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First Rent Appeal No. 931 of 1983, decided on 25th March, 1986.

‑‑‑Ss. 2(f)(j), 15 & 21(1)‑‑Relationship of landlord and tenant, determination of‑‑Tenant taking premises on rent from landlord through tenancy agreement to which sub‑tenant was not party‑‑After termination of tenancy agreement instead of handing over vacant possession of premises to landlord, tenant taking plea that actual tenant was sub‑tenant and he was only guarantor for payment of rent‑‑Plea of tenant being inconsistent with tenancy agreement and letter addressed by him to landlord for terminating tenancy agreement, Rent Controller, held, was not justified in holding that actual relationship of landlord and tenant was between landlord and sub‑tenant and that original tenant was only guarantor for payment of rent.

‑‑‑Ss. 15(2)(ii) & 21(1)‑‑Default in payment of rent‑‑Proof‑‑Deposit of rent by unauthorised occupant of premises with Rent Controller after refusal of acceptance of such rent by landlord, held, was not valid tender and could not save unauthorised occupant or even original tenant who had unauthorisedly handed over premises to him, from consequence of default in payment of rent.

Ajeebullah Jeswal for Appellant.

Syed Mehmoodul Hasan for Respondents.

Date of hearing: 25th March, 1986.

This appeal is directed against the order of Xth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi dated 18‑10‑1983, whereby he dismissed the ejectment application filed by the appellant.

The appellant is the owner and landlord of the disputed premises which is the ground floor of Bungalow No. 89‑A / 2 situated in P . E. C . H . Society, Karachi. The respondent No. 1 had entered into a rent agreement in respect of said premises and had taken the same on rent at Rs.500 per month for the use of its officers. Opponent No. 2 who was the Research Officer in the SUPARCO was allowed by the opponent No. 1 to reside in the said premises. On 3‑9‑1976, opponent No. 1 intimated the appellant that opponent No. 2 is no more in its employment, hence the premises was no more required by it and cancelled the rent agreement.

2. It is further alleged by the appellant that opponent No.l did not pay any rent to the appellant after 6‑9‑1976 nor returned the possession in spite of such a request. The opponents had also parted with the possession of a portion of the said premises and had given it over to one Hakeem, who is running his Matab therein.

3. Opponent No.l filed the written statement in which it admitted relationship of landlord and tenant as well as the rate of rent. It also admitted that opponent No. 1 had entered into a rent agreement with the appellant but strangely enough stated that the same was entered into only as a guarantee to safeguard the payment of rent otherwise the premises were taken on rent for opponent No. 2, who was the actual tenant and liable to pay the rent.

4. Opponent No. 2 also filed the written statement in which he also took the same stand. He states that he had tendered the rent to the appellant after leaving the employment of Opponent No. 1 but the appellant refused to accept the same. Hence, he started depositing the rent with the Controller. He was, therefore, not a defaulter.

5. I have heard Mr. Ajeebullah, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Mahmood Hussain who appeared for respondent No. 1 has stated that his client had instructed him not to defend the appeal. Opponent No. 2 is absent.

6. I have gone through the judgment of the learned Controller. I do not find myself in agreement with reasoning given by him on issue No. 3. In the face of clear stipulation in the agreement that the premises were taken on rent by opponent No. 1, by that agreement to which opponent No. 2 was not a party, the Controller was not justified in holding that the actual relationship of landlord and tenant was between the appellant and respondent No. 2 and that the respondent No. 1 was only the guarantor for the payment of rent. The perusal of the rent agreement will clearly show that there is nothing therein to show that the opponent No. 1 was a guarantor. He was all along shown as the tenant and as a matter of fact the sole tenant of the appellant in respect of the disputed premises. The appellant was, therefore, absolutely justified in refusing to receive the rent when it was tendered by opponent No. 2 after the opponent No. 1 had intimated that it did not require, the premises any more because the opponent No. 2 had left its service and, therefore, the rent agreement may be treated as cancelled' The deposit of rent by opponent No. 2 with the Controller after the said refusal of the acceptance of rent by the appellant is not B a valid tender and cannot save the opponent No. 2 or even opponent No. 1 from the consequences of default in payment of rent. It was the duty of the opponent No. 1 to hand over the vacant possession of the premises to the appellant after the termination of the tenancy. It has acted in a most irresponsible manner by not handing over the possession to the appellant after cancelling the tenancy. It has also mis-conducted itself in taking a stand altogether inconsistent with the rent agreement and the letter, dated 3‑9‑1976. It was due to the above conduct of the opponent No. 1 that the appellant was compelled to knock the door of the Court and is deprived of the benefits of his house for the last ten (10) years.

7. I am, therefore, of the clear view that the opponent No. 1 had no right to thrust opponent No. 2 as a tenant upon the appellant. It is a matter of common knowledge that some landlords prefer to give their house on rent to a bank or other corporation for good reasons and are reluctant to rent it out to private persons. The appellant, therefore, cannot be compelled to accept a private person, as tenant in place of SUPARCO to which he had rented out his house.

8. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Controller and direct the opponents Nos.l and 2, to deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the appellant forthwith.

9. I also feel that the conduct of the officers of SUPARCO, who had filed such a written statement falsely claiming contrary to the terms of the rent agreement that it was executed only as a guarantee when in fact there was clear stipulation therein about the relationship of landlord and tenant between the appellant and opponent No. 1, is deplorable. I, therefore, direct that a letter be issued to the Director of the SUPARCO to give names and present address of the officer or officers responsible for instructing the filing of such a written statement on behalf of respondent No.l in the Court, so that necessary action may be taken against them. Hearing on 20‑4‑1986.

H . B . T . Appeal allowed.

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