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First, Rent Appeal No.191 of 1987, decided on 16th June, 1987.

---S.14(1)--Ejectment on ground of requirement for personal use of premises by landlord--Oral evidence of landlord about his retirement from service available on record--Photo copy of Retirement Data Book issued by landlord's employer filed with ejectment application but its original not produced before Rent Controller--- Rent Controller, no doubt, had relied upon documentary evidence as well for arriving at his findings but even if documentary evidence on point was wholly discarded, oral evidence was sufficient to support landlord's contention in regard to his retirement from service--Question of sufficiency of evidence, held; depend upon circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule could be laid down in that respect--No reason, therefore, was found to disbelieve oral evidence of landlord on point of his retirement from service.

---Ss.14(1), (2) & 21--Ejectment on ground of personal requirement of premises by landlord--Landlord letting out two garages of his house to tenant under written agreement which envisaged that said garages would be used by tenant for commercial purposes Garages in question originally formed part of residential building and their conversion from residential into commercial premises was unauthorised--Provisions of S.14 being entirely for benefit of landlord leaving no protection for tenant same must be strictly construed- Liberal construction if placed on subsection(2) of S.14 may completely tilt the balance in favour of landlord and defeat its very purpose- Garages in dispute having formed essential part of residential building could not change their basic character by having been let out for commercial purpose and the case was hit by S.14(2)--Respondent landlord, held, had failed to make out a case for ejectment of appellant under S.14(1)--Appeal allowed.

Abdul Majid v. Mst. Naimun Nisa P L D 1981 S C 118 and Syed Ali Hussain Rizvi v. Mst. Muzaffar Jehan P L D 1983 Kar. 410 ref .

Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Khatoon P L D A8 Kar. 873 distinguished.

M. A. I. Lakhani for Appellant.

S. Mahmoodul Hassan for Respondent.

This appeal calls in question the order passed by the learned Third Rent Controller Karachi (East), dated 29-1-1987, ordering the appellant's ejectment from the demised premises and directing him to hand over possession of the same within thirty days from the date of the order.

2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that the respondent had let out two garages of house No.102-K, Block-2,P.E.C.H. Society, Karachi to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs.400. The parties had executed a written agreement, dated 30-7-1979, which envisaged that the garages would be used by the appellant for commercial purposes. Thereafter, admittedly, the appellant invested a substantial amount of money on face lifting of the premises for using them as show-room for the business of motar cars. The rent of the premises was also enhanced from Rs.400 to Rs.500 per month.

3. In 1985, the respondent filed an applic9tion under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 before the learned Rent Controller for eviction of the appellant from the demised premises, inter alia pleading, that he was an employee of P.I.A. and had retired from service with effect from 1-6-1981 and the premises were required for his personal use for the purpose of business. A statutory notice dated 9-5-1985 had also been served on the appellant to meet the requirements of section 14 of the Sind Rent Premises Ordinance, 1979. This Notice was however, replied to by the appellant through his counsel and both the need of the respondent in respect of the demised premises as well as the factum of his retirement from service were denied. After filing of the eviction application by the respondent the appellant filed written statement wherein once again similar pleas were taken. The learned Controller however, after taking evidence came to a conclusion that the case of the respondent in respect of his personal requirement had been established and consequently the appellant was ordered to vacate the premises as pointed out above.

4. I have heard Mr. M. A. I. Lakhani, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. S. Mehmoodul Hassan, learned counsel for the respondent.

Mr. M. A. I. Lakhani has raised the following contentions:-

(1) That there was no proper evidence led before the learned Controller in respect of the respondent's retirement from service which could form the basis for passing of the impugned order;

(2) That since the respondent was admittedly in occupation of the main building, the garages in question were part of the same building and therefore, the respondent already being in occupation of a building owned by him was not entitled to avail the benefit of section 14(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, as his case was clearly hit by section 14(2) of the same Ordinance; and

(3) That the respondent was also used one of the rooms in the building for the purpose of his business as Art Gallery which further disentitled him to avail the benefit of section 14(1) of the aforesaid Ordinance due to the same reasons. The argument of Mr. S. Mehmoodul Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has been that there must be some nexus between the nature of the premises required by the landlord and those in his occupation and since the appellant had failed to established that the respondent was in occupation of any other building or premises for the purpose of his business, section 14(2) could not act as a bar for filing of application under section 14(1). As regards the Art Gallery, the argument of Mr. S. Mehmoodul Hassan has been that there was no evidence to indicate that the same existed at the time of filing of the ejectment application or that the same was being used for the purpose of his business by the respondent.

5. Turning to the first contention raised by Mr. M. A. I. Lakhani, admittedly, there is oral evidence of the respondent in respect of his retirement from service. No doubt, a photo copy of Retirement Data Book issued by the respondent's employers has been filed alongwith the ejectment application but admittedly its original was not produced before the learned Controller. Mr. Lakhani has argued that since neither the original document was produced in evidence nor the authority of this document was examined by the respondent, the document could not be taken into consideration by the learned Controller. Be that as may, but since there is oral evidence of the respondent on the point. I find no reason for not accepting the same as sufficient doubt, the learned Controller has relied upon the documentary evidence as well for arriving at his findings, but even if the documentary evidence on the point is wholly discarded, the oral evidence is sufficient to support the respondent's contention in regard to his retirement from service. The question of sufficiency of evidence depends upon the circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rules can be laid down in this respect. In the present case, I find no reason to disbelieve the oral evidence of the respondent on the point. Consequently, the first contention of Mr. Lakhani cannot be accepted.

Turning to the next argument of Mr. Lakhani, the contention of the learned counsel is, that since the garages are part of the residential building already occupied by the respondent, his case is clearly hit by the provisions of section 14(2) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which disentitle the landlord to avail the benefit under subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance under such circumstances. Subsection (2), of the Ordinance is as follows: -

"14(2).The landlord shall not be entitled to' avail the benefit of subsection (1 if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality."

In Abdul Majid V. Mst. Naimun Nisa (P L D 1981 S.C.118), it was held by the Supreme Court that subsection (2) of section 14 cannot be read in isolation from subsection (1) of section 14 and there has to be established a nexus between personal use for which eviction of the tenant is sought and the premises owned and occupied by the landlord in any locality. The main question, therefore, is whether the garages, demised to the appellant are to be regarded as part of the residential building owned and occupied by the respondent, because admittedly they were let out to the appellant for commercial purpose, According to Mr. S. Mehmoodul Hassan since the garages were let out and were being used for commercial purpose, they cannot change their character now and be regarded as part of the residential building, in this respect, I would also like, to refer to two cases reported as Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Khatoon (P L D 198 Kar.83) and Syed Ali Hussain Rizvi v. Mst. Muzaffar Jehan (P L D 1983 Kar.410). In the first case a shop had been carved out of residential house for being used for commercial purpose and the same was let out to appellant in the case for commercial purpose. It was held that the- shop could not be regarded as part of the residential premises. In the second case, the landlord who was residing on the ground floor of the building had rented out its first floor for shorthand and typing school. A question arose whether the building on the first floor could be regarded as a commercial building. It was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court:-

"In my view, the first floor of the premises did not loose its residential character on account of the same being given on rent to the respondent for being used for the time being as a shorthand/ typing school. It is not a case, where a shop is specially carved out of the residential premises and then given as a shop to a tenant on rent. It the case of a first floor of a residential building given by the landlord who was continuing to reside on the ground floor and using the ground floor premises as a residence and allowing the tenant to use the first floor as a shorthand/ typing school. As observed earlier, in my view, the fact of the first floor premises .being used for shorthand/ typing school did not change the character of the first floor premises into a commercial premises. In the circumstances, the appellant being in occupation of the ground floor premises, which are admittedly residential in character, could not derive benefit of section 14(1) by filing an application for ejectment of the respondent from the first floor of the premises in question, which as observed earlier has not lost their residential character and would continue to be treated as residential premises."

6. I have no doubt in my mind that the second case just referred to above, is clearly attracted to the facts of the present case and the case of Ulfat Hameed v. Mst. Birjis Khatoon is distinguishable, In the latter case a room had been carved out for commercial purposes and therefore the same could, in no case, form part of the residential building. In the present case, the two garages which originally formed part of the residential building had been let out for commercial purposes to the appellant. There is even evidence to show that such conversion of residential into commercial premises was unauthorised and the same had been objected to by the concerned authorities. Under such circumstances I cannot agree with Mr. S. Mahmoodul Hassan that garages cannot be treated as part of residential building of the respondent. In my view the provisions of section 14 of Sind Rented premises Ordinance, 1979, are entirely to the benefit of the landlord and they hardly leave any protection for the tenant. It is, therefore, imperative that such provisions must be strictly construed. Any liberal constrain placed on subsection (2) of section 14 may completely tilt the balance in' favour of the landlord and defeat the very purpose for which subsection (2) appears to have been inserted in section 14 of the Ordinance. Now, assuming in the present case, that the respondent had let out the entire building and now wanted the same for residential purpose including the garages, could the mere fact that garages had been let out for commercial purpose prevent the respondent from claiming the same as essential part of the main building The answer, in my opinion, can only be in the negative. I am consequently of the view that garages cannot change their basic character and the case is clearly hit by section 14(2) of the aforesaid Ordinance.

7. Lastly, turning to the third contention of Mr. Lakhani, the appellant in my opinion, has failed to establish that why part of the building in occupation of the respondent was being used for business at the relevant time. The argument, therefore, cannot be accepted.

8. However, I am convinced that the respondent has failed to make out a case for ejectment of the appellant under section 14(1).

The upshot of the about discussion is that the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the learned Rent Controller is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.

S.Q./M-261/L Appeal allowed.

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