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First Rent Appeal No. 277 of 1984, decided on 10th November, 1986.
‑‑‑S. 15(2)(ii)‑‑Default in payment of rent‑‑Proof‑‑Tenant admittedly committed default in payment of rent, but did not offer any explanation in that respect except filing certain money order coupons at time when parties had already concluded their evidence‑‑In absence of any explanation on behalf of tenant regarding default and no m6ntion having been made by tenant in respect of money order coupons either in his written statement or in evidence adduced by him, Rent Controller rightly held that tenant had committed default in payment of rent in circumstances.
Mehar Alam Siddiqui for Appellant.
Mubarak H. Siddiqui for Respondent.
Date of hearing: 10th November, 1986.
The only question arising for determination in this case is whether the appellant had committed default in respect of rent payable by him from September 1976 to December 1977.
Briefly stated, the facts are that the appellant was the tenant of the respondent in respect of premises situated on Plot No. 3/15, Industrial Area, Liaquatabad, Karachi at a monthly rent of Rs.75. The respondent filed an ejectment application against the appellant in the Court of the learned Second Rent Controller, Karachi, alleging, that the appellant had committed default in payment of rent for the aforesaid period and also that the demised premises were required by him for his personal bona fide use. Although the second ground taken in the ejectment application did not find favour with the learned Controller, but the learned Controller in his order, dated 25‑2‑1984 concluded that the appellant had committed default, if not otherwise, then at least in respect of September 1976. This order has now been impugned in this appeal before this Court.
I have heard Mr. Mehr Alam Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned counsel for the respondent .
Although the assertion of the respondent that default had been committed by the appellant from September 1976 to December 1977 was not denied by the latter in his affidavit filed in evidence before the learned Rent Controller, but in the cross‑examination he stated that rent was being deposited by him in Court through Miscellaneous Case No 45 of 1977 filed by him, with effect from 8‑1‑1977. A report from the Nazir of the Civil Court has also been placed on record of the case by the learned Controller which lends further support to the plea. Ever otherwise since the factual position stated by Mr. Mehar Alam Siddiqu, has not been disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent, the same can safely be taken to be correct. Be that as it may, but the difficulty still is, that the appellant had clearly committed default in payment of rent in respect of the month of September, 1976 and no explanation has been offered by him in this regard. Although Mr‑ Mehar Alam Siddiqui has drawn my attention to certain money order Coupons alleged to have been sent by the appellant to the respondent during the time of the alleged default, but the learned Counsel very candidly conceded that these coupons were filed in the Court at the time when the parties had already concluded their evidence. As such the coupons cannot be relied upon in proof of the fact that rent during the period in question had been remitted by the appellant to the respondent. The record of the case further indicates that no mention about these money order coupons had been made by the appellant either in the written statement filed by him or in the evidence adduced by him before the learned Controller. Under such circumstances, these money order coupons cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. Since there is no explanation given by the appellant in respect of the rent for the month of September, 1976, it appears that the learned Controller has rightly held that default had been committed in payment by the appellant.
I, therefore, find no force in this appeal, and the same is dismissed. Three months' time is, however, given to the appellant to vacate the demised premises. In case, the appellant fails to vacate the premises within such time, the execution will follow without any further notice to the appellant. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
H.B.T./51391K
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