Find a Lawyer

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Grievance application‑‑Misconduct‑‑Dismissal from service‑ Labour Tribunal is fully vested with jurisdiction to go into all facts of case and competent to substitute its own findings in place of those given by domestic tribunal.

Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub etc. PLD 1978 S C 207 rel.

(b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑-

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Power of Labour Court under S. 25‑A, and Labour Appellate Tribunal while hearing appeal against an order passed by Labour Court are co‑extensive.

(c) Constitution o' Pakistan (1973)‑‑-

‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S.38(3)‑ Constitutional jurisdiction‑‑Findings of fact arrived at by appellate Tribunal, held, could not be interfered with by High Court merely because a w different from that taken by appellate Tribunal was possible‑‑Petitioner failing to produce any material to establish that such findings arrived at by Tribunal were perverse or that impugned order had been passed without any lawful authority‑‑Even if it was assumed that view taken by Tribunal was erroneous, that would still not call for interference by High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.

(d) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑-

‑‑‑S. 25‑A‑‑Dismissal‑‑Illness‑‑None of medical certificates placed on record by employer indicated that worker's mental illness was of a permanent nature and it was nowhere suggested that services were being terminated on account of his illness and only it was stated in dismissal order that charges of misconduct against worker had been proved and that a lenient view was being taken by employer on account of his illness‑‑Arguments advanced by employer that services were terminated on account of his mental illness or that it was a case of termination implicit, held, was of no avail to management‑‑Order of re‑instatement upheld.

Syed Qamar for Petitioner.

Chaudhry Rashid for Respondent.

Date of hearing: 16th September, 1985

MAMOON KAZI, J.

‑‑This petition was dismissed on 16‑9‑1985 by a short order, the reasons for which were to be recorded later. These are the reasons.

2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are, that the petitioners are a pharmaceutical company engaged in manufacture, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical medicines. The respondent No. 2 was employed by the petitioner as Class III Operator in the tablet-manufacturing department. The petitioners received a copy of complaint purporting to have been written by the respondent No. 2 which had been addressed to the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the President of Pakistan. The complaint contained serious allegations against two officers of the petitioners, namely, Mr. Jawed Iqbal Mirza, Junior Executive and Mr. Nazeer Ahmed, Charge Hand, as it was mentioned therein that the two officers had illegally threatened the respondent No. 2 with a revolver and had compelled him to drink a syrup as a result of which the respondent fell ill. In view of such allegations the petitioner called for comments of the two officers who sent their comments to the petitioners denying the allegations made against them by the respondent No. 2. A preliminary investigation held by the petitioners revealed that the allegations made against the two officers were not true and consequently the respondent No. 2 was served with a charge sheet. An enquiry was later held against the respondent No. 2 during the course of such enquiry the two officers took oath on Holy Quran denying the allegations made against them by the respondent No. 2, in his complaint to the President. On this the respondent No. 2 stated before the Enquiry Officer that he was fully satisfied with the oath taken by the two officers and that he did not intend to cross‑examine witnesses. The respondent No. 2 further stated that he had been a victim of misunderstanding due to his mental worries and sickness which resulted in the making of the complaint. The respondent No. 2 also produced medical certificates before the management which revealed that about two years prior to that the respondent No. 2 had remained under treatment of different doctors and hospitals due to his mental illness. On the basis of this statement made by the respondent, the Enquiry officer found the respondent guilty of the misconduct with which he had been charged and in consequence thereof the respondent No. 2 was dismissed from service by the petitioners on 19th May, 1982. The respondent No. 2 thereafter filed application under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. before the Vth Sind Labour Court, Karachi, which vide its order dated 7‑8‑1983 dismissed such application of the respondent. Being aggrieved by this order the respondent filed appeal before the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal Karachi, the respondent No. 1 which vide its order dated 17‑2‑1985 set aside the order of the Labour Court and re‑instated the respondent No. 2 in service with all the back benefits. The said order has now been impugned in the instant petition.

3. The only grounds urged before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners are that the findings arrived at by the learned Tribunal in respect of the misconduct alleged against the respondent No. 2 are erroneous and secondly, that since as per his own admission the respondent No. 2 was suffering from mental sickness, he was no more fit to perform duties for which he was employed by the petitioners.

4. As far as the first contention is concerned the findings of the learned Appellate Tribunal are contrary to those arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. However, subsection (5) of section 25‑A of the I. R.O, clearly provides that "In adjudicating and determining grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case." The import of the words "shall go into all the facts of the case " was examined by the Supreme Court in Crescent Jute Products Ltd., Jaranwala v. Muhammad Yaqub etc. P L D 1978 S C 207 and it was observed that:

"The words shall go into all the facts of the case clearly signify that the Junior Labour Court has full and complete powers to enter even into questions of fact and to arrive at its own conclusions regardless of there being no illegality of procedure in the domestic proceedings. By use of these words the intention of the Legislature appears to provide a double check, one in the form of a domestic enquiry to be held by an employer and the other in the form of a judicial determination by the Junior Court itself. In other words the intention of subsection (5) of section 25‑A appears to provide another forum in determining the grievance afresh after considering the facts on which any impugned dismissal is based. If that was not so, then there was no occasion for using the words shall go into all the facts of the case" which, in our view, define the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court as a tribunal of facts, with regard to the matters which may have been dealt with by the domestic tribunal or the employer. Therefore, if the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen the words far‑reaching consequences, we do not see how their meaning can be whittled down and the provision construed in a limited sense as it (for example) the Junior Labour Court was hearing a second appeal within the meaning of section 100, C. P. C. The reason is also not far to seek, because, as pointed out earlier, it was intended to provide a forum to check against arbitrary, capricious, and camouflaged dismissals.

These observations of the Supreme Court make it abundantly clear that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was fully vested with jurisdiction to go into all the facts of the case and was competent to substitute its own findings in place of those given by the domestic tribunal. Needless to say that powers then of the Junior Labour Court and now the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the I. R.O. and the Labour Appellate Tribunal while hearing appeal against an order passed by the Labour Court under the said provisions of law are co‑extensive. Since the Tribunal was competent to go behind the findings of the domestic Tribunal, this Court would be too reluctant to interfere with such findings of facts arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal merely because a view different from that taken by the Appellate Tribunal is possible. The petitioners have however, failed to produce any material before us to establish that such findings arrived at by the Tribunal are perverse or that the impugned order has been passed without any lawful authority. Even if it is assumed that the view taken by the Tribunal is erroneous that would still not call for interference by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.

5. Coming to the next argument advanced by the petitioners' counsel, it has been contended by him that the respondents was a case of termination simpliciter as the services of the respondent No. 2 were terminated by the petitioners owing to his mental sickness since according to the medical certificates produced by the respondent No. 2 before the petitioners, the former was not fit to perform functions which had been assigned to him by the management. Against this argument the objection of Chaudhry Rasheed Ahmed, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 was that this was a new aspect of the case for which no opportunity had been provided to the respondent No. 2 for meeting the same. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the action taken by the management against the respondent was not justified. The learned counsel further stated that no evidence has been produced by the petitioners to establish that the illness of the respondent No.2 was of permanent nature to entail his dismissal from service.

This argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 does not seem to be without force, as none of the medical certificates placed on record by the petitioners indicates that the respondent's illness was of a permanent nature. However, another aspect of the case which cannot be lost sight of, is, that in the dismissal order, a copy of which has been annexed to the petition as Annexure 'U', it F has nowhere been suggested that the services of the respondent No.2 were being terminated on account of his illness. All that was said in the dismissal order was that the charges of misconduct against the respondent No.2 had been proved and that a lenient view was being taken by the petitioners on account of the respondent's illness. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the services of the respondent No.2 were terminated on account of his mental illness or that this was a case of termination simpliciter, therefore, can hardly be of any avail to the petitioners.

7. In view of the circumstances discussed above this petition stands dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

M.Y.H./5029/Lb Petition dismissed.

Find a Lawyer Near You

Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.