately the wife of the respondent was not examined in the case in support of the above allegation and the evidence of other witnesses in this regard is merely hearsay evidence. It was also the case of the respondent before the trial Court that a copy of the stay order was sent by Registered Post (A.D.) after the same was granted in favour of the respondent but the envelope containing the status quo order was refused. However, the petitioner was neither put any such question in cross-examination nor the alleged endorsement of refusal on the envelope was proved through the postman concerned. The learned counsel for the petitioner made a grievance that on 29-9-1985 when the case was fixed for further evidence he wanted to produce witnesses Saeed and Ghafoor on whom the notices and the stay order were allegedly served. The examination of these witnesses was very material for proving service and knowledge of injunction order on the part of petitioner. I accordingly accept the revision, set aside the order of two Courts below and remand the easel back to trial Court with the direction to first determine whether the petitioner positively had the knowledge of status quo order, before deciding the application of respondent under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3) C.P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that his client would like to examine Muhammad Din, Muhammad Idrees, Muhammad Ramzan and Hussain in addition to Saeed and Ghafoor on the point of knowledge and service of status quo orders. The learned counsel for the respondent also states that he may also be allowed to examine the wife of respondent and the bailiff and postman, if necessary, in rebuttal. I accordingly further direct that the abovenamed witnesses may be allowed to be examined by the parties in the case before the trial. Court. However, as the respondent is out of possession, the petitioner shall appear before the trial Court on 15th February, 1987, on which date he shall produce all the abovenamed witnesses before the trial Court which will be examined as quickly as possible and after conclusion of the evidence of the petitioner the trial Court will allow the respondent to lead evidence in rebuttal. The case will, therefore, be heard by the trial Court and decided in accordance with the law in the light of full evidence. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.