Salary Payment Act 1936 Section 15 Demarcation Act (IX of 1908), Section 14 Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), Section 36E [Since the Labor Law (Amendment) Act (XI of 1976)] The worker was badly time-barred and rejected before the application for authority, but the Labor Court, relying on section 14, the Limitation Act, remanded the authority, which allowed wage worker section 36E. , Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was treating employees for punishment for failing to comply with an earlier order. Although these proceedings may in any way apply to the labor court under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, by applying the principle stated in section 14, the demarcation act, in the case, arbitrarily using a labor order Refused to stop. Court issues remand to authority and this authority to allow wages
(a) Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936)‑‑
‑‑‑S.15‑‑Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.14‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S.36‑E [since omitted by Labour Laws (Amendment) Act (XI of 1976)] ‑‑Application for payment of dues‑‑Limitation‑‑Appli cation of worker before Authority miserably time‑barred and rejected but Labour Court relying on S.14, Limitation Act, remanded case to Authority who allowed wages‑‑Worker had been pursuing remedies under S. 36‑E, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for punishing employer for non‑compliance of order earlier passed by Labour Court although these proceedings in no way prevented him from seeking remedy, under S.15 of Payment of Wages Act, from Authority‑‑Labour Court, by applying principle stated in S.14, Limitation Act, in circumstances, held, exercised discretion improperly‑‑Order of Labour Court remanding case to Authority and that of Authority allowing wages was set aide.
(b) Payment of Wages Act (IV of 1936)‑‑
‑‑‑S. 15(2), second proviso‑‑Application for wages‑‑Limitation‑‑Applica tion under S. 15, Payment of Wages Act, held, would be competent after three years only, if Authority was satisfied that applicant had shown sufficient cause for not making application within such period and burden for same was on applicant‑‑Principle applicable in such cases was that delay of each and every day was to be explained.
Asad Ali Bilgrami for Petitioner.
Ali Murtaza Hussain for Respondents.
Date of hearing: 11th November, 1986.
JUDGEMENT The petitioner has called in question the orders passed by the learned Third Labour Court, Karachi, and the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, dated 31‑10‑1984 and 8‑4‑1985 respectively.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are, that the respondent No.l was dismissed from service of the petitioner on 1‑11‑1973. He filed an application under section 25‑A, I.R.O. before the Junior Labour Court which was dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent filed an appeal before the Second Sind Labour Court which was allowed vide order, dated 5‑7‑1974, and the respondent No.1 was re‑instated in service with back benefits. One of the reasons which weighed with the learned Labour Court was that the petitioner had failed to give second show‑cause notice to the respondent before his dismissal from service. Thereafter, although the respondent was re‑instated in service by the petitioner, on 12‑7‑1974, he was immediately put under suspension and a second show‑cause notice was also given to him the same day. Thereafter, the respondent was once again dismissed from service by the petitioner on 19‑7‑1974. The respondent then filed an application under section 36‑E of the I.R.O. (since omitted from the I.R.O. by Act XI of 1976) against the petitioner, for punishing the petitioner for non‑compliance with the earlier order of the Labour Court. Such proceedings were then challenged by the petitioner through a Constitutional Petition filed before this Court, but on 10‑12‑1979 this petition was dismissed for non‑prosecution. The respondent No.1, thereafter, filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the Authority under the Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Authority"), claiming wages from the petitioner from 1‑11‑1973 to 31‑8‑1982. This application was resisted by the petitioner on the plea that the same was time‑barred, since according to the first proviso to subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act, such application had to be presented within three years of the date from which the dues had been claimed by the respondent. Consequently, the application of the respondent was dismissed on the ground of limitation. Thereafter, the respondent preferred an appeal to the learned Labour Court, which by its order, dated 31‑10‑1984, set aside the order passed by the Authority and remanded the case for decision on merits. The matter then proceeded before the Authority which consequently by its order, dated 8‑4‑1985, directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.54,786 to the respondent No. 1.
3. The only contention of Mr. Asad Ali Bilgrami, learned counsel for the petitioner before this Court has been, that the application filed by the respondent No.l before the Authority was barred by time. As against this, the contention of Mr. Ali Murtaza Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has been that the cause of action to the respondent, in fact, had accrued after 10‑12‑1979, when the Constitution Petition pending against him before this Court was dismissed owing to non‑prosecution and, therefore, the application, which had been filed on 24‑8‑1982, was within time.
4. After hearing the counsel, I am clearly of the view that the application filed by the respondent No.1 before the Authority was time‑barred, and consequently the proceedings before the Authority were without jurisdiction. The proviso to subsection (2) of section 15 of the Act clearly indicates that an application under section 15 of the Act is to be presented to the Authority within three years from the date when the dues are claimed. The respondent, admittedly, in his application had claimed due from 1‑11‑1973 to 31‑8‑1982 and as earlier indicated, the application filed before the Authority was presented on 24‑8‑1982. Therefore, obviously the application was miserably time‑barred inasmuch as it pertained to dues beyond three years. However, alongwith such application the respondent had also filed an application for condonation of delay, stating, that he had been throughout pursuing remedy first under section 36‑E of the I.R.O. and thereafter he was defending the Constitution Petition filed by the petitioner before this Court which was ultimately dismissed on 10‑12‑1979. Therefore, the' respondent prayed that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of the dismissal of the Constitution Petition.
5. These reasons ultimately found favour with the learned Labour Court which while applying the principle stated in section 14 of the Limitation Act, allowed his appeal and remanded the case to the Authority for decision on merits. The reasons stated by the learned Labour Court for setting aside the order of the Authority, I am afraid, are not tenable. Although according to the second proviso to section 15(2) of the act, an application under section 15 can be competent after three years but only if the Authority is satisfied that the applicant has shown sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The burden for the same is, therefore, on the applicant. It hardly needs to be mentioned, that the principle applicable in such cases is that delay of each and every day has to be explained. The explanation given by the respondent is, that he was pursuing some other remedies but at the same time he has failed to establish that the remedies being pursued by him in any manner prevented him from approaching the Authority within time. His application under section 36‑E of the I.R.O. from which the Constitution Petition filed before this Court had arisen, admittedly, was only for punishing the employer for non‑compliance of the order earlier passed by the learned Labour Court. These proceedings, therefore, in no manner could prevent the respondent' from seeking remedy under section 15 of the Act from the Authority. The contention of Mr. Ali Murtaza Hussain that the cause of action accrued to the respondent after 10‑12‑1979 is completely misconceived for which the reasons have been just stated. I am, therefore, of the view, without going into the question, whether section 14 of the Limitation Act could be invoked to condone the delay made in filing an application under section 15 of the Act, that the discretion exercised by the learned Labour Court has been improperly exercised.
6. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is allowed and the impugned orders, dated 31‑10‑1984 and 8‑4‑1985, respectively and the notice, dated 21‑5‑1986, proceeding therefrom are quashed, being without lawful authority. The case is however, remanded to the learned Labour Court for decision in accordance with the law. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
M.Y.H. S‑25/ K.
Petition allowed.
