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Suit No.149 of 1987, decided on 9th July, 1987.

‑‑‑O.XII, R. 6 & S. 151‑‑Suit for recovery of money‑‑Defendant before filing of written statement admitted part of claim through application to Court offering submission of cheque relating to admitted claim‑‑Judgment to the extent of such admission during pendency of suit and before filing of written statement, whether competently be passed by Trial Court‑‑Words "or otherwise", connotation of‑ Provisions of O. XII, R.6, C.P.C, held, envisaged passing of judgment at any stage without waiting for determination of other questions involved in suit‑‑Party to a suit where admissions of act have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, could apply at any stage of suit to Court for judgment on admission of other party to extent to his entitlement‑‑Such admission need not necessarily be made only in pleadings‑‑Words "or otherwise" used in O. XII, R .6, C . P. C . would not restrict admission only on pleadings‑‑Words being of general application there was no justification to confine them to admissions made in pleadings only‑‑Defendant having admitted part of claim of plaintiff, judgment to the extent of admission without prejudice to other claim of plaintiff could be competently passed.

Abdul Karim Haji Essa and others v. Haji Sattar Haji Muhammad and others P L D 1953 Kar. 27; A I R 1926 Sind 190 and A I R 1918 Cal 467 ref.

Abbas Ahmed for Plaintiff.

Muhammad Jamil for Defendants Nos.l and 2.

This application under Order XII, rule 6 read with section 151, C.P.C. has been brought at the instance of plaintiff under the following facts.

On 22‑2‑1987 the plaintiff filed a suit, inter alia, for recovery of Rs.7,47,000 with interest against the defendants. The defendants No. 1 and 2 made an application under section 151, C.P,C. (CMA‑790/87) on 30‑3‑1987 stating that the plaintiff was repeatedly offered to collect the cheque in respect of his dues payable by the Company but the plaintiff failed to do so and that since the defendant is ready and willing to make the payments to the plaintiff whatever is due to him according to the defendants it comes to Rs.1,66,207 and a cross cheque No. 520696 drawn on National Bank Of Pakistan, NSC Building Branch, Karachi, in the name of the plaintiff is submitted in this Honble Court for the settlement of this suit. It was further prayed therein that the plaintiff may be directed to withdraw the said cross cheque under the order of this Court and release the defendants from the liability of any dues against them. The plaintiff, therefore, prayed by his application under consideration that the above statements of the defendants Nos.1 and 2 are a clear admission of their liability to the extent of Rs.1,66,207 and hence a Preliminary judgment and decree upto the extent of the admitted amount may be passed and for the balance of the claims preferred by M plaintiff the suit may be allowed to proceed. It is further mentioned in the application that the defendants Nos.1 and 2 having made a clear admission as aforesaid have no basis to seek release from the rest of the liability as claimed by the plaintiff.

Mr.Abbas Ahmad, learned counsel for the plaintiff made the same contentions before me which are given in the application. He relied upon the admission made by the defendants Nos.1 and 2 about their liability and prayed for the decree to the extent of the admitted claim under the above‑noted provision of law. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a decision of the erstwhile Chief Court of Sind in the case of Abdul Karim Haji Eissa and others v. Haji Sattar Haji Mohammad and others (PLD 1953 Kar. 27), In that case also it was contended on behalf of the defendant that the admission was a conditional admission and as such it could be the basis of judgment under Order XXII, rule 6, C.P.C. Inamullah, J. (as he then was) held as under:‑

" ..Under Order XII, rule 6 all that the Court has to see is whether any admission of fact had been made or not which would entitle a party to ask for judgment in his favour. In the present case, as I have already pointed above, condition put by the defendants is not of such a nature that minimizes the effect of the admission by the defendants."

It was further contended in that case "that, at any rat , if this admission is treated as unconditional admission the plaintiffs are not entitled to any thing more than what has been admitted by the defendants. The plaintiffs, it is contended by the defendants, would not be entitled to any further decree". His Lordship repelled this contention and held:‑

"This contention has no force. The object of the rule is to enable a party to obtain judgment at least to the extent of the admission made by the defendant and to pursue tle remedy further as regards the balance of the claim."

A reference was made to two other cases reported in AIR 1926 Sind 190 and AIR 1918 Cal. 467.

Mr. M. Jamil, learned counsel for the defendants Nos.1 and 2, on the other hand, opposed the application that the defendants have admitted their liability to the extent indicated in their application but on the condition that the plaintiff releases them from any further liability whatsoever and accepted the said amount in full settlement of his claim. He further states that if the court considers just and fair then the amount in question viz. Rs. 1, 66,207 may be ordered to be deposited with the Nazir for being invested in Khas Deposit for the benefit of the party succeeding in the suit. He also urged that the defendants have not yet filed the written statement and since the admission in question has not been made in their written statement, it cannot be made the basis for the judgment prayed for.

A bare perusal of rule 6 of Order XII, CPC makes it absolutely clear that it envisages the passing of a judgment at any stage without waiting for the determination of other question involved in this suit.

Before proceeding further I think it advisable to reproduce hereunder Order XII, rule 6 CPC which runs as under:‑

"ORDER XII

ADMISSIONS

6. Judgment on Admission.‑‑Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just.

It is again manifestly clear that the above reproduced rule permits any party, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on pleadings, or otherwise, to apply to the court for such judgment as upon such admission he may be entitled to. The admission need not, therefore, necessarily be made only in the pleadings. By laying down "or otherwise" the legislature has not restricted the admission only on the pleadings. These words are, in my opinion, of general application and there is no justification on the basis of the language used in rule 6 of Order XII to confine them to the admissions made in the pleading only as the learned counsel for the defendant desires me to do. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the statement of the defendants Nos.1 and 2 as made in the above‑referred application is conditional and does not entitle the plaintiff to obtain a judgment at least to the extent of the admission made. Here also I do not entertain any doubt that the facts of this case are identical to the facts of the Chief Court case (supra). The defendants Nos.1 and 2 have without any ambiguity stated that the plaintiff was repeatedly offered to collect the cheque in respect of his dues which according to the defendants comes to Rs.1,66,207 and for which amount a cross‑‑cheque in the name of the plaintiff has also been submitted along‑with application (CMA‑1790/87). I therefore entertain no doubt that this is a first case wherein I should unhesitatingly pass judgment for Rs.1,66,207 against the defendants Nos.1 and 2 on admission made by them without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to proceed with the rest of his claim against the defendants. it is ordered accordingly.

The above are the reasons in pursuance of the short order of even date.

A.A/M‑209/K. Order accordingly.

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