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Civil Transfer Application No.28 and Civil Miscellaneous Application No.776 of 1987, decided on 17th August, 1987.
‑‑‑Ss. 4(3) & 20‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 24‑‑Maxim; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) ‑‑Neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority has power under C.P.C. to transfer a case from one Rent Controller to another Rent Controller‑ ‑Govern men t and not the High Court is empowered to authorise District Judge or Deputy Commissioner to transfer a case from one Rent Controller to another within the District‑ ‑Non ‑issuance of notification by Government authorising District Judge/Deputy Commissioner in that regard, would .not confer any power on the High Court. ‑‑[Maxim].
The maxim, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) would be attracted for the Legislature, by expressly mentioning in section 20 of the Ordinance what p9wers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure the Controller or appellate authority would exercise, has impliedly excluded the exercise of other powers by the said authorities under the Code, for which the word 'only' used in the section is also a pointer.
It is, therefore, obvious that neither the Controller nor the appellate authority has powers under the Code of Civil Procedure to transfer a case from one Controller to another Controller.
Moreover, under subsection (3) of section 4 of the Ordinance, the Government and not the High Court is empowered to authorize the District Judge or Deputy Commissioner to transfer a case from one Controller to another within the District. This again shows that the Appellate Authority namely, the High Court cannot exercise the powers of transfer under section .24, C.P.C. Accordingly, if the Government has authorised the District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner to transfer a case from one Controller to another within the District, it will be for the applicant to move‑the authority named in subsection (3) of section 4. By giving powers to certain authoritie's on the authorisation of the Government, it was made clear that High Court cannot exercise powers of transfer under section 24, C.P.C.
Non‑issuance of notification under subsection (3) of section 4 by the Government authorising the District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner to transfer cases from one Controller to another Controller within the District, would not confer any power on' the High Court which it has not in view of specific provision of section 20 which impliedly excludes the exercise of such powers. It is for the Provincial Government to issue such a notification for whom the need is indicated.
Messrs Bambino Ltd. v. Messrs Selmor International Ltd. and another P L D 1983 S C 155 and Haseen Ahmed Khan v. Irshad Khan PLD 1987 Kar. 16 distinguished.
Abddl Waheed Siddiqui for Applicant.
This is an application under section 24, C.P.C. for transfer of rent case No.1197/1987 from the III Rent Controller Karachi (South) to any other Court of Rent Controller of Karachi. Office has raised objection that the transfer application is not maintainable.
I have heard Mr. Abdul Waheed Siddiqui learned counsel for the applicant.
The learned counsel submits that although the provision of section 24, C.P.C. in terms do not apply but the equitable principles contained in C.P.C. are applicable and he relies on Messrs Bambino Ltd. v. Messrs Selmor International Ltd. and another P L D 1983 SC 155 and also on a decision of this Court in Haseen Ahmed Khan v. Irshad Khan P L D 1987 Kar. 16.
In the first named case the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provision of section 16 of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 laid down "that although the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable in terms to proceedings before the Rent Controller by its own force, the Rent Controller was free to follow the equitable principles contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. In the second case of this Court relied upon by the learned counsel he has referred to the observation by the learned Judge of this Court, that "under the new law since Rent Controller has to evolve his own procedure he can make use of relevant provisions of Civil Procedure Code i.e. Order 21, Rules 100 and 101 of C.P.C.
Now so far as the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Bambino (Supra) is concerned, I may state that it has no application as the question before me is one of exercise of certain powers namely, whether this Court has jurisdiction to transfer a case from one Controller to another Controller and not following the equitable principles contained in C.P.C.
Considering the provisions of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 from the point of view whether this Court has power to transfer a case from one Rent Controller to another Rent Controller, I have to refer to the provisions of Section 20 which provide that "the Controller and the Appellate Authority shall, for the purpose of any case under this Ordinance, have powers of a Civil Court under Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in respect of only the matters, namely:‑-------
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling production or discovery of documents;
(c) inspecting the site; and
(d) issuing commission for examination of witnesses or documents."
The maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion. of another) would be attracted in this for the Legislature by expressly mentioning in section 20 of the Ordinance what powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure the Controller or appellate authority would exercise, has impliedly excluded the exercise of other powers by the said authorities under the Code, for which the word 'only' used in the section is also a pointer.
It is, therefore, obvious that neither the Controller nor the Appellate Authority has powers under the Code of Civil Procedure to transfer a case from one Controller to another Controller.
Moreover, under subsection (3) of section 4 of the Ordinance, the Government and not the High Court is empowered to authorise the District Judge or Deputy Commissioner to transfer a case from one Controller to another within the District. This a‑gain shows that the Appellate Authority namely, the High Court cannot exercise the powers of transfer under section 24, C.P.C. Accordingly, if the Government has authorised the District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner to transfer a case from one Controller to another within the District, it will be for the applicant to move the authority named in subsection (3) of section 4. 1 am clear in my mind that by giving powers to certain authorities on the authorisation of the Government, it was made clear that this Court cannot exercise powers of transfer under section 24, C.P.C.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that no notification under subsection (3) of section 4 has been issued by the Government I authorising the District Judge or the Deputy Commissioner to transfer cases from one Controller to another Controller within the District, but non‑issuance of the notice would not confer any power on the High Court which' it has not in view of specific provision of section 20 which impliedly excludes the exercise of such powers. It is for the Provincial Government to issue such a notification for whom the need is indicated.
The other case cited by the learned counsel is not relevant as the question of evolving its own procedure by the Controller is not involved in the exercise of powers of transfer.
I, therefore, dismiss this application in limine.
M.B.A./252/M‑K Application dismissed,
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