Unlock direct contact details for up to 10 lawyers so you can call or WhatsApp the right legal professional and move your matter forward with confidence.
Before Nasir Aslam Zahid, J
MEHRULLAH KHAN‑‑Appellant
versus
ABDUL SATTAR and 6 others‑‑Respondents
First Rent Appeal No.110 of 1984, decided on 20th May, 1987.
(a) Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑
‑‑‑S. 15‑‑Ejectment for default in payment of rent‑‑Failure of tenant to deposit or tender rent after receipt of notice from landlord‑‑Effect‑ Notices served upon tenant intimating therein that persons serving notices were landlords of premises and that person receiving rent previously was not authorized to receive same‑‑Conduct of tenant in not tendering rent to such landlords but depositing same in the name of previous Collector of rent who had since refused to receive the same, held, could not be termed as bona fide to absolve him of responsibility of tendering or depositing rent in the name of landlords‑‑Previous ejectment application by landlords against tenant had been withdrawn because of settlement between landlords and tenant outside Court‑‑Default in payment of rent was therefore, established in circumstances.
Muhammd Siddique v. Muhammad Ilyas 1979 C L C 720; Noor Muhammad v. Iqbal Ahmed 1985 C L C 1007; Sarwar Abbas v. Hajrabai 1983 C L C 337; A.S. K. Samad v. A. Hussain 1983 C L C 2211 and Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Hamid 1982 S C M R 237 ref.
(b) Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑
‑‑‑Ss. 15 & 21‑‑Tenant making default in payment of rent‑‑Previous Collector of rent refusing to receive same‑‑Notices of default served upon tenant by landlords other than previous collector of rent‑‑Tenant instead of making enquiries, demanding title deeds from such landlords‑‑Effect‑‑Tenant, held, was required to make inquiries about ownership of persons demanding rent or should have deposited rent in their names with reservations‑‑Tendering of rent in the name of previous Collector of rent in spite of his refusal to receive same and in spite of receipt of notices from persons claiming to be owners/ landlords of premises, held, was not bona fide‑‑Tenant's appeal against order of ejectment was dismissed by High Court on ground of his default in payment of rent.
Muhammad Aslam Bhutto for Appellant.
Muhammad Hanif Mangi for Respondents.
Dates of hearing: 16th February, and 2nd March,1987.
By order dated 28‑11‑1984, learned, I Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller Larkana allowed the ejectment application filed by the respondents/ landlords and directed ejectment of the appellant/tenant on the ground of default only. Other ground of personal requirement taken by the respondents was not accepted. The appellant challenged the ejectment order in the First Rent Appeal under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. Arguments of Mr. Muhammad Aslam Bhutto, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi, learned counsel for the respondents were heard by me on 16‑2‑1987 and on 2‑3‑1987. On conclusion of the arguments, this appeal wag dismissed by the following order:‑---
"Heard learned counsel. For reasons recorded separately, this appeal is dismissed but with no order as to costs. The appellant is, however, granted time till 31‑12‑1987 to vacate the premises subject to deposit/payment of rent."
Reasons for dismissal of the appeal are given in this judgment.
2. Rent application was filed by the respondents before the Rent Controller on 27‑1‑1982 claiming that rent had been paid by the appellant upto August 1979 but thereafter he failed to pay or tender the rent. It was also averred that two notices dated 18‑3‑1980 and 2‑4‑1980 were given to the appellant but in spite of that no rent was paid or tendered by the appellant to the respondents. The appellant contested the rent application pleading that the premises had been rented out to him by one Haji Din Muhammad to whom rent had been paid upto August, 1979 and thereafter he did not come to collect the rent and when he came on 17‑3‑1980 to collect the rent at the shop of the appellant, the respondents paid the rent but he refused to accept the rent and demanded enhanced rent of Rs.120 p.m. It was then averred that notices were received from the respondents to whom replies were sent to furnish ownership documents and then collect the rent. It was submitted that as no one came to collect the rent, appellant sent one money order dated 6‑4‑1980 to Din Muhammad towards rent from September, 1979 to March, 1980 and another money order dated 5‑5‑1980 towards rent from September 1979 to April 1980 but both were refused by Din Muhammad, and thereafter rent has been deposited in the name of Din Muhammad in a Misc. Rent case with Rent Controller, Larkana.
It was further averred in the written statement that earlier rent application No.15/80 was filed by the respondents against the appellant and 2 others on the ground of default, personal use and subletting but subsequently the respondents had withdrawn that rent application on 12‑4‑1981.
On behalf of the respondents, respondent No.l Abdul Sattar and respondent No.2, Abdul Aziz gave evidence whereas on behalf of the appellant, the appellant himself and one 2ahid Hussain gave evidence. As observed earlier, by the impugned order dated 28‑11‑1984, the ejectment application has been allowed on the ground of default.
3. Mr. Muhammad Aslam Bhutto, learned counsel for the appellant, had argued that as upto August, 1979 Din Muhammad had been collecting rent from the appellant, in spite of the two notices dated 18‑3‑1980 and 2‑4‑1980 received from the respondents, the appellant was not bound by law to pay or tender rent to the respondents and his tendering rent by two money orders to Din Muhammad and then deposit of rent in Misc. Rent case in the name of Din Muhammad were bona fide actions on the part of the appellant and it could not be held that the appellant was a defaulter for which he was liable to be ejected. On the other hand, Mr. Muhammad Hanif Mangi had submitted on behalf of the landlords that on the evidence it had been established that the appellant was a wilful defaulter.
Following reported judgments were cited before me:‑----
(i) Muhammad Siddique v. Muhammad Ilyas 1979 C L C 720
(ii) Noor Muhammad v. Iqbal Ahmed 1985 C L C 1007
(iii) Sarwar Abbas v. Hajrabai 1983 C L C 337
(iv) A.S.K. Samad v. A. Hussain 1983 C L C 2211
(v) Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Hamid 1982 S C M R 237
The first four decisions are by learned Single Judges of this High Court. I may, however, reproduce para 4 of the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 1982 S C M R 237 which reads as follows:‑
"According to the case put forward by the petitioner himself, his predecessor‑in‑interest had entered as a tenant when only allottees rights were conferred on Tahir Basharat. The transfer of same or similar rights was claimed by respondents 1 and 2 and a notice to that effect had been served, a copy of which was also sent to the transferee. Even if the petitioner had a doubt with regard to the competing claims of the two allottees, he could have ascertained it from the authorities sanctioning the transfer or made a deposit before the Rent Controller with his own reservations. He could not in good faith deposit the amount in the name of landlord about whom he was informed formally that he had ceased to have interest in the property thereby depriving the claimant landlord to prove his entitlement before the Rent Controller and get the rent deposited. Such a conduct on the part of the tenant has always been considered contumacious. Without being himself interested in title, the tenant looks upon himself to challenge the title of the transferee. On this view of the conduct of the petitioner, the decision of the controller and the appellate authority would appear to be amply justified and beyond, interference in the constitutional jurisdiction. "
4. In the facts of the case, the conduct of the appellant in not tendering the rent to the respondents and depositing the rent with the Rent Controller in the name of Din Muhammad cannot be termed as bona fide to absolve him of the responsibility of tendering rent to or depositing rent in the name of the respondents. This is so far the following reasons:‑----
(a) Two notices dated 18‑3‑1980 and 2‑4‑1980 had been served upon the appellant intimating that the respondents were the owners/ landlords of the disputed premises and that rent had not been paid by the appellant since September, 1979.
(b) Din Muhammad had refused to receive the rent from September, 1979.
(c) Din Muhammad had refused to accept the money orders sent to him by the appellant in April and May, 1980.
(d) No effort or attempt was made by Din Muhammad from September, 1979 onwards to collect rent from the appellant and the ejectment application was filed by the respondents on 27‑1‑1982.
(e) Previous rent application No.15/80 had also been filed by the respondents against the appellant and two other persons (alleged sub‑leases) but the same was withdrawn by the respondents on 12‑4‑1981 by making the following statement:‑
"We the applicants do hereby withdraw above rent application as nek‑mards have settled our dispute.
In view of the aforesaid circumstances, even if the respondents did not documents of their ownership for inspection by the appellant, the appellants must have realized that either the respondents were the owners /landlords of the premises in question or at least become doubtful as to whether Din Muhammad was still entitled to receive rent from the appellant. In such a situation, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in 1982 S C M R 237, the appellant should have made inquiries about the ownership of the respondents or deposited rent with the Rent Controller with reservations. The deposit of rent in the name of Din Muhammad with the Rent Controller by the appellant without reservations was, therefore, not made in good faith, It may be observed here that there is no dispute that respondents are the owners of the premises in question, and no rent was at all tendered to the respondents or deposited in their names.
5. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs but the appellant has been granted time till 31‑12‑198, to vacate the premises subject to payment/deposit of rent.
A.A./M‑237/K Appeal dismissed.
Dealing with a matter like this? Connect with a verified advocate in your city — free on SJP Lawyers Directory.
🔍 Find a Lawyer