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Criminal Original Miscellaneous No. 11 of 1986, decided on 7th April, 1987.

‑‑‑Ss. 3 & 5‑‑Contempt of Court, scope of‑‑Parcel containing gold and silver seized by Pakistan Coast Guards and ultimately confiscated by Collector of Customs‑‑Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue, on revision, however. reversed the finding of Collector of Customs and allowed goods to be returned to owners but in spite of such final order respondents failed to return goods‑‑Contention that respondents having disobeyed and disregarded orders of Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue, they brought themselves within the mischief of Contempt of Court and as such liable to punishment, held, was fallacious‑‑Member (Judicial), Board of Revenue being not a 'Court' within the meaning of S. 3 of Contempt of Court Act‑‑Petition under S. 5, Contempt of Court Act, was therefore, not maintainable and dismissed, in circumstance.‑‑[Court].

Sahibzada Masood Ahmed, P.C.S., Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Sehgal Chairman, Daily 'Afaq' Lyallpur and 6 others P L D 1958 (W.P.) Lah. 153; Grindleys Bank Limited v. Azam Soharwardi, Advocate 1981 P Cr. L J 1146 and Mir Rahman Khan and another v. Sardar Asadullah Khan and 14 others PLD 1983 Quetta 52 ref.

Sh. Mushtak Ali for Applicants.

Habibur Rehman for Respondents.

Dates of hearing: 21st December, 1986 and 29th March, 1987.

This is an application under section 5 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976. Briefly the facts of the case are that the applicants Nazaz Ali and others are dealers of silver and gold and are members of District Sarafa Associations of Okara and Sahiwal. They purchase old silver and gold ornaments, melt them into Bars and Slabs thereafter sell the same either at Lahore or at Karachi, in the wholesale market. The petitioners despatched different parcels of silver through Pakistan Railway for Karachi as Karachi Market was very high in those days. Pakistan Coast Guards detained and seized the parcels containing gold and silver at Karachi Cantt. Railway Station and confiscated the same in September 1983 under the orders of Deputy Collector Customs, Pakistan Coast Guards, Karachi. The petitioners filed appeal before the Collector of Customs against the said order of Deputy Collector which was dismissed in June 1985. Being dissatisfied with the order of Collector the petitioners filed Revision before the Member, Judicial, Central Board of Revenue, Karachi who accepted the Revision on 12‑6‑1986 whereby the order of the confiscation was set aside and goods were directed to be returned to the petitioners who are the owners. It is stated that respondents refused to return the goods, therefore, committed contempt of Court.

In pursuance of pre‑admission notice Mr. Habibur Rahman Advocate appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 Brigadier Shahid Aziz, Director General, Pakistan Coast Guards and respondent No. 3 Major Muhammad Zulfiqar, Legal Officer, Pakistan Coast Guards. Respondent No. 2 Colonel Syed Jalil Ahmed Zaidi, Deputy Director, Pakistan Coast Guards' name was deleted at the request of the Advocate for the petitioner as he had retired during the pendency of the proceedings.

I have heard Mr. Shaikh Mushtaq Ali, for the petitioners. He has argued that in view of section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 whoever disobeys or disregards any order, direction or process of a Court, which he is legally bound to obey; or commits a wilful breach of a valid undertaking given to a Court; orders anything which is intended to or tends to bring the authority of a Court or the administration of law into disrespect of disrepute, is liable to contempt of the Court. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents have breached the administration of law in this respect, therefore, they are liable to punishment. He has referred to the cases reported in P L D 1958 Lah. 153, 1981 P Cr. L J 1146, and PLD 1983 Quetta 52. However, he has not Mr. Habibur Rahman, learned counsel for the respondents has referred to the case reported in P L D 1983 Quetta 52. However, he has not denied the facts as given in the application but has sought protection of the law that the case does not come under the purview of contempt of Court as Member Board of Revenue (Central) is not a Court.

Mr. Muhammad Ali, learned Additional Advocate‑General submitted that applicants, though disobeyed the order of Member, Board of Revenue, have not committed the contempt of Court.

As the facts of ‑the present case are that the Member Judicial, Central Board of Revenue has reversed the finding of the Collector of Customs and allowed the goods to be returned but in spite of this final order the respondents have failed to return the goods. In all fairness after the final order passed by the authority concerned the goods should have been returned to the petitioners but I am only confined to the question whether the action for the contempt of Court is warranted in the circumstances or not. In case of Sahibzada Masood Ahmed, P.C.S. Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur v. Mian Muhammad Saeed Sehgal Chairman, Daily 'Afaq', Lyallpur and 6 others reported in P L D 1958 (W.P.) Lah. 153 it was held that a Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner under the Pakistan Rehabilitation Act, 1956 is not a Court as he was not subordinate to the High Court. In that case number of authorities have been cited and the Honourable Judge has come to the conclusion that Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner is not a Court and in any case is not subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Court Act, therefore, no action is called for in those proceedings. It has further been observed that petitioner may seek his remedy by filing complaint in a criminal Court.

In another case of Grindleys Bank Limited v. Azam Soharwardi, Advocate reported in 1981 P Cr. L J 1146 the facts are that application was made by the respondent which intended to deter him from performing the function as counsel and to obstruct the due process of law, therefore, he was convicted. In the present case the case was pending on the administration side before the various authorities and they have dealt with under the Customs Act. In case of Mir Rahman Khan and another v. Sardar Asadullah Khan and 14 others reported in P L D 1983 Quetta 52 it was argued that the forums created by special law are not the Courts. The Honourable Judge observed that the Courts are such organs of the State which follow legally prescribed scientific methodology as to procedure and evidence in arriving at just and fair conclusions. Finally it was held as under:‑‑

"The Black's Law Dictionary defines the Court' as an organ of the Government belonging to the judicial Department, whose function is the application of the laws to controversies brought before it and the public administration of justice."

This definition finds support from White Country v. Gwin (1) Bta dley v. Town of Bloomfield (2). With reference to some other case‑law it further defines the Court' as a body in the Government to which the administration of justice is delegated'. Proceeding further it also says that the word Court' is often applied in circumstances otherwise than in technical sense and is applied to various tribunals not judicial in their character, and includes Jury as well in the definition of the Court'. This explanation amply clarifies that although in strict sense Courts are such bodies or organs of the Government which apply laws to controversies and administer justice by pressing into service the prescribed rules of procedure and Evidence, but at times this term is loosely applied to such forums also which are not the Courts stricto senso. So, it does not mean that all forums responsible for the settlement of various kinds of disputes created from time to time under different laws are all Courts by dint of their function.

In Words and Phrases Legally Defined by Butterworths, Vol. 1, p.367 the word Court' leas been defined as a Department entrusted with the administration of justice and it also includes in its definition the Parliament Parliament is included because it passed verdict in impeachment proceedings. Otherwise, Parliament would not fall into the category of the Court. Similarly Jury is included in the term Court and Mr Ansari an this premises argued that alike Jury a Tribunal could also be called Court. It is a fallacy to say so. Jury in the Anglo Saxson system is the Judge of facts but in the Tribunals under Ordinance I of 1968, it is only a recommendatory body and its verdict is in no way binding upon the Deputy Commissioner over and above this, Deputy Commissioner is not a judicial Officer but an executive authority. That makes all the difference. The "Shorter. Oxford English Dictionary" also defines the Court as a forum for the decision of causes and here also decision means decision in the fashion I have referred heretofor.

It is thus manifest that although the term Court' is at times used for quasi‑judicial or administrative tribunals also but on this premises it cannot be inferred that such forums should be equated with the Court' of law. Therefore, in our opinion "Courts" are such organs of the State which administer justice strictly in accordance with law, meaning thereby that while applying laws to the controversies, they follow certain rules with regard to procedures and evidence and are not left altogether unguided and uncontrolled to act on their whims and fancies as in the case of the Ordinance I of 1968, which although a procedural law, nullifies all laws and all doctrines hitherto universally considered necessary for the imparting of justice. The Tribunal under the Ordinance I of 1968 is one such forum which is not bound by any law of procedure or Evidence and like the Jirga under the erstwhile F.C.R., it may or may not even record evidence; and if recorded, the applicability or otherwise of the same has no criterions. It all depends on the whims of the tribunal to deny or allow any kind of evidence.

It is free to pass a verdict on personal knowledge, belief or hearsay. The Deputy Commissioner who passes final order in proceedings under the Ordinance 1 of 1968 on the recommendations of the tribunal stands on the same footings as the Deputy Commissioner under the F.C.R. Both the Deputy Commissioner, and the Commissioner who heard revisions, against the Deputy Commissioner's orders in F.C.R. were held not to be the Courts or functionaries of the judiciary in Summandar and 17 others v. Crown. The reasons are obvious namely the executive authorities, who decided litigation without the guidance of any law were not supposed to be administering justice, though they decided disputes between the parties. They were administrative tribunals whose aims were patently different than that of the Courts of law. Following paragraph from the observations of Mr. Justice Akram, J. (as he then was) is of benefit and may be reproduced:‑‑

"An order of the above nature cannot be regarded as having been made judicially by a Court of law. The Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner in this respect appear to have been mentioned in the Regulation merely as persona designata and not as judiciary. The conviction and the sentence in question, therefore, cannot be treated as made in the course of performance of the normal duty of administration of justice in a litis contestatio."

Likewise, the Rent Controller, who is creation of a special law and is not bound to act like the ordinary civil Courts, has been regarded Persona Designata and not a Court (See Rais Ahmed v. Mian Abdul Jabbar and another). It was reiterated in this case with emphasis that they held such position because they were not bound by any particular procedure; nature and extent of inquiry was left to be determined by Rent Controller Messrs Ahmed Brothers v. Muhammad Hassan Khan, it was held that as the Compensation Commissioner who was not bound to record evidence, while deciding disputes with regard to compensation, was a special forum created by a special law and did not, therefore, function like a Court. Here as well, the emphasis is on the same criterion i.e. whether or not, a functionary under a particular law, was bound by a procedure as to the regulation of the proceedings as also the Evidence Act, if it was not, it was not equitable with a Court'. On the other hand in Des Dewan v. Major Nazir Beg and others the Border Area Committee, created under the West Pakistan Border Area Regulation 1959, was held to be a Court within the meaning of the section 3 of the Evidence Act, as it was authorised to record and use the evidence following the principles of the Evidence Act. The distinction can well be seen. Similarly in Chargul v. The Commissioner, F.C.R. Quetta and another the view was that the functionaries under the F.C.R. were quasi‑judicial and not judicial authorities.

On the authority of Hari Charan Kundu v. Kaushi Charan Dey, it was attempted to be argued by Mr.Ansari that since the evidence was recorded and assessed in the cases under the Ordinance I of 1968, also therefore, it had essential attributes of a Court of law. It is fallacious to equate a Court following a law in the matter of evidence with a forum simply examining witnesses but not bound in any manner to an admissible piece of evidence or to reject and inadmissible evidence. Then the case cited by him has definite reference to the Courts following the Evidence Act and for that matter they were to be regarded as "Courts" for the purposes of that Act. In proceedings under the Ordinance I of 1968, the Evidence Act is excluded, so there is no question of regarding the tribunal a Court even for the purposes of the Evidence Act.

In the light of above we are of the view that the Courts are only such organs of the State which administer justice under the guidance of procedural laws as to the conduct of the proceedings as well as Evidence. Since such methodology helps the Court in administering justice in accordance with law, therefore, all other bodies which have a free hand in the matter of deciding disputes are not Courts."

In view of the above facts and circumstances and case‑law, I am of the view that Member Judicial, Central Board of Revenue is not a Court, therefore, this application under the Contempt of Court Act is not maintainable, as such it is dismissed in limine.

S.G.D./N‑13/K Petition dismissed.

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