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Suit No. 465 of 1986, decided on 17th November, 1986.

‑‑‑S. 42‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑ Interlocutory injunction, grant of‑‑Four companies executing "Participation Agreement", whereby shares, held, by each of such company, if sold were first to be offered to other participants and on refusal to buy by other participant such shares could be sold to a stranger‑‑One of participant of "Participation Agreement" selling shares to an outsider, after obtaining approval and concurrence of other members of Participation Agreement"‑‑‑ Third party/purchaser having not signed 'Participation Agreement', whether entitled to benefits enshrined in such agreement‑‑Plaintiff, in order to obtain approval of other participants agreeing to waive requirement of becoming member of "Participation Agreement"‑‑Such waiver whether estoppel against plaintiffs‑‑Documents of waiver, held, could not give rise to estoppel against plaintiffs, as they had not agreed to waive any of the rights attached with shares they had purchased‑‑Such shares purchased by outsider Company were not merely share scripts, but "shares free from all charges or liens or any other encumbrances and with all rights attached thereto"‑‑Purchaser Company having a prima facie case would be entitled to prohibitory injunction to the extent of shares held by them.

‑‑‑Court has duty to spell out real meaning of expression, used in contracts and to discover and discern real intention of parties behind those expressions.

1903 A C 414 and 1951 Mad. 533 rel.

‑‑‑S. 42‑‑Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), 0. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2‑ Interlocutory injunction, grant of‑‑Where plaintiff prima facie had a vested right to purchase shares sold by one of participants of "Participation Agreement", High Court granted interlocutory injunction restraining defendant from purchasing such number of shares as might form extent of shares held by plaintiffs‑‑Defendant could purchase rest of the shares being sold by one of participants‑‑Defendants however, were restrained from exercising voting rights on basis of those shares being purchased by them till disposal of suit.

Kamal Azfar and Fakhruddin Farooqui for Plaintiff

E. A. Nomanifor Defendants.

Date of hearing: 22nd October, 1986.

Plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are holding controlling shares in defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 1 is selling all its shares to defendant No.2. But plaintiff claims a right to purchase a percentage out of the lot held and not being sold by defendant No.l to defendant No.2. The dispute remained unresolved out of Court and this suit has been filed by the plaintiff for the following reliefs:‑

(1) Declaring that the proposed sale of shareholdings of Burmah Oil‑‑The defendant No.l in P.R.L., is in breach of the relevant provisions of Agreement dated 26‑3‑1970 (Annexure 'A' to the plaint) and the plaintiffs rights thereto and is illegal, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff;

(2) Grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.l from transferring the said shares to the defendant No.2 or to anyone else and restricting the defendant No. 3 from registering the transfer of all or any of the shares is its registers;

(3) Grant of cost of suit;

(4) Grant of any other and further relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit.

2. C.M.A.No.3283 of 1986 has been filed under Order XXXIX, Rules and 2, C.P.C. for an interlocutory injunction for "restraining the defendant No.l. Burmah Oil Public Ltd. Company from selling its shareholdings in Pakistan Refinery Ltd. to the defendant No.2, the Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. or to anyone else except the plaintiff and restraining Pakistan Refinery Ltd., the defendant No. 3 from registering or recording in its share registers the sale or transfer of the said shares in the name of the defendant No.2 or anyone else except the plaintiff and also restraining the Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. the defendant No.2 from purchasing or dealing in any manner with the said shareholdings until the decision of the above case".

3. The suit was filed on 17‑7‑1986 with the above application. The same day one of my brothers granted a chamber order directing the parties to maintain status quo till appearance after notice:

4. By a series of letters and an agreement dated 28‑11‑1959 between the Government of Pakistan and four Oil Companies namely, (1) The Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., (2) The Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., (3) The Esso Standard Eastern Inc. and (4) The Caltex Petroleum Corporation, a company known as Pakistan Refinery Ltd. was incorporated in Pakistan. The share capital of the Pakistan Refinery Ltd. was Rs.20 crores divided into 20,00,00,000 shares of face value of Rs.100 each. Out of these 20,00,00,000 shares 40 shares were offered to the public in the open market, while 60% shares were reserved for the four Oil Companies which are foreign companies. The 40 shares offered to the public in Pakistan were called 'A' Class shares, while those allocated to the four Oil Companies, were called 'B' Class shares. The respective proportion of holdings of the four Oil Companies out of the 60% shares is as follows: ‑

(1) Burmah Oil Co. Ltd.15 Equity shares

(2) The Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd.15%

(3) Esso Standard Eastern Inc.18%

(4) Caltex Petroleum Corporation.12%

5. The Pakistan Refinery Ltd. has constructed and founded an Oil Refinery for producing petroleum, kerosene, lubricants and other allied products by refining and processing local and imported crude oil.

6. The four Oil Companies, who are together holding 60 shares in the Refinery have preserved for themselves the controlling interest of the Refinery. The 40 shareholders are only entitled to the dividend earned on their investments. They have no share in the management and control of the Refinery.

7. To regulate the inter se relationship among themselves, the four Companies have agreed upon a working arrangement to effectively exercise their control over the refinery. These four Companies, the 'B' Class shareholders can also modify and amend the Articles and Memorandum of the Patent Company the Pakistan Refinery Limited.

8. The four 'B' Class shareholding Companies have agreed among themselves on the modelities and rules how the benefits and privileges flowing from their right of control and management should be shared between themselves. The right to supply the 'Food Stock' to the Refinery and the right of 'off taking', lifting the products of the Refinery are some of the main advantages to be shared by these Companies. For 'off take' of the products and for supply of the 'Food Stock' the Companies have agreed to a fix quota for each of them.

9. In order to effectively protect and ensure a continuity in the arrangements agreed between themselves the four 'B' Class shareholders executed an agreement which is known as the "Participants Agreement" whereunder all the terms of performance and obligations inter se were mentioned in details. This agreement was executed on 26‑3‑1970, Messrs Burmah Oil Company Ltd., Caltex Petroleum Corporation, the Shell Petroleum Company Ltd. and Esso Standard Eastern Inc. are parties to this "PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT".

10. As the participation in the affairs and management and control of the Refinery carried valuable rights each participant was enviable of the other and the voting strength of each of the participant was jealously sought to be preserved by each. This voting strength was, obviously dependent on the number of "B" Class shares held by each. The urge and anxiety to preserve and bag as many more shares as possible if and when available is fully reflected in the participation agreement referred to above.

11. Article III of the agreement deals with shareholding. Clause 3.02 of this Article reproduced below would show that not only in present but even in future the participants were keen to keep an even balance in their shareholding. Clause 3.02 runs as under:‑

"3.02.‑‑ The participants undertake to secure that, if the refinery company increases its share capital by making a further issue of 'B' shares beyond the amount referred to in the third recital each participant shall be offered such percentage of the total issue of new "B" shares as in equal to that participant's shareholding percentage of "B" shares at the time of the offer. If any participant does not wish to take up the whole of the new "B" shares to which it is entitled, the new "B" shares which it does not wish to take up shall be offered only to the other participants using the same procedure mutatis mutandis as is set out in Article 11.02; the right to take up new "B" shares which are not taken up by other participants may thereafter be disposed of that participant deem fit."

12. Articles XI of this agreement places a restriction on the right of free transfer of shares. None of the four "B" Class shareholders, who is a member of the "Participation Club" can transfer his shares to a party who is not a member of the so‑called club of four unless he gets the first refusal from other members. The shares intended to be sold would first be offered to the other participants and only on their refusal to buy them would they be offered to a stranger/ outsider. Clause 11.02 of this Article may be quoted here:

"11.02.‑‑ In the event that a participant wishes to transfer any or all of its shares in the refinery company otherwise than pursuant to Article 11.01, such shares shall first be offered on identical terms to the other participants in the ratio of their respective shareholding percentage at the time of the offer. If any participant does not wish to take up all the shares so offered to it, the shares which that participant does not wish to take up shall than be similarly offered to, the remaining participants in the ratio of their respective shareholding percentages and at the same price and upon such other terms as were stipulated in the original offer, and if need be, further offers shall be made on the same basis until all the shares to be disposed of shall‑ have been taken up by the other participants of until it is ascertained that there is a share or shares which none of the participants wishes to take up'.

13. It appears that sometime in 1976 Esso Standard Eastern Inc. decided to pull out their capital from the oil business for the re‑investment in Esso Fertilizers and other business. They desired to sell their 1,80,000 shares in the Pakistan Refinery. By an agreement dated 15‑9‑1976 Esso Standard Eastern Inc. sold these shares to the President of Pakistan. Under this agreement it was agreed that all rights so far enjoyed by the Esso Standard Eastern Inc. under various agreements with the Refinery shall be assigned by Esso to a Company designed by the President for the purpose, mainly 'State Oil Company Limited. "

14 Esso also agreed to assign all their rights and obligations under the sale and purchase agreements dated 1st January, 1976 with the Pakistan Refinery Ltd.

15. The Government of Pakistan have for purposes of formally vesting the shares in the "State Oil Company Ltd." taken quite a few steps which it is not necessary to state here. Reference may be made to Act LXXIX of 1976 dated 30‑12‑1976 and a Notification dated 15‑9‑1976 to show that State Oil Company Ltd. are the designated Company to whom the Esso's shares finally stand transferred and who are now vested with all the rights and obligations which vested in Esso.

16. Para. 1 of the agreement dated 15‑9‑1976 is relevant and may be reproduced here:‑

"1. Esso shall sell to the President and the President shall buy from Esso on 'the Commencing Day' (hereinafter defined), the said shares free from all charges or liens or any other encumbrances and with all rights attached thereto."

17. Before proceeding further it must be mentioned here that Esso have fully observed the obligations under clause,11.02 of Article III of the 'Participants Agreement' and have disposed of their shares to the plaintiffs after obtaining the approval and concurrence of other members of the 'Participants Agreement'.

18. In this connection three letters have come up in discussion to show the conduct of the defendants at the time when Esso transferred their shares to the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that in 1976 when Esso wanted to pull out and dispose of their entire shareholding they had to obtain a refusal from the other members of the participants agreement in compliance with Article 11.02 quoted.

19. A letter dated 29‑4‑1976 was addressed by the General Manager of Esso International to the Secretary, Ministry of Fuel Power and Natural Resources which is to the following effects:‑

"We refer to our discussions with you in connection with the waivers required from participants, to enable us to sell our shares to you in P.R.L.

Participants have now agreed to provide Esso with the required waiver subject to the following pre‑conditions:

(1) The Government has approved the sale and purchase of Products Agreement including the shareout formula.

(2) The Government succeeds to our (Esso's) rights and obligations under the Refinery Agreement as amended to date including the Agreement agreed to on November 21, 1975.

(3) The Government provides a letter to the other participants as follows: ‑

"In consideration of your granting a waiver of certain pre‑emptive rights you enjoy with respect to the disposal of the shares of P.R.L., now held by Esso, the Government of Pakistan gives its assurance that it has no intention of directing the Government Corporation, which it is proposed shall become the owner of said shares, to amend its lifting patterns and volumes in any manner not consistent with its off‑take obligations under the Refinery Agreement and the sale and purchase of products Agreement to each of which it will have become a party."

Your prompt action in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

20. A reply dated 21‑8‑1976 was sent by Director‑General, Petroleum, Government of Pakistan to (1) Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., (2) The Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. and (3) The Caltex Petroleum Corporation, in which the assurance called for in the letter noted above were offered in the following terms: ‑

"The assurance contained in this letter are conditional upon the waiving by all the three companies; Burmah Oil Company Limited, Shell Petroleum Company Limited and Caltex Petroleum Corporation of their pre‑emptive rights to the said shares and the proposed sale of said shares being concluded."

21. The dispute has arisen because the defendant No.l are disposing of the 15 shares held by them to the defendant No.2.

22. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the plaintiffs being the purchaser of 'B' Class shares of Esso, have become Esso's successors in all respects and are entitled to all the privileges, benefits and advantages which are attached to the shares and were enjoyed by their predecessors namely Esso.

23. When the counsel talks of the benefit and rights in the shares, he vigorously emphasises on the benefit accruing to them through Article 11.02 of the 'Participants Agreement'. Under this Article the plaintiffs have a pre‑emptive right to purchase the shares which any one of the participants may desire to sell.

24. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs contends that on a true interpretation of Article 11.02 the 15 shares of defendant No.l now being disposed of, must first be offered on identical terms to other participants on the ratio of their respective shareholding percentage. The transfer of the entire lot of 15 shares to defendant No.2 is against the text and substance of Article 11.02. Such a unilateral transfer would result in a heavy weightage in favour of defendant No.2 and would disturb the equilibrium .which was sought to be achieved among the four founding members of the Pakistan Refinery Ltd. In the final analysis the plaintiffs who are by now the senior most member of the club of four would hereafter be reduced in size and stature as against defendant No.2 who would command 30 . As the controlling power of the Refinery vests in the 'B' Class shareholders only, it is not difficult to visualise the enormous strength and voting punch that the defendant No.2 would acquire after becoming owners of the 'B' Class shares of defendant No.l to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, who being successors in interest of Esso, are entitled to claim shares to the extent of 18% in the total number of shares available for disposal on account of the defendant No.l's intention to retire.

25. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant on the other hand is that the plaintiffs not being a party to the "Participants Agreement" is not entitled to the advantages and benefits flowing out of this agreement and the defendant No. l is free to sell and defendant No.2 is free to purchase the shares belonging to the defendant No.l. Question arises whether by purchasing Esso's shares the plaintiffs have become entitled to all the benefits including the right of first option of purchase of shares of a co‑participant which admittedly vested in Esso, or they cannot claim this right.

26. The learned counsel for the defendant at least for the purposes of this application, has not been able to show why the plaintiffs, who have acquired the shares of Esso after full concurrence of the defendants, should not be allowed all the benefits which are attached to these 'B' Class shares.

27. I am afraid the arguments advanced by the learned counsel were not only incoherent, but are contradiction in terms. The learned counsel, relying on Article 11.05, tried to argue that clause (a) of this Article prescribes that "the participant whose shares are to be transferred, shall procure that the third party purchaser shall become a party to and be bound by all the provisions of this and all other applicable Agreements". Learned counsel submits that because the plaintiffs "a third party purchaser from Esso" have not signed this agreement, they are not entitled to the benefits enshrined in this "Participants Agreement". But in the next breadth the learned counsel relies on a letter dated 27‑8‑1976 which is Annexure 'I' to the Counter Affidavit of Mr. Donald M. Keith. This letter is addressed to Esso and the defendants have written to say that in view of the assurance given by the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, the Burmah Oil Co. Ltd., Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. and the Caltex Petroleum Corporation agreed to waive our rights under Articles 11.02 and 11.03 of the "Participants Agreement" dated 26‑3‑1970. The letter further goes to say that:

"We further waive the requirement of Article 11.05 (a) of the Participants Agreement to the effect that the President of Pakistan or his nominees as third party purchaser must become a party to and be bound by the Participants Agreement."

28. This argument seems to be at cross with the earlier contention raised by the learned counsel. On the one hand he contends that a new‑comer is obliged to become a party to and be bound by the provisions of the Participants Agreement and on the other hand he himself relies on this letter, which in clear terms "waive he requirement of Article 11.05 (a) of the Participants Agreement to the effect that the President of Pakistan or his nominee as third party purchaser must become a party to and be bound by the Participants Agreement."

29. The learned counsel then picks up another line of argument. The contention raised is that because the requirement of becoming a party to the Participants Agreement vide Article 11.05 (a) has been waived, the plaintiffs purchaser have not acquired any rights flowing out of the Participants Agreement. But waiver would operate only against a promissor and not against a promisee. If the defendants are waiving the requirement of Article 11.05 by releasing the new purchaser from becoming a party to the Participants Agreement, it does not mean that they are also entitled to deprive the new‑comer from the benefits attached to the shares unless the new‑comer also waives his right of claiming those benefits in Pxoress terms. This letter in my humble opinion, cannot be read as estoppel against the purchaser /plaintiffs because they have not agreed to waive any of the rights which goes with the shares they have purchased; and what they have purchased is not A merely the share scripts, but "shares free from all charges or liens or any other encumbrances and with all rights attached thereto."

30. The above discussion would show that while contracting to sell their shares, the former owner of these shares had expressly assigned to the plaintiffs /purchasers all the rights attached thereto. But assuming for the sake of arguments that an express assignment of the rights attached to these shares was not made, and, as erroneously argued by P the learned counsel of the defendants only the right to collect dividends was transferred, in my opinion the attending circumstances are speaking louder than any argument. In the peculiar situation of the case we will have to read such an assignment even if we ignore the express words in the several clauses of the agreement dated 15‑9‑1970.

31. Two cases have been placed where in more or less similar situation the House of Lords and the Privy Council have taken the same view. (1) Case from "House of Lords (1903) Appeal Cases P.414" and (2) a case from "Privy Council reported in 1951 Madras 532."

32. In the case of House of Lords, one Tolhurst, owner of quarries of chalk, entered into a contract with a company known as Imperial Portland Cement Company Ltd. for supply of at least 750 tons and, if needed, even more quantity of chalk, per week for the manufacture of Portland cement by the company for a period of fifty years.

33. The Imperial Portland Cement Company, after a couple of years assigned the contract and sold its land, undertaking, works and business to another much larger company. The Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd., who had a‑ potential to consume far larger quantity of chalk than the quantity Tolhurst had agreed to supply at a fixed rate for 50 years. Tolhurst tried to avoid the contract while Associated Company tried to enforce it as assignee of the original Imperial Co. Cross actions were filed by the parties. Mathew, J. who tried both, gave judgment for Tolhurst relieving him from the bargain viz‑z‑viz a stranger. The action of Associated Co. against Tolhurst was dismissed.

34. The Court of Appeal revised these decisions and decreed performance of contract by Tolhurst in favour of Associated Co. Tolhurst filed appeal to the House of Lords. Four Lords concurred in the opinion that in spite of absence of the right of assignment in the contract the nature and circumstances justify that the right of assignment should be read in the contract and as such the Assignee was entitled to enforce the contract against the owner of quarry. Lord Robertson dissented.

It would not be without interest to have a look on the opinion expressed by each member of House who recorded separate concurring judgment.

Earl of Halsbury L . C . held:‑

"The circumstances which have induced me to change the view I originally entertained are the length of duration of the contemplated contract, the persons engaged in it, and the nature of the contract itself. I quite agree that the fact of the word assigns' not being in the contract is immaterial if it is ascertained that the intention of the contract is that it should be assigned. Under these circumstances I acquiesce in the judgment which is intended to be moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Macnaghten, but it is with very great hesitation."

Lord Macnaghten held:‑

"Two alternative constructions have been proposed. One follows the letter of the instrument and adheres to it closely; the other favours a more liberal interpretation, supplying, it is said, nothing more than what is required in order to carry out the obvious intention of the parties."

It was further held:‑

"It seems to me that the contract is to be read and construed as if it contained an interpretation clause saying that the expression "Tolhurst" should include Tolhurst and his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, owners and occupiers of the Northfleet quarries, that the expression "the company" should include the company and its successors and assigns, owners and occupiers of the Northfleet Cement Works, and that the words "his" and "their" should have a corresponding meaning. That, I think, was the plain intention of the parties."

Lord Lindley held:

"The nature of the agreement and the time it was to last negative the idea that it was confined to the parties to it. The word 'assigns' does not occur in the agreement. But this does not show that the benefit of the contract is not assignable. An agreement for a lease, and even an option to require a lease or a renewal of a lease, is assignable in equity even although there is no mention of executors, administrators, or assigns."

35. In the Privy Council case father and minor sons of a Hindoo Joint family sold a village to the defendant by a deed, dated 27‑1‑1891. A 'counter‑part document' was also executed by the purchaser the same day, promising to reconvey the property to the seller if the latter had paid the same price back to the purchaser after 30 years. In 1897 the seller was adjudicated an insolvent and his property passed into the hands of the official assignee. The father died and the son sold the property to a stranger by a deed dated 12‑5‑1910 assigning to the purchaser the right of repurchase. The transaction was approved by the official assignee. In 1919 the seller's son who had sold the property in 1910, as well as the original purchaser died. On 12th July, 1920 the new purchaser invoking the right of repurchase in the deed dated 27‑1‑1891 sued for specific performance seeking release of the property. The heirs of the original purchaser contested the suit and pleaded that the plaintiff was a stranger and the assignment in his favour was ineffective. The trial Court dismissed the suit. In the appeal to the High Court the suit was decreed. The heirs of the purchaser under the original deed dated 21‑1‑1891 appealed to the Privy Council. The Privy Council dismissed the appeal and concurred with the conclusion of the High Court It was held by the Privy Council:

"It was not intended that the option could be exercised only by Venkata Subrahmanya and Krishnasami personally. The terms of the contract and the time at which the option was to be exercised go to show that the intention was that the option might be exercised by the abovementioned two persons or their heirs.

It was not disputed that, if the transaction of the 27th January, 1891 amounted to a completed contract, as their Lordships have decided, the benefit of the contract could be assigned."

36. The above two cases no doubt lend strong support to the view that the Court has a duty to spell out the real meaning of the expressions used in contracts and to discover and discern the real intentions of the parties behind those expressions.

37. The case on hand relates to a controversy between two shareholders to purchase the same lot of shares now put up for sale by a third shareholder, who is retiring. The shares in question are not simple dividend earning shares, but carry a potential of being utilised for a number of other purposes in a variety of ways. They confer upon their owner enviable power and prestige, in addition to the right to earn dividend. The chances to obtain contracts of "feed material" to the Pakistan Refinery Ltd. and off take rights of its product depend to a large measure on their acquisition and the consequential opportunity of manoeuverability that their holder would enjoy as a member of the Board of Directors in the parent Company.

38. All these situations were fully comprehended by the original four "Participants" of the parent Company and taken care of by serialising all eventualities in the 'Participants Agreement'. Now does it stand to reason that a successor‑in‑in trest standing in the shoes of one of the founding father of the company should be stripped of all other benefits and advantages which the original owner of these shares possessed Would it not mean that out of "B" Class shareholders two sub‑clauses are being split up now one who has a pre‑empting right to purchase the shares of a retiring 'Participant' and the other who is without such a right. On what rationable such a distinction can be created

39. I am afraid I had to examine this part of the case a little deeper even though it is an interlocutory stage. I had to do so to evaluate the merit of the arguments of the learned counsel for the defendants that defendant No.l has full right to dispose of his shares to the defendant No.2 and defendant No.3 is bound to act accordingly by entering the name of the transferee of shares in all the books of the defendant No.3.

40. I may, however, add that it goes without saying that any opinion expressed in this order would be tentative.

41. In the circumstances I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case, but only to the extent of 18% of the shares flow being transferred. The prayer for a prohibitory injunction for all the shares, prima facie has no merit.

42. Now the question arises, how the equities in the case can be served causing minimum inconvenience to the defendants and yet safeguarding the interest of the plaintiffs

43. An argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the defendants that the shares be allowed to be transferred, but subject to the decree in the suit. But this might cause irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. As holder of these shares, the defendant No.2 would be owner of about 50 of the 'B' Class shares and by the time the suit is matured for hearing, they may exploit this position to such an extent that it may make conditions unbearable for the plaintiffs.

44. The order proposed to be passed is as follows:‑

(1) The defendant No.l is restrained from selling and defendant No.2 from purchasing such number of shares as may form 18 of the lot now being disposed of by defendant No. 1.

(2) The two defendants would be free to deal with the remaining shares without any restraint from the Court including disbursement of the dividends to the purchaser. This will be subject to obtaining refusal of opitions by other participants as provided in Clause 11.02 of Article XI of the participation agreement.

(3) That the defendant No.2 should not be entitled to exercise voting right or claim any additional pecuniary or non‑pecuniary advantage on the basis of the newly‑purchased shares till such time that the dispute regarding disposal of 18 shares is resolved

(4) The 18 disputed shares would continue to remain with the defendant No.l and they would continue to enjoy all the rights and benefits which they have been enjoying before till now.

Order accordingly.

A.A. ‑‑‑‑ Order accordingly.

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